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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, zu untersuchen, ob und auf welche Weise die 
Einrichtung von entscheidungsbefugten Sanktionsausschüssen im Weltsicherheitsrat 
die Entscheidungstätigkeit sowie den Gehalt der Entscheidungen beeinflusst. Im 
Rahmen der Sanktionsregime des Weltsicherheitsrats werden zahlreiche kleinteilige 
Umsetzungsentscheidungen über längere Zeiträume hinweg getroffen. Diese 
Entscheidungen überträgt der Sicherheitsrat auf seine Sanktionsausschüsse mit 
identischer Mitgliedschaft. In dieser Arbeit wird dafür ein theoretisches Konzept des 
Regierens im Ausschuss entwickelt und argumentiert, dass die Einrichtung von 
Sanktionsausschüssen einen zweistufigen, in sich differenzierten 
Entscheidungsprozess hervorbringt, der Regelsetzung und Regelanwendung trennt 
und damit Anreize zu regelbasiertem Entscheiden erzeugt. Dies ist selbst dann der 
Fall, wenn alle kollektiven Entscheidungen von denselben Mitgliedern getroffen 
werden. Während Akteure, die sich darauf konzentrieren spätere 
Umsetzungsentscheidungen mit Regeln zu steuern, einem erheblichen 
Konsistenzzwang unterliegen, sehen sich die Akteure in der Ausschusssituation mit 
Koordinationssituationen konfrontiert, die externer Regeln oder intern erzeugter 
Präzedenzfälle als Orientierungspunkte bedürfen. Dies gilt sofern kein Akteur eine 
Entscheidungsblockade bevorzugt. Anschließend werden, basierend auf bislang 
ungenutzten Dokumenten, die Effekte von Regieren im Ausschuss im 
Weltsicherheitsrat anhand von fünf Sanktionsregimen (Irak, Al-Qaida/Taliban, 
Demokratische Republik Kongo, Sudan und Iran) untersucht. Ich komme zu dem 
Schluss, dass die Übertragung von Entscheidungskompetenzen an 
Sanktionsausschüsse selbst mächtige Akteure zu regelbasiertem Entscheiden 
veranlassen kann. 
 
 
Schlagwörter: Funktionale Differenzierung, Regieren im Ausschuss, Internationale 
Organisationen, Sicherheitsrat, Sanktionsausschüsse, Wirtschaftssanktionen, gezielte 
Sanktionen, Al-Qaida, Terrorismusbekämpfung, Irak, Demokratische Republik 
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Abstract 
In this book, I study how and with what consequences the creation of sanctions 
committees within Security Council sanctions regimes affects the Council’s dominant 
logic of decision-making and the content of decisions taken. Security Council 
sanctions regimes increasingly involve complex governance projects that require the 
adoption of numerous detailed implementation decisions over extended periods of 
time. The Security Council increasingly delegates these decisions to its sanctions 
committees with identical membership. In a first step, I develop a theoretical model 
of committee governance. I argue that the establishment of sanctions committees 
creates a two-stage decision process which affects collective decision processes in 
ways that favor rule-based decisions even though the same group of actors adopts all 
relevant decisions. This effect occurs if a group of actors separates a comprehensive 
decision-process into a stage of rule-making and a stage of subsequently applying 
these rules to a stream of implementation decisions. While rulemaking actors are 
subject to constraints of consistency, in rule-application, actors face coordination 
situations that create the demand for externally provided rules or internally produced 
precedents as focal points. Subsequently, based on previously neglected documents, I 
analyze the effects of committee governance for five Security Council sanctions 
regimes (Iraq, Al-Qaida, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Iran). I 
conclude that delegating implementation decisions to sanctions committees may 
commit even the most powerful member states to rule-based decision-making. 
 
 
Keywords: Functional Differentiation, International Organization, Committee 
Governance, Security Council, Sanctions Committees, Comprehensive Sanctions, 
Targeted Sanctions, Smart Sanctions, Al-Qaida, Counter-terrorism, Iraq, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iran 
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1 Introduction 
The United Nations Security Council transfers an astonishing range of substantive 
decision competencies to specifically created sanctions committees. Strikingly, these 
committees process a huge number of single-case decisions, for instance, exemptions 
from a comprehensive trade embargo or listing and delisting of individuals subject to 
assets freeze and travel bans. The Yugoslavia sanctions committee alone adopted 
more than 35,000 decisions in just one year (S/1996/946). More importantly, 
decisions taken within the sanctions committees set legally-binding international law 
for all UN Member States. These decisions can have significant humanitarian 
consequences or potentially abridge the fundamental human rights of sanctioned 
individuals, even though only few states are represented in the Council. In effect, the 
workings of the Council’s sanctions committees is relevant as the decisions taken 
substantially enhance or strain the Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy. Indeed, 
sanctions regimes have become a key tool of the Security Council for maintaining 
international peace and security besides the authorization of the use of force. Since 
the end of the Cold War, the Council has created almost 30 sanctions regimes for a 
range of objectives, including interstate conflicts, civil wars, counter-terrorism, non-
proliferation and the protection of civilians. The Council currently maintains 16 
different sanctions regimes, all of which are administered by a separate sanctions 
committee. 
Security Council sanctions regimes, although they are temporary arrangements, 
require adopting a host of implementation decisions continuously and over extended 
periods of time (Sievers/Daws 2014: 520–521) so that they give rise to significant 
regulatory decision-making. Banning the travel and freezing the assets of presumed 
Al-Qaida affiliates requires drawing up comprehensive and reliable list of sanctions 
targets and eventually delisting those who have convincingly renounced terrorism. 
Equally so, to administer comprehensive economic sanctions Council members need 
to decide about which exemptions are acceptable on humanitarian grounds and which 
should not be granted: “Medicines clearly fell outside the sanctions regime. But what 
about books, clothes, construction materials, and agricultural equipment?” (Bosco 
2009: 164). Nuclear materials and ballistic missile related commodity sanctions are 
only effective, when Council members draw up and regularly adapt a detailed list of 
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singular items banned from trade with the target country to cover technological 
advancement and forestall sanctions busting. In essence, the overall effect of a 
sanctions regime consists of a plethora of small and separate implementation 
decisions taken by sanctions committees, while each single decision itself is 
negligible. Nevertheless, in the environment of high politics, member states, in 
particular the powerful permanent members bargain hard over these decisions, which 
are politically sensitive and often controversial. 
Not least because of the political nature, Security Council sanctions regimes have 
a remarkable institutional design as the Council delegates these single-case decisions 
to sanctions committees which have the same membership. In fact, the Council 
delegates to itself. As David Bosco noted, “[t]he council, after all, might have 
delegated the function of monitoring sanctions to the secretary-general and his staff, 
just as the council had long delegated the management of peacekeeping operations. 
Instead, it chose to carry out the task itself” (2009: 157). Even though the Council 
members assume all important decisions for themselves, the Council recreates a more 
complex governance structure and introduces a system of divided labor. It relieves the 
Council from taking numerous detailed implementation decisions, which the Council 
itself as a political body cannot deal with adequately. The Council focuses on the 
overall political issues such as which sanctions measures should be imposed, under 
what conditions should sanctions be lifted or whether or not a Panel of Experts should 
monitor sanctions implementation. Then, the sanctions committee is responsible for 
the subsequent and consecutive implementation, including listing and delisting of 
individuals or granting exemptions from a comprehensive embargo. 
Against this background, it is puzzling that current international relations 
scholarship cannot convincingly account for a phenomenon that practitioners and 
close observers have recognized and frequently reported since the Iraq sanctions 
regime, namely that sanctions committees seem to decide according to rules. Notably, 
former Canadian UN ambassador David Malone, claimed that imposing 
comprehensive sanctions against Iraq in 1990 “represented an important step by the 
Council away from its classical politico-military approach (…) toward a more legal-
regulatory approach, imposing standards of conduct on a Member State, which it then 
monitored and implemented through a regulatory agent – on this occasion the 661 
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committee“ (2006: 61; Malone/Chitalkar 2016: 557–558). Many Council diplomats 
have made similar assertions (Conlon 2000: 8–9; Malone 2012: 63; van Walsum 
2004; Scharf/Dorosin 1993; Koskenniemi 1991; Kaul 1996; Mimler 2013). Yet, 
despite the extensive scholarship on the UN Security Council, the existing literature 
pays little attention to the governance structure of Security Council sanctions regimes 
because aspects that are usually assumed to foster autonomous action, such as a 
strong secretariat, are absent. Instead, the literature predominantly perceives the 
Council and its committee as a single comprehensive body. As a result, the Security 
Council including its subsidiary bodies is primarily conceptualized as a forum of 
great power politics, where decisions can be sufficiently well explained by the 
interest constellation among its members on both levels. The current scholarship 
would not expect that the governance structure of sanctions regimes affects decision-
making because the same group of member states controls all relevant decisions. 
However, practitioners assert that sanctions committee members, even in highly 
political sanctions regimes, align their behavior frequently to rules and rules derived 
from precedents and extensively debate about the viability of competing decision 
proposals vis-à-vis existing decision rules. 
In this study, I address the gap by systematically analyzing the dynamics of 
decision-making within Security Council sanctions regimes. I provide a theoretical 
framework that accounts for the structuration of decision processes even in 
intergovernmental and highly political organizations. Since Security Council 
sanctions committees are assumed to be least suitable for rule-based decision-making 
due to their composition and politicized environment (Wood 1998: 84), they lend 
themselves for the analysis of how a more structured decision-making process 
actually affects even the behavior the world’s most powerful states. The analysis 
yields strong theoretical and empirical implications and contributes to understand 
how international organizations work as well as how Security Council sanctions 
regimes operate. 
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1.1 Research question 
It is puzzling to observe that decision-making in Security Council sanctions 
committees seems to follow a different logic despite the identical membership of the 
Council and the sanctions committees. But how can one account for the apparent 
effect that decisions produced in sanctions committees seem to be rule-based, rather 
than power-based? These observations highlight a remarkable feature of Security 
Council governance which gained particular relevance after the end of the Cold War, 
namely that it creates more complex, indeed functionally differentiated, institutional 
structures that affect its decisions. Therefore, the empirically-guided research 
question is how and with what consequences does the creation of sanctions 
committees within the Security Council’s sanctions regimes affect the decision-making 
behavior of the actors involved and the content of the decisions taken? 
This basic research question provides the framework to four interrelated sets of 
empirical-analytical research questions. The first set of questions looks into the exact 
nature of the division of labor between the Security Council and its sanctions 
committee. Here the analysis focuses on the matter, which functions the Security 
Council retains, and which functions it transfers to the respective sanctions 
committee. Underlying this division of labor, what are the causes of the observable 
increasing regulation of sanctions regimes? Can one observe that the Council 
intentionally guides its sanctions committee and if yes, how? How can decision-
making blockades within the committee be meaningfully adverted? Is there a 
difference in observable effects when committee members themselves adopt decision 
rules instead of the Council? 
The second set of questions highlights the consequences for the Security Council 
when it transfers decision competencies to its committee. While the existing literature 
has centered on effects of decision-making within the Council, little is known about 
the consequences of Council decision-making when it does no longer decide about 
single cases but provides political guidance to its sanctions committee. Does the 
Council guide the sanctions implementation stage in the committee with rules? If so, 
can we observe pressures to adopt consistent rules despite situation-specific interests 
of powerful members or do these rules contain exemptions for the powerful? Are 
Council members willing to commit the work of the committee to rules? Can we 
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ascribe an absence of regulation to the Council member’s desire to avoid such 
commitments to retain flexibility? 
The third set of questions takes the consequences of division of labor for the 
committee into the view. Above all, under what conditions will committee members 
be willing to accept that decisions have to follow rules assuming that they may have 
diverging situation-specific interests in some cases? When committee members 
indeed accept rules as a yardstick to process decision requests, then there is reason to 
believe that decisions will be more consistent and arbitrary behavior would be 
difficult to sustain. In this context, for a meaningful test of theoretical arguments it is 
decisive to question if rules are also applicable to decision requests of powerful 
committee members and not just those of the Council’s non-permanent members or 
those of the wider UN membership? Furthermore, how do committee members deal 
with situations where regulation is absent? How do procedural changes affect 
committee decisions?  
The fourth set of questions highlights the consequences for the results of 
regulatory decision-making in sanctions committees. Here the analysis focuses on the 
ultimate regulatory decisions taken within a particular sanctions regime. In what 
respect does functional differentiation of Security Council sanctions regimes cause 
increasingly rule-based decisions in comparison to decisions we would expect to 
observe in an undifferentiated negotiation setting? Can we also observe the effects of 
functional differentiation in cases where the targeted individual’s fundamental human 
rights are not directly affected, for instance in sanctions regimes applying economic 
embargoes or non-proliferation measures? Are the effects of committee governance 
robust across a number of different settings, interest constellations or content of 
decisions? 
Behind the central empirical motivation lies a theoretical research question rooted 
in the larger research agenda on the study of international organizations in 
international relations theory. In its center is the ambition to analyze how 
international organizations at all can affect decision-making and under what 
conditions we would expect such effects to occur. While previous research has 
emphasized the role of independent agents (Hawkins et al. 2006b) and bureaucracies 
(Barnett/Finnemore 2004), the scholarship has not yet accounted for the setting of a 
 
24 
simple, but differentiated organization where the exact group of members is present 
on all relevant decision-making levels, usually thought to be unfavorable for rule-
based decisions. Therefore, the theoretically-guided research question is how can 
functional differentiation within international organizations as a basic principle 
change the decision-making rational of member states and the content of decisions 
even if decisions are taken by the same group of actors? 
This study contributes to the empirical analysis of Security Council sanctions 
regimes. The aim is to provide a systematic explanation for decision-making in the 
increasingly complex governance structures within the Security Council, with a focus 
on its sanctions regimes. In that sense, the explanation provided is broader than 
existing approaches that attribute the increasing regulation of sanctions regime 
entirely to external pressure, because it highlights that the cause of regulation lies in 
its functionally differentiated structure. Whereas external pressure can lead to 
increasing regulation, it is not the sole source of such development. Thereby, the 
analysis also demonstrates that Security Council sanctions regimes are indeed capable 
of producing well-reasoned decisions even though the Council is dominated by great 
powers and although the committee consensus procedure would not lead to expect 
such outcomes. 
Equally important, the analysis seeks to contribute to the theoretical debate about 
the role and effect of international organizations in international relations. This study 
aims at enriching the theoretical understanding of how international organizations 
work and how they potentially affect decision-making of rational actors. Centrally, 
the thesis contributes to the previous knowledge by analyzing under what conditions 
the effects of functional differentiation are also present in the borderline case of a 
functionally differentiated organization that transfers decision competencies to a 
committee with the same membership. By focusing on the structuration effects of a 
purely intergovernmental organization, the analysis goes beyond previous 
institutional analysis by looking into a theoretical constellation that is least favorable 
to the rationalizing effects of committee governance. 
With this analysis, I do neither intend to clarify whether or not sanctions regimes 
are meaningful governance tools nor to what extent the studied sanctions regimes 
have achieved their intended objectives. Neither do I seek to provide a normative 
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assessment of sanctions decisions taken, nor to make a contribution to the exact 
impact on targeted individuals, populations or economies. Existing research has 
convincingly studied the effectiveness of sanctions (Cortright/Lopez 2000; Biersteker 
et al. 2013), the devastating effects of comprehensive sanctions on civilian 
populations (Hoskins 1997; Provost 1992; Mueller/Mueller 1999), how even targeted 
sanctions have unintended consequences (Eriksson 2010), the infringement of 
fundamental human rights of listed individuals (Kanetake 2008; Fassbender 2006), or 
how sanctions have contributed to the emergence of fraud, smuggling networks and 
organized crime (Andreas 2005; Wezeman 2007), for instance in the context of the 
UN Oil-for-Food programme (Califano/Meyer 2006). In this respect, I do not 
question whether sanctions decisions of the Security Council are particularly wise, 
normatively ‘good’ or ‘just’. 
 
1.2 State of the art 
“[F]ew institutions have generated so much commentary yet so little systematic 
analysis. (…) Most of the numerous texts and collections of essays on the 
United Nations contain a chapter on the Council or, more likely, on one or more 
of the peacekeeping, sanctions, or humanitarian measures it authorizes. But 
there have been remarkably few books devoted to the Security Council as an 
institution” (Luck 2007: xv). 
To recapitulate, the phenomenon of primary interest lies in the consequences of 
establishing committees within the Security Council, endowed with substantial 
decision competencies, for the Council’s logic of decision-making and the content of 
decisions taken. Against this background, I inquire whether or not the effects of the 
transfer of implementation decisions to a competent committee can and do also occur, 
if such competencies are transferred to an intergovernmental body with the identical 
group of members. The review of the relevant existing literature is intended to 
classify prevailing empirical and theoretical approaches to the study of the 
phenomenon and in a second step to evaluate the gap in the existing research. To 
proceed, in a first section I will organize the existing empirical literature on the 
dependent variable of interest and their explanations for the observable phenomenon. 
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In a second section, I will take a theoretical orientation and classify the existing and 
prevailing theoretical explanations for decision-making in international organizations. 
1.2.1 The gap in the empirical literature 
The review of the relevant empirical literature starts out with two striking empirical 
observations: (1) Eye-witnesses, former first-hand participants and observers have 
recognized an independent effect of decision-making embedded in complex 
governance structures of UNSC sanctions regimes even though the same group of 
actors is present at both the Council and the sanctions committees. Their observations 
clearly hint at a substantial difference in decision-making within sanctions 
committees in contrast to Council decision-making without recourse to a committee. 
As early as the first post-Cold War sanctions regime, a member of the UN Secretariat 
serving the Iraq sanctions committee from 1990 to 1995, Paul Conlon, argued that  
“[i]f Council and subsidiary organ practice were more clearly distinguished 
from each other, the political discretion of the Council, with its often 
questionable sanctions decisions, might appear more legitimate. Member states 
would have to accept politically driven sanctions decisions of the Council, but 
once those decisions were adopted, member states would have a more 
predictable system of norms and practices to fall back upon within the sanctions 
committees” (2000: 9). 
Early on, Paul Conlon ascertained that sanctions committees perform an 
“administrative function” (1995b: 646) for “(…) matters of the type that in Western 
societies are handled by regulatory bodies” (2000: 31). Equally, David Bosco noted 
that “[t]he creation of that committee was a small but notable step toward an active 
governance role for the council” (2009: 157). For a later phase of this sanctions 
regime, Dutch diplomat Peter Walsum echoed similar findings and the “[r]ules and 
[c]onstraints” of sanctions committees (2004: 183). Former diplomats of the 
Yugoslavia committee, responsible for implementing comprehensive sanctions 
against Yugoslavia, similarly asserted that the “(…) the record of the Sanctions 
Committee’s deliberations are full of references to previous cases which the 
Committee Members considered to constitute precedent (…)” (Scharf/Dorosin 1993: 
823–824). Consequently, within this sanctions committee “[r]outine cases are handled 
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as a paper exercise” (Scharf/Dorosin 1993: 775). This account accords distinct 
function to the Council on the one hand, and to its committee that was tasked as 
regulatory body interpreting Council resolutions through follow-up implementation 
decisions on the other hand. The committee had established acceptable categories of 
exemptions through precedents and subsequently a more or less consistent application 
of these to similar cases (Scharf/Dorosin 1993: 783). For the Iraq committee, Paul 
Conlon further affirmed that “[d]elegates frequently asked the secretariat for 
information on previous practice, precedents and similar cases in the past. 
Occasionally delegates consented to decisions they had originally opposed in order 
not to upset previously established patterns and practices” (Conlon 1996b: 280). 
More recent diplomats’ accounts of UNSC sanctions committees administering 
targeted sanctions regimes echo these observations. During the annual ‘Hitting the 
Ground Running’ Workshop for incoming, outgoing and permanent members’ 
delegations to discuss the Council’s work, a diplomat stated that “(…) the sanctions 
committees acted as the de facto executive branch of the Security Council” 
(S/2006/483, p.6). Similarly, another diplomat noted that “[t]he subsidiary machinery, 
(…) should be technically-oriented and relatively autonomous” (S/2005/228, p.6). 
During the 2010 workshop, a diplomat stated that the subsidiary bodies involve 
“substantial legal work” (S/2011/484, p.22). Concerning the consensus procedure 
most visibly distinguishing the Council from the committees, several diplomats  
“noted that, because the committees operate on the basis of consensus, reaching 
agreement in them is often more difficult than reaching agreement in the 
Council. On the other hand, several speakers pointed out that in instances when 
consensus is difficult to reach in a committee, the Chair has the option of 
bringing the issue to the level of Ambassadors in the Council” (S/2010/177, 
p.19). 
Regarding the role of the chairing delegation within the sanctions committees and 
the division of labor between the Council and its committees, one diplomat noted that 
many follow-up questions arise as a result of the act of delegation: 
“Should it be within the authority of the chairperson of a subsidiary body (…) 
to refer instances of impasse to the Council or should such a decision first be 
approved by the body in question? Furthermore, should chairpersons be allowed 
a certain degree of flexibility in their actions so that the work of a committee 
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actually contributes to reducing the workload of the Council, rather than 
overburdening it with technical details?” (S/2009/192, p.17) 
Strikingly, these practitioners’ accounts, through focusing on the consequences of 
functional differentiation between Council and sanctions committees, implicitly 
utilize an institutionalist approach. German diplomat Hans-Peter Kaul observed that 
while Council members generally favor the principle of single-case decision-making 
and that states reject to be bound by previous decisions, simultaneously, he notes that 
there is a more or less consistent decision practice oriented on precedents (Kaul 1996: 
98–99). Thus, Council members favor flexibility but are willing to restrain their 
decision-making if necessary. 
(2) Sanctions regimes are – to an increasing degree – subject to regulation 
through Security Council resolutions, committee rules of procedures and precedents. 
First, Council resolutions are increasingly becoming instruments to steer committee 
decision-making with the adoption of detailed decision criteria and procedures. While 
this development has been noted for the prominent Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime 
(Kanetake 2008), it is also observable in many others, less publicly scrutinized 
regimes. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) sanctions 
regime, the Council over time specified the listing criteria for its sanctions committee 
from a vague “provision of assistance” in arms embargo violations (resolution 1493 
(2003), para. 20) to a detailed list of ten specific listing criteria (resolution 2136 
(2014), para. 4a-j). On humanitarian exemptions, the Council has provided detailed 
exemptions to its imposed assets freeze and distinguished four different categories of 
acceptable exemption requests, each subject to a distinct procedure in the Iran 
sanctions regime (resolution 1737 (2007), para. 13a-d). As regards arms embargo 
exemptions, the Council has provided detailed prescriptions to administer exemptions 
from the arms embargo to the Somalia sanctions committee (resolution 2093 (2013), 
paras 32-39; resolution 2111 (2013), paras. 4-17, Annex). In the context of aviation 
sanctions, the Security Council provided for detailed exemptions to the flight 
embargo on Iraq (resolution 670 (1990), paras 2-6). Second, the committees itself 
engaged in increasing self-regulation of their own rules of procedures (“committee 
guidelines”). For instance, while the initial Cote d’Ivoire committee guidelines had 
only 10 pages in 2005, over time they grew in detail to 18 pages in 2014. Similarly, 
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the Liberia committee guidelines increased from six pages in 2004 to 17 pages in 
2010. Even the politically contentious DPRK committee increased the length of its 
committee guidelines from seven pages in 2007 to 11 in 2014 (all documents are on 
file with author). In the Iraq sanctions regime, the committee adopted a list of ten 
larger items groups that are to be exempted favorably from the comprehensive 
sanctions (“gentleman’s agreement”, on file with author). Third, below the level of 
formal rules, although the role of precedents is not directly measurable on a macro 
level due to the private nature of committee discussions, first-hand participants have 
highlighted their relevance for committee decision-making (Scharf/Dorosin 1993: 
775, 823–824; Conlon 2000: 91, 100). 
From these two observations, it is obvious that the decision situation for 
committee members appears to be substantially different to that of the Council, 
although the same group of members decides on both levels. In addition, the Council 
and the committee alike subjected decision-making within UNSC sanctions regimes 
to an increasingly complex system of rules. In this context, it is striking that the 
world’s most powerful actors are evidently and increasingly so subjecting themselves 
to the effect of rules and precedents, although they frequently express their objection 
to be bound by anything but their own power. 
Despite the extensive scholarship on the UN Security Council sanctions regimes, 
there are virtually no empirical-analytical approaches that provide a convincing 
account of the observed phenomena across a range of sanctions regimes. The existing 
empirical sanctions literature predominantly does not ascribe an independent effect to 
the governance structure of the sanctions regimes although practitioners describe a 
new development (Conlon 2000; Malone 2006; Malone/Chitalkar 2016). In the 
empirically informed literature on the UNSC, three different strands can be identified: 
policy-oriented literature, international law scholarship as well as theoretically 
informed approaches of the Security Council. 
The policy-oriented literature lacks a systematic and theoretically guided 
understanding of the effects and workings of committee governance and the 
establishment of more complex governance systems in UNSC sanctions regimes. This 
strand of literature has intensively focused on the development of the UNSC 
sanctions practice, in particular after the end of the Cold War (‘sanctions decade’, see 
 
30 
Cortright/Lopez 2000; Cortright et al. 2002; Cortright et al. 2008a; Gottemoeller 
2007; Wallensteen/Staibano 2005) and in the 2000s (Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2011; 
Weschler 2009-2010). The Council’s sanctions practice has sparked two interrelated 
debates. On the one hand, a particularly intensive debate ensued around the 
humanitarian consequences of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, Yugoslavia and 
Haiti on the general population of target states (Cortright/Lopez 2000; Cortright et al. 
2002; Hoskins 1997; Sponeck 2000; Mueller/Mueller 1999; Duffy 2000; Malone 
2008; Minear et al. 1994; Brzoska 2003). This was aggravated by the failure of the 
Iraq sanctions committee to remedy negative humanitarian consequences and the 
disastrous ill-management of the Oil-for-Food Program (Malone 2008; 
Califano/Meyer 2006). On the other hand, a second debate questioned the 
effectiveness of these types of UNSC imposed comprehensive sanctions regimes, 
however, neglects a more detailed analysis of decision-making within more complex 
sanctions regimes. This debate incorporates works on the effectiveness of sanctions in 
general (Hufbauer 2007; Pape 1997; see also special issue on sanctions in 
International Interactions), EU sanctions (Portela 2010), UN sanctions in particular 
(Doxey 2000; Chesterman/Pouligny 2003; Cortright/Lopez 2000; Rose 2005; 
Mack/Khan 2000), and sanctions busting and evasion strategies (Dodge 2010; Brooks 
2002; Andreas 2005). 
As a result of these two debates, the frequent calls for reform of comprehensive 
sanctions in favor of more targeted measures (‘smart sanctions’, see Brzoska 2003; 
Wallensteen/Staibano 2005; Cortright et al. 2008b) have led to sanctions reform 
processes (Brzoska 2001; Biersteker et al. 2001; Wallensteen et al. 2003) and 
respective sanctions reform at the UNSC level (Brzoska 2003; Biersteker et al. 2005; 
Farrall 2010; Cortright/Lopez 2004). Authors have consecutively analyzed the 
implementation and effect of targeted sanctions (Wallensteen/Grusell 2012; Eriksson 
2010), and the increasing incorporation of expert bodies (Vines 2007; Boucher 2010; 
Boucher/Holt 2009; Rupiya 2005). Recently, the Targeted Sanctions Consortium has 
analyzed the effectiveness of Security Council targeted sanctions regimes (Biersteker 
et al. 2013; Biersteker et al. 2016). 
The policy-oriented sanctions research touches upon the issue of sanctions 
committees, but – in the absence of a suitable theoretical framework - fails to 
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adequately and systematically address the functioning and effect of committee 
governance within the Security Council. There is research on single cases (Ward 2005 
on the Counter-terrorism committee; Scharf/Dorosin 1993 on Yugoslavia committee; 
Conlon 2000 on the Iraq committee) or the interests of permanent members (Holslag 
2008; van Kemenade 2010; Wuthnow 2010) and non-permanent members (Wouters 
et al. 2009; Løj 2007; Kaul 1996; Mimler 2013) within sanctions regimes. In the 
context of counter-terrorism, the literature dealt with the development and 
effectiveness of sanctions measures to combat terrorism (Heupel 2007; Rosand 2010; 
Kramer/Yetiv 2007), the domestic or regional implementation of legally-binding 
Council sanctions (Cortright 2009; Vries/Hazelzet 2005; Wallensteen/Staibano 2005), 
as well as the monitoring of sanctions implementation by sanctions committees 
(Rosand 2004). A particularly controversial debate emerged around targeted sanctions 
against individuals and entities suspected of being associated with transnational 
terrorism (Biersteker 2004), which led to several proposals for reforming targeted 
sanctions instruments (Biersteker et al. 2005). In this context, the Watson report 
studied how the Council’s targeted sanctions regimes could be more adequately 
brought in line with the fundamental human rights of listed individuals 
(Biersteker/Eckert 2006, 2009; Eckert/Biersteker 2012). Here, it is consistently 
argued that the procedural enhancements of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime 
have been entirely sparked by external pressure, such as reform proposals by UN 
member states (Biersteker et al. 2005) or court proceedings (Biersteker 2010). 
However, this argument cannot account for the observation that similar developments 
have taken place in other sanctions regimes in the absence of such pressure. 
Predominantly, the analysis remained on the macro level and often the Council and its 
committee were primarily regarded as one conceptual entity (Cortright et al. 2009; 
Cortright/De Wet 2010) so that the more complex decision structure of sanctions 
regimes was neglected. 
The strand of literature informed by international law also does not lead to a 
theoretically-informed analysis of functional differentiated decision-making within 
sanctions regimes, though it does take sanctions committees more closely into its 
focus. The international law scholarship highlighted the legal basis derived from the 
UN Charter and the legal boundaries of Council prerogatives (Simma et al. 2012; Wet 
2001; Angelet 2001; Peters 2012). Many areas of Council practice were analyzed 
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from an international law perspective, including the authorization of the use of force 
(Gazzini 2005; Blokker/Schrijver 2005), the development of peacekeeping (Bothe 
2012), or the Council’s role as a global legislator (Talmon 2005). With regard to 
sanctions committees, international law scholarship studied the Council’s practice to 
establish subsidiary organs including standing committees, criminal tribunals, 
peacekeeping operations, and also sanctions committees, among others (Sievers/Daws 
2014; Farrall 2007; Sarooshi 1999). In particular, the international law literature 
engaged in shedding light on the specific composition of subsidiary bodies, their 
mandates, the division of labor between and the generic competences of the organs of 
the complex governance structures of sanctions regimes in a detailed manner (Paulus 
2012; Farrall 2007: 146–182, 2009). However, their analyses remained on the level of 
describing the competences of the Council and committee, while they did not engage 
in the empirical study of committee decision-making. 
A particular controversy, which draws on international law scholarship (De 
Wet/Nollkaemper 2003), on the discussion about an emerging global administrative 
law (Krisch 2006; Kingsbury et al. 2005) and on political science informed concepts 
of accountability (Grant/Keohane 2005), has arisen over the question to what extend 
the sanctioning of individuals and entities infringes the target’s fundamental human 
rights as well as whether and how procedural enhancements could ensure upholding 
these rights without compromising sanctions effectiveness (Gutherie 2005; De 
Wet/Nollkaemper 2003; Hovell 2016). Notably, Kanetake analyzed the mechanisms 
of the sanctions addressees, including member states and individuals, to hold the 
Security Council accountable by imposing external pressure to remedy the substantial 
intrusion into fundamental rights of targeted individuals (2008). These studies 
centrally focused on the fact that decisions of sanctions committees had been subject 
to national and regional court decisions, because they directly curtail the fundamental 
rights of listed individuals (Feinäugle 2010; Tzanakopoulos 2010; Keller/Fischer 
2009). In the well-known “Kadi-case” (Yassin Abdullah Kadi vs. EU Council and 
Commission), the European Court of Justice annulled the Union’s implementation of 
targeted sanctions on the respective individual, because the respective EU regulations 
violated the individuals basic due process rights (Goede 2011; Michaelsen 2010; 
Hoffmann 2008). In turn, the procedural enhancements by the Security Council have 
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sparked a debate about the suitability of those procedures to remedy the due process 
infringements (Prost 2012a; Margulies 2014; Sullivan/Goede 2013). 
Similar to the policy-oriented literature, this strand of literature on targeted 
sanctions also primarily regards the Council and the committee conceptually as a 
unitary entity and does not ascribe specific analytical attention to the fact that 
sanctions regimes are processed by separate entities characterized by division of labor 
(Fassbender 2006; Bothe 2008; Feinäugle 2010). Above all, the major empirical 
explanation for the dynamics of UN sanctions regimes, predominantly the evolution 
of the Al-Qaida/Taliban regime, was mainly ascribed to pressure exerted from outside 
the UNSC: diplomatic initiatives (Cramér 2003; Miller 2003; Rosand 2004), reform 
initiatives of like-minded countries seeking reform (Biersteker et al. 2005; Kanetake 
2008), domestic or regional court judgements (Biersteker 2010; Heupel 2009, 2013). 
Both, the policy-oriented as well as the international law inspired research cannot 
necessarily account for the practitioner’s observation that the differentiated structures 
of sanctions regimes give rise to increasing regulation, even in the absence of external 
pressure. When external pressure was the key causal factor for the regulation of 
sanctions regimes in the wake of the humanitarian disaster in Iraq, why can one then 
observe regulation in the phase even before such this controversy emerged? And how 
can one account for committees that increasingly decide rule-based, such as the DRC 
sanctions committee, where the protection of individual rights of listed individuals 
was less scrutinized, or for committees deciding about decisions where no individuals 
were involved such as in nuclear-related dual-use commodity sanctions? 
The workings of UNSC sanctions committees have not yet been empirically 
studied from institutionalist or organization theory approaches. Despite the extensive 
rationalist scholarship on the UN Security Council, the existing literature does not 
ascribe an independent effect to the governance structure of the sanctions regimes and 
fails to convincingly account for the empirical puzzle. In generally explaining 
Council decisions, these works have focused on factors of non-organizational nature, 
for instance, how great powers use the Council for information transmission 
(Thompson 2006a, 2006b, 2009), how great powers use threats and bribes as voting 
incentives (Vreeland/Dreher 2014; Kuziemko/Werker 2006), and the impact of 
outside options of great powers on Council decisions (Voeten 2001). As a result, the 
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Security Council including its subsidiary bodies is mainly conceptualized as a forum 
of great power politics (Bosco 2009, 2014a; Roberts/Zaum 2009; Luck 2007). 
Accordingly, from this perspective, Council and sanctions committee decisions can 
be sufficiently well explained by the interest constellation among its members. 
In conclusion, so far a theoretically-informed empirical analysis of the effects of 
functional differentiation in the area of sanctions committees is missing. This analysis 
contributes to closing this gap. Thereby, the exploration of committee governance, 
which occurs by virtue of establishing subsidiary committees with substantial 
decision competencies, is in the center of the analysis. Insofar, the analysis seeks to 
explicate the sources of the development that practitioners have suggested for quite 
some time, namely that Council sanctions decisions become more legitimate, when 
member states including the great powers in their own interest accept that the 
implementation of sometimes problematic sanctions regimes occurs more rule-based 
and therefore becomes more predictable (Conlon 2000: 9; Angelet 2001: 71–72; 
Malone 2006; Malone/Chitalkar 2016). 
1.2.2 The gap in the theoretical literature 
Although the international relations scholarship has recently rediscovered 
international organizations as subject of inquiry, the structuration of decision 
processes within international organizations is under-specified in theories of 
international relations so far. In other words, existing accounts fail to provide 
theoretical instruments, which encompass the effects of international organizations 
and the emerging autonomy of the organization vis-à-vis its member states 
systematically, and at the same time are empirically applicable. 
Neorealists treat international organizations fundamentally as epiphenomenal to 
state power and interests (Martin/Simmons 2013: 329; Reinalda 2013: 4–5). In this 
reasoning, the organization structure exerts no separate effect on the powerful 
member states, because decisions of international organizations entirely mirror the 
interests of powerful member states (Waltz 1979; Grieco 1988). In criticizing the 
pessimistic neorealist notions of institutions, the institutionalist scholarship 
considered international institutions as central unit of analysis, but focused 
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specifically on international regimes and less international organizations 
(Martin/Simmons 2013: 330–331). As such, institutionalist theory analyzed how 
states can achieve increasing and lasting cooperation under the conditions of an 
international system characterized by anarchy and which role international 
institutions serve in facilitating cooperation. In the context of rationalist cooperation 
theory, authors scrutinized various aspects of regimes. Particular attention was paid to 
regime creation (Axelrod 1984), their effects (Keohane 1984) and effectiveness 
(Young 1999), regime compliance (Underdal 1998) and the enforcement of 
agreements (Fearon 1998). All in all, scholars merely ascribed international 
organizations a subordinate function as a facilitator of or forum for interstate 
cooperation (Barnett/Finnemore 2008: 45–47; Hasenclever et al. 1997: 33–36; 
Rittberger et al. 2012: 18–25), so that organizational effects cannot be meaningfully 
captured. 
More recent scholarship on international organizations in international relations 
ascribes organizational parts, mostly in the form of secretariats or courts, a central 
role in the decision-making processes of international organizations. Thereby, the 
central research question is how international organizations can become autonomous 
actors and what consequences this has. The rationalist principal-agent theory 
conceptualizes international organizations as ‘agents‘ that perform a specific function 
to benefit from centralization (Abbott/Snidal 1998; Reinalda 2013: 17). Ideally, 
principals hire an agent to perform a function that the principal would have done in 
their place, but there is a persistent danger that the agent deviates from what the 
principal intends the agent to do (“agency slack”, Hawkins et al. 2006b; 
Nielson/Tierney 2003: 245; Epstein/O’Halloran 1999: 25). When agents act 
undesirably, this behavior will result in agency losses for the principals (Hawkins et 
al. 2006b: 7–9). From the principals’ perspective, there is a demand for control 
(Nielson/Tierney 2003: 245). In principal-agent models control is conceptualized as 
hierarchical control mechanisms such as retaining the final decision authority, 
providing different oversight mechanisms and redesigning the agent’s competencies 
(Pollack 1997: 108–109). Standard principal-agent theory assumes that if the 
principals have the right tools of hierarchical control at their disposal, such as ‘police 
patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ they can secure the proper functioning of the agent 
(Kiewiet/McCubbins 1993: 28–38; McCubbins/Schwartz 1984; Pollack 1997: 109–
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112). Such approaches have been used to study the discretion of IO bureaucracies in 
designing new international organizations (Johnson/Urpelainen 2014), delegation 
within the European Union (Pollack 1997, 2003), the World Bank (Nielson/Tierney 
2003) or the World Trade Organization (Elsig 2010; Stone 2011). Altogether, 
principal-agent theory fails to explain the effect of a decision system that employs the 
same group of actors simultaneously as principal and agent. In this approach, agency 
slack is entirely conceptualized as a negative aspect of delegation that does not 
account for the rationalizing effects of division of labor. 
A second strand of principal-agent literature, modern regulatory theory, suggests 
delegating to an independent agent to enhance the credibility of the principal’s 
commitment to a cooperation project (Majone 2001a, 2001b). A time inconsistency 
issue will occur in case an actor’s optimal long-term behavioral choice differs from 
optimal short-term behavioral choice. Without being committed to a binding contract 
reflecting the long-term commitment, an actor will use its discretion to pursue its 
short-term interest (Majone 2001a: 62–63). This dilemma of time inconsistency can 
be solved exactly when the agent has a different incentive structure than the principal. 
In the case of inflation policy, the classical suggestion is to delegate inflation policy 
to an independent central bank, which is more inflation averse than its principal 
would be (Rogoff 1985; Majone 2001a: 65–66). The agent is intended to keep 
principals committed to the long-term interest of price stability and thus to solve the 
time-inconsistency problem (Hawkins et al. 2006b: 18–19). The major argument is 
that the agent must be sufficiently independent to freely implement the desired policy 
(Majone 2001a: 65–67). Such logic can be found in the delegation to courts (Alter 
2008, 2006) and the European Central Bank (Majone 2001b). However, while this 
account highlights the relevance of creating specific incentive structures for the agent 
to reap long-term cooperation benefits, the account fails to explain how this can be 
achieved when the same group of actors controls all major decisions. 
The constructivist, bureaucratic culture approach (see Reinalda 2013: 17–18), 
highlights that the internal functioning and autonomous action of organizational parts 
lies in the ability of the organization, in this case the IO secretariat, to define its own 
bureaucratic rules. International organizations are conceptualized as bureaucracies, 
whose authority is exercised through the creation of impersonal rules. The application 
 
37 
of these rules can become problematic when they lead to “self-defeating outcomes” 
and organizational pathologies (Barnett/Finnemore 2004, 1999; Weaver/Leiteritz 
2005). A similar, but narrower concept focusing entirely on the secretariats of 
international organizations maintained that secretariats are in fact predominantly 
interested in problem-solving and not in maximizing their own mandate and power. 
Accordingly, differences in the autonomy of IO secretariats can be attributed to 
differences in organizational culture (Biermann/Siebenhüner 2009, 2013). Although 
these approaches attract the attention to an important part of international 
organizations, which potentially structure decision-making and organizational 
decisions, this explanation is solely directed to one part of the organization, while the 
non-bureaucratic parts of organizations move out of the center of attention. This is 
most valid for international organizations that are almost entirely characterized by an 
intergovernmental structure and the absence of a strong secretariat. 
Overall, these approaches cannot be readily and meaningfully transferred to the 
Security Council. In the first instance, these accounts provide no meaningful 
explanation as to why we would expect to see different decisions when actors indeed 
delegate to themselves. Furthermore, even though these approaches analyze the scope 
of organizational autonomy, they narrowly focus on bureaucratic actors and Security 
Council is endowed with a particularly weak secretariat. 
Furthermore, international organizations were conceptualized as system-theoretic 
social systems that develop their own inherent logic of operation, although they are 
dependent on their member states (Koch 2009, 2015; Ness/Brechin 1988; 
Ansell/Weber 1999). Thereby, organizations are often conceptualized as being 
autonomous per se, because they are operationally closed as specific forms of social 
systems and take decisions solely by recourse to earlier decisions. However, this 
conception remains largely theoretical so to preclude an empirical analysis of the 
type, scope and consequences of organizational autonomy. 
A promising starting point for the present analysis is the existing scholarship on 
functional differentiated international organizations and delegation to committees. 
The so far defined discussion centered on the delegation of decision competencies to 
committees. Thereby, the literature notably dealt with the delegation of decisions 
within the EU comitology. These studies argued that the transfer of decision 
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competencies to executive committees has a decisive impact on the governance of the 
particular issue area (van Schendelen 1996; Schaefer 1996; Joerges 2006). 
Accordingly, international organizations were analyzed as decision systems, which 
allowed for explaining the emerging autonomy and the significantly affected 
decisions by structuring decision processes. Based on institutionalist considerations, 
these approaches maintained that because of the functional differentiation of the 
decision process and the connected transfer of single case decisions to committees, 
participating actors could no longer achieve their preferred outcomes through power-
based bargaining (Gehring 2003). Furthermore, this scholarship has empirically 
shown that the transfer of decision competencies caused the rationalizing effects of 
committee decision-making that led to problem-adequate governance. This applies 
especially to the field of ‘low-politics’ including environmental politics 
(Gehring/Plocher 2009), protection of species (Gehring/Ruffing 2008) or 
international development (Kerler 2010) as well as the European Union (Gehring 
2002, 2003; Gehring/Kerler 2008). 
While these approaches provide a suitable basis for the analysis of inner-
organizational decision processes, they predominantly have been applied to 
international organizations operating in ‘low-politics’ that are considered to be more 
amenable to rule-based decision-making. The concept has not yet been applied to 
entirely intergovernmental structured international organizations that are least prone 
to more institutionalized forms of cooperation (Rittberger et al. 2012). 
Simultaneously, these approaches primarily treat the rules as exogenous factor, 
meaning that if the rules from the hierarchically superior level are unsuitable, the 
committee cannot work. This analysis seeks to contribute to this literature by 
showing, why the rules are created in the first place and only then, how they affect 
decision-making. In addition, existing approaches assume that actors always have an 
interest in rule-based decisions, which is not to be expected in security organizations. 
Similarly, the function of rulemaking must not necessarily be differentiated among 
two different bodies, but it is reasonable to assume that the effects also occur when 
the same group of actors decides about rules first and then applies these rules to 
single cases. Finally, these studies so far did not pay attention to conceptualizing 
precedents as functional equivalents of formal rules. 
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To date, a fundamental conception of international organizations, which can draw 
conclusions about how even simple structured international organizations can affect 
the behavior of rational actors and thus the content of decisions and at the same time 
is empirically applicable, is missing. While the previous research on functional 
differentiation provides a useful starting point, this is particularly true for the 
borderline case of an organization in which the member states essentially delegate the 
main workload to themselves. 
 
1.3 The argument 
In this study, I seek to account for the effects of delegating decisions to sanctions 
committees in UN Security Council sanctions regimes. I develop a theoretical model 
of committee governance in international organizations that shows how even rational 
behaving states can be committed to rule-based decision-making without excluding 
them from the decision process. The core argument is that in contrast to a uniform 
decision process, a group of states that delegates decision competencies to a 
committee will produce an entirely different decision situation in ways that favors 
rule-based decision-making, even if the same group of actors adopts all major 
decisions. The argument is developed in three steps. 
At the outset - based on the assumption that states are the central actors, which 
behave rationally but suffer from informational deficits - I outline a concept of 
international organizations that identifies their primary function in continuously 
adopting collective decisions for their members. International organizations gain 
influence on joint decision-making insofar as they structure decision processes and 
create institutionalized negotiation settings that open new or preclude and alter 
existing options. This occurs even in the absence of powerful bureaucracies or courts. 
In a second step, I develop a baseline model of power-based decision-making in a 
uniform decision process to contrast the effects of committee governance. In a 
uniform decision process, a group of actors decides about a number of aspects of the 
cooperation project without recourse to a committee. In this case, states will bargain 
over the content of grand political decisions and seek to move the negotiated solution 
closer to their ideal points. The decisions taken in a uniform decision process mirror 
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pure bargaining outcomes and reflect the constellation of interests and the relative 
power among the actors. Accordingly, powerful actors reject unfavorable decisions 
unless negative outcomes are compensated through linkages. 
In a third step, I argue that a group of actors provides incentives for rule-based 
decision-making if they divide a bargaining process over a comprehensive package 
deal into a process negotiating general decision criteria (rulemaking) and a decision 
process in which a stream of decision requests is processed in light of these criteria 
(rule-implementation). A group of actors that delegates implementation decisions to a 
committee will have to focus on adopting rules to be applicable to many future single 
cases. Even though states will also strive to move the outcome on many future 
decisions closer to their ideal point, they cannot pursue all their future case-specific 
preferences in the choice among different sets of rules. Hence, actors gain an interest 
in adopting generally applicable rules that promise to result in widely acceptable 
solutions on a large number of implementation decisions. 
A group of actors deciding about small and separate implementation decisions in 
the committee stage, which cannot be accumulated to decision packages, will face 
reoccurring coordination situations that create the demand for focal points unless a 
member favors blockade over a cooperative solution. Because not every committee 
member can equally benefit from each single-case, the committee stage creates the 
danger of blockade if all members seek to achieve their preferred outcome. Thus, the 
committee stage creates the demand for focal points. In this situation, externally 
provided decision criteria or rules derived from earlier similar cases (precedents) 
provide focal points to determine acceptable from unacceptable implementation 
decisions. Consequently, actors gain an incentive to accept some unfavorable single-
cases as long as overall cooperation project yields positive outcomes. Should 
committee members reorient their behavior on generally applicable rules or 
precedents, the regulatory outcome will be increasingly rule-based and consistent. 
On a whole, the concept of committee governance reveals that delegating 
decision competencies to a committee generates fundamentally different incentives 
for a group of actors in ways that favor rule-based decision-making in comparison to 
a uniform decision process. The concept conforms to a broad range of international 
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organizations and is applicable to the circumstances of committee governance in UN 
Security Council sanctions regimes. 
In its empirical application to five UNSC sanctions regimes (Iraq, Al-
Qaida/Taliban, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Iran), I find 
substantial evidence that the transfer of decisions to a sanctions committee in fact 
leads to more consistent and rule-based decisions provided that the permanent 
members of the Security Council share a common interest in the functionality of a 
sanctions regime. 
The empirical results are robust across a range of preference constellations, 
sanctions measures or content of decisions. Importantly, the effect is rooted in the 
comparable decision situation across sanctions regimes, namely, to decide about 
many similar single cases over time. Hence, the rule-based nature of committee 
decision-making is not just observable in the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee 
that has attracted particular attention due to the infringement of fundamental human 
rights of affected individuals. Notably, the rule-based decision-making is equally 
observable in the Iraq sanctions regime, where the committee mainly decided about 
humanitarian exemptions from the economic embargo on Iraq. Beyond that, the Iraq 
sanctions regime shows that the effect occurred even in the early phase of the regime 
and preceded the critique on the humanitarian consequences of comprehensive 
sanctions. The same applies to the Iran sanctions regime that imposes targeted 
sanctions against individuals implicated in the Iranian nuclear program, but also non-
proliferation related commodity and ‘dual-use’ sanctions. Similarly, committee 
governance affected decision-making in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
sanctions regime, where the conflict of interest is not between the Western powers 
and China and Russia, but between the three Western permanent members. 
The empirical results show that if the Council delegates decision competencies to 
a new sanctions committee and retreats to guiding its work, the rules that arise are 
consistent and do not favor any particular powerful member. This effect can be 
equally observed in case the sanctions committee engages in selective rulemaking to 
overcome specific decision problems. 
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The sanctions committee in turn takes a much narrower perspective and decides 
about separate implementation decisions under the framework provided by the 
Security Council. The committee’s track record in all studied positive cases shows 
that member states align their requests to the rules and committee members tend to 
avoid rejecting convincing proposals. The analysis provides evidence that powerful 
members frequently accept decisions they originally opposed in order to uphold the 
functionality of a sanctions committee. Altogether, the regulatory outcome of 
sanctions regimes is remarkably rule-based. 
The studied sanctions regimes highlight remarkable features of committee 
governance in the UNSC. The Iraq sanctions committee reveals that without Council 
rules, committee members sought to use precedents as functional equivalent source of 
focal points to overcome decision blockades. A systematic large-n analysis of 8,200 
committee decisions confirms a rule-based decision practice of the committee based 
on previously adopted precedents, even though two powerful committee members 
initially refused to be bound by rules or rules emerging from precedent. Committee 
governance also caused rule-based decision-making in the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions 
committee. The Council increasingly subjected the committee with a dense set of 
rules for the processing of committee decisions on listing and delisting of individuals 
and entities suspected of being associated with Al-Qaida. The effects of committee 
governance had already resulted in remarkably consistent decisions, even before the 
introduction of a remarkably strong review mechanism (Office of the 
Ombudsperson), which provided additional incentives for rule-based decision-
making. The DRC sanctions committee also presents a confirmatory case for 
committee governance. Even powerful committee members dropped decision 
requests, if no reliable and up-to-date information could be assembled. In effect, 
decision requests that fulfilled the evidentiary requirements were successfully 
presented, even if they stemmed from less powerful non-committee members. 
Three findings can be reconciled with the postulated causal mechanism of 
committee governance, but point to its restricted applicability. First, the analysis also 
highlights that all permanent members need to share a preference for a coordinated 
solution within a sanctions regime over blockade. In the Sudan sanctions regime, 
which represents a baseline case, China consistently rejected the notion of Security 
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Council sanctions on Sudan and was indeed interested in committee blockade. 
Accordingly, although proactive members demanded to sanction individuals 
obstructing the Darfur peace process, the sanctions committee has not listed any 
individuals. Instead, the proactive states referred their listing proposals to the Council, 
which adopted a package resolution listing four individuals (resolution 1672 (2006)). 
Second, the empirical results demonstrate that resolutions on the one hand and 
delegation to a sanctions committee are two principled mechanisms to pursue a 
sanctions regime. The Iran sanctions regime provides evidence that delegation to a 
sanctions committee led to increasingly rule-based decisions in comparison to 
decisions observed in the uniform Council decision process. Here, the Council 
initially retained decision-making competencies that it delegated to a committee in 
later phases of the sanctions regime. Since 2006, the Council decided about listing of 
individuals and entities implicated in the Iranian nuclear program and only in 2012 
delegated these implementation decisions to its sanctions committee. However, as 
theoretically expected the Council has not separately decided about listing decisions 
but accumulated many aspects of the sanctions regime into package decisions. Only 
from 2012 onwards, the committee took over the listing task, which yielded rule-
based decisions entirely different to the Council decision packages. 
Third, the mechanism of committee governance only becomes causally relevant, 
if the committee members have an actual interest in the decisions taken so that there 
is a certain conflict of interest among committee members. In the absence of such a 
conflict, committee members do not have incentives to challenge submitted decision 
proposals, which prompts the danger of blockade and the associated willingness to 
engage in rule-based decision-making in the first place. In the first episode of the Al-
Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee, the members caused a laissez-faire decision-
making mode according to which listing requests were simply accepted regardless of 
their content, evidence and origin without causing blockade. This empirical finding 
highlights that the degree of rule adherence by sanctions committee members 
presupposes the existence of a conflict of interest among Council members and their 
willingness to challenge non-conforming decisions. Indeed, in other sanctions 
regimes, committee members seriously exercised such mutual control, for instance, 
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through the US and the UK in the Iraq sanctions regime, or Russia and China within 
the Iran sanctions regime. 
 
1.4 Relevance 
This study provides a rare systematic, theory-guided and comparative analysis of 
regulatory decision-making within UNSC sanctions regimes that exceeds the 
prevailing single case studies (Conlon 2000; Ward 2005; van Walsum 2004). 
Although the empirical findings of the five case studies cannot be broadly 
generalized, there is reason to believe that the results are equally transferable to other 
cases. This is rooted in the ability of the theoretical approach to explicate the 
fundamental sources of a development that practitioners have suspected since the first 
post-Cold War sanctions regime (Koskenniemi 1991; Scharf/Dorosin 1993). 
This study will make both a theoretical and an empirical contribution. 
This study contributes to the ongoing debate about the role and effect of 
international organizations in international relations theory and alludes to a previously 
unaccounted source of organizational effects. While the literature ascribed 
organizational effects mostly on specific characteristics of organizations such as 
particularly powerful agents (Hawkins et al. 2006a), courts (Alter 2008), or the role of 
bureaucracies (Barnett/Finnemore 2004, 1999), in this analysis I present a causal 
model that captures the sources of these effects through structuration of decision 
processes, although these effects are unintended by member states. In fact, this 
conception encompasses the effects of strong agents, because it derives its 
explanatory power from a broader view on organizational structuration of decision 
processes, where agents or bureaucracies are only one potential source of influence. 
At the same time, this theoretical concept does not conflate organizational influence 
with agency slack or organizational pathologies, which are necessarily directed 
against the member states’ interests. 
The analysis also contributes the literature on credible commitments through 
delegation (Majone 2001a, 2001b). The application to an international organization 
that is regarded as least prone to institutionalized forms of cooperation, demonstrates 
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that the effects of functional differentiation occur in the absence of delegation to 
secretariats, scientific committees or other independent agents, even in deliberately 
political and purely intergovernmental institutions. In the borderline case of a ‘high 
politics’ organization that differentiates decision competencies between two bodies 
with identical membership and thus with the same constellation of preferences, other 
explanations based on the presence of strong agents are less relevant. Instead, it is 
maintained that the emergence of a differentiated governance structure provides 
incentives even for the great powers to commit themselves to more rule-based 
decision-making without depriving these actors from the opportunity to adopt 
political decisions. Therefore, principals can be credibly committed to their long-term 
interests through committee governance, even if such committees have the identical 
membership. As a result, members of an international organization intending a 
credible commitment gain a politically feasible substitute to delegating competencies 
to independent agents or even courts. 
The analysis further theoretically contributes to the debate about the causes and 
consequences of functional differentiation in international organizations that have 
mostly covered ‘low politics’ institutions (Gehring/Ruffing 2008) or the European 
Union (Gehring 2003). In particular, this study goes beyond the prevailing literature 
by highlighting that besides formal rules, precedents may serve as functionally 
equivalent sources of focal points within international organizations, for instance in 
case rules are absent or ambiguous. 
The analysis empirically contributes to the understanding of how the Security 
Council works. Through explicating the effects of delegating decision competencies 
to committees with identical membership, the empirical analysis seeks to 
convincingly account for the patterns of committee decision-making within the 
Security Council (Conlon 2000; Malone 2006). Thereby, for the first time, the effects 
of delegating decision competencies to sanctions committee become subject to a 
systematic and theory-driven analysis. 
The analysis empirically contributes to the understanding of the broader 
dynamics of Security Council sanctions regimes. The analytical framework allows for 
drawing more accurate conclusions about the sources and consequences of regulation 
within sanctions regimes. The theoretical framework highlights the structuration 
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effects and altered decision situations that are inherent to any organization that 
applies a decision-making system of divided labor. At the same time, the analytical 
framework is entirely compatible with arguments that empirically explain the 
increasing regulation of sanctions regimes with externally applied pressure, because 
the sources of such pressures are rooted in the structuring effects of committee 
governance. 
This analysis empirically contributes to the sanctions debate. By focusing on the 
structuring effects of committee governance, the approach can systematically shed 
light on how the far-reaching sanctions decisions of the Security Council come about. 
Thereby, the relationship between the Council and the committee and the division of 
labor between the two, which is often treated as a black box, moves into the center of 
the analysis. Then, the concept is capable of explaining how the committee decides 
about individual single-cases within Council sanctions regimes. Gaining a deeper 
insight into decision-making on sanctions may enhance the understanding of 
sanctions effectiveness (see for instance, Biersteker et al. 2013; Bianchi 2007; 
Wallensteen/Grusell 2012) or how potential humanitarian consequences could be 
prevented or mitigated (Eriksson 2010; Farrall 2007). Beyond the confines of the 
Security Council, this concept also promises to explain decision-making in the 
European Union sanctions regimes if they separate the elaboration of criteria and the 
subsequent application to single-cases (Giumelli 2013; Portela 2010; Vries/Hazelzet 
2005). 
Finally, this analysis adds to the theoretically-informed studies of the Security 
Council. These approaches mainly focus on non-organizational factors, for instance 
the Council’s role for information transmission (Thompson 2006b, 2006a, 2009), the 
influence of outside options (Voeten 2001) or the threats and bribes of powerful 
members vis-à-vis opposing Council members (Vreeland/Dreher 2014). In contrast, 
this study pays attention to the institutional structures that shape and influence 
decision behavior and promises to explain, if not predict, UNSC decisions beyond the 
influence and interests of powerful Council members. 
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1.5 Structure of the book 
In addressing the research question, the analysis proceeds in five major steps. In the 
first step, a causal mechanism and hypotheses for decision-making within 
functionally differentiated international organizations are explicated (chapter 2). In 
the second step, the methodological approach of theory-testing process tracing is 
elaborated, outlining the case selection strategy, the operationalization of dependent 
and independent variables and the applied data sources (chapter 3). In the third step, 
the specific institutional design of functional differentiated UNSC sanctions regimes 
and the general opportunity structures that result from their particular institutional 
setup are evaluated (chapter 4). In the fourth step, I investigate for five UNSC 
sanctions regimes with differentiated decision-making, whether or not the postulated 
causal mechanism is present and works as expected. In the chapters five to nine, I 
analyze sanctions regimes applying individual targeted sanctions (Al-Qaida, DRC, 
Sudan, and Iran) and those with other differentiated decision-making procedures (Iraq 
and Iran). In the fifth step, this thesis is concluded by summarizing empirical and 
theoretical findings as well as providing policy implications (chapter 10). 
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2 Rule-based Committee Governance through Rules and 
Precedents as Focal Points – A Causal Model 
In this chapter, I develop a causal model of how committee governance affects 
decision-making and the content of decisions even if the same group of actors decides 
about all major aspects. In other words, I elaborate how committee governance can 
systematically provide incentives for actors to engage in rule-based decision-making. 
In doing so, the causal model is contrasted against the postulated effects of a unitary 
decision process without recourse to a committee stage. I argue that the separation of 
the decision-making process into two separate stages, rulemaking and subsequent 
rule-application, creates specific incentive structures in both stages. While actors in 
the rulemaking stage will face constraints of consistency and uncertainty, actors in the 
committee stage are usually confronted with a stream of similar and separate 
decisions, which preclude adding requests to negotiated packages. Therefore, actors 
in the committee stage have incentives to engage in rule-based decision-making, even 
if they have to accept some decisions that violate their case-specific interests. 
Because actors in the committee stage will likely prefer different solutions, they find 
themselves in coordination situations that create demand for focal points if actors 
seek to avoid stalemate. In this situation, actors will turn to previously provided 
decision criteria, and if those are unavailable, adopt precedents that are applicable 
over a range of future cases as focal points. 
In this constellation I identify two ideal types of decision-making, which both 
come with significant consequences for decision-making. On the one hand, the actors 
could pursue decisions in a unitary decision process without recourse to a committee 
stage. This situation provides almost no constraints and actors will likely bargain over 
large politicized decision packages that are very important for the cooperation project. 
Hence, actors will heavily invest into moving the negotiated solution closer towards 
their ideal points. Accordingly, power resources of actors are the major source of 
influence. In essence, one would usually expect this this basic mode of power-based 
decision-making. On the other hand, actors could opt for a differentiated decision-
making process of committee governance which separates rulemaking and subsequent 
rule-application, for instance to process implementation decisions within a 
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committee. Thereby, a group of states would separate a larger political project into 
small decisions that are each of limited importance and only their collective outcome 
produces utility for actors. Consequently, actors gain an incentive to accept some 
unfavorable, but small decisions as long as overall cooperation project yields positive 
outcomes. In essence, I argue that committee governance transfers the dynamics of a 
group of states towards a logic of rule-based decision-making. 
The causal model is developed in five steps. First, I outline two theoretical 
assumptions, namely that states are the primary actors and states act rationally but 
suffer from informational deficits (section 2.1). In the second step, I develop the 
foundations of a concept of international organizations, which shows that the primary 
function of such organization is the collective production of decisions (section 2.2). In 
the third step, I argue that uniform decision processes offer little structuring effects 
and provide incentives to pursue situation-specific interests in all cases by means of 
negotiating package deals. Accordingly, decisions taken in a uniform decision process 
would reflect bargaining among powerful members (section 2.3). In the fourth step, a 
model of committee governance is developed. I maintain that separating rulemaking 
from subsequent rule-application affects the decision situation in both stages in ways 
that favor rule-based decision-making (section 2.4). In the fifth step, I argue that the 
causal model is suitable to study the effects of committee governance in the United 
Nations Security Council (section 2.5). The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
main arguments. 
 
2.1 Theoretical assumptions 
The theoretical argument rests upon two assumptions following the rationalist meta-
theoretical tenet to the study of international organizations that understands its role as 
“explain[ing] both individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual 
goal-seeking under constraints” (Snidal 2013: 87). In essence, actors are self-
interested, goal-seeking and aspire to maximize their individual utility under given 
constraints (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 23–27; Marx 2010: 47, 54–57). Only within the 
following assumptions the argument put forward here gains analytical leverage. 
 
51 
The first assumption is that the central, but not the sole actors in the international 
system are states. Neorealist (Waltz 1979; Grieco 1988) and institutionalist 
(Hasenclever et al. 1997: 23–27; Stein 1982) scholarship has traditionally viewed 
states as the “principal actors” (Abbott/Snidal 1998: 6; “crucial actors”, Keohane 
1984: 25) in an international system characterized by anarchy. Institutionalism has 
highlighted how cooperation problems among state yield institutionalized forms of 
cooperation such as international regimes and international organizations 
(Abbott/Snidal 1998; Krasner 1983; Koremenos 2016). In essence, states give rise to 
such cooperative projects. Nevertheless, non-state actors have entered the conceptual 
landscape (Snidal 2013: 101), either from a constructivist perspective including 
secretariats (Barnett/Finnemore 2004, 1999) and norm entrepreneurs 
(Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Price 1998), or institutionalist approaches including 
environmental NGOs (Raustiala 1997) and empowered IOs (Abbott/Snidal 1998). 
Though all these actors might be influential, crucially, states are the gatekeepers that 
equip them with decision functions or admit them to the negotiation process. The 
focus on states as major actors seems justifiable in as much states specifically allocate 
non-state actors with opportunities for action within international organizations 
(Koremenos 2016: 14) and can often revoke their authority as required. Still, I also 
wish to shed light on the circumstances and to what degree states allow non-state 
actors to participate (Gehring 2002: 41–42, 2003: 66). 
Second, a ‘wide’ conception of rational action is used meaning that actors are 
rational, seek to maximize their utility under given constraints but suffer from an 
informational deficit (Opp 1999: 173–176; Snidal 2013: 87–90; Lindenberg 1990: 
744–745; Elster 1989: 97–99; for a discussion of rationality in international relations, 
see Kahler 1998). I assume that actors have complete and consistent order of 
preferences and seek to pursue them in strategic interactions of bargaining and 
negotiation with the ultimate goal to maximize their own utility. Actors choose among 
different behavioral options through assessing their likely consequences. Collective 
action will depend on the bargaining power of actors. Thereby, actors follow a ‘logic 
of consequences’ (March/Olsen 1998: 949–951; Risse 2000: 3–4; Fearon/Wendt 
2002: 60). Narrower versions of rational action contend that actors are ‘fully 
informed’ and omniscient (Opp 1999: 174), a highly demanding and unrealistic 
assumption. In contrast, I assume there are limits to information under conditions of 
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complexity and uncertainty so that actors cannot always know what they want in the 
future and completely estimate the consequences of all their actions (Scharpf 1997: 
19–22; Hasenclever et al. 1997: 140–142). To pursue their preferences, actors will 
seek to reduce informational deficits by generating information including from 
secretariats or experts, while they gain an interest in rules as sources of information 
(Scharpf 1997: 38–40). In essence, the concept is open to actors that behave 
differently, for instance following a logic of appropriateness (March/Olsen 1998: 
951–952) or a more or less defined collective interest, but it is reasonable to assume 
that they do not. The causal model developed here must be applicable to rational 
utility maximizers; otherwise, the organization would not be able to generate rule-
based decision-making on a whole. In other words, the explanatory power is 
strengthened if even egoistic utility-maximizers stick to rules. 
 
2.2 The foundations of international organizations 
The foundations of an international organization concept build upon the observation 
that formal international organizations represent a particular form of cooperative 
arrangements in international relations. Interested member states create formal 
international organizations as to realize one or several cooperation projects 
(Abbott/Snidal 1998: 4–5; Koremenos 2016). Thus, they are functional entities. This 
does not imply that the organizations’ members or other relevant actors do not have 
diverging particularistic interests. Indeed, the creation of a formal international 
organization rests upon a political compromise between actors with a more or less 
heterogeneous preference constellation. In that sense, the instrumental or functional 
starting point for concept of an international organization is compatible with 
rationalist cooperation theory (Keohane 1984; Stein 1982). In essence, international 
organizations must be so advantageous in achieving cooperative gains for the 
constituting actors so that they do not forfeit their legitimacy (Abbott/Snidal 1998: 5). 
Conceptually, the existence and the decisions of international organizations are 
therefore closely tied to the interests of its constituting member states. 
In contrast to other cooperation facilitating international institutions, the most 
basic function of international organizations is to adopt collectively binding decisions 
(Koch 2009: 439; Gehring 2009: 71). Whereas cooperation can also “emerge” from 
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individual and uncoordinated behavior (Axelrod/Keohane 1985: 244; Axelrod 1984; 
Sugden 1989; ‘spontaneous institutions’, Keohane 1989: 4; Daase 1999: 224–231) 
without collective decision-making (Kratochwil/Ruggie 1986: 765) or international 
regimes in form of treaties, the structure of international organizations allows 
adopting decisions within a certain cooperation project as needed. The contracting 
parties do not need to negotiate about all decisions at once, but can focus on those 
decisions that are presently achievable and required. Instead, other more remote 
decisions can be deferred. International organizations are created in fields with a 
frequent demand for decisions and allow for adapting to changing circumstances or 
reacting to external shocks. As such, international organizations are characterized by 
being incomplete contracts (Milgrom/Roberts 1990: 61–62; Hawkins et al. 2006b: 
16–17; Cooley/Spruyt 2009). The central element of organizations are decisions: 
“[O]nce started, organizations do nothing else than decision making” (Koch 2009: 
439). The concept highlights that international organizations emerge from interaction 
among member states, but can be distinguished from the member states and their 
interaction (Dörfler/Gehring 2015: 57–58). 
In essence, international organizations can be conceptualized as decision-making 
systems (Rittberger et al. 2012: 71–75, Easton 1965b: 29–33, 1965a: 111–112; for an 
application to the EU, see Schmidt 2013). An international organization forms a 
political system that converts inputs from its environment (‘demands’ and ‘support’) 
into decisions (output). The output then potentially affects new input via a feedback 
loop (Rittberger et al. 2012: 72; Easton 1965a: 111–112). Concerning the input, all 
interventions made by members or relevant actors can enter and affect the decision 
process. Without any signals from the environment the organization is bereft of its 
task, because in the absence of such signals, there can be no decisions. Therefore, the 
organization depends on the input from relevant members. At the same time, the 
incoming information is processed and decisions are adopted according to 
organizational rules and only according to such rules, which structure the decision 
process. While actors may strive to alter such rules, they can hardly ignore them 
(Gehring 2009; Koch 2009: 435). 
Even simple international organizations structure decision processes through 
adopting decisions on membership, scope and decision rules (Gehring 2009: 68–69, 
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2002: 79–100), often part of extensive pre-negotiations (Risse 2000: 20; Sebenius 
1983; Gross Stein 1989). The organizational rules determine how decisions are taken 
from now on. First, the organization sets boundaries on its membership. In fact, it 
makes a considerable difference if an intervention is made by a member or a non-
member so as to affect decisions of the organization. For instance, some organizations 
restrict access to the negotiation only to subgroups of states along certain predefined 
criteria. Second, organizations restrict the scope of negotiable issues (Koremenos et 
al. 2001: 770–771). Actors seek to delimitate issues that are subject to the 
negotiations to avoid overwhelming complexity. The creators can decide to have a 
rather broad scope and other seemingly unrelated issues might be linked to 
compromise (Sebenius 1983: 292–300). However, the more actors are involved, the 
more incentives actors have to limit the number of issues (Gehring 2002: 81–86). 
Third, actors need some principled mutual understanding on how future 
organizational decisions will be taken (Koremenos et al. 2001: 772). Because 
members need to know how collective agreements are adopted, they have to decide 
about how the input is transferred into organizational decisions. In principle, 
organizations can adopt decisions unanimously, by consensus or by any form of 
majority vote (Rittberger et al. 2012: 78–79). In fact, deciding on principled 
procedures defines which inputs become influential (Gehring 2002: 94–98). 
Organizational structuration effects can be traced back to two fundamental 
mechanisms. In the first instance, such structuration effects result from the transfer of 
decision competencies to subsidiary bodies (Gehring 2003: 93–97; Dörfler/Gehring 
2015: 58; also Keohane/Martin 2003: 102–104). Thereby, the decision process 
becomes functionally differentiated. Functional differentiation emerges “where the 
subsystems are defined by the coherence of particular types of activity and their 
differentiation from other types of activity, and these differences do not stem simply 
from rank” (Buzan/Albert 2010: 318; Luhmann 1983: 242). Because any simple 
negotiation system will be less efficient, more complex international organizations 
will comprise of a series of different organs that each serve a different function 
(Rittberger et al. 2012: 71–88). Functional differentiation even emerges when a 
thematic working group focuses on a subset of issues or an expert committee 
appraises certain factual questions. Likewise, every transfer of decision authority to 
secretariats, international bureaucracies or courts creates a system of divided labor. 
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Within the organization’s decision process, such organs perform particular functions. 
Actors in every sub-process will eventually create a specific decision rationale, 
simply because it has a particular membership, scope and decision rules that affects 
how inputs are transferred into decisions. In that sense, every suborgan can process 
different sorts of inputs be it scientific or legal, among others. The fundamental 
principle of functional differentiation does not only apply to modern societies 
(Buzan/Albert 2010), but also to organizations (Hawkins et al. 2006b: 12–20). 
In essence, in a functionally differentiated organization actors can no longer 
influence the content of the agreements in a single comprehensive decision, but can 
only influence a certain part of the overall decision (Gehring 2002: 162). Functional 
differentiation often results in distributing decision competencies authority among 
different organs with own procedures. Thereby, the organization will establish a sub-
process, for instance a committee, to deal with a subtask. This committee focuses on a 
specific issue area and operates under own formal or informal procedures. The 
committee will have a significantly narrower scope than the main conference. As is 
well known from international negotiations, the number of negotiated issues has an 
effect on the preference constellation within a negotiation and therefore also on the 
chances of cooperation (Sebenius 1983: 292–300). In addition, the procedure in any 
suborgan of an organization has a strong impact on who can actually influence 
decisions. Hence, which type of subsidiary body is selected for a task has an impact 
on an actor’s influence on decision-making (Schaefer 1996: 144). However, this logic 
also applies if the same group of actors processes two separated tasks one after the 
other. If the overall decision is split into a number of separate but smaller decisions 
that together produce the outcome, the actors can no longer affect the outcome by a 
single collective decision. To influence the overall outcome actors have only the 
possibility to influence the outcomes of the portioned sub-processes. As a result, 
separating the decision-making process into several sub-process will likely modify 
the overall decision and thus significantly affect actor’s behavioral opportunities 
(Gehring 2002: 162, 170–174; Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 125). 
In the second instance, organizations create structuration effects already through 
the mere fact that organizational decision-making processes take place against the 
background of previous decisions (Gehring 2009: 71–75; Koch 2009: 440; 
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Keohane/Martin 2003: 99–104). Within the organization, the initial rules on 
membership, scope and rudimentary decision procedures can be followed, amended 
or replaced, but they cannot be ignored. More than that, every new decision has to fit 
into the complex of already existing decisions. This creates a sequential decision 
process in which the already pre-existing decisions structure following phases of 
decision-making. While courts frequently settle disputes by recourse to earlier 
judgments (Koch 2009: 440–444), this applies equally to non-juridical organizations. 
Overall, organizational decision processes are typically characterized by path 
dependency insofar as previous decisions affect later decisions (Dörfler/Gehring 
2015: 60). 
All in all, international organizations will gain autonomy vis-à-vis its constituting 
member states as actors choose different collective decisions that they would not have 
chosen in an undifferentiated setting. If the organizational decisions can no longer be 
explained by the mere constellation of preferences among actors, but only through 
taking modified decision processes into account, then the organization must have at 
least some autonomy. While international organizations obviously vary in their degree 
of autonomy (Rittberger et al. 2012: 15–34), the degree of autonomy depends on the 
extent to which the organization interferes between the interest constellation of 
members and the organization’s decisions. In addition, to become an autonomous 
entity, the organization must dispose of relevant governance resources so as to make a 
difference for its addressees (Dörfler/Gehring 2015). 
In sum, this fundamental concept of international organizations highlights that 
international organizations are designed to fulfil a continuous demand for decision-
making and affect the decision-making and the decisions taken by two fundamental 
sources, which provides different opportunities for action. On the one hand, 
functional differentiation allows actors to influence the overall outcome only in 
smaller parts. On the other hand, decisions are always taken against the background 
of previous decisions. 
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2.3 Power-based decision-making in a uniform decision process 
A group of actors facing a cooperation problem can opt for a basic power-based 
decision-making mode in a uniform decision process, which serves as a baseline to 
assess the impact of a differentiated decision process. In essence, the group of actors 
would decide about all aspects of the cooperation problem without recourse to a 
committee stage. Thereby, the utility of the political cooperation project to produce 
favorable decisions for its members on a larger scale rests with the ability of the 
actors to adopt grand political decisions. In this process, actors have incentives to 
invest heavily in give-and-take bargaining processes as their aim is to move the 
negotiation outcome closer to their preferred solution. Hence, bargaining power 
becomes the major means of influence. Such negotiations would be subject to the 
logic of coordination within uniform negotiation settings. Accordingly, powerful 
actors will not accept unfavorable decisions unless costs are compensated through 
linkages. 
In case the group of actors favors to decide about all decisions within a unitary 
decision process, one can reasonably expect actors to employ a strategy of bargaining 
over the content of decisions. Bargaining as a concept refers to a negotiation process 
where actors exchange demands reinforced by promises, threats and more or less 
credible exit options to achieve their objectives and maximize their utility (Risse 
2000: 8; Elster 1989: 50–96; Odell 2013: 380–383). As such, negotiators will seek to 
produce additional welfare beyond the status quo. In addition, they have to bargain 
over the exact distribution of gains along the pareto frontier (Scharpf 1997: 118–124; 
Odell 2013: 387; Gehring 2002: 103–106). Under these circumstances, actors will 
enter the negotiation with maximalist bargaining positions and subsequently seek to 
achieve a negotiated solution of diverging positions by means of threats and step-wise 
offers. Actors have to make concessions because others have bargaining power, but 
seek to make as little concessions as possible (Elster 1989: 68–74). The extent of 
bargaining power thereby depends on the credibility of a selective exit from the 
negotiations. Actors with a credible exit option (also ‘outside option’) can threaten to 
exit negotiations if the costs associated with the exit are small. In turn, with 
increasing bargaining power, an actors has to make fewer concessions (Elster 1989: 
69, 74–82; Gehring 2003: 84–85; Kerler 2010: 90–92; Voeten 2001). 
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Under circumstances of diverging interests, actors will seek to nest single issues 
of asymmetric distributive effect through linkages into a grand decision package that 
is very important to its members and thus actors will seriously bargain over 
distributing costs and benefits (Koremenos et al. 2001: 770–771). A negative payoff 
for one party on one issue can be compensated through a positive payoff on another 
negotiation issue. Hence, accumulating completely unrelated issues into packages 
provides a viable means to ensure decision outcomes in spite of contradicting 
interests (Sebenius 1983). This way, while many decisions might be unfavorable for 
one negotiation party and thus accepting those would be irrational, it may be 
completely rational if the whole package of decisions is beneficial (Gehring 2003: 
91–92; Scharpf 1997: Chapter 6). 
In a uniform decision process, the content of decisions resulting from these grand 
bargains are characterized by the fact that potential gains of cooperation will be 
distributed on the basis of the constellation of bargaining power (Moravcsik 1998: 
60–67). In fact, these decisions will reproduce the power distribution and thus neglect 
the interests of less powerful actors (Scharpf 1997: 122–123). The bargaining power 
of actors will depend on their position relative to the status quo, and to what extent 
credible outside options are available. In case their position is close or equal to the 
status quo, a veto actor has strong bargaining power and can request considerable 
concessions or linkages to compensate for eventual losses. The decisive criterion of a 
successful bargaining process lies in achieving a solution that is beneficial for all 
actors, and not that the decision is particularly wise or efficient in implementation. 
Consequently, a uniform decision process provides little incentives to cease a 
bargaining strategy. Even though rational utility maximizers might be in need to gain 
information in case of uncertainty, which cannot be meaningfully produced in 
bargaining settings, after the information is available, actors will have incentives to 
pursue their interests with all power resources available (Gehring/Kerler 2007: 223; 
Gehring 2003: 84–90; Holzinger 2001: 419–422; Odell 2013). During the final 
negotiations, only bargaining will shift the outcome in a desired direction. Thus, we 
cannot expect actors to cede to bargain in a uniform decision process, if bargaining 
actually produces superior utility (Gehring 2003: 86). 
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Conversely, as regards the content of decisions, we can expect that 
implementation decisions taken within the framework of uniform bargaining 
processes will not primarily reflect problem-solving considerations or withstand 
criteria-based judgement. Bargaining processes are not suitable to produce justifiable 
solutions as problem-solving requires actors to forgo pursuing those alternatives that 
they favor but instead to weigh alternatives against a given standard to find those that 
fit the standard best. Bargaining processes substantially inhibit problem-solving 
processes and actors will not accept arguments as relevant information because they 
cannot expect others to be changing their preferences based on arguments. Actors will 
not engage in exchanging arguments if they believe to achieve their interests better in 
a simple bargaining process (Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 125–128; Gehring/Kerler 2007: 
222). 
Therefore, power-based decision-making serves as a baseline model that I expect 
to observe in a uniform, undifferentiated decision process and against which the 
effects of decision-making in differentiated settings will be assessed. Hence, if actors 
pursue decisions solely in one unitary decision stage, I expect that decisions will 
mirror pure bargaining outcomes that reflect the interest constellation and the relative 
power among the states. These decisions will accumulate any relevant aspects of the 
cooperation project into larger political bargains. In this scenario, powerful actors will 
not accept unfavorable decisions unless they can compensate costs through linkages. 
Consequently, the content of the decisions taken will entirely reflect the power 
distribution among the group of actors. 
 
2.4 Rule-based decision-making in functionally differentiated 
negotiation settings 
A group of actors significantly alters the decision situation and provides incentives for 
rule-based decision-making if they divide a bargaining process over a comprehensive 
package solution into two separate decision stages of deciding about rules which are 
subsequently applied to a number of singe cases. For instance, this is the case when 
the group of actors refers implementation decisions to a committee. Thereby, these 
actors chop a larger political project into small decisions, which each are of limited 
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importance. The political utility of the cooperation project, however, rests with the 
decision system’s ability to produce favorable outcomes on a larger scale. In this 
process, actors have to trade-off the overall utility of the cooperation project with 
their incentives to invest power resources to avoid every small implementation 
decision that runs counter to an actor’s interest. Therefore, actors may simply accept 
negative decisions, provided that the organization produces reasonable decisions on a 
whole. 
In contrast to unitary decision processes, a functionally differentiated decision 
process systematically affects the ability of rationally behaving states to enter 
situation-specific interests and provides incentives to submit well-founded decision 
requests aligned to mutually acceptable rules (Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 126). In fact, 
functionally differentiated organizations are suitable to limit the desire of rational 
actors to bargain for distributive gains in favor of assessing the merits of single-case 
decision requests vis-à-vis substantive decision criteria. Organization theory suggests 
that the structuring effects of functional differentiation results from splitting a 
formerly uniform decision process into several sub-decision processes with specific 
but limited functions. Whilst the institutional separation of tasks, for instance between 
a main conference and a committee, is a viable strategy, we would even expect such 
effects to be present if the same group of actors processes all aspects of a cooperation 
project, since these effects stem from the structuration of decision processes and not 
from the exact composition of the organs (Dörfler/Gehring 2015: 62). 
The structuration effect rests upon the separation of rulemaking and rule-
application (Gehring 2003: 98–103). In essence, actor’s behavioral options will be 
significantly altered when rulemaking and subsequent rule application, are distributed 
to two different decision-making processes, even if both functions are processed by 
the same group of actors. The separation of rulemaking and rule-application will 
initially defer a range of possibly contentious aspects, especially those that deal with 
the specific implementation of the cooperation problem and will instantly reduce the 
number of unresolved issues (Gehring 2003: 95–96). For instance, in case the group 
of actors mandates a committee with developing solutions for the cooperation 
problem, there will be an almost automatic separation between a level on which 
actors define the very cooperation goal and a level on which implementing decisions 
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are taken. In this differentiated setting, both organs will specialize on certain aspects 
(Mayntz 1988: 19; Ruffing 2011: 64–65). This will create a modified form of 
“institutional bargaining” (Young 1994: 98–106) that significantly influences the 
calculus of decision-makers (Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 126; Gehring 2003: 99). 
2.4.1 The constraints of rule-making 
In case a group of actors divides a previously uniform decision-making process into a 
stage negotiating general rules and a stage in which a number of applications are 
processed in light of these rules, actors operate under significantly altered constraints. 
In regulatory decision-making, actors usually separate bargaining over a 
comprehensive political decision about the content of a regulatory arrangement from 
many technical follow-up implementation decisions. In fact, by separating 
rulemaking from rule-application, actors in a first stage circumscribe their own scope 
of functions so as to adopt the general framework for later decisions and subjects 
actors entirely, or at least partially, to the constraints associated with the adoption of 
generally-applicable rules. In particular, in the rulemaking stage actors forfeit the 
possibility to overcome conflicts of interest by means of comprehensive package 
solutions. Instead, actors have to concentrate on guiding the subsequent decision 
process on implementation decisions through substantive and procedural decision 
criteria. As a result, functional differentiation converts the actors negotiating a general 
institutional setup from a logic of adopting mutually acceptable package deals to a 
logic of rulemaking. 
In a decision situation that requires the adoption of generally applicable decision 
rules, actors operate under systematic constraints that limit their ability to pursue their 
case-specific interests through bargaining over rules. Instead, they gain an interest in 
negotiating over a set of general procedural and substantive criteria that will guide 
the decision making process in the rule-implementation stage (Gehring 2009: 77). In 
fact, there is a “categorical difference” (Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 28) between the 
choice among different sets of rules and the choice among different options within the 
previously accepted rules. Unlike case-specific decisions, decisions about institutional 
rules apply across a broader range of contexts and longer timeframes (Young 1989: 
361–362; Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 29). At the same time, achieving the goal of 
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cooperation depends on the ability of both processes to adopt a sufficient number of 
small-scale implementation decisions. Specifically, in case a committee decides about 
small implementation decisions by consensus, the latent danger of committee 
decision blockade threatens the achievement of the cooperation goal. As a result, even 
rational utility-maximizers skeptical of rules gain an interest in guiding the rule-
application stage through rules (Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 126–127; Gehring/Dörfler 
2013: 569–571). 
The adoption of generally applicable rules subjects the actors to two pivotal 
constraints. First, if actors have to adopt generally applicable decision criteria without 
knowing their future situation-specific preferences, they operate under a ‘veil of 
uncertainty’ (Buchanan/Tullock 1965; Brennan/Buchanan 1985; Rawls 1971: 136–
142). At the time of rulemaking, actors do not yet know which of the potential 
options would best serve their interests because they are required to define rules that 
are applicable to individual cases that are yet unknown to actors. Brennan/Buchanan 
argue that “[a]s both the generality and the permanence of rules are increased, the 
individual who faces choice alternatives becomes more uncertain about the effects of 
alternatives on his own position” (Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 29–30). As long as actors 
are insecure about their preferences, they will be subject to the veil of uncertainty. In 
such a situation, actors are not sufficiently certain about their particularistic 
preferences so as to identify specific rules which would promise an advantageous 
position vis-à-vis other actors in the future. Hence, actors cannot simply apply their 
bargaining power because they are uncertain about which specific option out of a 
number of available options would match their particularistic interest best (Gehring 
2003: 104; Kerler 2010: 112). 
For the individual actor, it becomes rational to pursue a strategy that promises to 
reduce the probability to result in negative future consequences. If actors can hardly 
estimate which consequences a particular rule will have on a range of possible cases, 
they will gain an interest in elaborating rules that will generally produce acceptable 
implementation decisions (Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 29–30; Rawls 1971: 136–137; 
Young 1989: 362). The more actors are uncertain about their preferences in future 
cases, the more we can expect that actors are deprived of pursing a bargaining 
strategy effectively, as long as they do not have similar preferences across single 
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cases (Ruffing 2011: 66–67). Although Brennan/Buchanan make this argument for 
individual citizens facing a constitutional choice, Young argues that the mechanism 
equally applies to collective state actors (1989: 362; Gehring 2003: 104). 
Second, even if rulemaking actors know their future interests well, they are 
subject to a considerable consistency requirement. Should actors know the 
preferences in every single case that is to be decided and should they have different 
preferences in these cases, they can hardly pursue and realize all those case-specific 
interests. As substantive and procedural rules have to be applicable to a whole range 
of single case decisions, case-specific opportunistic decision-making is virtually 
impossible (Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 28–31). In fact, actors that only decide about 
general rules cannot pursue their case-specific interests because such single cases are 
no longer decided in this stage decision-making. Instead, they have to represent a 
bargaining position that aggregates over a number of single-case decisions (Gehring 
2003: 105). Therefore, each actor is forced to aggregate several case-specific interests 
into one consistent bargaining position. If actors are under such constrains they will 
naturally have to sort out extreme case-specific considerations (Brennan/Buchanan 
1985: 29–31). So even rational utility maximizers will gain an interest in choosing a 
bargaining position that reflects a median case and produces an acceptable outcome 
across a range of single cases (Gehring 2003: 105, 2004: 689–690). 
The rules resulting from rulemaking processes among powerful members are not 
automatically fair or isolated from bargaining power, simply because these rules 
materialize from decision-making processes among actors that bargain to achieve 
rules most favorable to them. When deciding about a generalized rule, the actors will 
indeed bargain for rules that maximize their utility when the rules are applied to 
specific cases in the committee stage. However, no generalized rule will satisfy all of 
the actor’s case-specific preferences. On the contrary, the influence of the single actor 
is restricted on influencing the package of rules that guide the decision-making 
process over a range of cases (Gehring 2003: 105–106; Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 29–
31). 
The constraints of rule-making are applicable to rule-making in the main 
conference and a committee alike. The effects are also likely to occur if a group of 
actors first decides about substantial and procedural criteria and afterwards processes 
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single cases according to such criteria within the same organ. In essence, the group of 
actors would first decide about the broader undertaking to adopt rules and would only 
then address the individual case-specific decisions in a second stage. Thus, it would 
first act as a main political body responsible for rulemaking and then act as a 
committee responsible for rule-implementation. 
In conclusion, actors delegating implementation decisions to a committee stage 
will be restrained to adopting consistent rules that are applicable to many future 
single cases in the implementation stage. The institutional process in the rulemaking 
stage systematically excludes all too detailed regulation of the decision-making 
process and precludes introducing all case-specific positions into the negotiation 
about the rules. Because actors cannot pursue all situation-specific interests in all 
future cases, even rationally behaving states gain an interest in adopting generally 
applicable rules that promise to result in widely acceptable solutions on a larger 
number of implementation decisions. 
2.4.2 The constraints of rule implementation in the committee stage 
Separating the elaboration of rules from adopting detailed implementation decisions 
significantly alters the decision situation of actors in the committee stage. Typically, 
actors in the committee stage are confronted with a stream of implementation 
decisions that cannot be meaningfully integrated into decision packages. Under these 
circumstances, actors cannot block every single decision that runs counter to their 
interests without compromising the functionality of the decision making apparatus on 
a whole. This particular situation prompts the issue of committee governance (Baylis 
1989: 15–20; Sartori 1987: 227–232). Hence, actors gain an interest in aligning 
decisions to mutually accepted rules or precedents because they have to make a trade-
off between marginal case-specific benefits and undermining the functionality of the 
governance system. 
The committee decision situation is substantially different to that of the rule-
making stage in as much as actors in the committee stage concentrate on adopting 
many small implementation decisions. The committee is usually confronted with a 
steady-stream of decision requests and so exists in a “continuous decisional context” 
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(Sartori 1987: 228). Furthermore, all these decision requests are usually of a similar 
and dichotomous nature (accept/reject). In fact, the decision requests will be 
relatively separated from each other so that they also have to be processed separately. 
Moreover, not every member will equally benefit from single-case decisions that 
typically have an asymmetric distributive effect, while each of these implementation 
decisions is of limited importance. Simultaneously, actors in the committee stage 
adopt decisions against the background of a more detailed set of decision criteria 
provided in the rulemaking stage. Even if these rules were previously made by the 
same group of actors, such decision criteria are likely to influence decision-making in 
terms of possible choices, unless the group of actors is prepared to ignore these 
criteria and to undermine the previously established separation of rulemaking and 
rule-application. 
In the rule-implementation stage, the danger of actors introducing their situation-
specific interests into the decision process is pertinent, in particular because the 
constraining mechanisms associated with rulemaking, the consistency requirement 
and the ‘veil of uncertainty’, are absent. As actors decide about single cases, they can 
define their interests well and thus are able to identify their benefits and costs 
associated with a particular single case decision (Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 29). In the 
committee stage, rational actors will seek to maximize their individual utility in every 
case before them. In addition, enforcing rule compliance will be problematic if actors 
prefer conflicting solutions to the cooperation problem.  
 
2.4.2.1 The logic of coordination situations in the committee stage 
The actor’s decision-making calculus within the committee stage under consensus 
will entail the constant danger of a decision-making blockade (Rittberger et al. 2012: 
101–102). Since the distributive effects of a single decision will most likely be 
asymmetrical, a single decision will hardly ever be of equal advantage for all 
committee members alike. Since not all members can realize their preferred outcome 
on each of the decision taken, the effectiveness of the committee stage is 
compromised if actors seek to pursue their situation-specific interests in all cases. An 
obvious solution to this problem would be to balance individual actor’s benefits and 
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costs associated with single case decisions through accumulating larger packages in a 
bargaining process. If single cases within the committee stage are small, well-
separated and of a dichotomous nature so as to preclude putting them into packages, 
the decision situation in the committee stage will create the pertinent danger of 
blockade if all actors equally pursue their situation-specific interests on decisions that 
will likely disadvantage some committee members over others (Gehring 2003: 109; 
Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 127). 
Assuming a decision situation facing only one discrete decision, state actors who 
strive to maximize their utility can decide without any restrictions if they want to 
support or if they want to obstruct that single decision. Actors will calculate the 
payoff of every possible outcome and select their decision according to what 
maximizes their utility. In this case, they would have incentives to sideline any 
available decision criteria if they do not promise to increase their utility in this single 
decision. As not all actors will equally benefit from a single decision, this situation 
resembles a Prisoner’s Dilemma constellation, characterized by free-riding that would 
result in a pareto-inferior collective outcome. If actors strictly follow their situation-
specific interests, they will not be able to coordinate their behavior and, as a 
consequence, endanger the realization of cooperation gains (Gehring 2002: 176–177). 
The calculus of actors in the committee stage will be significantly altered if they 
will have to process not only one discrete decision but a whole chain of single case 
decisions (Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 126–127; Kerler 2010: 111). In such a situation that 
exhibits the structure of an iterated game, actors will face many discrete single 
decisions in many different rounds of negotiation across time. Actors will have to 
consider that they not solely decide about a single case but that every single decision 
is part of a chain of decisions that have to be taken in the future. Consequently, 
achieving the overall goal of cooperation depends on continuously adopting separate 
decisions at different points in time. The overall utility for an actor therefore depends 
on each of the single cases including the expected utility of future cases. When 
deciding about a single case, actors have to take the effects of their choice today on 
the future cases into account. Actors have to expect that their defection in one game 
will be sanctioned by other actors in the following games (Tit-for-tat, see Axelrod 
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1984). However, actors can also expect that their cooperation will be honored with 
cooperation by other actors in the future (Gehring 2003: 108). 
In such a situation an actor has two options. On the one hand, an actor can still 
decide to support or object to a single case in order to maximize its payoff. However, 
the actor also has to face cost associated with its short term gains in the single case as 
the overall goal of cooperation may be undermined. The actor can no longer expect 
other actors to be cooperative in future decisions. Achieving short-term gains in one 
case will result in losses in a number of cases in the long run. On the other hand, the 
actor can decide to accept a single-case decision, even if it runs counter to its own 
case-specific interests. Although this decision does create some losses in the short-
term, it promises to increase the likelihood that the cooperation project will result in 
positive gains in the long run. We can expect that actors facing such a decision 
situation will favor cooperation if the “shadow of the future” is large (Gehring et al. 
2005: 58). 
This situation resembles the structure of a mixed-motive coordination situation 
(Stein 1982: 309–311; Snidal 1985: 931–936) in which actors have a common interest 
in cooperation and prefer agreement over non-agreement but have diverging 
preferences for the particular solution (battle of the sexes). Hence, actors collectively 
have to select one solution out of a range of potential solutions. These situations 
exhibit multiple equilibria (Schelling 1960: 57–58; Garrett/Weingast 1993: 181–187) 
and are characterized by the fact that they do not structurally emphasize one 
particular solution to the coordination problem. At the same time, because each single 
decision request follows the logic of a coordination game, realizing the cooperation 
project depends on finding a solution to the sum of single-cases. Because not all 
actors can always achieve their case-specific interests in the committee stage, an actor 
ultimately has to accept some decisions that violate its preferences, unless the actor 
indeed prefers blockade over coordination. In effect, assuming differing preferences, 
some actors will be victorious, while others will have to compromise. The challenge 
for actors lies in determining, which of the potential solutions to pick, i.e. when to 
compromise. 
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2.4.2.2 Coordination situations in the committee stage create demand for focal points 
In the committee stage, the issue of multiple equilibria in coordination situations with 
diverging interests creates demand for focal points (Schelling 1960; Garrett/Weingast 
1993) that indicate when actors have to compromise and when they can pursue their 
situation-specific interests. Actors in the committee stage will only accept short-term 
losses when they can reasonably expect that other members will accept losses in a 
future decision that are unfavorable to them. Without a focal point, an actor that does 
not want to tolerate short-term loss will have no incentives to give in and will 
eventually endanger the entire cooperation project. Accordingly, the decision situation 
creates the demand for decision rules that guide decision-making in the committee 
stage. This issue is aggravated when decision-makers face a steady stream of 
decisions to be taken which will result in pressure for routinization and 
standardization of procedures (Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 127–128). 
The major interest of the study of focal points is how actors arrive at solutions in 
coordination situations with multiple equilibria (Martin/Simmons 2013: 331; 
Keohane/Martin 2003: 99–104; Garrett/Weingast 1993: 181–185). Actors in favor of 
agreement over stalemate require a mutually accepted focal point which denotes a 
certain solution out of several potential solutions. Since coordination situations 
exhibit two or even several equally plausible solutions (Nash equilibria), a focal point 
indicates one specific solution that is “salient” (Mehta et al. 1994: 661–662; Schelling 
1960) or “sufficiently obvious” from the other solutions in one dimension relevant to 
the actors (Sugden/Zamarrón 2006: 615–617). It is the essence of cultural traditions 
such as etiquette that it is a solution (out of many possible) to a basic coordination 
problem solved by mutual expectation: everyone expects everyone else to adhere to 
the agreed rules (Schelling 1960: 91). This logic also applies to mixed-motive games, 
where individuals have a common interest in avoiding an uncoordinated solution but 
have divergent preferences on the coordinated solution. In an experiment, where two 
players need to divide 100$ between themselves, each player wishes to increase the 
individual share. When the players cannot communicate, both individuals will likely 
choose to split the amount in half. This solution exemplifies that the 50:50 solution is 
unique among all possible solutions and serves as a focal point (Schelling 1960: 61–
63).  
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The solution to the coordination problem is that individuals will consult 
additional information to bring expectations into convergence which is dependent on 
the context of the situation (Schelling 1960: 57). A focal point is taken from beyond 
the decision-situation precisely because coordination situations are structurally 
underspecified and do not naturally offer a point of reference as to where actors are 
expected to compromise and where they can pursue their situation-specific interests 
(Ringe 2005: 733; Sugden/Zamarrón 2006). As a result of the consulted information, 
the actor’s perceived structure of the game is different from the formal structure of 
the game. Focal points can enable the actors to pick one particular solution out of an 
amorphous range of possible options, precisely because of a particular feature of the 
chosen solution. This move becomes a rational choice for actors (Schelling 1960: 68–
69). To solve the coordination problem actors have to identify a method for 
“equilibrium selection”. The existence of a focal point narrows the available range of 
identifiable solutions (Huth et al. 2013: 92–93). Focal points translate an abstract 
cooperation problem into specific behavioral expectations in a given decision 
situation, even when actors have diverging interests. The role of focal points is 
especially crucial under circumstances of complexity and uncertainty, where 
appropriate information may serve as “pivotal mechanisms” to coordinate mutual 
expectations (Garrett/Weingast 1993: 176–179). 
In the committee stage, actors can resort to two sources of powerful focal points 
to solve the coordination problem. First, externally provided substantive and 
procedural decision criteria lend themselves as potential candidates for such focal 
points in coordination situations (Garrett/Weingast 1993: 181–185; Huth et al. 2013: 
93; Martin/Simmons 2013: 331-333, 339), even if they have been previously 
elaborated by the identical group of actors. In case a previous decision stage 
determined a set of substantive and procedural rules, actors in the committee stage 
gain a strong interest in accepting these rules as focal points to guide their decision-
making. In fact, these rules are easily available and produce no additional transaction 
costs. Essentially, these rules adopted under the constraints of rulemaking precisely 
reflect the long-term goal of cooperation. However, as a prerequisite, all relevant 
actors in the committee stage, especially those that would otherwise block the 
decision process, must accept a focal point. Alternatively, actors could simply agree 
to sideline the previously agreed decision criteria by accepting other information as 
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focal point. Yet, this strategy presupposes finding a formal or informal rule that all 
members can agree on instead of the existing rules. However, making a decision on a 
single case has to be logically preceded by a stage of determining the rules before 
making choices within these rules similar to pre-negotiations in simple negotiations 
(Brennan/Buchanan 1985: 6; Gross Stein 1989). If actors seek to sideline the decision 
criteria by negotiating a new set of rules, they will have to face additional transaction 
costs (Gehring/Dörfler 2013: 570). Accordingly, it is likely that actors in the rule-
application stage follow externally provided rules not because they are unbiased, just 
or equally preferred by all members, but because these rules provide a readily-
available solution to a coordination problem. 
Second, in case there are no sufficiently precise decision criteria available, actors 
in the committee stage have to resort to precedents as functionally equivalent source 
of internally created focal points. In the absence of decision criteria, actors will need 
other focal points to address a coordination problem that would lead to blockade if 
unsolved. Basing decisions on similar but earlier accepted or rejected decision 
requests offers a meaningful and easily available solution to a coordination situation 
(March/Olsen 1989: 21–38; Schelling 1960: 67–68). An earlier decision – regardless 
of how it came about – will inevitably provide a yardstick for later decisions of a 
similar kind because it reflects a collective decision by the same group of actors in the 
same institutional context (Schelling 1960: 135). Actors will find it difficult to select 
an alternative solution that is more widely acceptable than the precedent. The 
repeated application of a precedent to a number of like single-case decisions will 
create a decision practice and increase the pressures for consistent decision making 
(Snidal 1985: 936). Repeatedly accepted precedents are likely to create lasting 
behavioral expectations (Schelling 1960: 64, 91, 260; Young 1989: 359–366), which 
are determined by what is usually done in such a case (Schelling 1960: 57). The 
mechanism will become increasingly self-sustaining as those actors, which have 
accepted unfavorable decisions in favor of realizing the long-term goal of 
cooperation, will insist that others, which face unfavorable decisions, will also adhere 
to accepted decision practice (Gehring 2003: 109). In fact, similar to rules, an 
established precedent creates collective expectations about acceptable follow-up 
decisions both positively (i.e. what is an acceptable proposal) and negatively (i.e. 
what is an unacceptable proposal). In addition, processing decision proposals 
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according to the established precedents promises to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with decision-making in a large number of cases that are complex but have 
limited utility each (Coleman 1988: 213; Stone 2011: 12). 
As a result, the decision situation in the committee stage generates substantial 
constraints and provides strong incentives to rule-based decision-making. Existing 
rules and precedents will favor those actors that submit rule-conforming decision 
proposals and disadvantage actors that submit non-conforming decision requests. 
Actors that advocate a rule-conforming solution will expose deviant proposals as 
arbitrary, whereas those actors favoring a solution non-conforming to the rules will 
struggle to draw on a similarly persuasive account (Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 2004: 259; 
Huth et al. 2013: 94; on the similar concept of ‘rhetorical entrapment’, see 
Schimmelfennig 2001). On the contrary, actors will refuse to accept a collective 
solution that violates existing rules unless this step is necessary, for instance because 
the type of case is unprecedented or because the proposal does not meet established 
preconditions. However, in case of deviating preferences, a disadvantaged group of 
actors is unlikely to accept a solution that is not in conformity with the rules. Actors 
without stakes will tend towards options that will be justifiable in light of the decision 
criteria because they do not have any incentives to permanently violate the mutually 
agreed rules (Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 127; Gehring/Kerler 2008: 1007). While actors 
in the committee stage might prefer power-based decision-making over rule 
adherence, rules serve as a means to overcome decision blockades in coordination 
situations because rule violation in one case will likely trigger reciprocal objections. 
Therefore, because power-based decision-making is likely to elicit blockade, rule-
based decision-making provides a viable alternative. Consequently, if actors have an 
interest in avoiding an uncoordinated solution, they will tend to accept some negative 
decisions of a small scope provided that the costs of such case-specific decisions are 
small in comparison to the benefits of the larger cooperation project. Thus, even 
rational utility maximizers have incentives to accept a solution following a focal point 
as long as they favor agreement on this specific choice over stalemate. 
The constraints of rule application inherent to committee governance provide 
implications for behavioral choices of actors submitting single-case decision 
proposals. While proponents of a certain decision have incentives to align the 
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decision proposal to established decision criteria or rules emerging from a particular 
precedent, opponents need to argue for the difference of the decision proposal vis-à-
vis the established practice (i.e. rule/precedent is not applicable). The costs of 
blocking a decision will increase if its content is like to previously accepted cases. 
Repeatedly accepted decisions will increase the introduction of similar decision 
proposals insofar actors are aware of such a decision practice. Actors will tend to 
submit decision proposals that they can reasonably expect to succeed and will tend to 
avoid submitting proposals that have little chance of succeeding. This way, the 
emergence of mutually accepted decision criteria encourages to submit proposals that 
can be justified in light of the decision criteria, whereas developing behavioral 
expectations discourage submitting unjustifiable proposals (Huth et al. 2013: 93). 
Furthermore, proponents of a certain decision proposal will seek to incrementally 
change the decision practice to aligning new but similar decision proposals to 
previously accepted decisions (Gerhardt 2005). Decision proposals are likely to be 
slightly different from one another. As such, members of the committee have to 
decide whether a decision proposal sufficiently resembles an existing decision criteria 
or rule emerging from precedent or whether the differences in degree justify setting a 
new precedent. Actors will seek to deliberately set new precedents to better achieve 
their expected utility. 
The constraints of rule application also provide implications for behavioral 
choices of actors deciding about decision requests in the committee stage. Actors in 
the committee stage have incentives to align their decisions to substantive and 
procedural decision criteria or rules emerging from precedent. When deciding about a 
case, actors will have an interest in applying the same substantive criteria across 
cases, as not to provoke reciprocal shifting of criteria on their own decision requests 
in future decisions. Crucially, the decision situation provides incentives to accept 
decision requests that are justifiable in light of decision criteria, even if a state has 
diverging situation-specific interests, provided that the functionally differentiated 
organization produces favorable decisions. As a result, one could expect that the 
quality of a request vis-à-vis the decision criteria becomes a decisive factor in 
explaining the decision outcome. 
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Alternatively, actors in the committee stage could confront the danger of decision 
blockade by rubber-stamping all decision requests in a laissez-faire decision-making 
mode (Gehring/Dörfler 2013: 570–571). This is likely to occur if actors do not have 
substantive interests in the single cases and thus no incentives to challenge submitted 
decision proposals. Then, actors are not in a coordination situation, which prompts 
the danger of blockade and the associated willingness to engage in rule-based 
decision-making in the first place. Thus, the constraining effects of rule application 
will only occur if actors in the committee stage have an interest in the decisions so 
that there is a certain conflict of interest among actors. Accordingly, rule adherence in 
the committee stage depends on the existence of a conflict of interest among actors 
and their willingness to scrutinize, challenge and eventually block non-conforming 
decision requests. 
 
These theoretical considerations can be summarized in the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: If a committee of states processes separate and asymmetric decision 
proposals of limited scope that preclude accumulation into decision packages, 
committee members are expected to abide by given substantive and procedural rules, 
even if these rules contradict situation-specific preferences of some committee 
members. 
Hypothesis 2: If a committee of states processes separate and asymmetric decision 
proposals of limited scope that preclude accumulation into decision packages and 
substantive and procedural rules are absent or ambiguous, committee members are 
expected to abide by rules derived from precedents, even if such rules contradict 
situation-specific preferences of some committee members. 
 
The expected effects of committee governance are likely to occur regardless of 
the specific institutional design. Assigning rulemaking and rule-application to 
different bodies, for instance between a main conference and a committee, or even to 
independent agents, institutionalizes the separation of functions. However, the same 
effect is likely to occur if both functions are processed by the same group of actors 
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within the same organ. The altered decision situation essentially arises from 
separating decision functions even within the same body, not from the establishing 
supplementary organs. This should equally apply to precedents as internally produced 
sources of focal points because adopting a precedent logically presupposes that the 
case is applicable to future cases. 
The developed causal model of committee governance is subject to three scope 
conditions. First, the effects of committee governance will only occur if decision 
proposals are entered separately. Otherwise, these could be accumulated into 
packages until negative payoffs have been sufficiently compensated. Second, the 
effects of committee governance will only occur if the actors have to process a stream 
of single-cases that are each of relatively limited importance to decision-makers. 
Without such a stream of decisions there are no suitable rules or precedents because 
decisions are not similar in kind. On the contrary, if decisions are singular and 
isolated issues – whether technical or not – that are of vital interest to actors, actors 
will heavily invest in bargaining to realize favorable distributive effects. Third, the 
effects of committee governance only occur if actors find themselves in a 
coordination situation, which gives rise to the influence of focal points. In case one 
member favors a decision blockade over rule-based decision-making, rules and 
precedents lose their power as focal points because focal points no longer signify a 
mutually acceptable solution. In fact, any coordinated solution will be outside the 
win-set of the member and thus that member will likely stall. In all three cases, I 
would expect to observe a logic of power-based decision-making.  
In summary, the decision situation in the committee stage provides strong 
incentives for rule-based decision-making. The decision situation is substantially 
different if actors are faced with the task to take numerous separate implementation 
decisions in light of provided criteria. Actors tasked with rule-implementation are 
deprived of their ability to compensate losses through accumulating single issues to 
packages. In this case, actors find themselves in a mixed-motive coordination game 
that entails the serious risk of a decision blockade should every actor pursue its 
situation-specific interests in all cases. Instead, to realize the goal of cooperation, 
committee members require focal points. Externally produced substantive and 
procedural criteria are suitable and easily available. Alternatively, actors could use 
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similar cases as precedents. The process will be self-sustaining if actors operate under 
a well-established decision practice because actors will expect that rule violation will 
be reciprocally sanctioned. As a consequence, because alternatives to rule-based 
decision-making are unattractive, the committee will essentially operate in a rule-
based decision-making mode. 
 
2.5 The logic of committee governance in the United Nations Security 
Council 
The outlined causal model of committee governance applies to a multitude of 
international organizations and is neither specified to a certain decision procedure nor 
to a particular organization. I would expect the causal mechanism to be present in 
circumstances in which a stream of separate implementation decisions with limited 
scope has to be processed regardless whether or not the organization operates in high 
or low politics and independent of the policy area. Moreover, the decision functions 
of rulemaking and rule-application do not need to be separated between two bodies, 
but can equally be processed, albeit separately, by the same group of actors within the 
same organ. The causal model also relates to a multitude of organizations regardless 
of the question whether or not the decision-makers intend to produce the effects of 
committee governance or simply delegate decision competencies to reduce the 
workload and increase efficiency. 
The Security Council conforms to the outlined fundamental conception of 
international organizations. Apart from being a UN principal organ, the Security 
Council can be conceptualized as a separate international organization even though it 
lacks institutional features usually linked to organizational autonomy, such as a strong 
secretariat (Barnett/Finnemore 2004, 1999; Biermann/Siebenhüner 2009, 2013; Elsig 
2010). States created this institution with a defined membership (UN Charter art. 23). 
The scope is clearly defined and formally restricted to the field of international 
security. In essence, the Council serves as a cooperation project with the “primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. As an 
organization, the Security Council has the major task to continuously adopt 
collectively binding decisions for all UN member states (UN Charter art. 24, 25). The 
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UN Charter also outlines specific decision rules on substantive and procedural 
decisions including the veto power for the permanent members (UN Charter art. 27). 
Due to its right to adopt legally-binding international law, impose sanctions, send 
peacekeepers to conflict zones, or authorize the use of force, the Council disposes of 
far-reaching resources to act, which potentially affects its decisions’ addressees. 
The Security Council also matches the baseline model of power-based decision-
making in uniform decision processes, which can be compared to the logic of 
committee governance. In case the members of the Security Council decide to adopt 
decisions without recourse to a committee, the Security Council follows the logic of a 
uniform decision process. The UN Charter provides no significant limits to Council 
action (Peters 2012: 765–771) so this decision mode will provide very little 
constraints. This is especially true since the Security Council is not subject to any 
form of judicial control and non-state agents, such as the UN Secretariat, do not play 
any significant role. In fact, UNSC member states retain virtually all meaningful 
decisions to themselves. In this case, I would expect to observe Council decisions in 
the form of package deals following the interests of powerful members. 
The UN Security Council equally conforms to the causal model of committee 
governance. The Security Council serves as a meaningful case for the causal 
mechanism according to which the transfer of decision competencies to a committee 
fundamentally alters the decision situation and therefore affects the content of 
decisions taken. One typically finds the situation of committee governance within the 
Security Council’s sanctions regimes. The Security Council frequently delegates 
streams of small-scale implementation decisions to its sanctions committees with 
identical membership. These decisions are submitted separately and independently of 
each other and are mostly of a small scope, such as listing and delisting of individuals 
and entities subject to assets freeze and travel ban. Thereby, the decision functions of 
rulemaking and rule-application are not necessarily separated between the Council 
and its committee. In some instances, the committee serves a rulemaking function 
alongside the Council. As a consequence, I expect to observe the effects of committee 
governance, if the Security Council within in its sanctions regimes delegates streams 
of single-case decisions of limited scope to its sanctions committees. 
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How can we now locate the issue of committee governance within the overall 
decision situation of Security Council members? Figure 1 provides a decision tree and 
outlines the individual choices of permanent Council members that yield collective 
outcomes when the Council is confronted with a crisis situation and decides about 
whether or not to impose a sanctions regime. 
Figure 1: Decision Tree Security Council Sanctions Regimes 
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Note: Author’s illustration. 
 
When permanent Council members decide about imposing sanctions in a particular 
crisis, they can either cooperate and impose a sanctions regime or they can not 
cooperate and veto the establishment of a sanctions regime (Choice I). In the former 
case, the Council institutes a sanctions regime if all permanent Council members 
prefer cooperation over non-cooperation. In this situation, a skeptical permanent 
member will have to weigh the costs and benefits of cooperation vis-à-vis the costs 
and benefits of obstruction. On the one hand, permanent Council members may have 
an interest in how to address a particular crisis situation. These interests may derive 
from various sources including long standing political alliances, particular economic 
interests, overall geostrategic interests or principled objection to outside intervention. 
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On the other hand, while the veto privilege of the five permanent members may 
seriously impede collective action of the Council, the permanent members may often 
opt for some Council action over obstruction. Skeptical permanent members can 
employ the Council to control far-reaching initiatives of proactive members (Contessi 
2010). Proactive permanent members may use the Council as a tool for information 
transmission (Thompson 2006a, 2006b, 2009) or to increase the legitimacy of their 
actions (Voeten 2005; Hurd 2007). As a result, in many cases, the permanent 
members may have a diffuse shared interest in agreement and avoiding the use of the 
veto privilege (Krisch 2008: 141–142). The costs and benefits of the particular choice 
depends on the relative position towards the status quo and the availability of credible 
outside options (Voeten 2001). A skeptical permanent member, which can issue a 
credible veto threat, can extract substantial concessions of proactive members 
provided that the proactive members cannot fall back on a credible outside option, for 
instance, a unilateral military intervention. If a skeptical permanent member can 
credibly draw on an outside option as alternative to imposing a sanctions regime, it 
will likely veto the imposition of the sanctions regime. The extent of these costs and 
benefits in a particular case is then up to empirical investigation and may vary from 
case to case. 
In a second step, if permanent Council members have collectively decided to 
create a sanctions regime, they can delegate implementation decisions to a sanctions 
committee or they can pursue all aspects of the sanctions regime within the Council 
as unitary decision process (Choice II). In the former case, actors may profit from 
creating a committee, for instance to take implementation decisions as necessary over 
a longer period of time and thus reduce the immediate workload of the Council. In the 
latter case, retaining the important decisions in a unitary Council decision process 
allows Council members to instantly pursue their situative preferences and will 
expectedly yield a collective outcome following the logic of package deals. For 
instance, actors can opt for a unitary Council decision process if they are specifically 
interested in a package deal, are under time constraints or wish to raise the public 
profile of their decisions. The content of these package deals is likely to be 
determined by the interest constellation among Council members, in particular among 
the permanent members. 
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In a third step, if the permanent Council members prefer to delegate 
implementation decisions such as listing and delisting of individuals subject to 
targeted sanctions to a committee, the individual choices of committee members on 
single-case implementation decisions in the context of the specific sanctions regime 
determine the collective outcome. These can potentially yield three collective 
outcomes (Choice III) provided that decisions are small and separate. 
As a first scenario, if actors decide to pursue their situative preferences in all 
implementation decisions, the collective outcome likely is blockade. A situation of 
committee blockade is also expected to occur if at least one committee member 
pursues a dominant strategy of blockade under consensus. This route provides an 
alternative to a Council veto in a uniform decision process and can be beneficial for a 
skeptical permanent member because it can similarly prevent meaningful decisions 
while committee deliberations are less visible to the outside. However, non-
permanent members can equally choose for a decision blockade but they could be 
outvoted in the Council and by virtue have a finite ‘non-permanent’ Council tenure. 
In a situation, where one committee member has a dominant interest in blockade, 
rules will be epiphenomenal because rules will likely point to solutions which are 
situated outside the win-set of the skeptical permanent or non-permanent member. 
As a second scenario, if actors decide to not pursue their situative preferences in 
all implementation decisions, the collective outcome likely is rule-based decision-
making. Should all committee members have a more or less pronounced common 
interest in the functionality of the sanctions regime but differ in the preferred solution, 
they will find themselves in a mixed-motive situation on single case decisions. If 
decisions are taken at different points in time and thus preclude adding decisions into 
larger packages, actors gain an interest in accepting some unfavorable 
implementation decisions unless they are willing to risk the operability of the 
committee. Formal rules and rules derived from precedents then provide suitable 
candidates for focal points that point to coordinated solutions. Hence, the committee 
is expected to operate according to a logic of rule-based decision-making if all 
committee members prefer a coordinated solution over blockade. 
As a third scenario, if actors simply accept all implementation decisions because 
committee members have a negligible self-interest in those single-case decisions, the 
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collective outcome likely is laissez-faire decision-making. Hence, the committee 
members do not have any impetus to challenge any of the decision requests. 
However, a certain conflict of interest would be necessary to give rise to the 
coordination situations and the risk of blockade, which ultimately creates the demand 
for focal points and the incentives for rule-based decisions. 
In conclusion, the UN Security Council conforms to the causal model of 
committee governance, if it delegates decision competencies to its sanctions 
committees. I expect to observe the effects of committee governance, if the Security 
Council delegates implementation decisions of limited scope to its sanctions 
committees, while I expect power-based decision-making in a uniform Council 
decision situation. Accordingly, the aggregated preferences of Council members point 
to four distinct collective outcomes. Rule-based decision-making is only one potential 
outcome and will expectedly occur, when Council members delegate to a committee 
and have a certain interest in the implementation decisions so that they eschew a 
laissez-faire mode or a decision blockade. Hence, the causal mechanism of committee 
governance only applies, if a permanent member does not pursue a dominant strategy 
of blockade within the committee. In this case, rules will point to coordinated 
solutions that are outside the actor’s win-set. 
 
2.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I developed a causal model of committee governance and argued that 
decision-making within UNSC sanctions regimes is best explained by looking at the 
decision situation provided by a specific form of functionally differentiation as 
opposed to a uniform Council decision process. The postulated causal mechanism 
suggests that separating a formerly uniform decision-making processes into a stage of 
rulemaking and a subsequent stage of applying these rules to single-case decisions is 
causally relevant to explain actor’s behavioral patterns and the content of decisions 
taken within both stages. 
The decision situation of a group of actors in the rulemaking stage systematically 
yields incentives for adopting consistent and generally-applicable rules to guide the 
following implementation decisions. A group of actors concentrating on adopting 
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rules for processing a number of future single-case decisions in a separate decision 
stage is confronted with constraints that favor the adoption of consistent rules. On the 
one hand, actors will operate under a ‘veil of uncertainty’ when they have to adopt 
decision criteria without knowing their preferences on all future cases to which these 
rules will apply. For individual actors, it is reasonable to strive for rules that promise 
to produce acceptable implementation decisions. On the other hand, even if actors 
know future cases well, they will be subject to consistency constraints. When actors 
no longer decide about single cases but about general rules, they have to present a 
bargaining position that aggregates several case specific preferences into one 
consistent bargaining position and sort out extreme cases. Hence, even rational actors 
gain an interest in choosing a bargaining position that produces an acceptable 
outcome across a range of single cases. 
The decision situation in the committee stage provides strong incentives for rule-
based decision-making. The situation is substantially different if actors have to adopt 
many separate implementation decisions in light of provided criteria. Actors tasked 
with rule-implementation are deprived of their ability to compensate losses through 
accumulating single issues to packages. In this case, actors find themselves in a 
mixed-motive coordination situation that entails the serious risk of a decision 
blockade should every actor pursue its situation-specific interests to the effect that 
some actors need to compromise. Instead, to realize the goal of cooperation, 
committee members require focal points to signify which solutions are acceptable and 
which not. Externally produce substantive and procedural criteria are suitable and 
easily available. Alternatively, actors could use similar cases as precedents. The 
process will be self-sustaining if actors operate under a well-established decision 
practice because they will expect that rule violation will be reciprocally sanctioned. 
As a consequence, because alternatives to rule-based decision-making are 
unattractive, the committee will essentially operate in a rule-based decision-making 
mode. 
The analysis of rule-based decision-making is contrasted to a uniform decision 
process that is likely to yield power-based decisions. In this mode, a group of actors is 
relatively unconstrained provided that they can agree on a solution. The group of 
actors will likely accumulate single issues into a comprehensive package. Such 
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negotiations would be subject to the logic of bargaining over grand political 
decisions. In bargaining, actors invest heavily into moving the bargaining outcome 
closer to the individually preferred solution, while diverging preferences are 
compensated through linkages. Hence, bargaining power becomes the major means of 
influence. Decisions emerging from such bargaining processes will entirely reflect the 
preference constellation among powerful actors. 
The presented argument is entirely compatible with an institutionalist research 
agenda and incorporates organization theoretical concepts without leaving the 
fundamental assumptions of rationalist cooperation theory. It is rooted within 
institutionalism that highlights the mutual benefits of institutionalized cooperation for 
states (Abbott/Snidal 1998; Koremenos et al. 2001; Keohane 1984). It complements 
such theoretical thoughts with ideas from organization theory that emphasizes the 
structuration effects of decision-making in differentiated organizations (Koch 2009; 
Gehring 2009). This conceptual choice rests upon the consideration that a meaningful 
concept of decision-making within more complex organizations only achieves 
sufficient explanatory power, if it is also applicable under the demanding conditions 
of egoistic utility maximizers. The argument is also compatible with alternative 
explanations attributing the increasing regulation in UNSC sanctions regimes 
primarily to external pressure. Such arguments suggest that the critique over the 
infringement of fundamental rights of targeted individuals in one particularly 
important UNSC sanctions regime (Genser/Barth 2014; Bothe 2008; Tzanakopoulos 
2010; Biersteker/Eckert 2006, 2009; Heupel 2013; Kanetake 2008) caused the 
increasingly dense set of regulations. While these approaches made convincing 
contributions, the causal model places these arguments within the broader context of 
UNSC committee governance. 
The argument outlined here is substantially different from arguments that explain 
decision-making and decisions of international organizations primarily by the 
autonomous action of bureaucracies or secretariats. In principal-agent approaches 
(Hawkins et al. 2006b; Nielson/Tierney 2003), but also in bureaucratic culture 
approaches (Barnett/Finnemore 2004), the deviation of the agent from the principals 
interests is inherently considered as a problematic aspect. A different strand of 
modern regulatory theory highlights that in some instances principals gain from an 
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independent agent if it binds it to the principal’s long-term interest (Majone 2001b). 
However, these approaches fail to account for effect created by delegating decision 
competencies to the same group of actors. The argument outlined here is also 
substantially different from arguments that explain the decisions of international 
organizations primarily by focusing on the interest constellation of powerful 
members. By contrast, while taking the significance of rationally pursued preferences 
seriously, I suggest that such rational utility maximizing actors operating in structures 
characterized by functional differentiation cannot pursue their situation-specific 
interest in every case without compromising the operability of the cooperation 
project. Therefore, in the present argument I combine rationally pursued preferences 
with the idea that such preferences can only be pursued within the institutional 
framework in which actors operate. 
The added value of this theoretical approach is that it takes the structuration 
effects of functionally differentiated organizations into the view. The concept of 
committee governance provides an empirically applicable framework, which directs 
the attention to the specific opportunity structures that emerge from separating 
rulemaking and rule-application in which rational members operate. The causal 
mechanism illustrates that the transfer of decision competencies to a subsidiary 
committee will alter the decision situation of rational actors, even if the same group 
of actors is present in all decision stages. Because the organization allocates different 
opportunity structures to actors in both stages, actors will choose behavioral patterns, 
they would not have chosen without such a structuration. Because it rests upon the 
creation of specific opportunity structures, this concept explicitly captures powerful 
agents such as secretariats or even courts, which might be instituted with particular 
functions and be comparatively independent and therefore can affect organizational 
decisions. More than that, the concept offers an explanatory framework for the 
borderline case of a relatively simple structured, intergovernmental organization that 
is dominated by few great powers, where a group of actors transfers decision 
competencies to a committee with the same membership. While the extent of 
structuration may empirically differ, every organization exhibits some form of 
institutional incentives that members cannot eschew. 
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3 Methodological Approach: Theory-testing Process Tracing, 
Case Selection and Observable Implications 
In this chapter I clarify why I expect the method of theory-testing process tracing to 
produce valid evidence for the postulated causal mechanism of committee 
governance. Above all, the decisive factor for choosing this method is that research 
goal is to empirically analyze if the hypothesized causal mechanism is present in the 
studied cases and if so, whether it actually empirically worked as theoretically 
postulated. At the same time, the chapter elucidates why the Security Council is a 
useful object of investigation, why its sanctions regimes provide a suitable unit of 
analysis and why the particular cases promise to produce a particularly meaningful 
test. Equally, the comparative perspective of intentionally selected cases seeks to 
admit deriving at least some modest generalizations about the presence and workings 
of the causal mechanism across other potential cases (for such research approach, see 
Beach/Pedersen 2013). 
The chapter will exclusively focus on those aspects of process tracing that are 
essential for the choice of methodology, case selection and overall research design. 
The chapter will not engage in a discussion of the development of process tracing as a 
research methodology (see George/Bennett 2005, Chapter I; Bennett/Checkel 2015), 
its ontological and epistemological foundations (see George/Bennett 2005, Chapter 
VII; Beach/Pedersen 2013, Chapters V, VI, Mahoney/Goertz 2006; King et al. 1994), 
or particular variants of process tracing or differences to other case study 
methodologies (George/Bennett 2005). 
The present analysis shares the positivist ontology and objectivist epistemology 
underlying the mainstream process tracing approach in social sciences 
(George/Bennett 2005: 8–9; Beach/Pedersen 2013: 11–13; Bennett/Checkel 2015; 
Brady/Collier 2010; Collier 2011). While other different ontological and 
epistemological foundations are equally legitimate and no approach is per se superior 
to another – a discussion that goes way beyond the purpose of this study - the present 
analysis should be evaluated within these foundations. It has its roots in the endeavor 
to explicate generalizable theories and uncover the “causal forces” that link a 
particular cause to a particular real-world phenomenon. The causes are understood as 
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systematic factors that gain relevance beyond a particular studied case as 
generalizable cause-effect relationships. The ultimate goal is to go beyond mere 
descriptive inference and to achieve causal inference (Mahoney/Goertz 2006: 228; 
King et al. 1994: 7-9, Chapter II, III; Brady/Collier 2010) by developing logically 
consistent models with associated observable implications that are tested against 
empirical observations (George/Bennett 2005: 6). 
The chapter proceeds as follows: In the next section, I explicate the particular 
demands for the choice of research methodology that logically follows from the 
theoretical conception of this analysis to produce a convincing empirical foundation 
of theoretical postulates. I seek to demonstrate that the method of theory-testing 
process tracing fulfills these demands and provides a suitable approach for the 
empirical analysis. In the second section, I argue that the Security Council is a 
particularly demanding case for the theory of functional differentiation, elucidate the 
logic of case selection in process tracing and the particular strategy used. In the third 
section, the major variables will be operationalized through developing an analytical 
scheme that transfers theoretical expectations into empirically observable 
implications. In the fourth section, I introduce the data sources. Fifth, the chapter is 
concluded with a short summary. 
 
3.1 Process tracing as research methodology 
In its essence, the central objective of the present analysis is to reconstruct whether 
the theorized causal mechanism is present within the empirical cases studied and if 
so, analyzing if it worked as the theory predicted. In this case, the objective is to 
study whether and how the delegation of decision competencies to sanctions 
committees affects decision-making and the content of decisions taken. Because the 
choice of method is not and should not be an end in itself and rather be driven by 
particular research problem, epistemic interest and theory, the choice of methodology 
has to be justified in light of these considerations (King et al. 1994: 9). The following 
two sections first introduce theory testing process tracing as a methodology and then 
argue why it is suitable for the present research problem. 
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3.1.1 The essence of process tracing 
To fulfill the prerequisites posed by the theoretical framework on the choice of 
method, the present analysis will conduct theory-testing process tracing as laid out by 
Beach/Pedersen (2013). Process tracing is a small-n, case-study method that seeks to 
provide descriptive as well as causal inferences from evidence, usually along a 
temporal sequence of events (Collier 2011: 824; Mahoney/Goertz 2006; Gerring 
2009). George/Bennett provide a definition: “In process-tracing, the researcher 
examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see 
whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident 
in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” (George/Bennett 
2005: 6). 
Process tracing is best explained by the analogy of a criminal investigation. The 
investigator of a crime cannot make a convincing case based on statistical 
probabilities that a particular individual is likely to be the perpetrator. On the 
contrary, the investigator has to empirically demonstrate a complete evidentiary chain 
linking the suspect’s motive, the means used and the potential opportunity to commit 
the crime to the deed through providing forensic evidence for each part of the chain 
(George/Bennett 2005: 21; Bennett 2010: 208; Beach/Pedersen 2013: 75–76). Thus, 
process tracing investigates the evidentiary basis that either confirms or disconfirms 
the hypothesized causal chain and its rival explanations within a case (Bennett 2010: 
208). 
The essence of process tracing is to study causal mechanisms that link the 
explanans to the explanandum. For instance, in the study of democratic peace, where 
other studies have found a strong correlation between democracy and peace, process 
tracing would rather be interested in studying if democracy had indeed caused peace 
and in particular, how democracy exactly causes peace (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 1). 
Thus, each part of a hypothesized causal mechanism is best understood in the analogy 
of a “toothed wheel”, which conveys “causal energy” to the next toothed wheel 
ultimately generating the observed effect. Each part of the hypothesized causal 
mechanism is itself an insufficient but necessary part of overall mechanism. In fact, 
all parts of the causal mechanism are essential (i.e. necessary) for the mechanism to 
work on a whole. If the empirical investigation reveals disconfirming evidence on at 
 
88 
least one part of the mechanism, the researcher can reject the theoretical claim, 
however, if it reveals confirming evidence, the researcher can infer that the 
mechanism indeed exists (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 29–44). Hence, process tracing 
ultimately seeks to open up the “box of causality” (Gerring 2007a: 45; 
Beach/Pedersen 2013: 1), which is black-boxed in “effects-of-causes” approaches, to 
uncover causal factors that are intermediate between structural independent variables 
and the observed effect (Mahoney/Goertz 2006: 229–234). 
Process tracing as a methodology adopts both a mechanismic and deterministic 
ontology of causation (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 25–28). Concerning the former, its 
mechanismic ontology relates to the debate about whether causality can be seen in 
terms of covariance between two variables (‘regular association’) or if causality better 
resembles a close connection between a particular cause and observed effect 
(mechanismic). In process tracing, causal forces are not black-boxed in favor of 
looking at mere correlations between independent (X) and dependent variables (Y) as 
in approaches assuming ‘regular association’, but the interest lies rather in causal 
mechanisms whereby X produces Y and the transmission through a set of sequential 
causal forces from X to Y. Concerning the latter, process tracing is inherently 
associated with a deterministic as opposed to probabilistic ontology of the nature of 
causal relations. Probabilistic causality assumes that the world has random properties, 
expressed in statistical error terms, resulting from randomness or complexity of the 
world. Probabilistic causality usually assumes relationships taking the form of “Y 
tends to increase if X increases”. This approach is most meaningful when the goal is 
to investigate mean causal effects of systematic parts across a usually large sample of 
cases. In contrast, qualitative scholarship perceives causality in terms of set-theoretic 
relationships of sufficient and necessary conditions. Therefore, causal relationships 
take the form of deterministic laws: “Y occurs if X occurs” (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 
25–28; Mahoney/Goertz 2006: 232–235). The mechanismic and deterministic 
ontology differentiate process tracing from large-n designs (regularity, probabilistic) 
and other case-based methods such as congruence testing (regularity, deterministic) 
(Beach/Pedersen 2013: 27–28). 
Process tracing seeks to establish causal inference through empirically applying 
four tests, each having different conclusive power and providing evidence for 
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confirming or disconfirming hypothesized and alternative explanations (Bennett 
2010: 209–211; Collier 2011: 825–828; van Evera 1997: 30–34). Because in the 
social sciences, ‘doubly decisive tests’ that both confirms the hypothesis and 
eliminates alternative explanations (i.e. a camera filming the perpetrator of a bank 
robbery proves suspect is guilty or innocent) are difficult to find, and ‘straw-in-the-
wind’ tests do neither confirm nor disconfirm hypothesis or alternative explanations, 
scholars usually employ ‘hoop tests’ and ‘smoking gun’ evidence to establish causal 
inference. The former seeks to eliminate rival explanations while passing the test for 
the hypothesis is necessary to establish causal inference (e.g. was suspect at crime 
scene?). For the latter, passing is sufficient to confirm the hypothesis but does not 
automatically eliminate other explanations and takes the form of observing the 
suspect holding a smoking gun at the time of the homicide (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 
102–105). 
3.1.2 Theory-testing process tracing as methodology for the study of committee 
governance 
The research methodology of process tracing fulfils the preconditions required for the 
empirical analysis of committee governance and its hypothesized effects. The 
research problem requires looking into the ‘box of causality’ to study intermediate 
factors between the cause and observed effect, with the aim of updating the 
confidence in theorized mechanism. Thereby, the logic of process tracing involves 
tracing only theoretically assumed causal mechanisms in specific episodes (within-
case analysis), not just a diachronic series of historical events, and study if expected 
case-specific implications are present in a case (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 1-2, 15). 
First, process tracing enables to test postulated causal mechanisms (for other 
variants, see Beach/Pedersen 2013, Chapter II). Process tracing allows for drawing 
inferences about if the causal mechanism was present and, if yes, to evaluate whether 
it functioned as predicted. Thereby, it provides a method that is able to handle the 
testing of causal mechanisms and any of its causal parts. Simultaneously, because the 
causal mechanism is expressed deterministically, it builds upon on the same 
deterministic considerations of sufficiency and necessity as process tracing. The 
existence of the mechanism as well as the fact that it worked as expected can only be 
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true or false. It is a matter of existence in kind, not in degree (George/Bennett 2005: 
25–27; van Evera 1997: 55–67; Bennett/Checkel 2015). 
Second, theory-testing process tracing allows for acknowledging the time 
component inherent to the process character of postulated theoretical mechanisms. It 
allows for acknowledging the fact that causal processes take place over time as the 
term ‘process’ exemplifies. Causal mechanisms form the essence of process tracing as 
truly mechanismic endeavor: understanding the process whereby causal forces are 
conveyed by a causal mechanism to yield the outcome (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 36–
40). Therefore, process tracing sheds light into the causal direction through its 
account for temporality. In contrast to quantitative “effects-of-causes” approaches, 
process tracing methods have the potential to provide inferential leverage on the 
causal direction linking independent and dependent variables and establish if there is 
a causal chain of connection between both, in other words that X actually caused Y 
(Bennett 2010: 208–209; Mahoney/Goertz 2006: 229–234). Simultaneously, process 
tracing case studies represent a test as to how the causal mechanism worked in each 
case, where each part of the causal mechanism is evaluated in a stepwise fashion 
(George/Bennett 2005: 25).  
Third, theory-testing process tracing allows for analyzing data on macro- and 
micro-levels. The postulated theoretical mechanism provides for a conceptualization 
of structural phenomena and individual behavior. For instance, rules as expression of 
structuration of decision making situations is a structural phenomenon, while in 
comparison, acceptance of a decision proposal is observable behavior on the 
individual level. Process tracing as a method is open to investigating causal 
mechanisms both at the micro- and the macro-level as well as possible situational and 
aggregation mechanisms between the micro- and macro levels (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 
40–43). 
Fourth, theory-testing process tracing as a method provides for drawing at least 
some modest generalization of empirical results despite being a small-n method. The 
nature of the case-based process tracing method is to study in-depth a limited number 
of cases, so naturally it is usually less representative of the population than randomly 
selected large-n studies. While this allows to reap the benefits from a high internal 
validity, it comes with the tradeoff of low external validity, an characteristic shared 
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with experimental designs (Gerring 2009: 101–102, 2007: 38, 43). This naturally 
makes generalizations “more fragile” as in large-n statistical tests (Mahoney/Goertz 
2006: 237–238). The analysis can only yield “contingent generalizations“ 
(George/Bennett 2005: 30–32) based on explicating the scope conditions under which 
a hypothesis can be generalized (Bennett/Checkel 2015: 13–14). In fact, each process 
tracing case study for itself is restricted to make strong within-case inferences if 
postulated mechanism is present in relation to the studied case. A single process 
tracing case study does not allow for drawing causal inferences about the necessity or 
sufficiency of the mechanism in relation to the wider population (except when the 
mechanism is not found to be present). However, if scope conditions are empirically 
present and if combined with other cross-case methods testing for the necessity of the 
postulated mechanism on a wider range of carefully selected cases, modest 
generalizations can be drawn (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 68–94; George/Bennett 2005: 
30–32). 
Fifth, theory-testing process tracing allows for empirically accounting for valid 
alternative explanations. In case there are existing rival explanations that can be 
transformed into predictions about causal processes in a given case and at the same 
time there is access to evidence required for tracing such rival explanations, 
competing explanations can be eliminated (George/Bennett 2005: 29). Practically, this 
can be achieved through a combination of hoop tests and smoking gun tests that fulfil 
the analytical goal of supporting one explanation and simultaneously eliminating rival 
explanations (Bennett 2010: 211; Collier 2011: 827). Since the content of the research 
project deals with decision-making in international security organizations, where 
usually many powerful actors, including the great powers, are present, the literature 
provides an alternative explanation that has a high a priori probability to be true. 
While this remains the object of empirical investigation, process tracing is open for 
accounting for such possibly powerful rival explanations. 
Sixth, theory-testing process tracing allows for controlling for the possible 
interdependence of selected cases. Resulting from the choice of research object, the 
population of cases exhibits a modest potential that learning or diffusion processes 
between cases, but also issue linkages or package deals could account for the 
observed outcome across cases. A frequentist reasoning requires assuming the 
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independence of cases, which would otherwise significantly decrease the degrees of 
freedom. In other words, the observed phenomenon might not be caused by the 
hypothesized phenomenon, but the outcome is dependent on developments in another 
case. In fact, while process tracing cannot per se eliminate the effect that a case, 
which is dependent on another case, will not increase our confidence in the theorized 
mechanism, the method allows for controlling for such effects. Process tracing can 
shed light on linkages between cases and allows the researcher to evaluate, how much 
of the variance is explained by a case’s dependence on an earlier case 
(George/Bennett 2005: 33–34). 
In sum, the method fulfils the necessary prerequisites for drawing valid 
inferences from the empirical analysis. The methodology of choice is theory-testing, 
accounts for the process character of causal mechanisms, incorporate data on macro- 
and micro levels, allows for a modest generalization, grasps potential powerful 
alternative explanations and is able to deal with potentially interdependent cases. 
 
3.2 Case selection 
In a social science analysis seeking to re-trace a theoretical causal mechanism with 
in-depth case study research, cases have to be selected intentionally and carefully. In 
quantitative oriented research designs, cases would be selected by randomization. The 
goal is to select cases that are both representative of the larger population and at the 
same time exhibit variation across the theoretically interesting variables to attain 
‘causal leverage’. A high number of draws is meant to ensure that the cases in the 
sample are representative of the population across different variables. However, 
randomized selection of cases in small-n case studies is not advisable. First, for only a 
few number of studied cases, random selection will produce a sample that is highly 
unrepresentative of the given population (Seawright/Gerring 2008: 295; Gerring 
2007: 86–88). Second, because small-n research often asks different types of research 
questions, researchers will often intentionally select those cases that are 
unrepresentative of the population, exactly because these cases would provide 
particularly strong inferences (George/Bennett 2005: 30–32). One way or another, 
case selection strategies in small-n research should be based on the central purpose of 
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the analysis and thus requires careful, theory-driven selection of nonrandom cases 
(van Evera 1997: 78–88; Levy 2008: 8–9). In that sense, selection bias is 
unproblematic as long as its consequences are made transparent and generalizations 
are made contingent (George/Bennett 2005: 31–32). 
Generally, before selecting cases one first has to establish what is understood as a 
case. The present analysis applies Gerring’s case study concept (2004). He defines a 
case study as an “intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a 
larger class of (similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon—e.g., 
a nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person observed at a single point 
in time or over some delimited period of time. (…) A ‘population’ is comprised of a 
‘sample’ (studied cases), as well as unstudied cases. A sample is comprised of several 
‘units,’ and each unit is observed at discrete points in time, comprising ‘cases.’ A case 
is comprised of several relevant dimensions (‘variables’), each of which is built upon 
an ‘observation’ or observations” (Gerring 2004: 342). In conformity with the 
foundations of process tracing, which are centrally focused on within-case inferences 
on postulated causal mechanisms, the present analysis takes ‘sequences’ into the view. 
Therefore, I regard a temporally delimited sequence within a unit as a “case” (Gerring 
2004: 342; Collier 2011). 
3.2.1 Case selection in theory-testing process tracing 
A fundamental problem of case selection arises out of the question, whether or not the 
researcher can draw determinate inferences from only a few studied cases. From a 
frequentist perspective, this critique of the case study method rests on the “negative 
degrees of freedom” arising from having few cases but many variables leading to an 
indeterminate research design (George/Bennett 2005: 28–30; King et al. 1994: 208–
230). However, simply increasing the number of cases, will not always a lead to more 
inferential value because the cases may not be comparable anymore (Brady/Collier 
2010: 23–24). In fact, qualitative scholars maintain that the ultimate goal of drawing 
inferences rests on its ability to reject alternative explanations even in a few number 
of cases, which the case study method allows for (George/Bennett 2005: 28–30). 
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As a result, the case selection strategy should be centrally driven by the research 
objective at hand. Cases should not be merely selected, because they provide 
abundant data, are particularly interesting or seem historically relevant to the 
researcher. On the contrary, the cases have to be selected on considerations about how 
much control and variance the research objective requires to draw valid inferences. In 
this case, even a single-case design can be useful, if it supports the purpose of the 
research problem (George/Bennett 2005: 83–84). At the same time, the researcher has 
to explicate the scope conditions under which the theoretical mechanisms is 
postulated to work (Gerring 2009: 83). Theory-testing process tracing is particularly 
suitable as a strategy for performing empirical tests in cases where there is a well-
developed theory (such as in the case of functional differentiation within international 
organizations), but not yet empirical support, at least for difficult cases with rival 
explanations. 
Theory-testing process tracing poses specific prerequisites for the selection of 
cases. The logic of theory-testing process tracing prompts the researcher to select 
cases according to their values on X and Y (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 146–154). Thus, 
the case study method requires at least some a prior case knowledge about the 
distribution of X and Y to select cases. Its ultimate goal is to go beyond mere 
covariance between two variables and thus to empirically test the existence of 
postulated causal mechanisms (Lieberman 2005: 436; Beach/Pedersen 2013: 146). 
Fundamentally, for drawing inferences about the workings of the causal mechanism, 
testing if the postulated mechanism is present and if it also worked as expected, the 
researcher has to select cases were X and Y are present. It would not make sense to 
select a case in which one already knows that either X or Y is not present because the 
mechanism will not present in this case. To make inferences about the overall 
necessity of the mechanism to cause the phenomenon at stake, we have to rely on 
other cross-case comparisons (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 144–154). 
3.2.2 The Security Council as object of investigation 
The method of process tracing entails the Bayesian logic of ‘updating’ based on the 
usage of a priori knowledge (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 83–88; Bennett/Checkel 2015: 
16–17; Brady/Collier 2010). According to this logic, the confidence in the validity of 
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the postulated mechanism is strengthened, when we find evidence that is least-likely 
to be found as a result of a small a priori probability of its leverage, i.e. the presence 
of a strong and plausible alternative explanation. According to Beach/Pedersen (2013) 
the “belief in the validity of a theory is most strongly confirmed when we engage in 
new scholarship and find evidence whose presence is highly unlikely unless the 
hypothesized theory actually exists” (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 84). 
Therefore, because the research objective of this study is to test the applicability 
of a theory of committee governance in international organizations, a particularly 
difficult case, where we would least expect effects to be present and with strong and 
plausible alternative explanations, will strengthen our confidence in the postulated 
mechanism most. This approach resembles a strategy often applied in theory-testing 
small-n research designs such as Nielson/Tierney’s study of World Bank agency 
(2003: 252–253), Barnett/Finnemore’s analysis of IO autonomy (2004: 10, 15) or 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni analysis of transgovernmentalism in high politics (2009: 196). 
The present analysis builds on earlier studies that have analyzed a similar theoretical 
mechanism, albeit in different policy fields and institutional contexts. From a 
theoretical perspective, these contexts more likely to exhibit such effects, for instance 
because they operate in ‘low politics’ or show a high degree of institutionalization. As 
such, the research adds to existing analysis of institutions such as the European Union 
(Gehring/Kerler 2008; Ruffing 2011), the World Bank (Kerler 2010; Gehring/Kerler 
2007), the CITES regime (Gehring/Ruffing 2008) or the climate change regime 
(Gehring/Plocher 2009; Plocher 2011). Strikingly, in these studies, the effects of 
functional differentiation mostly result from a strong institutional agent such as a 
powerful secretariat or scientific experts. 
The UNSC constitutes such a particularly demanding case for a theory of 
committee governance and itself represents a crucial case (Gerring 2007: 115–120; 
Eckstein 1975). First, in contrast to many international organizations, the structure of 
the UNSC is almost purely intergovernmental and other institutional agents such as 
an independent secretariat are either absent or weak. Second, the UNSC is dominated 
by few powerful great powers that serve as permanent members and often have 
conflicting interests (Bosco 2009; O’Neill 1996). Third, the UNSC main task of 
maintaining international peace and security is situated in the field of ‘high politics’ 
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that is usually regarded as least prone to institutionalized forms of cooperation 
(Rittberger et al. 2012: 141–142). Fourth, the UNSC represents selecting a case, for 
which the literature presents rather statist, obvious and widely-shared alternative 
explanations (for this reasoning see Barnett/Finnemore 2004: 14–15). 
As a result of these considerations, in the UNSC, rule-based decision-making can 
only result from organizational rules regulating collective decision processes that 
shape or constrain actors’ opportunity structures because other influences usually 
associated with such effects (e.g. agents or bureaucracies) are absent. Such logic of 
case selection is common in International Relations. For instance, in their study on 
the role of precedents, Stone Sweet/Sandholtz have considered the Security Council a 
hard test case for which evidence that points towards UNSC members referring to 
precedent provided strong support for their theoretical proposition (2004). 
Accordingly, if one finds that UNSC members “create and consider precedent” 
although these members had strong incentives to deny the impact of precedent 
because they favor maximum discretion and seek to maximize their sovereignty, one 
has strong support for the theoretical argument (Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 2004: 260). 
As a consequence, choosing the Security Council as an object of investigation has 
meaningful consequences for the leverage of the postulated causal mechanism (see 
also Thompson 2009: 12–13). Because one can be legitimately skeptical to find the 
mechanism at work, finding it will significantly increase the confidence into the 
mechanism according to the Bayesian logic of updating inherent to process tracing 
(Beach/Pedersen 2013: 96–98). As a result, if we can observe the structuration effects 
in organizational decision-making in a purely intergovernmental organization, we 
would also expect it to be present in other more institutionalized contexts. 
3.2.3 Security Council sanctions regimes as a population 
The present analysis will focus solely on Security Council sanctions regimes as unit 
of analysis, because sanctions regimes are least institutionally structured and receive 
substantial and continuous decision functions. Evaluating the effects of functional 
differentiation within the UNSC offers a range of selectable cases. Under Article 29 
of the UN Charter and rule 28 of the UNSC’s provisional rules of procedure 
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respectively, the UNSC has the authority to transfer decision competencies to one or 
more subsidiary bodies, whenever deemed necessary. Over time, the UNSC has 
created a plethora of different subsidiary bodies ranging from peacekeeping 
operations, standing committees (e.g. Committee on the Admission of New Members) 
to courts (e.g. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)), 
depending on the function to be fulfilled (Paulus 2012: 995–1027; Sievers/Daws 
2014: 467–556). However, not all of these subsidiary bodies are suitable for empirical 
analysis as outlined above. The universe of UNSC subsidiary organs, on the basis of 
which the consequences of functional differentiation of a comprehensive decision 
process will be analyzed, is reduced by the following considerations. 
First, to achieve meaningful results on the functioning of the UNSC, the cases 
should be connected to the Council’s central decision-making function: authorizing 
legally-binding measures to counter threats to international peace and security. Under 
the so-called ‘Chapter VII mandates’ the UNSC can adopt ‘measures short of armed 
force’ (i.e. sanctions) and even authorize the use of force to maintain international 
peace and security. This consideration excludes procedurally-oriented subsidiary 
organs such as the Committee on Council Meetings Away from Headquarters or the 
Committee on the Admission of New Members. 
Second, to ensure comparability of more or less similar cases, international 
criminal tribunals (e.g. ICTY), cases of international territorial administration (e.g. 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo), special political missions and peacekeeping 
operations or other bodies (e.g. UN Compensation Commission) will be excluded 
although they have complex organizational structures (for a discussion of the 
differences see Sievers/Daws 2014: 460–571; Paulus 2012). However, in these cases, 
the organizational structure is composed of more or less powerful agents and not 
purely intergovernmental. In the case of an international criminal tribunal, which as a 
court is supposed to be independent and work according to its own rules, finding 
evidence for rule-based decision-making would not be surprising. 
Third, in the selected cases the subsidiary bodies must have actual decision 
competencies, which are not merely oversight, monitoring or reporting functions. In 
these cases, the subsidiary organ does not have a primary decision function. Since this 
analysis deals with decision-making, we would not expect any effect of decisional 
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structuration, because no meaningful decisions are taken. Therefore, subsidiary 
bodies such as fact-finding or Council visiting missions were excluded. This leaves 
sanctions regimes as population from which units can be selected into a sample of 
studied units.  
3.2.4 The criteria for the selection of suitable ‘units’ 
Since it is infeasible and unnecessary to study the total population of the 30 historical 
and current UNSC sanctions regimes (see Annex 1), cases have to be intentionally 
selected based on their potential to contribute to causal inference about the postulated 
theoretical mechanism. Simultaneously, the analysis seeks to maximize the variance 
of selected cases to draw modest generalizations and ensure modest external validity 
of empirical results. Selected units have to be substantially different in their relevance 
for the research objective because studying finding the same mechanism in a very 
similar case will not significantly increase our confidence in the mechanism. Hence, 
the following case selection strategy will be applied. 
First, the two Cold-War cases are discarded on the basis of their sui generis nature 
against the background of the East-West conflict. The sanctions regimes against 
Southern Rhodesia (resolution 232 (1966)) and South Africa (resolution 418 (1977)) 
took place in the political divisions of the Cold War and are not comparable to the 
post-Cold War cases (see for instance Malone 2008: 120–121; Cortright/Lopez 2000; 
Cortright et al. 2002; Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2011; Weschler 2009-2010). 
Second, the subsidiary body must actually make use of its decision competence, 
because the present analysis is about decision-making. In cases, where Council 
members do not intend to take decisions, effects of the structuration of decision-
making simply cannot be observed since there is nothing to decide and one would 
also not expect to observe decision-making issues. Table 1 shows the number of 
committee meetings for each historical and current UNSC sanctions committee. The 
number of meetings serves as a proxy for committee activity. Two sanctions 
committees, Lebanon and Iraq (here: Iraq sanctions committee pursuant resolution 
1518 (2003)), did not meet at all since their establishment. Four other committees 
have either existed for two years or less or have rarely met: Haiti, Eritrea/Ethiopia 
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and Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau committees, respectively. The latest UNSC sanctions 
committees on Central African Republic, Yemen and South Sudan do not have 
sufficient decision practice for proper analysis yet. 
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Table 1: Meetings of Security Council Sanctions Committees 
Sanctions 
Committee 
Resolution Number of Meetings 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 20 01 02 Ø 
Iraq 661 (1990) 22 37 24 22 13 11 16 17 13 14 19 20 15  
Yugoslavia 724 (1991)  1 47 46 22 23 2       35 
Libya I 748 (1992)   14 19 14 16 8 7 11 2 0 0 0  
Somalia 751 (1992)   4 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 7  
Haiti  841 (1993)    6 5          
Angola  864 (1993)    4 3 1 1 2 3 6 9 17 9 5 
Rwanda  918 (1994)     1 3 1 1 2 1 0 0 0  
Liberia  985 (1995)      2 1 1 1 1  9 7  
Sierra L. 1132 (1997)        2 4 7 7 5 4  
FRY 1160 (1998)         7 11 2 0  7 
Al-Qaida 1267 (1999)          2 2 13 21  
Eritrea/Eth 1298 (2000)           3 2  3 
 
Sanctions 
Committee 
Resolution Number of Meetings 
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15* Ø 
Iraq 661 (1990) 4             18 
Libya I 748 (1992) 0             8 
Somalia 751 (1992) 10 12 12 7 7 7 7 7 7 10 5 6 3 5 
Rwanda  918 (1994) 0 0 0 3 1 1        1 
Liberia  985 (1995) 6 4 2 13 9 11 8 2 3 3 3 4 3 5 
Sierra L. 1132 (1997) 8 3 0 1 1 1 0 0      3 
Al-Qaida 1267 (1999) 40 39 43 41 31 36 27 33 17 17 16 13 10 26 
Iraq 1518 (2003) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DRC 1533 (2004)  5 17 11 16 6 6 3 4 4 2 4 4 7 
Côte d’Iv. 1572 (2004)  2 20 11 10 5 7 6 3 6 6 5 2 8 
Sudan  1591 (2005)   16 6 12 8 11 8 5 7 5 5 3 7 
Lebanon 1636 (2005)   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DPRK ** 1718 (2006)    0 15 0 15 4 7 5 9 6 3 8 
Iran 1737 (2006)    0 23 5 0 1 4 4 8 6 2 6 
Libya II 1970 (2011)         7 7 4 6 2 6 
Taliban  1988 (2011)         3 3 5 5 4 4 
Guinea-B. 2048 (2012)          2 0 1 0 1 
CAR 2127 (2013)           0 9 4 9 
Yemen 2140 (2014)            8 1 - 
S. Sudan 2206 (2015)             5 - 
Notes: Author’s illustration based on Bailey/Daws (1998: 367) and updated using UNSC annual reports from 1989/90 to 2014/15, 
available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/reports/ [22 March 2016]. 
‘FRY’ denotes Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; ‘Sierra L.’ Sierra Leone; ‘Eth.’ Ethiopia; ‘DRC’ Democratic Republic of the Congo; 
‘Guinea-B.’ Guinea-Bissau; ‘CAR’ Central African Republic; ‘S.Sudan’ South Sudan. Tables list committees only between creation 
and termination. Average excludes first and last year to compensate for different creation and termination dates. Greyed numbers mark 
termination year. 
* Values only denote meetings between 01 January and 31 July 2015 due to reporting period of UNSC annual reports. 
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** UNSC annual reports for 2008 (A/63/2, pp.238-239) and 2009 (A/64/2, pp.91) do not list DPRK sanctions committee meetings. The 
DPRK sanctions committee annual report denotes one formal and 14 informal meeting for 2007 (S/2007/778, para. 3). In a Council 
statement (S/PV.6043), the Chair referred to one formal and 14 informal meetings for 2007 and 2008. Thus, it had not met in 2008. 
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Third, selected cases should cover sanctions regimes with different decision 
competencies such as listing and delisting of individuals, determination of dual-use 
goods or comprehensive sanctions, to control for specifics of a particular sanctions 
measure. Table 2 shows the different sanctions measures across sanctions regimes. To 
ensure comparability, at least in principle, all types of sanctions measures give rise to 
comparable decision situations, if the decision function requires many single-case 
decisions to be taken in light of general criteria. This applies to exemptions from 
comprehensive trade embargoes (Iraq, Yugoslavia), exemptions from flight 
embargoes (Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya I, Haiti, Angola, Al-Qaida/Taliban, Libya II), 
listing and delisting decisions in targeted sanctions (Yugoslavia and all targeted 
sanctions regimes), or determination of commodity sanctions (e.g. non-proliferation 
regimes DPRK and Iran). All selectable cases include an arms embargo, albeit this 
does not always include a decision function. 
Fourth, selected cases should be typical for their class of cases concerning the 
conflict type. While the majority of cases address armed conflicts including civil 
wars, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism are two different threats to the peace, 
the UNSC addresses by imposing sanctions (Security Council Report 2013: 3–5). 
Fifth, cases should differ in terms of the degree of public scrutiny to control for 
alternative explanations based on external pressure caused by a public human rights 
discourse. This mainly applies to the significant attention gained by the Al-
Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime concerning the infringement of fundamental rights of 
listed individuals and associated regional or domestic court cases (Kanetake 2008; 
Biersteker/Eckert 2006, 2009; Keller/Fischer 2009; Heupel 2013). 
Sixth, the analysis should vary across time and include cases at the beginning of 
the ‘sanctions decade’ (Cortright/Lopez 2000) after Cold War as well as cases after 
the sanctions reform process from comprehensive to targeted sanctions (Interlaken, 
Bonn-Berlin, Stockholm processes, Biersteker et al. 2005) to rule out alternative 
explanations based on the political context of UNSC sanctions policy.  
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Table 2: Decision Functions of Sanctions Committees by Sanctions Measure 
Case Sanctions Measure Initiating 
Resolution 
Resolutions 
 A: C
om
prehensive 
(E
con./Financial) 
B
: 
A
rm
s E
m
bargo 
C
: T
ransportation 
Sanctions 
D
: T
argeted 
Sanctions 
E
: C
om
m
odity  
Sanctions 
  
Iraq X x X  n/a 661 (1990) A: 666 (1990), 1, 5; 687 
(1991), 20; C: 670 
(1990), 3 
Yugoslavia* X x X X n/a 713 (1992) A: 787 (1992), 9; 820 
(1993), 22, 27, 28; 942 
(1994), 7, 13, 15; C: 757 
(1992), 13; D: 942 
(1994), 14 
Somalia/ 
Eritrea 
 X  X x  
(charcoal) 
733 (1992)  B: 1356 (2001), 4; C: 
1907 (2009), 18b 
Libya I  x X  x  
(oil service 
equip.) 
748 (1992) C: 748 (1992), 9e 
Liberia***  X  X x 
(diamonds, 
timber) 
788 (1992) B: 1343 (2001), 14d; 
1521 (2003), 21c; 1683 
(2006), 1-3; 1731 
(2006), 1ab; D: 1343 
(2001), 14ei; 
1521(2003), 21d; 1532 
(2004), 4a 
Haiti X x X X X (petroleum 
import)** 
841 (1993) A: 917 (1994), 7, 8; C: 
917 (1994), 14e; E: 841 
(1993), 10d; D: 917 
(1994), 3 
Angola 
(UNITA) 
 x X X x 
(diamonds, 
petroleum 
imp., other) 
864 (1993) C: 1127 (1997), 11b; D: 
1295 (2000), 24 
Rwanda  x   X 
(explosives 
import) 
918 (1994) E: 1005 (1995), 1 
Sierra Leone  x  X X 
(diamonds, 
petrol. imp.) 
1132 (1997) D: 1132 (1997), 10f; 
1171 (1998), . 6; E: 
1132 (1997), 10e 
Yugoslavia 
 
 x    1160 (1998)  
Al-Qaida/ 
Taliban 
 X X X x  
(acetic 
anhydride) 
1267 (1999) 
1989 (2011) 
B/C: 1333 (2000), 16; 
D: 1452 (2002), 1, 3; C: 
1267 (1999), 6; D: 1333 
(2000), 16; 1390 (2002), 
5 
Eritrea/ 
Ethiopia 
 X    1298 (2000) B: 1298 (2000), 8e 
DRC  X  X  1493 (2003) B: 1596 (2005), 18d; D: 
1596 (2005), 18a; 1649 
(2005), 4; 1698 (2006), 
14 
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Case Sanctions Measure Initiating 
Resolution 
Resolutions 
 A: C
om
prehensive 
(E
con./Financial) 
B
: 
A
rm
s E
m
bargo 
C
: T
ransportation 
Sanctions 
D
: T
argeted 
Sanctions 
E
: C
om
m
odity  
Sanctions 
  
Iraq  x  X x  
(cultural 
property) 
1518 (2003) D: 1483 (2003), 19 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
 X  X x  
(diamonds) 
1572 (2004) B: 1572 (2004), 14c; D: 
1572 (2004), 14a 
Sudan II  X  X  1556 (2005) B: 1591 (2005), 3a; D: 
1591 (2005), 3a,ii 
Lebanon 
 
 
   X  1636 (2006) 1636 (2005), Annex, 
2i,ii 
DPRK  x  X X  
(nuclear, 
ballistic, 
luxury 
goods) 
1718 (2006) D: 1718 (2006), 12e; E: 
1718 (2006), 8, 12d; 
2094 (2013), 23 
Iran  x  X X  
(nuclear, 
ballistic) 
1737 (2006) D: 1737 (2006), 18df; E: 
1737 (2006), 18e 
Libya II  X X X x 
(illicit crude 
oil exports) 
1970 (2011) B: 1970 (2011), 9; C: 
1973 (2011), 17; D: 
1970 (2011), 17; 
Taliban 
 
 x  X  1988 (2011) D: 1988 (2011), 30 
Guinea-
Bissau 
   X  2048 (2012) D: 2048 (2012), 9b 
CAR  X  X  2127 (2013) B: 2196 (2015), 1c; D: 
2196 (2015), 4,7 
Yemen 
 
 x  X  2140 (2014) D: 2140 (2014), 11,15 
B: 2216 (2015), 14 
South Sudan 
 
   X  2206 (2015) D: 2206 (2015) 11,13 
Notes: Author’s illustration based on Carisch/Rickard-Martin (2011: 10), complemented with Farrall (2007) 
and information available in SanctionsApp: http://sanctionsapp.com/ [22 March 2016].  
‘x’ denotes no decision function for committee, ‘X’ denotes decision function for committee. 
*Yugoslavia represents three sanctions regimes 713(1991), 757(1992), 820(1993). 
** prior to comprehensive sanctions. 
*** includes 788 (1992), 1343 (2001) and 1521 (2003) Liberia sanctions regimes. 
 
These considerations allow for significantly reducing the number of cases. The first 
case is the Iraq sanctions regime in its entirely intergovernmental phase from 1990-
1995. The UNSC imposed a comprehensive trade embargo on Iraq in reaction to its 
invasion of Kuwait and transferred considerable decision competencies, primarily on 
‘humanitarian exemptions’, to its Iraq sanctions committee. This case allows for 
studying, whether or not the effects of committee governance also do occur in the 
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absence of the infringement of individual human rights inherent to targeted sanctions. 
Additionally, the analysis draws on a new data source of the publicly available Paul 
Conlon Sanctions Papers. 
The second case is the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime. The sanctions 
committee was established in 1999 to apply pressure on the Taliban government of 
Afghanistan to extradite Usama bin Laden and was later strengthened into a global 
counter-terrorism targeted sanctions regime applying assets freeze, travel bans and 
arms embargoes on suspected affiliates of Al-Qaida and the Taliban. This regime is 
significant because it has the largest sanctions list and has generated major attention 
by the human rights community for the infringement of fundamental rights of listed 
individuals and its procedures are particularly well advanced (Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 
25). The case is useful as it allows for the analysis of the effects of regulation on 
decision-making within a sanctions regime with high decision workload. 
The third case is the Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions regime. In 
2003, the UNSC imposed an arms embargo to address the ongoing violent conflict in 
in Eastern Congo and established a sanctions committee to monitor the arms embargo 
in 2004. Since 2005, the UNSC applied assets freezes and travel bans on a range of 
individuals including spoilers to the peace process. This case represents a mid-active 
sanctions regime with about 40 list entries on its sanctions list. This case is useful as 
it adds a comparative perspective within the group of targeted sanctions regimes to 
preclude drawing premature conclusions from the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime 
that is under exceptional public scrutiny and the focus of the due process discourse. 
The fourth case is the Sudan sanctions regime to address the civil war in Darfur. 
Since early 2003 the uprising of rebel militias in Darfur against the central 
government and its associated Janjaweed militias led to massive violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law. The UNSC adopted an arms 
embargo on Darfur in 2004 and imposed an assets freeze and travel ban in 2005. The 
Sudan sanctions regime allows for analyzing decision-making problems associated 
with the listing of individuals and entities and represents a negative case. This case 
illustrates the context conditions of the theoretical mechanism and eludes the logic of 
decision-making within functional differentiated sanctions regimes. As a result, even 
though the UNSC requested the newly created sanctions committee to determine 
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sanctions targets, the decision blockade in the Sudan sanctions committee could only 
be solved through adopting a listing decision comprising of four individuals in a 
UNSC resolution (1672 (2006)).  
Finally, the fifth case is the Iran sanctions regime. Since 2006, the UNSC 
imposed sanctions in the context of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Subsequently, 
the sanctions regime was significantly strengthened with follow-up resolutions (1747 
(2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010)) and includes targeted sanctions against individuals 
and entities involved in the nuclear program as well as sanctions on nuclear 
proliferation and ballistic missile related goods. Accordingly, this case allows for a 
cross case comparison of sanctions on individuals and entities. In addition, the 
committee’s decision function of determining potential dual-use items allows for a 
comparison of both types of decision-making in the context of the same sanctions 
regime. In this regard, the committee partially transferred its decision competencies 
on dual-use goods to two external transgovernmental networks as agents. Moreover, 
the Iran sanctions regime provides for comparing Council decision-making purely 
from 2006 to 2010 and committee decision-making afterwards. 
The selected cases share important characteristics that allow for cross-case 
comparisons. The sanctions regimes exhibit similar decision problems because the 
sanctions regimes’ sanctions measures require that the committee takes a number of 
single-case implementation decisions. Second, they are all similarly institutionally 
structured. Sanctions committees operate as purely intergovernmental implementation 
bodies and powerful agents with decision functions are absent (except for 
Ombudsperson of the Al-Qaida sanctions regime). Sanctions regimes will differ in 
structuration of organizational decision making both across cases, but also within 
cases (see below), which provides substantial variation required to draw causal 
inferences. Therefore, the selected units provide suitable cases to draw inferences on 
the effects of functionally differentiated decision-making. 
3.2.5 The selection of case episodes 
As a consequence of the research objective, evaluating if the postulated causal 
mechanism exists and works as hypothesized, specific case episodes within the 
 
107 
selected units have to be empirically investigated. I seek to explain, why Council and 
committee members within functionally differentiated sanctions regimes create rules 
and how these rules affect their decision-making behavior within the sanctions 
committees. A reasonable baseline assumption is that actors favor less regulation over 
more regulation, because they wish to retain maximum flexibility unless they can 
benefit from the adoption of rules (see Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 2004). To ensure that 
empirical results are valid and to account for the latent danger of drawing premature 
conclusions from case-specific particularities, a sufficient breadth of empirical 
observations, both across case and within-case, is essential. 
From this consideration follows that each regulatory step within a specific 
decision function of a specific sanctions regime is a causally relevant case episode. A 
regulatory step is defined as a change in formal procedures (as observable in rules of 
procedure) and informal procedures (as observable by adoption of precedents). Every 
change in decision rules provides a case within a unit, because it is first sparked by a 
decision-making issue and possibly leads to an altered decision situation within the 
committee that is causally linked to committee decision-making. Thus, every 
regulatory step of a main committee decision function represents a sub-case. 
This methodological approach has advantages for the explanatory power of the 
research project. Focusing on particular case episodes within units enables to broaden 
the empirical basis of the analysis through ‘within-case’ analysis (Gerring 2004). In 
this respect, variance can be observed not only spatially across units but also 
temporarily within units. Thereby, the logic of process tracing involves tracing only 
theoretically assumed causal mechanisms in specific episodes and studying whether 
or not the expected case-specific implications are present in a case. A case only 
becomes a case in light of its relevance for the causal mechanism (Beach/Pedersen 
2013: 1-2, 15). In effect, the number of relevant observations is systematically 
increased through the analysis of parallel case episodes within each unit. Thus, taking 
case episodes as a ‘case’ increases the N (George/Bennett 2005: 151–179; King et al. 
1994: 217–218). 
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3.3 Operationalization and observable implications 
In contrast to frequentist “effects-of-causes“ approaches interested in exploring 
covariance between variables, the process tracing approach poses the challenge of 
operationalization of causal mechanisms, which is not a self-evident task. In a first 
step, the postulated causal theories have to be converted into clear hypothesized 
mechanisms to describe how the phenomenon of interest is produced. The analysis of 
causal mechanisms prompts the researcher to explicate both, the causal conditions, 
which trigger the mechanism, and an explicit theoretical mechanism that produces the 
outcome. Chiefly, each of a causal mechanism’s parts has to be described as particular 
activity of a particular entity. Entities are usually represented by nouns such as 
individuals, groups or states. Activities of these entities are usually represented by 
verbal expressions and describe the how the causal forces are transmitted as a causal 
mechanism. In effect, finding evidence confirming that the causal link exists provides 
strong evidence that the causal mechanism produces the outcome. Above all, each 
part of a postulated causal mechanism is itself insufficient but necessary part of the 
causal ‘machine’ that integrally produces the phenomenon of interest. Parts that do 
not fulfil this description are redundant (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 45–60). 
Before collecting empirical data, theory-testing process tracing requires 
explicating case-specific expectations about observable implications for each part of 
the hypothesized causal mechanism, which we should be able to ‘observe’ if the 
mechanism is present (Bennett/Checkel 2015: 18; Beach/Pedersen 2013: 95; also 
‘causal process observations’, Brady/Collier 2010, ‘process tracing observations’, 
Bennett 2006). Observable implications are specific pieces of empirical evidence that 
we should expect to see for each of the causal mechanism’s parts. With this in mind, 
process tracing requires carefully formulating case-specific predictions of what kind 
of evidence the researcher should expect to ‘observe’ to evaluate the presence of the 
postulated mechanism. This includes making predictions about the particular entity 
performing a particular activity for each part of mechanism. To increase our 
confidence in the hypothesized mechanism, the analysis should also include expected 
observations on alternative explanations. For this reason process tracing involves 
designing predictions for what counts as evidence to observe if a causal mechanism’s 
part exists, what evidence should we expect to observe for alternative explanations, 
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and what conclusions can be drawn in case the predicted evidence cannot be observed 
(Beach/Pedersen 2013: 95–105). 
Owing to the research interest of this analysis to test whether or not the postulated 
causal mechanism is present and if it works as hypothesized under particular 
demanding circumstances, the analysis necessarily has to focus on particularly 
powerful actors within the decision-making process. For a hard test of the mechanism 
one has to show that the structuration of organizational decision processes even binds 
powerful actors to rules. These states would have an abundant range of resources to 
invalidate such rules. On the contrary, in case these actors agree to follow the rules 
and even accept single-case decisions of negative payoff, than one can infer that rules 
were decisive. If the rules are shown to bind even the most powerful actors of the 
international system, we can expect that this also holds true for less powerful actors. 
This strategy is often pursued in similar theory-testing research designs (see 
Garrett/Weingast 1993: 203; Barnett/Finnemore 2004: 10–11, 14-15; Thompson 
2009: 12–13). 
Within the UNSC, these powerful states are the permanent members because of 
their dominant position within the decision-making process. Crucially, the permanent 
members each enjoy a veto privilege. In addition, they constantly serve on the UNSC 
and therefore cannot be outvoted by delaying a decision. In contrast to the permanent 
members, the non-permanent members are almost negligible in voting power (see 
O’Neill 1996; Hosli et al. 2011). Within the sanctions committees, however, all 
members, including the non-permanent members have the same voting weight as they 
all enjoy blocking capability through the consensus procedure. Nevertheless, the 
permanent members are equipped with particularly large power resources, including 
positive and negative incentives for making weaker states deviant behavior 
prohibitively costly. However, whether or not actors actually make use of such tools 
is a matter of empirical investigation (see Vreeland/Dreher 2014; Cronin/Hurd 2008). 
3.3.1 Operationalization of dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the collective outcome of individual decision-making 
within a sanctions regime. While a uniform Council decision process entails many 
 
110 
aspects of a sanctions regime, each committee has a particular set of decision 
functions, usually centering on one central decision function such as listing and 
delisting of sanctions targets or granting exemptions from a trade embargo. Single 
committee decisions are the aggregate of micro-level individual choices by committee 
members either during committee meetings or using the no-objection procedure. In 
this case, because committee decisions are made by consensus, an objection by any 
committee member leads to a negative single-case collective decision. On the 
contrary, for a positive single-case collective decision, all committee members must 
acquiescence to a decision proposal. The collective outcome is the aggregate of case-
specific individual choice on at least one, but usually a number of unrelated single-
case decisions in a particular case episode. 
The dependent variable can take four different values: blockade, rule-based 
decision-making, laissez-faire, or power-based decision-making. Each of these values 
is not directly observable but requires defining what distinct observable implications 
each measurable value should have to be present in the studied case-episode 
(Beach/Pedersen 2013: 14). Table 3 summarizes the theoretical concepts and its 
observable implications. 
Table 3: Operationalization of Dependent Variable 
Value on  
Dependent Variable 
Observable Implication 
blockade no decisions in spite of decision proposals 
rule-based  
decision-making 
actors systematically accept unfavorable decisions  
laissez-faire decision proposals are systematically accepted 
power-based 
decision-making 
powerful members prevail 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
(A) Blockade is observed when the sanctions committee produces no decisions in 
spite of decision proposals before it. This value requires having empirical evidence 
that the committee has received one or more decision proposals submitted by any 
relevant committee or non-committee actor, but all of these are rejected. 
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(B) Rule-based decision-making is observed when the sanctions committee 
systematically accepts decisions that are unfavorable to at least one  member. This 
value requires having three sorts of evidence. First, one observes positive decisions 
that are compatible to the rules. Second, one observes negative decisions that are not 
compatible to the rules. Third, because the first two would not yet allow for strong 
inferences regarding the impact of organizational structuration, one observes that also 
powerful members systematically accept decisions even if they have different case-
specific interests. 
(C) Laissez-faire decision-making is observed when the sanctions committee 
systematically accepts all decision proposals. This value requires having empirical 
evidence that there are decision proposals submitted by any relevant committee or 
non-committee actor, and simultaneously, having evidence that all of these requests 
receive a positive decision regardless of its requestor or the request’s content. 
(D) Power-based decision-making - as possible outcome expected in decision-making 
in a uniform Council decision process and as alternative explanation on committee 
level - is observed when the Council or the committee accepts decisions that are in 
line with the interests of powerful members regardless of the content of the request. 
This value requires having empirical evidence of package deals and linkages that 
compensate for losses of competing powerful members. If actors operate in power-
based decision-making, one would expect to observe weak states proposals being 
rejected while powerful states requests would be accepted in packages. 
The empirical measurement is conducted through a comparison between (1) the 
number and content of submitted decision proposals vis-à-vis (2) the number and 
content of the final decisions adopted. Concerning the former, submitted decision 
proposals are measured indirectly. Because Council and committee proceedings are 
not public, the analysis has to rely on relevant internal documentation, and where not 
available, rely on secondary sources including news coverage and reporting by close 
observers. Concerning the latter, for final collective decisions we have to distinguish 
between positive and negative decisions. Positive decisions are published in Council 
resolutions and committee press releases. Negative decisions are also not public per 
se, because they remain within the confines of the Council or the committee. Again, 
they have to be measured indirectly and are either available through internal 
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documentation or documented by a systematic analysis of news coverage (see section 
3.4). The research design partly compensates for potential biased results. It takes most 
contentious decision proposals, which have a high likelihood of being reported, into 
the focus, because these proposals can increase our confidence in the postulated 
theoretical mechanism most. Formal rules are public documents, while informal rules 
including precedents have to be measured on the micro-level. 
3.3.2 Operationalization and observable implications of causal mechanism 
Before collecting empirical evidence, the theoretical expectations have to be 
translated into case-specific observable implications of the behavior of relevant actors 
(Beach/Pedersen 2013: 14). Causal inference in process tracing is conceptually 
entangled with specific steps of a mechanismic and deterministic process. Because 
these mechanisms are not directly observable, process tracing requires carefully 
formulating case-specific predictions of what kind of evidence the researcher should 
be able to ‘observe’ for each causally relevant part of the mechanism (Beach/Pedersen 
2013: 95–105). Therefore, the empirical analysis of the separate case episodes should 
proceed in the following analytical scheme (see Table 4). 
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Table 4: Observable Implications of Theoretical Mechanism of Committee 
Governance and Alternative Explanation 
 
Theory Empirics 
Alternative 
explanation 
 
Causal mechanism 
Observable 
implications 
Observable 
implications 
Independent  
variable 
Separation of 
rulemaking and 
rule-application 
- Blockade 
- Laissez-faire 
- Blockade 
 
Parts of  
causal 
mechanism 
Rulemaking 
 
- attempts for formal 
rules/precedent 
 
- package deal 
 
 
 - no exceptions for 
powerful members in 
rules 
- exceptions for powerful 
members in rules 
Rule-application - proposals are aligned to 
rules 
- proposals are aligned to 
interests 
 - proposals are treated 
separately 
- proposals are 
accumulated to package 
deal 
 - same criteria are 
applied to every 
proposal 
- different criteria 
applied to every 
proposal 
 - proposals compliant to 
rules are accepted 
- powerful member’s 
proposal is accepted 
 - proposals non-
compliant to rules are 
rejected 
- less powerful state’s 
proposal is rejected 
 - quality of the request 
determines decision 
- power resources of the 
requestor determines 
decision 
Dependent  
variable 
Decision-making - Rule-based decision-
making 
- Power-based decision-
making 
Note: Author’s illustration based on Beach/Pedersen 2013: 59. 
 
Step 1: Identification of demand for regulation. In this step I question for what 
reasons Council members would actually adopt rules at all. Organizational 
substantive and procedural decision criteria are perceived as specific forms of 
structuration of organizational decision-making processes. Without an initial set of 
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rules, there would be no structuration of decision processes. At the same time, without 
demand for such regulation, there would also be no such rules. In this step, the 
analysis seeks to assess, whether or not the current set of rules gives rise to decision 
problems or alternatively package deals. However, the analysis has to take 
precautions against falling prey to the fallacy of ex-post rationalization as the 
observation for the regulatory demand has to precede its solution and cannot be 
derived from the solution ex-post. 
As regulatory demand cannot be directly observed, it is operationalize through 
the following observable implications. First, one has to observe if the decision 
proposals are truly separate from each other or if they at least are processed as 
separate agenda items, which precludes actors from finding mutually acceptable 
cooperation solutions through adoption of decision packages. Second, regulatory 
demand can be observed through instances of internal decision problems within the 
governance system of the form of blockade or through dysfunctionality of the 
governance system vis-à-vis the environment as observable through laissez-faire 
decision-making on the macro-level.  
Step 2: Regulation of decision problems by rules or observation of decision packages. 
In this step, I ask how actors resolve the regulatory demand. Generally speaking, 
actors have two possibilities. First, actors could engage in adopting substantive and 
procedural decision criteria within the UNSC or the sanctions committee to provide 
focal points for the coordination of behavior. As a second option, actors could sideline 
single-case decision-making by explicitly accumulating many single-case decisions to 
a comprehensive package deal within the Council or the sanctions committee. 
Instances of regulation can be assessed through the following observable 
implications. First, this requires finding observable instances of actors submitting 
decision proposals for decision packages within the committee or the UNSC. Second, 
the analysis seeks to observe actors that table decision proposals for rulemaking in the 
form of formal rules or precedents. 
Step 3: Consequences of rulemaking. In this step, I assess which constraints actors 
face, if they want to adopt substantive and procedural decision criteria. After the 
demand for regulation and its actual solution through rules was established, I study, 
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how the decision function of rule-making impacts actors behavioral options. For 
adopting rules actors principally have two options. First, they can agree a formalized 
set of rules. Second, they can adopt a single-case decision that will serve as a 
precedent for later similar cases. Both have a generalized character and must be 
consistent. This should hold true empirically for both, UNSC and committee in their 
function as rulemaking entities. In this stage, the empirical analysis also has to 
account for potential failures of rulemaking, which would not lead to an expected 
change in the actors’ opportunity structure. 
The consequences of rulemaking on actors, particularly the consistency 
requirement and resulting median preferences, can only be observed indirectly 
because often there is not enough data covering the entire negotiation process. 
Therefore, I will proceed with an indirect measurement and seek to assemble counter-
evidence. In case one can observe specially crafted exceptions clauses for particular 
UNSC stakeholders, one has reasons to believe that the consistency requirement is 
not at work. Therefore, I seek to assess, if actors create special rules for exceptional 
cases that only benefit few individual actors, in particular the great powers. Thereby, 
not the wording of a general rule is decisive, but its (intended) effect. 
Step 4: Consequences of rules on rule application. How do substantive and procedural 
criteria affect the discretion of committee members? Do rules have a disciplining 
effect on decision-makers? The consequences of rule-application are made observable 
through changes in the decision situation of actors. To begin with, the consequences 
of rule-application on the available behavioral options are analyzed. If rules have an 
effect, I would expect that actors who seek to maximize their output would actually 
align their decision proposals to the rules to increase the likelihood of their adoption. 
As observable implications for evaluating how rules impact decision proposals, 
the possible range of discretion without violating the altered rules will be assessed. 
Then, the range of decisional options will be compared with the actual decision 
proposals. I seek to observe if actors actually align their decision proposals to the 
rules and refrain from submitting decision proposals that do not conform to existing 
rules. One would also expect to observe that the committee treats each proposal 
separately and applies the same criteria to every proposal alike. 
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Step 5: Consequences of rule application on binding effect of rules. In this step, I 
evaluate if the adopted rules in fact unfold a binding effect even on the most powerful 
actors. Only if rules also bind powerful actors, they are a true expression of 
structuring the decision situation of committee members and not merely symbolic. 
I question whether or not actors in practice comply with the rules. Strong 
indicators are those decision proposals that are collectively dismissed, because they 
do not fit to the rules. In addition, the analysis will look if there are documented cases 
were the rules are violated. However, particularly critical cases for the existence of 
the theoretical mechanism are those, where powerful members, especially the 
permanent members, accept the rules, even for cases in which they have high stakes 
and diverging case-specific interest. Conversely, a weak state that successfully 
submits a rule-conforming case even against the situation specific interests of a 
permanent member provides strong evidence for rule adherence. 
The causal mechanism of rule-based decision-making competes with a strong 
alternative explanation for committee decision-making (see Table 4 above; 
Beach/Pedersen 2013: 95–105). To that effect, the empirical analysis is based on the 
counterfactual scenario of power-based decision-making in the committee (on 
counterfactuals see Levy 2010). In terms of rulemaking, powerful members would 
attempt to insert one-sided exceptions in bargaining over rules that maximize their 
payoff in a package deal over the content of rules. In terms of rule-application, we 
would expect to see decision proposals that are entirely aligned to the requestor’s 
interests and are accumulated to decision packages. While UNSC members would 
face a similar decision problem, i.e. to adopt a number of single-case decisions in 
light of strongly diverging interests to give effect to a sanctions measure, they would 
resort to a different decision solution in face of decision blockades. Decisions would 
be the result of a comprehensive bargain among the powerful members. The content 
of decisions could be sufficiently-well explained by the preference constellation of 
the UNSC members and their relative power position in the bargaining process. As 
rational utility maximizers they will use all kinds of power resources available to 
them to achieve bargaining outcomes that are favorable to them. In effect, powerful 
members’ requests are expected to be granted while less powerful states’ requests are 
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expected to be rejected. In this case, the requestor’s power resources determine the 
decision. 
To empirically assess instances of bargaining is not trivial (see also Kerler 2010: 
124–125). The present analysis will use an indirect approach. The veto-yielding 
permanent members will not agree to any decision negative to them. This implies that 
veto powers will only accept least common denominator agreements, unless actors 
adopt decision packages or issue credible threats or bribes. First, actors could simply 
aggregate a number of single-case decisions to larger package deals to compensate 
individual losses from a single case decision with gains in other cases. For instance, 
for the listing of individuals to sanctions lists, permanent members could simply 
aggregate a number of listing proposals to achieve a mutually beneficial package. In 
these cases, the assessment of acceptability of decisions would be solely based on the 
situation-specific interests of its members. In some sanctions regimes, the UNSC 
actually does decide without recourse to a committee (e.g. Iran, Libya and Sudan). In 
these cases we would not expect an effect of structuration because its causal forces 
are sidelined. Second, decision makers could offer positive (‘bribes’) or negative 
(‘threats’) incentives to shift the cost-benefit calculation towards accepting a decision 
(on this see Vreeland/Dreher 2014). In effect, we should expect to see that the power 
resources of the requestor determine the decision to the effect that a powerful state’s 
proposal is accepted while a less powerful state’s proposal is rejected. 
In each of the studied case episodes, the merits of the causal model will be 
evaluated along the analytical scheme. In a first step, it will be assessed if the 
conditions for the functioning of the mechanism are given and if so, in a second step 
it will be tested if the theoretical mechanism worked as expected. For that purpose, 
the empirical case studies of the analysis contain three sections. 
Description of origins of sanctions regime: In this section, the preferences of the 
actors are assessed and analyzed, which actors drive the sanctions regime, how the 
interests of the major actors are distributed and if we therefore would expect the 
mechanism to function. Next, the analysis proceeds with describing the original rule-
set at the time of the regime’s establishment. Are there already rules and why so? Do 
actors already expect decision-making issues? 
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Analysis of decision-making along the analytical scheme: In this section, the 
sanctions regime will be split into case episodes. Each case episode is analyzed along 
the analytical scheme outlined above in order to generate evidence confirming or 
disconfirming the postulated causal mechanism. 
Assessment: In the third section, I will draw conclusions from the operation of the 
mechanism in the case for the general virtue of the mechanism. Thereby, the 
empirical result will be compared to the original theoretical expectation. 
 
3.4 Data sources 
In any form of scholarship, the researcher has to be absolutely transparent about the 
data sources including their public availability, the time frames under investigation 
and the specific method of analysis used, to ensure the replicability of the analysis. 
Even more so in small-n qualitative case study research, replicability is one of the 
crucial issues when conducting because it enables other research to re-trace the 
empirical evidence and re-evaluate the analysis’ merits often based on large sets of 
documents (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 120–143; Blatter/Haverland 2012: 67–68; 
Moravcsik 2010: 30–33). Accordingly, to ensure highest levels of replicability and 
transparency, all files referenced throughout the analysis, even those that are publicly 
available, are on file with author and can be obtained upon request. 
As others have noted, tracing UN decision-making processes and in particular 
those in the highly secretive Security Council is difficult. This is mainly the result of 
the fact that these processes usually do not happen in the public domain, but in highly 
informal settings such as Council consultations with no public record. Often these 
processes take place in bilateral negotiations. Commonly, only the end-result of an 
informal negotiation can be directly observed (Smith 2006: 224; Heupel 2009: 307–
308; Reisman 1993). This is even more valid for sanctions committees that meet in 
private and keep little public documentation (‘culture of secrecy’, Conlon 2000: 35; 
Conlon 1996b: 272; 283-284; Sievers/Daws 2014: 520). Nonetheless, the large 
number of primary Council documents allow for a reconstruction of the dynamics of 
sanctions regimes and their complex governance structures. To provide replicable 
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empirical evidence, this study relies mainly on written primary documentation to the 
extent possible. 
On the level of the Security Council, the analysis will draw on formal Council 
decisions including resolutions, presidential statements and presidential press 
statements, in addition to annual reports and verbatim records of relevant Council 
meetings (i.e. transcripts of formal sessions, denoted by S/PV.****), letters sent by 
UN member states and Council presidency notes. Other UN documentation includes 
the ‘Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council’ and different UN publications. 
Further sources used more sporadically include statements at informal Council 
retreats (e.g. ‘Hit the ground running’ workshop summaries), reports by other UN 
entities (e.g. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism), documents of the UNSC Working 
Group on General Issues of Sanctions or other sanctions reform processes (e.g. Bonn-
Berlin process). 
On the level of the sanctions committees, the analysis will draw on information 
provided on committee formal procedures as adopted in the consensus-based 
‘Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work’, formal documents 
relating to committees decisions (usually in press releases), the publicly released 
sanctions lists (‘consolidated list’) and associated ‘narrative summaries of reasons for 
listing’ as well as other committee documents, including committee annual reports. 
As a major source of information serve the reports provided by the Panel of Experts 
that are now regularly created as a source of independent information. These include 
mid-term briefings to the committee (not always public) and final reports issued as 
Council documents (provided at the end of a mandate cycle, usually public). In 
addition, for some sanctions regimes, regime-specific information sources are 
available. Specifically for the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime, Office of the 
Ombudsperson documentation including the annual reports and ‘status of cases’ 
documentation is particularly valuable. 
The present analysis will make use of two previously unused or unavailable data 
sources. First, for the Iraq sanctions regime, the analysis will mainly draw on a 
unique, exceptionally detailed and readily available data source, the Paul Conlon 
United Nations Sanctions Papers, donated to the Special Collections Department, 
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University of Iowa Libraries in Iowa City, Iowa by a former UN Secretariat member 
servicing the Iraq sanctions committee.1 The documentation is open for research and 
the author has personally reviewed the documentation at the University of Iowa in 
December 2013. With very few exceptions (Conlon 2000; Hakimdavar 2014; 
Koskenniemi 1991; Gordon 2010 used similar documents; Scharf/Dorosin 1993 used 
Yugoslavia committee documents), this unique source of information has been 
neglected. The documentation includes detailed records of 120 Iraq sanctions 
committee meetings from 1990 to 1995. The ‘summary records’ of meetings, which 
record all verbal interventions in UN reported speech, are denoted as ‘SR.x’ for 
‘summary record’ of meeting ‘x’. Information about the outcome of requests are 
available in committee ‘communication logs’ (so-called COMM-logs), available from 
1990 to 1993. Communications are denoted as ‘S/AC.25/1991/COMM.53’ and read 
‘Security Council subsidiary organ 25’ (i.e. Iraq sanctions committee), year 1991, 
document is a ‘communication’ (i.e. letter sent to Iraq sanctions committee by UN 
member state or other organization) number 25 in annual consecutive numbering, 
here short ‘1991/COMM.53’ (Sievers/Daws 2014: 465–467). Additional documents 
also include internal memoranda and Conlon’s personal notes. Iraq committee files 
referenced throughout chapter 5 are on file with the author. 
The ‘status of communications’ lists have been used to produce a dataset of 
nearly 8,200 humanitarian exemptions decisions made by the Iraq sanctions 
committee from 1993 to 1995. The documentation contained the status of 
communication lists for Iraq sanctions committee meetings 100 to 121. Data from 
meeting 103, 106, 108, 114, and 119 is missing or password protected in the 
electronic version. The author hand-coded humanitarian exemptions requests into 
item categories according to the UN Standard International Trade Classification (see 
section 5.2.3). The dataset includes additional information on requestor, the 
committee decision (accepted or rejected) and reasons provided for in case of 
objections or holds. 
                                                 
1 For catalogue entry see: http://www.lib.uiowa.edu/scua/msc/tomsc550/msc529/msc529.htm [09 
February 2015].  
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Second, the analysis also draws on the unique collection of US diplomatic cables 
(‘Cablegate’) as publicly available through the WIKILEAKS Public Library of US 
Diplomacy website.2 The documentation contains more than 250,000 cables mostly 
from 2003 to 2010 sent between US diplomatic missions including the US Permanent 
Mission in New York and the US State Department. The leaked cables provide a data 
source that has been previously under-researched particularly in UNSC sanctions 
research following a trend in political science to only reluctantly access leaked 
information as data source (Michael 2015b: 175–177). While leaked information 
might be imperfect in quality, incomplete or biased, this also applies to all other 
accessible primary data sources. Although US cables only convey the US perspective, 
there is reason to believe that they are less prone to misrepresentation than press 
articles. From an ethical perspective, using leaked cables will not cause any additional 
harm since the information has already been public for years. Also legal concerns 
seem to be overstated. As a result, Cablegate documents provides a unique and 
accessible research opportunity and allows for controlling differences in publicly held 
positions and private discussions. Moreover, it allows for illuminating political 
phenomena that usually take place in otherwise hard to access environments (Michael 
2015b: 178–184; for a discussion of such issues, Tucker 2010; Voeten 2010; Michael 
2015a; Drezner 2012; Weidmann 2015). The author conducted systematic text-based 
searches within the collection of diplomatic cables for the studied case episodes on 
relevant Council decisions and committee decision functions. All cables used are on 
file with author. 
Besides the official and available Council and committee documentation, other 
non-official data sources will be systematically used to fill gaps resulting from 
Council and committee secrecy. First, the analysis based on media sources including 
press articles, press agency reports and interviews distilled from the Lexis-Nexis 
database. To ensure geographical balance, the analysis will draw both on major 
Western sources (e.g. AFP, Associated Press, and New York Times) and non-Western 
coverage (e.g. Xinhua). Second, reporting by close Council observers, in particular 
                                                 
2 https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/about/ [22 March 2016]. 
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the coverage issued by Security Council Report3 (SCR) including the ‘Monthly 
Forecast’, ‘What’s in Blue’ and ‘Special Research Reports’, will provide additional 
non-official data sources. Third, a number of reports and publications of other 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations and think tanks will be 
employed. Fourth, this study makes use of secondary literature on the Security 
Council, sanctions, international law, the due process critique and sanctions regime-
specific literature. Memoirs of former (Council) diplomats (e.g. Annan 2012; Bolton 
2007; Hannay 2008) also proved useful. 
The conducted semi-structured interviews served an exploratory function, with 
few exceptions. On the one hand, interviews were instrumental in selecting units of 
analysis, suitable cases and theoretically-relevant case-episodes as well as acquiring 
further data sources. On the other hand, the author sought confirmation of his 
interpretation of the data available. The author has conducted a total of 35 interviews 
with current and former committee diplomats, other UN member states, members of 
Panel of Experts, and close observers, across all cases. In particular when data is 
scarce, other authors have frequently resorted to interviews (see for instance 
Barnett/Finnemore 2004: 12; Deitelhoff 2009). However these authors have also 
pointed to the difficulties in conducting interviews with diplomats in sensitive UNSC 
negotiation environments, which are difficult to get in the first place and involved 
interviewees who are hesitant to release confidential information “on the record” 
(Malone 2006: 3; ‘background conversations’, Heupel 2009: 308; on interviewing in 
security studies, Davies, Philip H. J. 2001; on ‘getting in the door’ in elite 
interviewing, Goldstein 2002). To avoid circular reasoning, to maintain full 
confidentiality of interviewees and to ensure replicability, the conducted interviews 
were sparingly used and often entirely replaced by written sources. 
Concerning the time frame under consideration, the analysis seeks to trace 
empirical evidence for the selected case episodes. Consequently, empirical evidence 
is assembled pre-regulation and post-regulation. A central concern in providing a 
valid and reliable measurement is represented by the functionalist fallacy of circular 
                                                 
3 Security Council Report is at http://securitycouncilreport.org/ [22 March 2016]. All cited SCR 
documents are available online. 
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ex-post rationalization that provides explanations of a tautological nature. This fallacy 
hints at deducting the cause of a phenomenon from the phenomenon’s occurrence. 
For instance, regime theory was criticized for its potential for “post hoc arguments” 
(Hasenclever et al. 1996: 195) explaining the existence of an international regime as a 
result of the functions it serves (Keohane 1984: 81; Hasenclever et al. 1996: 195–
196). In contrast, a proper application would require to specify interests ex-ante to 
explain cooperation outcomes (Keohane/Martin 2003: 83–84). Hence, the researcher 
has to ensure that actors’ preferences are not merely derived from observable 
behavior. Accordingly, any empirical investigation has to avoid tautological reasoning 
by acquiring independent empirical evidence for each step of the analytical scheme. 
Since the main object of this study is the effect of regulation on decision-making in 
selected case episodes, the analysis will trace the process from the decision-making 
problem, over the adopted regulation to effects on decision-making in time-frames 
ranging from six months to one year before and after the relevant regulation. 
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
Theory-testing process tracing is a viable methodology for the purpose of this study, 
although it faces some limitations. Process tracing fulfils the prerequisites that follow 
from the central objective of this research project that lies in analyzing whether or not 
the causal mechanism is present in the empirical cases and if it worked as postulated. 
The UN Security Council provides a meaningful object of investigation as a hard 
test case for a theory of committee governance in international organizations. Exactly 
because we can be skeptical to find the theorized mechanism due to the strong 
presence of rival explanations, our confidence in the mechanism will substantially 
increase, if we actually discover it. As a result, if we can observe the effects of 
structuration of organizational decision-making in a purely intergovernmental 
organization, although institutional features that usually are associated with such 
effects are absent, we would also expect it to be present in more institutionalized 
contexts. 
To achieve a sufficient breadth of empirical observations and to avoid drawing 
premature conclusions from regime-specific particularities, the analysis is focused on 
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five UNSC sanctions regimes, which itself will be divided into theoretically-relevant 
case episodes. First, the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq allow for assessing, 
whether or not the postulated effects also emerge in the absence of the infringement 
of individual due process rights. The Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime, the DRC 
sanctions regime and the Sudan sanctions regime serve as cases in which the 
committee has to decide about listing and delisting of individuals and entities subject 
to targeted sanctions. In fact, in the Sudan sanctions regime as a negative case, the 
boundaries of the postulated mechanism are investigated. Finally, the Iran sanctions 
regime combining targeted sanctions with commodity sanctions on dual-use items 
complements the analysis. 
Preceding the case studies, in the next chapter, the complex governance systems 
of UNSC sanctions regimes are analyzed focusing on the exact division of labor 
between the UNSC, the committee and other relevant entities. In particular, it is 
investigated which functions the UNSC retains and which functions it transfers to its 
sanctions committees and what consequences for decision-making we would 
therefore expect. In addition, the general incentive structure resulting from the 
particular organizational arrangement is explicated to investigate the incentives to 
engage in rule-based governance. 
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4 Security Council Sanctions Regimes as Complex Governance 
Structures 
The institutional structure of the UNSC sanctions regimes is considerably 
differentiated and relies on a system of divided labor among its various subsidiary 
bodies. In fact, the Security Council creates a “complex, multilayered governance 
system” for the administration of sanctions (Farrall 2009: 203). Within the 
governance system of UNSC sanctions regimes, each of the bodies performs a 
distinct function. Each of the bodies also has a particular composition and operates 
under specific substantive and procedural rules either given by another body or 
emerging from its own decision practice. Within their specified mandates, decision-
makers face institutional constraints that have an effect on the viability of preferred 
individual choices. As a consequence, in contrast to usual Council decision-making, 
the organizational output of sanctions regimes is the result of a complex interplay of 
various bodies. 
In this chapter, I analyze the fundamental structure of UNSC sanctions regimes 
with a focus on scrutinizing the exact division of labor between the bodies involved, 
in particular which functions the Security Council retains and which functions it 
transfers to other subsidiary bodies, what consequences this has for decision-making 
within the whole governance system and if so, what tools of governing these 
delegation relationships are applied. Additionally, I elucidate the general incentive 
structure provided by the organizational arrangement of sanctions regimes and 
analyze if the decision situation provides incentives to systematically forego the 
introduction of committee members’ bargaining power. I argue that while the 
relatively vague legal basis of the UN Charter (Gowlland-Debbas 2001: 7–9) leaves 
Security Council members with wide-ranging discretion as how to administer UNSC 
sanctions regimes and thus leaves room for the pursuance of situation-specific 
interests, committee governance comes with significant constraints for decision-
makers. As a result of the complex structure of sanctions regimes, the effective 
functioning of the governance system creates demand for rules or rules derived from 
precedents. 
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Within UNSC sanctions regimes, the decision process is divided among five 
major bodies that perform distinct functions (see Figure 2). At its center, the Security 
Council sets up the structure of the sanctions regime and guides the subsidiary bodies 
through the provision of substantive or procedural rules contained within its sanctions 
resolutions. However, principally, Council members retain the right to take 
implementation decisions anytime by means of a Council resolution (section 4.1). 
Next, the sanctions committee is tasked with taking implementation decisions such as 
listing and delisting of individuals or granting exemptions from trade embargoes 
(section 4.2). In addition, sanctions regimes usually also have a reflexive component 
in the form of Panel of Experts that review committee activities, monitor member 
states implementation and provide information for the sanctions committees’ 
operations (section 4.3). Sanctions committees are supported in their activities by the 
UN Secretariat “Sanctions Branch” (section 4.4). Moreover, sanctions regimes are 
complemented with a mechanism for the review of single-case decisions (Focal 
Point/Ombudsperson, section 4.5). Finally, section 4.6 will focus on the dynamic 
nature and periodicity of sanctions regimes as complex governance structures. 
Figure 2: The Governance Structure of UNSC Sanctions Regimes 
Security
Council
Sanctions
Committee
Panel of Experts
Focal Point / 
Ombudsperson
UN Member States
guidance, 
rules
decisions, 
reports
implementation
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UN Secretariat, 
Sanctions Branch
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Peacekeeping
Operation
coordination
review
Note: Author’s illustration. 
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The Council transfers additional functions to other subsidiary organs or remote 
organizations interacting with sanctions regimes. In some cases this requires other 
organizations to further process sanctions regimes’ outputs and therefore any 
sanctions regime needs to produce compatible decisional output. For instance, 
Interpol issues Interpol-United Nations Security Council Special Notice on listed 
individuals and entities to increase effectiveness of member states implementation 
and relies on information provided by a respective sanctions regime (see Romaniuk 
2010: 97). In addition, in sanctions regimes dealing with internal armed conflicts, 
peacekeeping operations can become a part of the governance system, for instance, by 
supplying information on sanctions violations or by cooperating with the relevant 
expert body (Boucher 2010). In the non-proliferation sanctions regimes, international 
transgovernmental networks such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (Verdier 
2008) or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) serve as expert bodies to 
supply lists of banned items for proliferation or ballistic missile related goods 
regardless of the specific sanctions case. The Financial Action Task Force provides 
recommendations for implementing targeted financial sanctions (Romaniuk 2010: 
133–136). Finally, UN member states have to implement collectively binding 
sanctions decisions for sanctions to become an effective regulatory tool. 
 
4.1 The Security Council as master of its sanctions regimes 
The Security Council as the central entity of the governance system provides the 
framework for all other bodies and decides about the political direction of its 
sanctions regimes. The Security Council consists of 15 members, five of which are 
permanent members (P-5): China, France, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. 
The other ten are the non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for a 
term of two years with no possibility for immediate re-election (UN Charter art. 23). 
Decisions on substantive issues such as the adoption of resolutions are taken by nine 
affirmative votes with none of the permanent members voting against, constituting 
what is generally referred to as ‘veto’ (UN Charter art. 27; also Simma et al. 2012). 
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The Security Council, as the “(…) parent body which exercises both authority 
and control (…)” (Paulus 2012: 989) over its sanctions regimes while leaving the 
day-to-day activities to its sanctions committees, serves four core functions within 
sanctions regimes. First, the Security Council defines the scope, type and duration of 
sanctions measures adopted under Article 41 of the UN Charter. The Council is 
empowered to “decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions (…). These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (UN 
Charter art. 41). In essence, the Security Council enjoys wide discretion as how to 
‘give effect to its decisions’ when it decides about the scope and duration of sanctions 
measures. Over time, the quality and quantity applying of such measures has evolved 
considerably (Farrall 2007: 106). The Council has shifted from comprehensive to 
“smart sanctions” (Brzoska 2003) and sizably increased the frequency of their 
adoption from two cold-war cases to 30 cases after 1990 (as of January 2016, for a 
complete list, see Annex 1). 
Basically, sanctions serve three purposes for the Security Council: to coerce 
behavioral change, to constrain sanctions target’s activities or to signal to the 
international community that a particular behavior is unacceptable (Biersteker et al. 
2013: 12–15; Chesterman/Pouligny 2003: 504–505; Giumelli 2011). The Council 
applies sanctions to achieve a variety of different objectives, including conflict 
resolution in interstate and internal conflicts (e.g. DRC), restoring democracy (e.g. 
Haiti), nuclear non-proliferation (e.g. DPRK), protection of civilians and their human 
rights (e.g. Libya II) and counter-terrorism (e.g. Al-Qaida) (Security Council Report 
2013: 3–5; Biersteker et al. 2013). Regarding the targets, the Council has initially 
applied sanctions against state targets, de facto state targets (in case of an 
unrecognized government) or failed state targets, while now almost exclusively 
imposing sanctions on distinct groups within states or even individuals (Farrall 2007: 
128–132). This trend towards a more “selective approach” to target particular 
individuals and group(s) while avoiding unintended consequences for the civilian 
population (Weschler 2009-2010: 32–33; 35) was mainly the result of the 
humanitarian impact of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, Yugoslavia and Haiti 
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(Weiss et al. 1997; Brzoska 2003: 528–529) and the sanctions reform processes 
sparked by these experiences (Brzoska 2003; Biersteker et al. 2005). 
Regarding the types of sanctions measures the Council applies under Article 41, 
the measures can be categorized according to their degree of discrimination. The 
Council has imposed comprehensive sanctions, i.e. a ban on imports and exports of 
all tradable goods with the target country while allowing for certain humanitarian 
exemptions, on Southern Rhodesia during the Cold War, and on Iraq, Yugoslavia and 
Haiti during the 90s (Farrall 2007: 107–108). Sanctions on whole core economic 
sectors, such as an embargo on petroleum products are more discriminating than 
comprehensive sanctions. Aviation sanctions or commodity sanctions on specific 
products (e.g. timer, diamonds, charcoal, or wildlife products) do affect only certain 
sectors and/or regions. A widely used tool, the imposition of arms embargoes or non-
proliferation related measures on countries, regions or even individuals are among the 
more focused sanctions. Finally, the application of targeted sanctions on individuals 
and groups including assets freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes are the most 
discriminating and currently widely used sanctions tools (Farrall 2007: 106–128; 
Biersteker et al. 2013: 16; Security Council Report 2013). 
Second, Security Council members can simply decide about potential sanctions 
implementation decisions such as listing of target individuals without recourse to a 
sanctions committee. Whilst Council members can refer functions to its subsidiary 
bodies, they can also remove authority from a subsidiary body or selectively take up 
single-case implementation decisions. In fact, proactive members generally have two 
options to get implementation decisions adopted, either through committee decisions 
or a Council resolution. Sanctions proponents can refer implementation decisions to 
the Council for various reasons including a committee blockade, an anticipated 
committee blockade, in case prompt decisions are warranted or for raising a 
decision’s public profile. For instance, during the hasty negotiations over the Libya 
sanctions regime (resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011) and 2009 (2011)) and within 
the politically contentious Iran sanctions regime (resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 
(2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2009)) Council members adopted package listings by 
means of Council resolutions. Similarly, while the Council had created a sanctions 
committee competent to list individuals and entities in the Sudan sanctions regime 
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(resolution 1591 (2005)), proactive Council members circumvented the committee 
which was unable to designate individuals (Holslag 2008: 81–82) and successfully 
proposed listing four individuals in resolution 1672 (2006). In 2014, the Council 
added further individuals to the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions list by resolution 2170 
(2014) to raise the public profile. It is a widely held view that decisions emerging 
from an undifferentiated setting (i.e. by Council decision) can be expected to be the 
result of a bargaining process where actors enter their individual decision requests 
and accumulate a package deal (e.g. Bosco 2009, 2014a). The accountability control 
of the decision solely rests upon the situation-specific interests of actors involved. In 
these cases, the logic of rule-making in the Council and adoption of small 
implementation decisions in the committee is sidestepped. 
Third, as a second, most common option, the Council refers implementation 
decisions to subsidiary bodies and thereby decides about the structure of sanctions 
regimes through assigning specific functions to its subsidiary bodies created under 
Article 29 of the UN Charter (Paulus 2012). Because the Security Council cannot 
perform all its tasks itself, the Council is in need of subsidiary organs. Many of the 
more administrative governance tasks associated with the maintenance of 
international peace and security including sanctions implementation decisions would 
either severely overburden an undifferentiated Council or would require increasing 
decision-making by independent experts or the UN Secretariat. This is most visible in 
the establishment of the criminal tribunals on Yugoslavia and Rwanda or the UN 
Compensation Commission, which had an adjudicative function that needed to be 
carried out impartially and independently within a given mandate (Di Frigressi 
Rattalma/Treves 1999). In recent times, the SC has increasingly resorted to the use of 
subsidiary bodies, indeed, “(…) subsidiary organs have become an indispensable tool 
for SC governance, ranging from judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (…) to the 
delimitation of boundaries (…) and, in particular, Sanctions Committees” (Paulus 
2012: 987). 
In absence of specific provisions on the creation of subsidiary organs in the UN 
Charter, the Security Council enjoys considerable discretion as how to design its 
sanctions regimes. As such, Article 29 provides a wide-ranging legal basis for the 
establishment of subsidiary bodies. On the one hand, the article requires that the body 
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must be ‘subsidiary’ (Paulus 2012: 987–989). The subsidiarity implies that the body 
has some capacity to act independently of its ‘parent body’. On the other hand, a 
subsidiary organ must be “deem[ed] necessary” for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. The Council must possess competence in area concerned and 
must respect the separation of powers between the UN’s principal organs, in 
particular the General Assembly (Paulus 2012: 991–992). While legal limits of the 
Security Council’s powers in respect to its subsidiary organs have come under 
scrutiny, Article 29 does not provide any substantive limits to the Council’s discretion 
(Paulus 2012: 987). The Security Council has manifested its ability to establish and 
dissolve subsidiary organs in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, stating that 
it “may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question” 
(Paulus 2012: 993; Bailey/Daws 1998: 333). Subsidiary organs are established and 
dissolved by a Security Council vote, although in practice many subsidiary organs 
have sunset clauses. Indeed this issue has been debated in the Informal Working 
Group on General Issues on Sanctions, which ended in a compromise that country-
specific sanctions regimes would have a sunset clause while a simple roll-over is not 
vetoed, whereas measures against global threats to the peace are of indefinite 
duration, as for instance the 1540 committee (Weschler 2009-2010: 39–42; Brzoska 
2003: 523). As a result of the veto procedure, it is difficult to establish but also 
difficult to dissolve a sanctions regime once established (Paulus 2012: 993–994). 
Fourth, the core task of the Security Council, once it has delegated decision 
competencies within its sanctions regimes, is to politically guide subsidiary bodies 
through rule-making (Conlon 1995a: 329). In sanctions regimes, the Security Council 
usually completely transfers small implementation decisions such as listing and 
delisting or granting exemptions from a comprehensive trade embargo to subsidiary 
bodies and thereby gives rise to governance issues associated with single-case 
decision-making within the subsidiary bodies when interests diverge. While each 
single decision taken within the committee is of a marginal importance to the 
achievement of the general cooperation project, the sanctions regime relies on ability 
of the governance system to produce a meaningful outcome on the macro level. While 
such delegation is entirely intended to relieve the Council’s decision-making 
apparatus from taking all too detailed single-case decisions, the Council forfeits the 
ability to solve conflicts emerging from different interests by aggregating single 
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decisions to packages. As a solution to these emerging decision-making issues, 
instead, Council members have to concentrate on politically guiding the decision-
making process through defining the mandates, powers and decision-making 
procedures applicable in its subsidiary organs. As such, the Council can decide which 
substantive and procedural prescriptions it provides to the subsidiary bodies. 
The Security Council usually makes use of its governance function and directs 
the work of its subsidiary organs through the adoption of resolutions outlining the 
principles of their work. In fact, Council resolutions form the central “legislative 
instruments” to guide sanctions regimes (Conlon 1996a: 75). The essence of this 
governance function lies in substantive decision criteria and procedural proscriptions. 
While doing so, the Council has principally two options. On the one hand, the 
Council can adopt substantive decision criteria or procedural prescriptions to the 
subsidiary body. For instance, the Council could provide the committee with set of 
applicable listing criteria or a procedure outlining how the committee should process 
individual listing requests. On the other hand, the Council can require the subsidiary 
body to adopt or amend own internal rules of procedure and thereby letting the 
subsidiary body solve potential decision-making issues through ‘self-regulation’. The 
frequent adoption of resolutions that make such substantive or procedural 
prescriptions illustrates that the Council uses its oversight function as to govern its 
subsidiary bodies, even though the same group of actors is present in the Council and 
the sanctions committee. 
In sum, the Security Council is the master of its sanctions regimes and enjoys 
considerable discretion as how to organize its sanctions regimes. However, the large 
number of agenda items each dealing with complex issues requires efficiently 
organizing its workload and taking decisions in a routinized manner. As a result, the 
Council retreats to the function of establishing and governing differentiated sanctions 
regimes, mainly through resolutions. While the Council transfers its implementation 
decisions to its subsidiary organs, negotiations in the Council necessarily take a much 
broader perspective. Decisions may be linked to other parts of the sanctions regime or 
even across sanctions regimes as a result of package agreements. As such, imposing 
sanctions measures is a political tool and individual sanctions measures do not 
necessarily have to be directly related to each other (Conlon 1995a: 328). While the 
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Council deals exclusively with issues of a general nature, subsidiary bodies and in 
particular, sanctions committees, take a much narrower perspective within the 
framework of Council guidance. 
 
4.2 The sanctions committees as implementing agents 
Within the governance system, sanctions committees constitute the main subsidiary 
organs to take numerous small implementation decisions and are equipped with 
substantial decision functions. All major sanctions measures including both 
comprehensive sanctions and targeted sanctions require substantial follow-up 
decisions to meaningfully implement a sanctions regime. With rare exceptions, for 
instance the 1996 Sudan sanctions regime, the Council has transferred these 
implementation decisions to separate and specifically established sanctions 
committees (Farrall 2007: 147). Besides adopting implementation decisions, 
sanctions committees have a role as secondary rulemaking body. Both functions 
provide a distinct incentive structure for committee members. 
Sanctions committees have three common core characteristics. First, strikingly, a 
sanctions committee has the identical membership as the Council and thus forms a 
“committee of the whole” (Sievers/Daws 2014: 520; Weschler 2009-2010: 38; 
Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2011: 4–5; Kaul 1996: 97). Thereby the composition follows 
the precedent that was set by the evolution in the first sanctions committee 
established in 1969 on Southern Rhodesia. After an initial phase, where this 
committee was composed of seven members (S/8697), in 1970, the Security Council 
decided that the committee consists of all Security Council members (S/9951). 
Thereafter, all sanctions committees established have followed this model (Farrall 
2007: 147–148; Gowlland-Debbas 1990: 606–609). While other design options such 
as an expert committee not formed by Security Council members would have been 
possible in principle, however, the Council has an established practice to duplicate 
Council membership in its sanctions committees (Conlon 1996b: 281; Sievers/Daws 
2014: 520). However, as Paul Conlon notes, the “identical membership [of Council 
and committee] in no way implies an overlapping of functions” (1995b: 663).  
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The committees are usually staffed with diplomats of a mid- and low-rank, below 
the level of the deputy permanent representative (van Walsum 2004: 183; Conlon 
2000). In fact, committee members’ representatives are career diplomats. Usually, 
these diplomats are generalists that served in different functions before and are not 
necessarily familiar with the subject matter. Mostly, diplomats usually serve in 
bilateral settings within their countries embassies and not in multilateral settings of 
the international organizations (Conlon 2000: 15; 27-28; Scharf/Dorosin 1993: 821). 
Depending on the size of the mission, different diplomats serve in different 
committees and increasingly so as the number of committees and the workload 
increases. Committees are chaired on the level of an ambassador. As an established 
practice, the Chair for each committee is selected among the E10 members, rotates on 
a yearly basis (initially in the first committee on Southern Rhodesia, chairmanship 
was fixed, later rotated with the Council presidency, see Farrall 2007: 148; Gowlland-
Debbas 1990) and serves in his/her personal capacity. Each committee usually has 
two vice-chairs that serve in their national capacity (Security Council Report 2013: 7; 
van Walsum 2004: 183; Kaul 1996: 97).  
Second, proceedings in the committees are not public as sanctions committees 
meet in private session in a meeting room with interpretation provided (Sievers/Daws 
2014: 520; Weschler 2009-2010: 38; Conlon 2000: 35). Consequently, not only the 
deliberations are secret, but also decisions, informal rules and justifications for 
decisions are not public unless there is an inherent requirement to provide such 
information, as for example, targeted sanctions require the publication of sanctions 
targets (Conlon 1995a: 329). Basically, there are two meeting formats, formal and 
informal meetings, both of which are private. In formal meetings the Secretariat 
prepares a summary record of the meetings proceedings in limited distribution, i.e. 
not as a public document, whereas in informal meetings, no such service is provided 
(Bailey/Daws 1998: 365; Sievers/Daws 2014: 520). The major difference is that the 
committee can take decisions in formal meetings which it cannot in informal 
meetings. However, organizing a formal committee meeting is more effort for little 
benefit as decisions can easily be taken in the written no-objection procedure and 
Council practice has considerably shifted towards conducting informal meetings. 
Generally, informal sessions are indeed very formal. The chair reads out from the 
“Notes for the Chair” prepared by the Secretariat, following a standard practice in UN 
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meetings. Delegates often read out written statements and do not often speak “off the 
cuff”, in particular because junior delegates are cautious to stick to statements 
previously cleared by their capital (Sievers/Daws 2014: 485–486; Conlon 2000: 29–
36; see Conlon Papers, Notes for the Chair). 
Third, sanctions committees decide by consensus and as a result, all 15 
committee members technically have a veto (Kaul 1996: 100). Essentially, “[i]f there 
is no consensus, there is no decision” (van Walsum 2004: 184). The consensus rule 
stems from the first sanctions committee on Southern Rhodesia in 1969, which 
accepted consensus as its decision rule in its first meeting, later adopted by all other 
sanctions committees. However, the literature does not offer precise sources as to why 
this rule was chosen (Gowlland-Debbas 1990: 609; Farrall 2007: 156; Sievers/Daws 
2014: 530). This is the most obvious difference to the Council and logic of deciding 
under the consensus provides a completely different structuring effect. For practical 
considerations, in sanctions committees, unless adopted in a formal meeting, 
decisions of all kind including listing and delisting, exemptions, adoption of press 
releases or Panel of Expert reports, are taken in a written no-objection procedure 
(also: silence procedure, or “simplified and accelerated ‘no-objection’ procedure” in 
early regimes, see Scharf/Dorosin 1993). This procedure provides an efficient means 
of decision-making, in particular in committees with the demand to take a high 
number of decisions (Conlon 1995b: 647; interview with UN member state official, 
New York, March 2012). Accordingly, the committee Chair circulates decision 
proposals in written form among committee members, which have three decision-
making options. First, they can do nothing and accept the decision. Second, they can 
place a technical hold, in case they do not wish to object the decision, but do not 
agree with it, usually to consult with the capital or to request more information. Third, 
they can object the decision proposal. For a decision to be adopted, all members must 
not object or place a hold (UN jargon: “break the silence”) within the specified 
timeframe which varies across committees and types of decisions (Rosand 2004: 748; 
Kaul 1996: 100; Farrall 2007: 156–157).  
The specific organization of the decision process generally does not naturally 
provide a fertile ground for activating internal accountability and reverses the burden 
of proof to the objecting states. Objecting to a decision proposal requires action, 
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while accepting decision proposals can be done tacitly without any action. In 
addition, the ability of committee members to evaluate decision proposals depends on 
the time limit. In essence, time limits for decisions taken under the no-objection 
procedure within sanctions committees are inherent to the procedure’s logic. In cases 
of complex decision proposals, a short time frame can pose significant limitations for 
committee members to respond (Kanetake 2008: 147). This is aggravated by the fact 
that many member states missions are limited in their ability to consult with their 
capitals quickly as a result of time zones differences. In such a case, decisions are 
difficult to challenge as actors must have good reasons for objections and provides 
incentives to only block decisions in cases of vital national interest. This undermines 
the effective operation of no-objection procedure in terms of providing incentives for 
rule-based and consistent decision-making (Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 29–30). 
Similar to the Council, sanctions committees have wide ranging discretion as how 
they organize their own work and there is no requirement to follow the same working 
methods as other committees. Theoretically, it is thinkable that different committees – 
as different subsidiary organs – adopt different working methods even if they process 
the same task (Farrall 2007: 156) or that committees are staffed with technical experts 
instead of member states delegates (Conlon 1996b: 281). Although there is no 
requirement to establish a separate committee for each sanctions regime and other 
organizational designs are plausible, such as establishing a more permanent 
“sanctions machinery” for sanctions administration (Doxey 2000: 10–11), it is the 
general Council practice to do so (terrorism-related Sudan and Somalia/Eritrea 
sanctions are exceptions, Farrall 2007: 210, for earlier cases see Bailey/Daws 1998: 
365; for later cases see Paulus 2012: 998–999). This practice is not without effect. In 
a unitary organ, member states would be forced to develop a coherent sanctions 
practice guided by overarching principles. On the contrary, the creation of separate 
sanctions committees limits the constraints to adopt consistent decisions that would 
arise out of such an alternate organizational design. For instance, the members of the 
non-aligned movement, mostly with majority Muslim population demanded a more 
lenient sanctions policy within the Iraq committee while pushing for a more 
aggressive approach towards Serbia in the Yugoslavia committee (Conlon 1995a: 
329). Yet, this form of organization provides possibilities to engage in forum 
shopping. For example, the individual “Jim’ale”, who was delisted from the Al-Qaida 
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list in anticipation of an Ombudsperson de-listing, was instantly listed in the Somalia 
committee (Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 19, 39). 
Concerning specific decision functions, sanctions committees form the main 
subsidiary body of sanctions regimes and provide two core functions: decision-
making, and rule-making alongside the Council (Krisch 2004: 886). The former and 
major function of sanctions committees is to adopt small, separate case-specific 
implementation decisions in the “day-to-day operation of the regime” (Krisch 2004: 
886), which the Council delegates to the committee (Security Council Report 2013: 6; 
Farrall 2010: 194, 2007). As such, sanctions committees in a system of divided labor 
mostly perform an “administrative function” (Conlon 1995b: 646) for “(…) matters 
of the type that in Western societies are handled by regulatory bodies” (Conlon 2000: 
31). The types of case-specific decisions vary by the design of sanctions measures. 
Whereas the administration of comprehensive sanctions requires deciding about 
exemptions from a trade embargo on a case-by-case basis, for targeted sanctions 
regimes to become effective they require the listing and delisting of individuals and 
entities as well as granting humanitarian exemptions from assets freezes and travel 
bans. In addition, arms embargoes require deciding about exemptions for 
peacekeeping operations or governmental forces. In addition, other functions include 
evaluating reports by member states or UN entities such as the Panels of Experts 
concerning the implementation of the sanctions measures, evaluate cases of sanctions 
evasion or non-compliance, report to the Council on its work through briefings and 
written reports and other tasks as assigned by the Council (Carisch/Rickard-Martin 
2011: 4; Security Council Report 2013). Although these types of decisions are 
different in substance, they have in common that they are small potentially separated 
single-case decisions, while each single case has only marginal importance on its 
own. 
While principally any unresolved or contentious matter on the committee’s 
agenda may be referred to the Council by any of the committee members, all member 
states have strong incentives to leave matters within the committee arena. On the one 
hand, the non-permanent member states enjoy much a stronger position in the 
committee than in the Council, as every committee member can block decisions. On 
the other hand, the permanent members, although having a stronger position in the 
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Council due to their veto and the majority requirement of nine affirmative votes 
instead of consensus, risk exposing their motivations and politicizing an issue of very 
limited scope. Although Council decisions are likewise mainly prepared in closed-
door meetings, agenda items, decision proposals and decisions are far more 
transparent in the Council than in the committee and subject to enhanced public 
scrutiny. In addition, this move would severely undermine the intended function of 
the committee to relieve the Council of making a range of decisions of a small scope. 
While the option to refer issues to the Council has been applied in a few sanctions 
regimes (for instance on Sudan, resolution 1672 (2006)), it was never used in others. 
Besides adopting implementation decisions and although the Council is the 
primary source of rule-making, the sanctions committees perform a significant rule-
making function alongside the Security Council. The separation of the two main 
functions of rulemaking and rule-application is observable in sanctions regimes, 
although this does not materialize in a clear separation between the organs. Besides 
its function as a decision-maker on small implementation decisions, sanctions 
committees specify the rules given by the Council and elaborate new rules upon the 
Council’s request (see also section 4.1 above). Thereby, the committees serve as 
organs of interpretation and clarification, provide ongoing definitions (e.g. on what 
“humanitarian circumstances” are) while deciding about single case decisions 
(Scharf/Dorosin 1993). In addition, the committees are empowered engage in 
selective ‘self-regulation’ to overcome issues associated with case-specific decision-
making and thus to resolve decision-making blockades. 
Committee rulemaking is associated with the same institutional constraints as 
Council rulemaking. If the Council is relieved of the interpretation task by 
transferring the task to the committee, however, the committee is under pressure to 
provide such authoritative interpretation, otherwise the individual UN member states 
would “interpret on their own” (Conlon 2000: 46, 1995a: 337, 1996b: 256). In case 
the committee engages in rule-making, the decision-making process is split into a 
sequence. In fact, any form of adopting decisions always requires the prior agreement 
on how decisions are to be taken at all. Therefore, rule-making separates the decision 
about single cases from the elaboration of the committee specific rules. First, the 
committee has to elaborate the generally applicable rule-set, which is later applied to 
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single cases. This transfers the committee into a logic of rule-making which 
subordinates committee members to the constraints usually associated with Council 
decision-making. In this context, not only formally accepted rules can guide decision-
making behavior, but also deciding by precedent whenever a new type of issue 
emerges after which similar issues are decided following the precedent (see e.g. 
discussions in Iraq and Yugoslavia sanctions committee summary records, Conlon 
Papers, on file with author). 
As such, Security Council members have incentives to defer meaningful 
decision-making authority to committee for clarification of its resolutions and 
evolving application. This results mainly from the differentiated nature of sanctions 
regimes that require granting a certain degree of discretion to the committee; 
otherwise the Council would have to take the all technical decisions itself. At the 
same time, effectively implementing complex sanctions regimes requires more 
detailed prescriptions and oversight than the Council is capable of delivering (Conlon 
1995b: 650). While negotiating about the content of its sanctions regimes, Council 
members almost naturally takes a much broader perspective. Resolution drafters 
cannot feasibly consider all implications of compromise language or previously 
“agreed language” from earlier resolutions under changing circumstances. Council 
resolutions are adopted at a certain point in time and depending on the situation, and 
are decided under severe time constraints (Conlon 2000: 46), whereas implementing a 
sanctions regimes requires making small decisions on a continuous and routine basis. 
In addition, potentially divisive technical details are excluded from Council 
negotiations to achieve broadest possible support, where intentional ambiguity 
provides a tool for consensus building (Scharf/Dorosin 1993; Byers 2004). Thus, to 
reduce transaction costs, the Council transfers the clarification of technical details and 
operational definitions to the sanctions committees within the boundaries of Council 
resolutions (Scharf/Dorosin 1993: 812–813). Therefore, as a regulator, the committee 
relieves the Council from providing all too detailed substantive and procedural 
prescriptions without undermining its oversight function. While the committee gains 
a rulemaking function, such transfer of authority is not problematic for Council 
members as they have a veto position both in the Council and the committee 
(Scharf/Dorosin 1993: 813). 
 
140 
In practical terms, sanctions committees function as a secondary regulator 
through adopting its own formalized rules of procedure and by developing an 
informal decision-making practice (Conlon 1996a: 77). For the former, each sanctions 
committee adopts its own “guidelines of the committee for the conduct of its work”, 
detailing committee working methods (Farrall 2007: 156; Sievers/Daws 2014) and 
giving procedural instructions to the committee secretariat (interview with UN 
member state official, New York, November 2013). Committee guidelines vary 
considerably in length and precision. For instance, the single page committee 
guidelines of the Iraq sanctions committee merely outline 10 short paragraphs, 
whereas the current committee guidelines of the Al-Qaida sanctions committee 
outlines 18 paragraphs with multiple subparagraphs on a total of 26 pages, detailing 
the sanctions provisions through specific substantive and procedural prescriptions. In 
some instances, the Council directs the committee to promulgate or amend its 
guidelines to adapt to new sanctions measures or to solve decision-making issues 
(Sievers/Daws 2014: 542–543). These directives highlight that the actors indeed 
perceive the Council and the committee as two distinct arenas within the same 
sanctions regime. While such a directive transfers contentious issues inherent to the 
adoption of rules applicable to a range of cases to the committee, it removes the 
option of non-regulation. Without performing the function of providing self-
regulation, the density rules in the committee stage would be significantly lower 
(Gehring/Dörfler 2013: 573). 
In conclusion, sanctions committees perform a decisive function for the Council, 
namely to bring meaning to its sanctions regimes by means of adopting 
implementation decisions. As a secondary role, sanctions committees adopt rules, 
either through adoption of committee guidelines or through decision practice, to 
overcome situations of diverging interests. In contrast to the Council, the decision 
situation within sanctions committee setting provides differing opportunity structures, 
not least since they decide by consensus. 
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4.3 The Panels of Experts as reflexive component 
With the Panels of Experts (sometimes called Group of Experts, Monitoring Group or 
Team, or Committee of Experts), the governance system of sanctions regimes include 
a reflexive component (e.g. “reflexive arm”, see Krisch 2004: 886) without formal 
decision powers. Traditionally, sanctions committees had the task to monitor 
sanctions implementation. However, for the Security Council and the committee 
staffed by diplomats and based in New York, it is impractical if not impossible to 
meaningfully monitor sanctions implementation in complex conflict settings. In 
addition, the diplomatic politics involved in Security Council affairs usually inhibit 
critical evaluation of the workings of sanctions regimes. As a result, to assess 
weaknesses of the sanctions mechanism in a particular case, to make 
recommendations for its improvement and to systematically identify sanctions 
violations (Krisch 2004: 886; Farrall 2009), the Security Council decided to create 
expert bodies for independent monitoring and information gathering on its behalf 
(Farrall 2009: 195). It is now a standard practice to establish a Panel of Experts 
whenever a new sanctions regime is imposed (dos Reis Stefanopoulos/Lopez 2012: 7; 
Farrall 2009: 194–195; Brzoska 2003: 524; Boucher/Holt 2009: 25–44). The Security 
Council individually establishes Panels of Experts as a subsidiary body in a resolution 
outlining its size, duration, location, and mandate (Farrall 2009: 196; Boucher/Holt 
2009: 10; Farrall 2007: 163–164). 
Panels of Experts vary considerable in their size (from two to 12 members), 
duration (from few weeks to years) and are usually located within the conflict region 
(except for the Al-Qaida, Iran and DPRK panels). The Panels are staffed with experts 
usually chosen for their competence in a required field or area. For instance, the 
Sudan Panel of Experts is comprised of five experts, including an aviation expert, an 
arms expert, an international humanitarian law expert, a regional expert and a 
financial expert who also serves as the Panel’s coordinator (S/2014/206). The 
Secretariat proposes a list of suitable candidates picked from a Secretariat roster 
which is circulated among the respective sanctions committee under no-objection 
procedure. If one member objects, the respective individual is substituted until no 
more objections are received. Finally, the UN Secretary-General formally appoints 
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the individual experts on a consultancy basis (Farrall 2009: 203, 207; 
Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2011: 5). 
Panels of Experts serve the function of an independent advisory body to the 
Council under the direction of the respective sanctions committee, but have no 
decision powers. In essence, such panels are “(…) organs with different and distinct 
mandates, of independent, expert and non-judiciary character, with no subpoena 
powers, whose primary role is to provide sanctions-related information to the relevant 
committees” (S/2006/997, para. 19). In essence, the transfer of tasks to such expert 
bodies partially outsources the primary responsibility of the UNSC to maintain 
international peace and security to private actors, in this case experts (Farrall 2009: 
209). In each case, the Panels of Experts "(…) act essentially as the eyes and ears of 
the Security Council” (Carisch testimony 2009) in the particular conflict region. 
Centrally, Panels of Experts monitor UN targeted sanctions regimes, provide 
information and evidence on sanctions non-compliance by targets and implementing 
member states, and make recommendations on ways to improve the effectiveness and 
implementation of the respective sanctions regime. First, expert bodies provide real-
time information about their investigation of sanctions violations or other 
developments on the ground to the committee (e.g. ASSMT on Al-Qaida/Taliban or 
the SEMG on charcoal ban in Somalia) or assist committees in ongoing assignments 
such as providing information on the listing of individuals or updating the 
information on the committee’s consolidated list. In addition, Panels seek the 
cooperation from relevant member states. Second, usually the larger share of 
reporting is confined to mid-term briefings and especially a final report at the end of 
the Panel’s mandate. These reports elaborate findings relevant to sanctions regimes 
often detailing evidence collected while in the field, make recommendations on how 
to generally improve sanctions effectiveness, propose additional individuals or 
entities for listing (mostly in a confidential annex), recommends to establish, lift or 
modify certain sanctions measures or highlight other issues including transparency 
and information provision by the committee (Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2011: 5; 
Boucher/Holt 2009: 45–54; Farrall 2009). 
Expert bodies are governed by the Security Council, the sanctions committee, the 
Secretariat (Farrall 2009: 202–203) and the expert body itself. First, the Security 
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Council serves as a regulator that establishes and defines the scope of the expert 
bodies mandate and the standards of evidence to be employed by the expert bodies. 
Panel of Experts’ mandates vary considerably in their form and precision. For 
instance, the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 
(ASSMT) assisting the Al-Qaida and Taliban committees, has 28 provisions on three 
pages (resolution 2083 (2012), Annex I), whereas the mandate of the Panel of Experts 
on Sudan has a mere three provisions (resolution 1591 (2005), para. 3b, as extended 
by subsequent resolutions). The Council has recognized the importance of providing 
more detailed mandates to Panels of Experts, and issue that was also part of the 
targeted sanctions reform initiatives (Biersteker et al. 2005: 27). To that effect, the 
Council can provide the expert bodies with requirements on the methodological 
standards to be employed. The Security Council has regularly governed Panel of 
Experts, which underlines that the Council had not anticipated the monitoring bodies 
to perform like they did (Farrall 2009: 201). In the final report of its Working Group 
on Sanctions, the Council acknowledged that the “working methods of expert groups 
have developed through a system of trial and error” (S/2006/997, para. 9). While it 
had accepted the importance of “common methodological standards” for the work of 
the expert panels, and in particular that expert bodies “(…) should rely on verified 
documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts 
themselves, including photographs” (S/2006/997, para. 22), the Council has not yet 
provided formal guidance on general standards of evidence. 
Second, the sanctions committees govern expert bodies. The respective sanctions 
committee decides about appointing the individual experts, is regularly briefed by the 
expert bodies and receives and discusses the final reports. Therefore, the committees 
more frequently deal with the expert bodies than the Council and ensure the day-to-
day governance (Farrall 2009: 202). Upon receiving the reports detailing their 
activities, findings and recommendations (Boucher/Holt 2009: 45) and after a briefing 
by the Panel followed by a committee discussion, the committee usually adopts the 
report and refers it to the Council at which time it will become a public document 
(except for confidential annexes). The committee can take action on the report’s 
findings by adopting case-specific decisions itself or by recommending amendments 
to the sanctions regime to the Council (Farrall 2009: 203). 
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Third, the UN Secretariat’s Sanctions Branch fulfills a governance function 
(Farrall 2009: 202–203), however, mostly of an administrative character such as 
assisting in travel and visa arrangements. On the substantive level, the Sanctions 
Branch provides an initial training and advice on how to interact with the respective 
committee. Sometimes the Sanctions Branch contributes to background research, 
report-writing and field work (Boucher/Holt 2009: 56–59, 2007: 3). 
Fourth, the expert bodies govern themselves within the scope of their mandate. A 
Panel of Experts has – as a Council subsidiary body – wide discretion as how to 
organize its own work within the limits given by the Council’s mandate. All Panels of 
Experts share the requirement to submit regular written reports including a final 
report with recommendations to the Council through the committee. As such, the 
expert bodies are independent in the sense that they are solely responsible for the 
content of their reports (Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2011: 5). Although the Panel as a 
collective actor is independent in its own reporting, the individual members have to 
agree on the substance and wording of the reports and which standards of evidence 
should be employed. In case there are diverging opinions, the Panel has to develop a 
mechanism to aggregate diverging opinions into a final written report. Panels have 
adopted different mechanisms of preference aggregation, including applying tighter 
standards of evidence, package deals, majority voting or simply noting a dissenting 
member’s opinion in reports. The coordinator serves as the official contact for the 
committee, coordinates the work of the group and signs off official correspondence 
(Farrall 2009: 203; Boucher/Holt 2009: 61–62). 
The reporting function of expert bodies creates a specific decision situation for 
committee members when they have a general interest in the functioning of the 
sanctions regime, but have situation-specific interests and thus create incentives to 
impede a report’s publication. The ability of committee members to block or delay 
expert body reports including individually unfavorable findings first and foremost 
depends on the procedure employed, which varies across sanctions regimes. While 
most committees indirectly receive the report and transmit it to the Council (which 
requires a consensus decision), some expert bodies are mandated to submit the report 
directly to the Council (Security Council Report 2013: 8). For the former, as a result, 
committee members have a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ option. For the latter, the committee is 
 
145 
no longer competent to decide about its publication. For instance, the Council 
recently changed the procedure for submission of the DRC expert body report 
requesting it to “submit to the Council its final report upon termination of the Group’s 
mandate” (S/2014/2136, para. 5), presumably to prevent blocking of reports by the 
committee member and conflict party Rwanda (see section 7.3). 
For committee members, there are theoretically two ways to challenge the content 
of expert panel reports. First, committee members can challenge a finding on the 
basis of standards of evidence. In particular, the question of what standards of 
evidence are acceptable has raised contentious debates in committees about the 
contents of filed expert reports. To avoid such a challenge, the Panel of Experts can 
apply stricter standards of evidence and methodology in selecting the presented 
evidence. In practice, there is a large grey area of sources that could possibly be used 
ranging from forensic evidence to hear-say reports. Using strict standards of 
evidence, selecting evidence that is fact-based rather than unsupported assertions, the 
usage of multiple sources to substantiate a claim, as well as inviting relevant parties 
to present disconfirming evidence will decrease opportunities to block a report. 
Second, committee members can challenge a particular finding if they can argue that 
the panel of experts overstepped the scope of its mandate. The more vaguely 
formulated the mandate is, the wider is a committee member’s discretion (interview 
with UN sanctions expert, Washington DC, December 2013). In the Sudan sanctions 
regime, the mandate is vaguely formulated and in terms of substance merely requests 
the panel “(…) to assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the [arms 
embargo, travel ban, assets freeze] (…), and to make recommendations to the 
Committee on actions the Council may want to consider” (resolution 1591 (2005), 
para. 3b). Accordingly, recommendations can be easily rejected arguing that the 
expert body has over-stretched its mandate. 
Finally, in the interaction between the Council, the committee and the expert 
body, certain mediating factors are at work. If committee members seek to control the 
expert body’s work and final report’s content by lobbying the Secretariat to put their 
“own” nationals to the list of candidates, often involving horse-trading between 
committee members (Security Council Report 2013: 6–7) in politically contentious 
sanctions regimes, they introduce an element of bargaining into the panel’s 
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information gathering process. Usually, governments susceptible towards controlling 
one expert, pick a career diplomat or ministerial official to ensure loyalty. However, 
even if individual experts succeed in deleting unfavorable content for their 
government, the logic of bargaining does not allow them to eliminate all unfavorable 
content, in particular if the investigated cases are bolstered with facts and are clearly 
documented. Moreover, the expert body has an incentive not to overstretch its 
mandate as the Council can always dissolve the expert body and has incentives to 
submit recommendations bolstered with sufficient evidence that have some chance of 
succeeding. On the same side, the Council and the committee cannot discard all 
expert body findings and recommendations if the Council as a collective has 
mandated the expert body for a particular task and does not want to undermine the 
sanctions regime as a whole. 
Concluding, the Panels of Experts complement UNSC sanctions regimes with a 
purely advisory body without decision competencies. In essence, the expert bodies 
provide information and recommendations the panel deems essential for 
strengthening the respective sanctions regime. While the committee retains the 
decision competence on any panel recommendation, including listing proposals, there 
are incentives to accept well-reasoned recommendations. 
 
4.4 The UN Secretariat’s “Sanctions Branch” as administrative 
component 
The Secretariat’s Subsidiary Organs Branch (often referred to as “Sanction’s Branch”) 
is the body within the governance system mainly tasked with providing 
administrative support to the committee, however, it does not have any formal 
decision functions and at best serves an agenda setting role. The Sanction’s Branch is 
situated in the Security Council Affairs Division (SCAD) within the Department of 
Political Affairs (Cortright et al. 2010: 22–23; Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2011). The 
Secretariat created the Sanctions Branch as a separate entity in 1992 after the 
imposition of sanctions on Iraq and Yugoslavia significantly increased the workload 
(Conlon 2000: 36–37). As the number of sanctions committees grew, the number of 
servicing staff grew considerably from 18 in 1993 (internal Secretariat document, 
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Conlon Papers), to 33 professional and general service staff (internal Secretariat 
document, as of October 2013). 
The main function of the Secretariat is to service the committee through meeting 
organization and document distribution. The Secretariat staff, in cooperation with the 
Chairman, prepares and drafts the meeting documents such as the provisional agenda, 
the Notes for the Chair (i.e. a script used by the Chairman during formal and informal 
sessions to guide the committee though the adopted agenda), as well as other 
documents relevant for a committee’s work. Each committee is served by a 
Committee Secretary, the main contact point for committee members and non-
Council member states, and the respective regime-specific Panel of Experts. Each 
Secretary is assigned to another sanctions committee as back-up. Besides the 
Secretary, each committee is serviced by a team of additional staff (Carisch/Rickard-
Martin 2011: 5), usually three, but up to six as during the labor-intensive Yugoslavia 
sanctions committee (internal Secretariat document, Conlon Papers). As Chairing a 
sanctions committee is quite labor-intensive, the Chairing delegation and the 
committee Secretary usually work closely together (Boucher/Holt 2009: 58). In 
addition, the Secretariat maintains the ‘Committee eRooms’, where documents, for 
instance, incoming correspondence (Communications) and outgoing correspondence 
(Notes), are electronically stored for committee members. 
On occasional basis, the Secretariat performs tasks including circulating 
incoming communications or decision proposals. In addition, the Secretariat usually 
engages in drafting the sanctions committee’s annual reports. Depending on the 
committee’s workload and the chairing delegation’s capacities, sometimes Secretaries 
draft complete annual reports on their own. Concerning the committee guidelines, the 
Secretariat, in cooperation with the Chairman, provides a draft version, usually based 
on committee guidelines from other committees familiar to the Secretary. On a yearly 
basis, the Secretariat briefs the incoming E10 delegations on the work of the sanctions 
committees and provides assistance to incoming chairing delegations. Concerning the 
Panel of Experts, the Secretariat maintains a roster of experts and proposes a groups 
composition to the committee for approval. Once a Panel of Experts is established, 
the Secretariat briefs incoming panel members and supports the panel’s work 
concerning administrative matters, travel arrangements and communication with the 
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committee. In some instances, Secretariat staff provides substantive support in terms 
of research, report-writing or accompanying the Panel of Experts on country-visits 
(Boucher/Holt 2009: 56–58). 
More generally, the Sanction’s Branch has the function of providing the sanctions 
regimes’ institutional memory (Boucher/Holt 2009: 58). As such, the SCAD 
maintains databases on sanctions provisions and mandates for sanctions bodies as 
well as the Panel of Experts work. For instance, the Secretariat maintains a database 
on the Panel of Experts recommendations included in their final reports to provide for 
a smooth transition in case Panels of Experts have a different composition after a 
mandate renewal (Cortright et al. 2010: 12; Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2011: 5). In 
addition, the Secretariat archives records of communications, decisions and other 
relevant committee documents. 
Although some former Secretariat members ascribe an influential role to the 
Secretariat highlighting the Branch’s importance for the continuity of sanctions 
regimes, its decision powers are severely limited (Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2011: 5; 
Conlon 2000: 18–21, 28, for instance, Farrall 2007 does not even mention the role of 
the Secretariat). Concerning the drafting of documents such as committee guidelines 
or committee annual reports, the Secretariat at best has an agenda setting role, while 
the sanctions committee takes formal decisions. The degree of Secretariat discretion 
depends on the Council and committee guidance. Through resolutions and committee 
guidelines, the tasks of committee secretaries, for instance, in how to handle arms 
embargo exemption requests, are procedurally directed. However, in absence of a 
substantive administrative law that could guide the Secretariats work, there are 
“constant arguments and doubts about what to do” (Conlon 2000: 19). The Secretariat 
could potentially use this discretion to change informal practice of committee 
conduct. For instance, within the Iraq sanctions regime the Secretariat decided to 
supply “status of communications” lists summarizing exemption requests. However, 
while this introduced standardization and a slight change in procedure, individual 
committee members could have simply objected. While the Secretariat theoretically 
provides an institutional memory, because there are fewer turnovers in personnel in 
the Secretariat than in permanent missions, organizational decisions in very few 
instances require institutional memory. In addition, the proactive permanent members 
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maintain their own archives and documentation systems (interview with UN 
Secretariat member, New York, March 2012). Concerning selecting suitable Panel of 
Expert members, the Secretariat sets the agenda, while the committee adopts formal 
decisions. As such, the Secretariat has an interest in selecting qualified members with 
distinct expertise to avoid objections from Council members (Farrall 2009: 207). 
In summary, even though the UN Secretariat provides administrative and in 
instances substantive support, it is bereft of any meaningful decision functions to the 
favor of the sanctions committee (Conlon 2000: 28). As a result, the Secretariat 
mainly serves the role of a supporting subsidiary organ within UNSC sanctions 
regimes. 
 
4.5 The Focal Point and the Office of the Ombudsperson as review 
mechanisms 
The governance system of sanctions regimes is complemented with a review 
mechanism as part of the de-listing procedure, however, only the Al-Qaida sanctions 
committee review mechanism has remarkably far-reaching decision powers. The 
Security Council created the ‘Focal Point for Delisting’ (resolution 1730 (2006)) in 
2006, and the ‘Office of the Ombudsperson’ (resolution 1904 (2009)) specifically 
tailored to the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime in 2009. The review mechanism 
enabled to two new types of actors to access the sanctions regimes. First, listed 
individuals and entities as private complainants could directly petition the committee 
and trigger a committee procedure to review if the petitioner’s continued listing is 
still justified. Second, the Council established an institutionalized actors within the 
UN Secretariat to receive and process review petitions (Biersteker/Eckert 2009: 12–
14; Kanetake 2008: 161–162; Sievers/Daws 2014: 542–544). 
Initially, the de-listing procedure of sanctions regimes was highly restrictive and 
entirely intergovernmental. In the beginning, sanctions regimes applying targeted 
sanctions including the Al-Qaida/Taliban regime did not provide any de-listing 
procedure. Later, to process first delisting petitions, sanctions regimes subsequently 
introduced purely intergovernmental de-listing procedures (Cramér 2003: 90–95; 
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Kanetake 2008: 157–158). According to these, delisting could be triggered by a listed 
individual exclusively through the state of nationality and/or residence. While any 
state can submit a de-listing request in any of the sanctions regimes, this procedure is 
highly problematic as an individual required the support of a state. Thus, the 
operation of the de-listing procedure depended on the sincerity of these states to 
forward individual petitions to the committee. However, a petitioned state might not 
be willing to support a specific de-listing request, be it for political reasons, 
insufficient capacity or lacking interest. Ultimately, this would deny access to the 
review process for listed individuals and entities. Because complaints might not have 
been forwarded due to lacking support by petitioned governments, it is unclear how 
many individuals and entities have unsuccessfully sought to initiate delisting 
(Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 2, 36). 
To remedy the issue of access, primarily related to the Al-Qaida/Taliban regime, 
the purely intergovernmental de-listing procedure was complemented by allowing 
listed individuals and entities to petition their listing via the central ‘Focal Point for 
De-listing’ within the UN Secretariat (resolution 1730 (2006)). This development is 
remarkable as it provides an avenue to file an individual complaint about one’s own 
listing without requiring support of a UN member state. Hence, individuals and 
entities could directly access the respective sanctions committee, even if their state of 
nationality of residency objected to such a request. Beside its function as a registrar of 
pending petitions, the focal point informs sanctions committees about incoming 
petitions, forwards them to relevant states such as designating states and states of 
nationality/residency and informs the petitioner about the applicable procedures, the 
status of the case and the final decision. Its function focuses on administrating de-
listing requests (and exemption requests for the Al-Qaida sanctions regime, resolution 
2083 (2012)) exclusively (Biersteker/Eckert 2009: 12–13; Security Council Report 
2013: 8). The Focal Point relieves the Council of administrative and routine tasks 
with the investment of very little resources (Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 40–41). The 
Focal Point is currently served by one staff member within the Sanctions Branch 
(internal Secretariat document, as of December 2013; Security Council Report 2013: 
8). 
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Nonetheless, the powers of the Focal Point are severely limited so that the Focal 
Point does not have any formal and independent decision-making authority, following 
the permanent members preferences for a process that would not restrict committee 
prerogatives, limit the number of states involved, in essence, for working as a mere 
“mailbox” (US Embassy Paris 2006b; Comras 2010: 100–101, see section 6.2.3). In 
as much the initiation phase of the de-listing procedure has dramatically changed, the 
subsequent decision procedure was only slightly modified. To be considered by the 
respective committee, a petition still requires a formal de-listing request by the 
petitioned state, the designating state, the state of nationality/residency or any other 
committee member. Ultimately, this preserves the intergovernmental de-listing 
procedure, because the committee decides about the de-listing request by consensus. 
In addition, the committee as collective actor does not have to provide reasons for its 
decision, neither to the public nor to the petitioner, which does not increase incentives 
for the committee members to adopt reasoned decisions. However, it merely assures 
that the committee automatically considers the delisting petition and that petitioners 
are informed about the decision (Kanetake 2008: 161–164; Rosand 2010: 259; 
Comras 2010: 100–101).  
After its establishment in late 2006, the Focal Point procedure remained 
unchanged and decision-making issues, resulting from its operation have not been 
dealt with by the Council. For instance, the Council does not prescribe time frames 
for the consideration of individual petitions and thus some requests might remain 
under consideration indefinitely (Briefing to incoming delegations, December 2013). 
Even at its establishment the Focal Point was met with disappointment from states 
that had favored a stronger review mechanism (statements by Switzerland, Austria, 
S/PV. 5446, 30 May 2006; Kanetake 2008: 161–164). 
Since its creation in 2006, the Focal Point has received de-listing requests from 
57 individuals and 38 entities in total (see Table 5). With a success rate of about 35 
percent, 16 individuals and 17 entities were de-listed and 34 individuals and 19 
entities de-listing requests were denied, with the remaining petitions pending or 
decided while the focal point procedure was still ongoing. There are significant 
differences between the sanctions regimes in terms of how individuals use the 
procedure. Most of the delisting requests have been made to the Al-Qaida/Taliban and 
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Liberia committees together combining about 75 percent of requests, while other 
committees with substantial lists, for instance Iran or Taliban, have not yielded many 
requests. 
Table 5: UN Focal Point for Delisting Statistics 
Sanctions Regime Requests De-listing Ongoing listing Success 
Rate 
Somalia/Eritrea 1 individual  1 individual 0.00 
Al-Qaida/Taliban 
(as of 2009) 
18 individuals 
22 entities 
3 individuals 
17 entities 
13 individuals 
3 entities 
0.50 
Iraq 3 individuals 
1 entity 
2 individuals 1 individual 
1 entity 
0.50 
Liberia 23 individuals 
9 entities 
11 individuals 9 individuals 
9 entities 
0.34 
DRC 8 individuals 
4 entities 
1 individual 7 individuals 
4 entities 
0.09 
Cote d’Ivoire 2 individuals  1 individual 0.00 
Iran 2 entities  2 entities 0.00 
Libya 2 individual  2 individual 0.00 
Taliban (as of 2011)* 3 individuals  2 individuals 0.00 
Central African 
Republic 
1 individual  1 individual 0.00 
Total 61 individuals 
38 entities 
17 individuals 
17 entities 
37 individuals 
19 entities 
0.35 
Note: Author’s illustration. Data as of 29 April 2016. (*) one individual was delisted while Focal 
Point process was ongoing. For Focal Point statistics see 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/dfp.shtml; see also Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 12–13. 
 
For the Al-Qaida regime specifically, the relevance of the individual complaints 
mechanism was strengthened through the creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson 
as an independent and impartial entity mandated to review delisting petitions 
(resolution 1904 (2009)). The Ombudsperson was entitled to interact with the 
petitioner and to collect information from relevant actors involved judging whether 
there is sufficient evidence for upholding the listing. To that effect, the Ombudsperson 
provided a ‘comprehensive report’ to the Al-Qaida/Taliban committee reviewing the 
case. However, the Ombudsperson did not have the right to make formal 
recommendations and her assessment did not have any direct consequences. 
Nevertheless, the Ombudsperson had a potentially powerful agenda-setting function 
(Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 14–25; Prost 2012a; Prost/Wilmshurst 2013). 
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In 2011, the role of the Ombudsperson within the procedure was dramatically 
enhanced (resolution 1989 (2011)). Henceforth, the Ombudsperson is not only 
empowered to make formal recommendations. Strikingly, if the Ombudsperson 
requests a de-listing, the individual or entity is de-listed after 60 days unless the 
committee decides by consensus to uphold the listing or unless one member state 
takes the matter to the Security Council (resolution 1989 (2011), Annex II, para. 12). 
This procedural change significantly enhances the agenda-setting power of the 
Ombudsperson and alters the decision-making rationale for committee members. A 
formal recommendation of the Ombudsperson will be difficult to overrule as the 
committee has to achieve consensus in maintaining the listing. A designating state 
intending to retain a listing despite an Ombudsperson de-listing recommendation 
would have to convince all other committee members of the rightfulness of 
overturning the Ombudspersons decision in light of existing decision criteria. As a 
consequence, provided that the recommendation of the Ombudsperson is convincing, 
the procedure implicitly shifts the burden of proof to the designating states. 
Moreover, the committee decision is communicated to the petitioner via the 
Ombudsperson and it has to include a statement setting out the potential reasons for 
an objection (guidelines November 2011, Annex II, para. 13), which increases the 
hurdles to retain a listing in face of a de-listing recommendation (Eckert/Biersteker 
2012: 14–25; Prost 2012a; Prost/Wilmshurst 2013). 
To summarize, the UNSC complemented its sanctions regimes with a UN 
Secretariat Focal Point to review petitions of targeted individuals and entities, 
however, without decision function, while further strengthening the mechanism for 
the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime through the creation of the Office of the 
Ombudsperson. Both have in common that listed individuals and entities can now 
directly access the respective sanctions committee to have their listings reviewed, 
however, they differ in the extent to which the UNSC has assigned decision functions. 
Remarkably, while the Focal Point has no decision functions, the Ombudsperson has 
been granted extensive agenda setting power which decrease the prospects for 
overturning a delisting recommendation. 
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4.6 The dynamic institutionalized structure of Security Council 
sanctions regimes 
The increasingly complex governance structure of UNSC sanctions regimes requires 
the regular adaptation of the decision-making apparatus to identify sources of 
decision-making issues. The UNSC and the sanctions committee, by means of 
adopting rules and decision criteria, have a meaningful mechanism for guiding 
decision-making in a system of divided labor without depriving individual bodies of a 
degree of autonomy to adopt political decisions. 
The development of UNSC sanctions regimes does not follow an envisioned, 
comprehensive institutional design, but rather occur in a step-wise fashion (Conlon 
1995b: 635; Biersteker/Eckert 2009: 12). Because negotiating Security Council 
resolutions is a resourceful and time-consuming endeavor, each substantive and 
procedural change within sanctions regimes is sparked by a specific issue, either 
resulting from case-specific decision-making or more general political developments, 
such as ineffective implementation by UN member states resulting from the decision-
making practice of the sanctions committees. Furthermore, negotiating parties cannot 
reasonably envision all future unintended consequence (Scharf/Dorosin 1993). As 
such, the Security Council remains a political body and resolutions mirror the 
political dynamics at the adoption of a resolution. As a consequence, major decisions 
taken with the adoption of a resolutions therefore are more stable and rigid in nature, 
because they require extensive negotiations to amend them (Doxey 2000: 10–11). 
Two major factors potentially trigger more specific governance of sanctions 
regimes. First, the Council may engage in providing authoritative interpretation of its 
own resolutions as a means to overcome regulatory issues or decision-making 
blockades associated with case-specific decision-making within a sanctions 
committee. For instance, resolution 1617 (2005) clarified the substantive decision 
criterion of a potential listing being “associated with” Al-Qaida to improve the quality 
of the listing process. In such a way, the Council can also formalize informally 
developed committee decision practice. Second, the Council can react to unintended 
consequences or changes in the environment. In fact, sanctions regimes are complex 
adventures and sanctions subjects or other intentionally behaving actors may adapt 
their behavior thus leading to unintended consequences (Conlon 1995b: 659). In 
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addition, external events, such as the emergence of new conflict actors, may trigger 
modifications in the governance of sanctions regimes. 
As such, the Security Council adjusts its sanctions regimes in a reactive, episode-
like manner with regularly re-occurring windows of opportunity. Thereby, to lower 
transaction costs, single decision-making issues are accumulated until the Council 
performs a review of the sanctions regime and deals with such issues in a package 
resolution. The Council intentionally provides such windows of opportunity through 
establishing sunset clauses to sanctions measures or subsidiary organs. Periodic 
renewal of sanctions regimes or particular subsidiary bodies enables the Council to 
provide procedural or substantive decision criteria to overcome decisional blockades, 
to redefine the scope and mandate of subsidiary bodies or to partially or completely 
dissolve the sanctions regime and its sanctions bodies. In addition, Panel of Experts 
reports containing recommendations to the Council on how to improve the sanctions 
regime in question, usually coinciding with the need for a mandate extension for the 
expert body, provide an opportunity for Council governance (Farrall 2009: 203). 
As a consequence, sanctions regimes, such as the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions 
regime depicted in Figure 3, usually develop with noticeable periodicity. In this 
example, the sanctions regime has been revamped every 12 to 18 months, with ad hoc 
governance on significant occasions when immediate action was required, for 
instance, when resolution 1363 (2001) established a permanent monitoring body. One 
can also observe that the committee has a significant role in performing a rule-setting 
function. In fact, to reduce transaction costs for Council decision-making, it may 
transfer potentially contentious issues to the committee which may result in 
significant time-lags in implementing changing Council regulation into committee 
procedures under consensus decision-making. The committee usually does not have 
to deal with mandate renewals and has thus less time-pressure to adopt a decision. In 
addition, the committee guidelines are less visible and gain less public attention. 
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Figure 3: The Episodic Development of the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Regime 
Note: Author’s illustration. 
Over time, the Council and its committees have dramatically increased the regulatory 
density within the sanctions regimes (Farrall 2009: 193; Carisch/Rickard-Martin 
2011: 4) to overcome disturbances in its case-specific decision-making. While the 
Council usually starts with a more flexible approach to lower transaction costs and 
increase the discretion of committee members to adopt political decisions, consensus 
requirement in the committee sparks decision-making problems associated with case-
specific decision-making that require Council guidance. This is particularly obvious 
in sanctions regimes that are faced with a high number of decision requests that 
cannot meaningfully be processed under unregulated committee decision-making. For 
instance, within the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime (see Table 6), the committee 
has revised its committee guidelines nine times. During these revisions, the guidelines 
grew significantly in length. While this does not automatically signify higher 
regulatory density, it gives a good indication about the procedural enhancements that 
were made by this particular sanctions committee. Nevertheless, as there is different 
need for regulation, there are significant differences between the committees in 
regulatory density. Some committees including the 1518 Iraq sanctions committee or 
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the 1636 Lebanon committee never faced significant numbers of decisional requests 
and thus little pressure for regulation. 
Table 6: Length of Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee Guidelines 
Committee 
Guidelines 
Date Number of 
pages 
Word Count 
1 07 November 2002 5 1,652 
2 10 April 2003 7 2,434 
3 21 December 2005 9 2,794 
4 29 November 2006 10 3,536 
5 12 February 2007 12 4,855 
6 9 December 2008 16 6,881 
7 22 July 2010 21 9,799 
8 26 January 2011 21 9,950 
9 30 November 2011 24 10,728 
10 15 April 2013 26 11,917 
Note: Author’s illustration. Calculations done by author based on versions of committee 
guidelines. All guidelines referenced are on file with author. 
 
In concluding, UNSC sanctions regimes resemble a political organization that evolves 
in a step-wise manner in reaction to emerging governance issues either resulting from 
decision-making issues or sparked by lacking goal attainment. Since in particular the 
permanent members are skeptical towards regulation limiting their discretion and 
Council negotiations are costly, the Council and alongside its sanctions committee 
reactively solve decision-making issues by amending substantive and procedural 
criteria. 
 
4.7 Chapter summary 
The UNSC’s increasing resort to sanctions has created governance structures that split 
an initially uniform decision process into sanctions regimes that allocate specific 
functions among its subsidiary organs, in particular between the Council, the 
sanctions committee and the expert body. Each subsidiary organ performs a distinct 
function, has a specific composition and operates under certain procedures. Within 
their mandates, decision-makers in each body face different types of decisions and 
thus different institutional constraints. As a result of the complex structure of 
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sanctions regimes, the effective functioning of the governance system creates demand 
for integrating the subsidiary bodies through rules or decision practice. 
The members of the Security Council as the formally hierarchical body can either 
choose to adopt implementation decisions on their own or it can establish a sanctions 
regime, transfer decision competencies to its subsidiary organs and guide those 
through the provision of rules. In the former case, Council members can pack a 
number of implementation decisions into a decision package in a formal resolution. In 
the latter case, Council members merely deal with much broader political questions, 
naturally because single implementation decisions are no longer decided on this level 
and are bereft of the possibility to adopt decision packages. Rather, when the Council 
transfers case-specific decisions to the committee, it focusses its role as a rulemaker 
directing the sanctions committee through the adoption of resolutions. While Council 
members have preferred a uniform Council decision process in few sanctions 
regimes, mostly they have preferred establishing a sanctions committee. 
Altogether, the decision situation within sanctions committee as an implementing 
agent is entirely different from those of the Council. When the Council decides to 
delegate decisions, the sanctions committees, which mirror Council membership and 
decide by consensus, in turn, are tasked with taking the rather technical single-case 
implementation decisions such as listing and delisting of individuals or granting 
exemptions from trade embargoes. Accordingly, committee members decide about 
small decisions that are narrowly confined to the specific conflict at hand. At the 
same time, the Council often charges the committee to adopt these decisions in light 
of Council provided criteria. As secondary role, to overcome situations of diverging 
interests, sanctions committees adopt rules through committee guidelines or decision 
practice. In that respect, committees serve as secondary rulemaker and implicitly 
separate rulemaking from rule-application. 
The Council complements sanctions regimes with Panel of Experts as a reflexive 
component that review committee activities, monitor member states implementation 
and provide information for the sanctions committees’ operations. Even though these 
expert bodies do not have distinct decision functions, their means of influence rests 
upon expertise that the Council and the committee themselves cannot create. Experts 
then have the interest in providing well-reasoned recommendations and fact-based 
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information because they have to convince committee members of the viability of a 
particular recommendation. Nonetheless, when Council and committee members have 
a general interest in the functionality of the sanctions regime, they cannot simply 
ignore all substantive recommendations over the long run and gain an interest in 
providing meaningful guidance as how to produce well-drafted reports.  
Additionally, sanctions regimes have three additional entities. Sanctions 
committees are supported in their day-to-day activities by the UN Secretariat 
Sanctions Branch, which serves mainly as administrative component and does not 
have an independent decision function. Finally, the UNSC added the Focal Point for 
Delisting as a review mechanism for the processing of delisting petitions, which 
functions as a mere communication device between petitioners and the respective 
sanctions committee and is bereft of any decision function. Exceptionally, the Al-
Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime is complemented with the Office of the 
Ombudsperson that initially served an agenda-setting function and since 2011 has the 
competence to submit delisting recommendations that the committee can only 
overturn by consensus. 
Lastly, UNSC sanctions regimes develop with an astounding periodicity. This is 
mainly founded in the fact that elaborating rules is costly so that actors prefer to 
create a sanctions regime with the least regulatory density needed to get a sanctions 
regime operational and then later providing substantive and procedural criteria as 
necessary. 
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5 The Iraq Sanctions Committee – Regulating Comprehensive 
Sanctions 
On 6 August 1990, in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces four days 
earlier, the Security Council imposed a comprehensive ban on all trade with Iraq and 
created a sanctions committee to oversee the sanctions regime. Although the Security 
Council had established sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa during 
the Cold War, the Iraq sanctions marked a drastic shift in the willingness of the 
Council to use its wide-ranging powers to coerce Iraq into compliance with the 
Council’s demands. Without a sunset clause, the sanctions regime was upheld until 
2003 even though Saddam’s troops were forced out of Kuwait by military 
intervention in 1991. Administrating and monitoring a comprehensive trade embargo 
on an entire state is an extremely challenging endeavor as it requires the continuous 
adoption of a multitude of small regulatory decisions. The bulk of the Iraq sanctions 
committee’s work was to grant exemptions from the comprehensive ban on all trade, 
which meant a considerable workload for the sanctions committee (Conlon 1996a: 
82). Subsidiary committee functions included evaluating state implementation 
reports, monitoring sanctions implementation and dealing with member states’ 
requests for economic assistance arising from the comprehensive sanctions (‘Article 
50’ requests). 
Although the Iraq sanctions regime is considerably differentiated, the effects of 
committee governance on the committee’s work have not been acknowledged, mainly 
due to the identical Council and committee membership. Most studies paid little 
attention to the work of the committee and rather focused on Council decisions 
(Manusama 2006: 130–151; Bosco 2009: 155–166), the general sanctions policy 
(Malone 2006: 115–151; Bennis 1996) and sanctions effectiveness (Cortright/Lopez 
2000: 37–61; Elliott/Uimonen 1993; Hakimdavar 2014). The severe humanitarian 
consequences of UNSC sanctions policy attributed to the comprehensive sanctions 
imposing extreme hardships on the general Iraqi population, in particular on the most 
vulnerable groups sparked vocal criticism (‘invisible war’, Gordon 2010; ‘sanctions 
of mass destruction’, Mueller/Mueller 1999; ‘starvation as a weapon’, Provost 1992; 
Weiss et al. 1997; Duffy 2000; Reisman/Stevick 1998; Sponeck 2006). The scandal 
 
162 
surfacing around the ill-administrated Oil-for-Food Program (Califano/Meyer 2006), 
further contributed to earn the Iraq committee the title “[t]he Council’s most famed 
sanctions committee” (Malone 2008: 124). The effects have triggered the debate 
about how “smart(er) sanctions” should replace comprehensive sanctions (Brzoska 
2003; Oette 2002; Craven 2002; Biersteker et al. 2005; Cortright/Lopez 2002). 
However, there are a number of accounts of former Iraq committee members (van 
Walsum 2004; Kaul 1996; Koskenniemi 1991), observers (Malone 2006), UN 
practitioners (Conlon 2000, 1995b, 1996b; Sponeck 2000, 2002, 2006; Fleischhauer 
1991) that provide detailed historical descriptions and suggest that effects of 
differentiation might exist although they do not provide systematic accounts. For 
instance, Sponeck describes the function of the Iraq sanctions committee as a “micro-
manager of bureaucratic detail” (2006: 273). 
In this chapter, I empirically analyze the consequences of committee governance 
for its decision-making and the content of decisions within the Iraq sanctions regime 
from 1990 to 1995. The aim is to study whether the causal mechanism is present and 
actually leads to rule-based decision-making in this case. The Iraq sanctions regime is 
evaluated with a view to its major decision functions, mainly granting humanitarian 
exemptions to comprehensive and aviation sanctions. In the early phase, a committee 
blockade on foodstuffs shipments prompts Council rulemaking and committee 
precedents that subsequently guided decision-making in similar cases later despite 
resistance by powerful members. After the Gulf War, the committee re-regulated its 
decision-making and over time developed a relatively consistent practice on 
humanitarian exemptions along item categories as primary, as well as end-use and 
quantities as secondary criteria even though this was not intended by powerful 
members. The systematic analysis of 8,200 humanitarian exemptions decisions shows 
that the committee predominantly decided rule-based. On aviation sanctions, the 
committee developed an expanding and consistent decision practice on flight 
exemptions that empowered weak states to file successful rule-conforming requests 
despite great power objections.  
The Iraq sanctions regime enriches the analysis with a comparative perspective to 
avoid unjustified generalizations derived from the analysis of targeted sanctions 
regimes. The case is suited to study, if comparable effects emerge even in the absence 
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of the problems specifically associated with the infringement of fundamental rights of 
individuals that are inherently associated with targeted sanctions. Although the Iraq 
sanctions regime follows the logic of comprehensive sanctions and was strongly 
criticized for its humanitarian consequences, it is not a special case from the 
perspective of functional differentiation. Similar to other sanctions regimes, it 
constitutes an instance of considerable delegation to a sanctions committee. In fact, its 
decision-making apparatus faced similar decision problems as other sanctions 
regimes with detailed implementation decisions. Hence, it provides a historical test 
case in which the postulated dynamics should be equally observable. The focus on the 
early phase of the Iraq sanctions committee from 1990 to 1995 is particularly 
promising as it focusses on the era where no other organizational differentiation such 
as the UN oil overseers, the Oil-for-Food Program or the UN Compensation 
Commission had an independent influence on decision-making. 
The good documentation of the Iraq sanctions committee proceedings provides an 
exceptional – however, little used (notable exceptions are Hakimdavar 2014; Conlon 
2000) – insight into its decision-making practice. The present analysis is based on the 
publicly available Paul Conlon United Nations Sanctions Papers donated to the 
Special Collections Department of the University of Iowa by Paul Conlon, a former 
member of the UN Secretariat servicing the Iraq sanctions committee. The 
documentation includes detailed and systematic records of all 120 committee 
meetings of the Iraq sanctions committee from August 1990 to February 1995, 
including agenda items, summary records of the meetings (i.e. meting protocol with 
all verbal interventions, abbreviated as ‘SR.x’), databases of incoming 
communications and personal notes on committee proceedings. The Sanctions Papers 
documentation of “status of communications” list has been used to produce the Iraq 
Sanctions Committee Decisions Dataset of almost 8,200 single-case committee 
decisions on humanitarian exemptions from 1993 to 1995. 
This chapter will proceed in the following analytical steps. In the first section, the 
case study assesses the distribution of interests of among UNSC members and 
evaluates the driving actors behind the sanctions regime, and hence if and how we 
would expect the mechanism to function accordingly. In the second section, the case 
study traces theoretically-relevant case episodes concerning the major functions of the 
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sanctions regime: the issues of committee governance associated with foodstuff’s 
shipments, the granting of humanitarian exemptions on medicines, foodstuffs and 
other items of humanitarian character, as well as granting exemptions to the aviation 
embargo on Iraq. The final section concludes with a summary of major findings. 
 
5.1 The origins of the Iraq sanctions regime 
In reaction to Iraq’s gross violation of international law by invading and annexing 
Kuwait, on 6 August 1990, with 13 votes in favor and two abstentions (Cuba and 
Yemen), the UNSC imposed a comprehensive ban on all imports from Iraq and 
Kuwait (resolution 661 (1990), para. 3a,b), exports to Iraq and Kuwait (para. 3c), and 
a complete financial embargo (para. 4). The embargo was further strengthened by 
many subsequent resolutions imposing a naval blockade (resolution 665 (1990)), 
aviation sanctions (resolution 670 (1990)), a military intervention (resolution 678 
(1990)) and finally upholding the embargo even after the original goal was achieved 
(resolution 687 (1991)). 
The members of the Iraq sanctions committee were confronted with a 
significantly different decision situation than in the UNSC. Committee members were 
tasked to process numerous small-scale implementation decisions under the 
constraints of UNSC resolutions through interpreting incoming decision requests by 
UN member states in light of existing UNSC resolutions (Gordon 2010: 23-24, 61; 
Conlon 2000: 45-46, 59–60, also UK, SR.76). In addition, these requests included a 
very broad range of items. David Bosco nicely summarizes the committee decision-
making situation: “Medicines clearly fell outside the sanctions regime. But what 
about books, clothes, construction materials, and agricultural equipment? And how 
should the council respond to requests for sanctions exemptions from states heavily 
dependent on Iraqi oil? Case by case, the sanctions committee struggled to manage 
the mechanics and politics of the economic isolation it was imposing on Iraq” (Bosco 
2009: 164, similarly Conlon 2000: 45). 
The Iraq sanctions committee was confronted with a constellation of strongly 
diverging interests, which constantly presented a serious danger of decision blockade 
(Graham-Brown 1999: 71; Koskenniemi 1991: 126–127; Conlon 2000). The 
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committee mainly consisted of three, more or less homogenous, groups. First, the 
‘sanctions enforcers’, which included the US and the UK, supported by France in the 
beginning, and later sometimes by Germany and Japan were one extreme pole 
(Graham-Brown 1999: 72). These actors strictly sought to prevent any weakening of 
the sanctions regime and were highly restrictive in granting exemptions to enforce 
Iraqi compliance. Their stance towards sanctions has not been fundamentally altered 
(Gordon 2010: 2-4,11,17,104), although over time their ultimate sanctions policy goal 
might have transformed slightly from regime change (Johnstone 1994: 17,36) to dual-
containment (Edwards 2014: 53–76). As permanent members, they had an extremely 
strong position within the UNSC and the committee alike. Because the sanctions 
resolutions did not contain a sunset clause, the sanctions enforcers could veto any 
proposal lifting the sanctions. Within the committee, they could object to any 
exemption request.  
Second, anti-sanctions states, particularly belonging to the non-permanent non-
aligned caucus (Colombia, Cuba, Malaysia, Yemen, the so-called ‘Gang of Four’ see 
Hannay 2008: 37; Bosco 2009: 160, later Djibouti, Ecuador, Morocco and Oman) 
formed the other extreme pole. These members ultimately sought to lift all sanctions 
on Iraq whatsoever (Malone 2006: 65–67; Johnstone 1994: 17). The policy goal of 
anti-sanctions states was the “maximum liberalization” of sanctions. In other words, 
“all sanctions measures were bad and thus all waivers were good” (Conlon 2000: 79). 
As these members were not equipped with a veto they had an inferior bargaining 
position. Nevertheless, they determinedly tried to relax sanctions by using 
humanitarian waivers as opportunity to adopt precedents exempting an increasing 
number of item categories from sanctions by committee practice (“Trojan Horse”, 
Conlon 2000: 60). Third, in between these two extreme poles, a number of countries 
including Belgium, Canada or the Chairing delegations (Finland, Austria and New 
Zealand) adopted a moderate policy position. In the studied period, China silently 
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supported the regime (Yang 2013: 137). Finally, the remaining members, including 
the African caucus, only very infrequently intervened during committee meetings4. 
As a consequence of adopting numerous but separate implementation decisions in 
light of UNSC resolutions, coupled with the extremely diverging interest 
constellation, one would expect that functional differentiation indeed prompts rule-
based decision making. Because all committee members have an interest in providing 
interpretation of UNSC resolutions, while simultaneously they strongly diverge about 
the exact form of regulation, they are expected to face significant coordination 
problems. Consequently, committee members are expected to engage in setting focal 
points either through formal rules or the adoption of precedent decisions within the 
committee, or both. Although the powerful permanent members are in a superior 
bargaining position, within the functionally differentiated setting, they are expected to 
face costs for dismissing similar requests that will increase over time. The weaker 
states are expected to pursue a strategy to align similar but slightly different proposals 
to earlier successful precedents to the range of permissible sanctions exemptions by 
decision practice. 
The resolution establishing the sanctions regime and Iraq sanctions committee 
was characterized by the absence of concrete decisional guidance for the committee 
through UNSC resolutions (see resolution 661 (1990), para. 6; Conlon 1995b: 635; 
Koskenniemi 1991: 122, 126–130). While Iraq was subject to a complete economic 
embargo, only medicines were exempted and foodstuffs could only be shipped in 
“humanitarian circumstances”, which the committee was left to decide upon. This is 
mainly the consequence of the negotiation process on resolution 661 (1990) were 
finally the contentious matter of the exact nature of the embargo, in particular on 
foodstuffs, was intentionally left ambiguous to achieve broader consensus. It also 
reflects the reluctance of permanent members to create rules that might later bind 
oneself (Conlon 2000: 45–53). 
                                                 
4 In 1990, the share of meeting time spent on committee member interventions was: Gang of Four 
38.7% [Yemen (14.0%), Cuba (12.8%), Colombia (6.7%), Malaysia (5.2%)], P-3 (33.6%) [US 
(14.1%), UK (12.8%), France (6.7%)], Canada (6.7%), Soviet Union (3.7%), China (3.3%), and 
the remaining Ethiopia (3.2%), Romania (3.0%), Cote d’Ivoire (2.9%), Zaire (2.6%), Finland 
(1.9%, in national capacity). Source: Sanctions Papers document (on file with author). 
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5.2 Theoretically-relevant case episodes of decision-making 
The Iraq sanctions regime’s initial substantive and procedural criteria created 
governance issues related to the separation of rulemaking and rule-application. In the 
following sections, three case episodes on foodstuffs exemptions, on exemptions of 
other humanitarian items and on flight exemptions are analyzed separately with a 
focus on the specific need for rules, the consequences of rule-making and in a third 
step, whether or not the rules actually drove committee decision-making towards rule-
based decisions. Then, a final section will take a macro perspective on all decisions 
taken from 1992 to early 1995 to devise large-n evidence of rule-based decision-
making. 
5.2.1 Requests to ship foodstuffs in “humanitarian circumstances” require the 
adoption of rules in the early stage of the regime 
The case episode of the Iraq sanctions committee immediately after resolution 661 
(1990) shows that a decision blockade on foodstuffs shipments prompted the adoption 
of Council rules and committee precedents as focal points to guide behavior in later 
cases. Since states opposing sanctions closely aligned their decision requests to earlier 
precedents, these states could enlarge the range of potential foodstuffs beneficiaries 
even against the interests of powerful members. Whereas the UNSC had imposed a 
comprehensive trade embargo, it had exempted “supplies intended strictly for medical 
purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs” (resolution 661 (1990), 
para. 3c). However, the resolution did not define what “humanitarian circumstances” 
were and who should determine if such situation had actually arisen (Conlon 1995b: 
635). While the states politically opposing the sanctions regime (Cuba, Yemen) 
considered foodstuffs as generally exempted, the sanctions proponents (US, UK) 
preferred a literal interpretation that no such humanitarian circumstances had yet 
arisen (Koskenniemi 1991: 126–127). 
The ambiguous wording of “humanitarian circumstances” instantly led to a 
contentious discourse about the applicability of sanctions on foodstuffs within the 
sanctions committee and single-case foodstuffs shipment requests caused a decision 
blockade (Graham-Brown 1999: 90). As early as the second meeting, anti-sanctions 
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states (Cuba, Yemen) argued for a broader approach “which prohibited the use of 
hunger as a means of warfare” (Cuba, Yemen, SR. 2). Although many committee 
members agreed that either the committee or the Council should clarify the nature of 
the foodstuffs embargo (Canada, Cuba, Yemen, UK, US, USSR), for instance through 
adopting “(…) general principles (…) of deliveries of foodstuffs” (USSR, SR.5), 
preferences of committee members considerably diverged. On the one extreme, some 
states, seeking to retain a complete economic embargo, advocated a strict legal 
interpretation according to which the committee or Council should first determine if 
humanitarian circumstances really existed followed by deciding how shipments 
should proceed (US, UK, Canada, SR.6). The sanctions proponents opposed such 
shipments because they feared that even food shipped to non-Iraqis “might fall into 
the wrong hands” (emphasis removed, Simons 1996: 45–46, 115-116). On the other 
extreme, members preferred to simply accept all foodstuffs shipments (Cuba, Yemen, 
SR.2, SR.5; Cuba, Yemen, Colombia, Malaysia, SR.6). 
While the committee previously discussed the matter without specific requests 
before it, defining “humanitarian circumstances” became a matter of urgency when 
the non-committee member India requested shipping foodstuffs to 160,000 Indian 
nationals residing in Iraq and occupied Kuwait (Chair, India, SR.5). While The UK 
and the US had an interest in providing clarification before UN member states would 
unilaterally interpret the resolution broadly (Conlon 2000: 46), they delayed action 
and insisted on requesting additional information (US; UK, SR.5, 7). Others 
advocated to pursue consultations on a general rule (Canada, Zaire, later also UK and 
US) whilst a third group preferred to immediately grant the request (Cuba, Yemen, 
Colombia, all SR.7). Notably, committee members recognized that a decision on the 
Indian request was significant for the committee’s future operation of similar 
requests. One group suggested that the committee should adopt a general procedure 
(Canada, US, SR.7; US, UK, France SR.8), whereas other members believed that “the 
Committee might be setting a precedent by adopting the draft decision” (China, SR.8, 
also Ethiopia, SR.12) or that the Indian request was a “test case” (Canada, SR.12), 
which would guide decision making in later cases (see also Zaire on behalf of non-
aligned caucus, Finland, SR.8, Canada, SR.14). As a result of consultations, the P5 
circulated a draft rule under which foodstuffs were to be allowed “on the basis of 
impartial information” and only in responding to emergency situations (France, SR.8) 
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to satisfy the terms of the resolution (i.e. foodstuffs only in humanitarian 
circumstances), whereas Zaire, on behalf of Cuba, Yemen, Colombia, and Ethiopia 
introduced a competing proposal suggesting to grant the Indian request, which led to 
a heated debate if a single decision should be adopted or if a general framework 
should be established or both (Zaire, 13 other committee members, SR.8). 
Because the committee had persistently failed either to adopt a general rule or to 
grant the Indian precedent (SR.7-8, 10), the committee referred the issue “that had 
clearly become a matter which the Security Council alone could decide” (US, SR.10) 
to the UNSC. On the Council level, sanctions enforcers were particularly determined 
to keep the number of permissible exemptions as low as possible because they feared 
that a positive decision on the Indian exemption will lead to a many more similar 
requests which could be hardly rejected (Doyle 1990a, 1990b). The UNSC adopted 
resolution 666 (1990) on 13 September 1990 with Cuba and Yemen voting against. 
Agreement to the resolution was coupled with a package deal to adopt a committee 
decision to grant the specific Indian shipment “on the basis of the information 
provided (…) to be carried out as provided for in the relevant Security Council 
resolutions” (SR.11, also Cuba, SR.13; Koskenniemi 1991: 129–130). The US 
immediately emphasized that the authorization was solely for “one Indian ship” 
(Boucher 1990). 
Adopting a Council resolution submits Council members to the consistency 
requirement associated with rulemaking. The adopted rule is consistent and does not 
contain provisions that one-sidedly benefit powerful members. The resolution 
requested the committee to determine if “circumstances (…) in which there is an 
urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait (…)” have arisen. 
However, the committee should make its determination only “after receiving the 
reports from the Secretary-General” based on “information from relevant United 
Nations and other appropriate humanitarian agencies and all other sources on the 
availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait” (paras 3,5, see Conlon 1996b: 252). In case 
the committee granted foodstuffs shipments, these “should be provided through the 
United Nations in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross or 
other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their 
supervision” thereby restricting purely bilaterally provided foodstuffs (para. 6). In 
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essence, the UNSC provided the committee with a procedure according to which the 
decision on a foodstuffs shipment request required impartial information on the 
humanitarian situation, while granted foodstuffs shipments should be distributed or at 
least supervised by recognized humanitarian agencies (para. 6). 
Instantaneously, other non-committee members, which had not yet evacuated all 
their nationals residing in Iraq or Kuwait, namely Bulgaria, Sri Lanka, Viet Nam and 
Yugoslavia, filed foodstuffs shipment requests almost identical to the Indian 
precedent (Koskenniemi 1991: 129–130). Sri Lanka explicitly aligned its request to 
the Indian precedent (Sri Lanka, SR.15). Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Viet Nam at least 
implicitly pledged that their requests were “in compliance with the relevant Security 
Council resolutions” (Bulgaria) and that they ”stood ready to comply with any 
conditions set by the Committee, including, (…) the dispatch of [Red Cross] 
personnel” (Yugoslavia, similarly Viet Nam, SR.15). In fact, anti-sanctions states 
succeeded in “creating a precedent that they hope will allow for food relief 
shipments” (Hall et al. 1990). Although committee members in general acknowledged 
that foodstuffs could be sent to third-country nationals in accordance with the Indian 
precedent, first distribution and supervision should be determined in the Indian case 
(e.g. US, SR.12) and for other cases, more information on the precise need (e.g. 
Canada, SR.12) or on the dissemination would be necessary (e.g. US, SR.12; US, 
France, SR.13, also Conlon 1995b: 636–637). Hence, the sanctions enforcers deferred 
these requests by arguing that as a consequence of evacuations, surpluses of 
foodstuffs from the Indian shipment would deprive the requests of their basis because 
then again first “(…) it was important to determine the existence of humanitarian 
circumstances (…)” (US, UK, SR.16, also US, France, SR.15). The committee finally 
agreed to authorize India to bilaterally coordinate with states wishing to supply food 
to their nationals in Iraq (Chair, SR.15). 
While powerful members had acceded into an unfavorable decision to grant the 
Indian request (Hall et al. 1990; Koskenniemi 1991: 129–130), the decision allowing 
India to make surplus food available to third-country nationals on a bilateral basis 
even forced powerful members to reluctantly grant an almost identical Palestinian 
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request (S/AC.25/1990/COMM.225). The Palestinian request was problematic for the 
US and the UK since the PLO had openly supported Iraq and they feared that the food 
could be diverted to Iraqi authorities or armed forces (Ibrahim 1990; Malone 2006: 
10; Hannay 2008: 32). In a heated committee debate, the US “felt bound to state that 
there was a difference between the situation of the nationals of [other states] (…) and 
the situation of the Palestinians, in Kuwait, a large resident population (…) [which 
were not] third-State nationals” and that in fact, foodstuffs were originally intended 
for “detainees and hostages” (US, SR.20). In addition, the US desperately challenged 
that humanitarian circumstances really existed (US, SR.20). However, the Chair, “in 
accordance with the Committee’s practice” (Chair, SR.20), had already informed the 
Palestinian authorities of the relevant procedure, that is to approach India bilaterally 
(Chair, SR.20). Several delegations fiercely refused to repeal this decision (e.g. 
China, Yemen, Cuba, Malaysia, SR.20) stating that “the decision had already been 
taken (…) and (…) [Yemen] therefore regarded as unacceptable the repeated attempts 
to introduce new procedures for the sake of political expediency” (Yemen, SR. 20). 
China regarded repealing the decision a “mistake” (SR. 20). The US delegation 
unwillingly gave in with a face-saving compromise suggesting that the decision 
would be on a “one-time basis” (US, SR.21), while the final consensus decision did 
not contain any such restrictions based on nationality and allowed to supply surplus 
foods to “all needy non-Iraqi groups” (Chair, SR.21). 
Before the Gulf War, the committee steadily expanded the range of acceptable 
foodstuffs beneficiaries by decision practice, even against the will of powerful 
members. Until early 1991, the committee solely had acknowledged that 
humanitarian circumstances existed for third-country nationals in Iraq and Kuwait 
(Conlon 1996b: 252). Accordingly, only in few instances, after determining 
humanitarian circumstances and reassuring national red cross supervision, the 
committee approved foodstuffs shipments, notably, when the USSR requested “to 
deliver foodstuffs, citing ‘humanitarian circumstances,’ to Soviet nationals in Iraq” 
(1990/COMM.111), even without discussion (SR.20). Interestingly, shortly after the 
                                                 
5 All Communications referenced in this chapter are from the ‘S/AC.25’ Iraq sanctions committee 
and are denoted short as ‘199x/COMM.x’ in the following. For Council nomenclature see 
Sievers/Daws 2014: 465–467. 
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committee accepted both the Palestinian and the USSR request, Pakistan requested 
“to airlift foodstuffs to their nationals on humanitarian grounds” (1990/COMM.156), 
which prompted a heated committee debate because the US and the UK wanted to 
block approval. While they had to agree that the request was acceptable “in principle” 
(UK, US, SR.22), they argued that more information about the distribution was 
required. Many other committee members fiercely rejected this position arguing that 
“Pakistan’s request was no different from other requests that had been granted” 
(Cuba, SR.22), the committee could not discriminate “among different nationalities” 
(Malaysia, SR.22) and Yemen even uttered that “the Committee should proceed with 
regard to Pakistan in the same manner as it had with regard to the Soviet Union, (…) 
which had been granted without difficulty” (Yemen, similarly China, Colombia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, France, all SR.22). Accordingly, after the Chair had received 
assurances about the distribution solely by Pakistani embassy employees to Pakistani 
nationals, the committee quietly granted the request (1990/COMM.169). 
While all these decisions had applied to third-country nationals, and not to Iraqis, 
non-committee members sought to broaden decision practice by requesting shipments 
to the general population. In early 1991, Iran (1991/COMM.42), Libya 
(1991/COMM.43) and Mauritania (1991/COMM.53) separately requested to ship 
foodstuffs to ordinary Iraqis, which the sanctions enforcers disapproved because the 
committee had not yet determined that humanitarian circumstances existed for Iraqis 
pending a Secretary-General report (UK, SR.26). During this time, the committee 
only approved a foodstuffs shipment for ICRC delegation members 
(1991/COMM.62). However, as information on the dire humanitarian situation was 
mounting, a more carefully formulated Iranian request to ship foodstuffs for the 
“most vulnerable population groups as indicated in resolution 666 (1990)” 
(1991/COMM.68, COMM.69), outlining the shipment details including beneficiaries 
and quantities, supervised by the Iranian red crescent (Chair, SR.30), as the US had 
earlier based its objection on, was finally approved. After that, the committee 
approved similar Belgian and Danish requests on the same conditions 
(1991/COMM.70, 1991/COMM.72), which further led to more positively decided 
similar requests. Even an anti-sanctions state was allowed to ship foodstuffs. When 
Yemen requested to send “20,000 tons of wheat intended for the most vulnerable 
population groups in Iraq”, distributed by the Yemeni Red Crescent and the ICRC, it 
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explicitly stated that the request was “identical to another that had already been dealt 
with by the Committee” (Yemen, SR.33). Although sanctions enforcers again tried to 
delay a positive decision arguing they did not receive instructions from their capitals 
(UK, SR.33), they had to give in because it resembled earlier precedents. After that, 
the committee systematically granted other foodstuffs requests detailing beneficiaries, 
quantities and distribution (1991/COMM.82, other requests concerned Denmark, 
1991/COMM.90/95; Germany, 1991/COMM.98; Jordan, 1991/COMM.105), while 
the committee sought additional information for incomplete requests (Turkey, 
1991/COMM.93; Mauretania, 1991/COMM.91; Libya, 1991/COMM.94). 
In the initial phase of the Iraq sanctions regime, sanctions enforcers demanded an 
absolutely strict reading of what UNSC resolutions and committee precedents 
stipulated, but were forced to follow established precedents even against their 
interests. Although sanctions enforcers were determined to avoid several similar 
incoming requests, they could no longer ignore that a precedent was set and thus that 
similar requests had to be treated consistently. In a step-wise manner, the committee 
subsequently enlarged its decision practice on foodstuffs shipments in humanitarian 
circumstances, first to third-country nationals, and in the end allowed the shipment of 
foodstuffs to ordinary Iraqis. Since anti-sanctions states and their non-committee 
allies closely aligned their decision requests to similar earlier positive decisions, they 
could set precedents enlarging the range of potential beneficiaries, despite powerful 
member’s resistance. 
 
5.2.2 The need for precedents on acceptable and non-acceptable categories of “no-
objection items” after the Gulf War 
This case episode sheds light on the elaboration of rules on ‘no-objection items’ by 
precedent through processing a large number of similar but unrelated requests after 
the Gulf War. Similar to the previous foodstuffs episode, the specific decision 
situation within the sanctions committee provided incentives to adopt substantive 
decision criteria through decision practice even though powerful committee members 
rejected the notion of regulation and wished to keep the committee as flexible as 
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possible. As such, decisions on single cases functioned as precedents that created 
pressures of conformity in subsequent decisions. In essence, this logic of decision-
making generated an implicit definition of acceptable and unacceptable categories of 
goods. 
The Gulf War in late February 1991 systematically altered the circumstances of 
the sanctions regime (Koskenniemi 1991: 133–134; Hannay 2000; Krasno/Sutterlin 
2003). Even though the UNSC demands of resolutions 660 (1990) and 661 (1990) 
had been realized by force, resolution 687 (1991) transformed the sanctions regime 
into a long-term effort to safeguard future Iraqi compliance (Bosco 2009: 164). The 
UNSC imposed a multitude of far-reaching conditions on Iraq, including border 
demarcation, disarmament, inspections, and compensation obligations so that the 
sanctions became preventive in character (Malone 2006: 74–75; Conlon 2000: 161–
162; Johnstone 1994: 17–18). Regarding the humanitarian situation, the Secretary-
General, tasked Martti Ahtisaari to conduct a humanitarian needs assessment mission 
to Iraq (Campbell et al. 1991: 179; United Nations 1996: 36–37), which the UNSC 
endorsed (S/22322, in United Nations 1996: 184). The Ahtisaari report (S/22366) 
drew a grim picture about the humanitarian situation noting that “[t]he recent conflict 
has wrought near-apocalyptic results (…)” (para. 8). Ahtisaari urged to remove 
sanctions on foodstuffs and related equipment for producing foodstuffs (para. 18). In 
addition, he pressed to allow the import of water and sanitation equipment, as well as 
medicines on “a more extended scale” including generators, vehicles and incubators 
(para. 27). The report made it clear that an “imminent catastrophe” would ensue if not 
“massive life-supporting needs are (..) rapidly met” (para. 37) (Cortright/Lopez 2000: 
45–46). 
In light of these profound developments, on 22 March 1991, the committee 
adopted a consistent rule restructuring committee decision-making. The committee 
made “a general determination that humanitarian circumstances apply with respect to 
the entire civilian population of Iraq” (S/22400, paras 2,3). In fact, the committee 
established three distinct procedures to process incoming exemption requests. First, it 
reiterated that medical supplies were generally excluded from the embargo. Second, 
the committee installed a simple notification procedure for foodstuffs (i.e. the 
exporting state simply must notify the committee of the shipment). Third, it 
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established a “no-objection procedure” for all other “civilian and humanitarian 
imports to Iraq as identified in Mr. Ahtisaari’s report” (S/22400, para. 3; Campbell et 
al. 1991: 179; Conlon 2000: 60–62). Accordingly, such a request would be granted 
unless one or more committee members objected (Farrall 2007: 147-149, 156-157). 
The Council formalized these three exemption procedures with adoption of resolution 
687 (1990), while slightly correcting that (“materials and supplies for essential 
civilian needs as identified in the [Ahtisaari] report (…) and in any further findings of 
humanitarian need by the Committee” would be decided under no-objection 
procedure (resolution 687 (1991), para. 20). Whereas Cuba voted against, Yemen and 
Ecuador abstained. 
Although the committee had adopted rules on a whole new range of items, the 
committee member’s decision situation did not systematically change so that 
committee members still found themselves in a coordination situation. First, the 
regulatory task was to determine which incoming requests were to be granted under 
the vague definition of humanitarian exemptions, the terms of which remained 
disputed within the committee (Graham-Brown 1999: 70–72). While medicines were 
excluded and the committee now treated edible foodstuffs consistently as notification 
items (see 1991 COMM.Log, on file with author; Conlon 2000: 61, 141–142), UN 
member states’ requests for shipping a particular no-objection item in a particular 
quantity to Iraq confronted the committee with a steady stream of unrelated decision 
proposals. As such, the nature of exemption requests varied extremely, ranging from 
“soap”, “textiles”, “cars”, unspecified “spare parts”, “steel sections”, a “combine 
harvester” to a complete “water desalination plant”. In fact, although many goods 
clearly would be either of humanitarian or non-humanitarian nature, the provision left 
a large grey area around the borders of these categories (Conlon 1996b: 253). Thus, 
the committee had to collectively decide which of these goods indeed represented 
“civilian and humanitarian imports” and which were incompatible with UNSC 
resolutions, while each decision was of marginal importance. 
Second, because governments did have strongly diverging preferences, under the 
consensus-based “no-objection” procedure, this would have led to extremely 
restrictive committee practice, were only items uncontested by all committee 
members would be approved. On the one hand, the sanctions enforcers, in particular 
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the US and UK were determined to completely uphold the economic embargo unless 
Iraq would comply with all previous UNSC resolutions, including resolution 687 
(1991). The US argued against “premature relaxation” of sanctions, not least to 
provoke regime change (Lewis 1991; Johnstone 1994: 17–18, Xinhua 1991b, 1991a). 
The US had only reluctantly agreed to the March 1991 committee decision and had 
initially even disputed Ahtisaari’s findings (Rosen 1991, see also US, SR.36). Thus, 
the committee should grant exemptions only in tightly constricted circumstances and 
not expand exemptions (Conlon 2000: 76). On the other hand, anti-sanctions states 
continued to favor the lifting of all sanctions, and if that is not achievable, at least 
substantially extending the range of exemptions (Johnstone 1994: 17). This situation 
was neatly summarized by the committee Chair: 
“One school of thinking says (...) we should be rather open minded as far as 
humanitarian needs are concerned. We should interpret the possibilities of 
facilitating such deliveries rather generously. But there is another school of 
thinking (...) [which] says the pressure on Iraq should be maintained as long as 
there is not full compliance with the resolutions” (Hohenfellner, May 1992, 
World Chronicle, as cited in Graham-Brown 1999: 71). 
Since adopted general rules contained in UNSC resolutions only vaguely 
distinguished between supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, foodstuffs and 
civilian and humanitarian imports as acceptable goods and all other items as 
unacceptable goods, the decision situation required the committee to adopt further 
precedents. Over time, the committee created a comparatively well-defined 
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable requests through adopting precedent 
decisions on unrelated decision requests. Previous committee decisions provided a 
cumulatively growing standard against which future requests could be evaluated. 
Early requests mostly concerned ICRC and Red Cross societies’ shipments, which the 
committee granted regardless of the requested items as a general rule (Red Cross: 
“items of medical and humanitarian assistance”, 1991/COMM.106, “sanitation 
materials, fuels, camp material, hospital material and vehicles”, 1991/COMM.107, 
“tea”, 1991/COMM.130, “relief material”, 1991/COMM.156 and 1991/COMM.169). 
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This logic was also applied to UN system agencies.6 The committee also 
systematically granted requests by states on behalf of domestic humanitarian 
agencies.7 
Simultaneously, UN member states began to request no-objection items, the 
processing of which required the committee to determine the limits of acceptable 
categories based on humanitarian characteristics of the good and its end-use. The first 
request was made by Sweden on 25 April 1991, when it requested to ship “spare parts 
for Dura/Taji silos and an electric engine for a grain silo”, which the committee 
granted (1991/COMM.133). Other requests were filed by Germany (“spare parts for 
harvester threshers“, 1991/COMM.175), Turkey (“detergent and water pumps for 
                                                 
6 UNHCR: “relief supplies” 1991/COMM.110, “relief supplies, supplies of fuel and office 
material for use of the UNHCR office” 1991/COMM.123, “thirty vehicles” 1991/COMM.166, “a 
list of equipment” 1991/COMM.172, “1,766 family tents and two temporary warehouses” 
1991/COMM.181, “one Toyota land cruiser, five Volvo station wagons” 1991/COMM.182, 
“10,000 family tents” 1991/COMM.185, “20 Nissan Patrol Station wagons and 9 Nissan 4x4 
Double Cab Pick-up” 1991/COMM.195, “radio and computer equipment, emergency field office 
kits, tents, kitchen material, high protein biscuits, soap and emergency health kits, 9 pick-ups, 20 
Nissan patrol and 10 Volvo station wagons” 1991/COMM.204, “100,000 jerrycans, 20,000 
cooking stoves, 72,300 kitchen sets and 50,000 blankets” 1991/COMM.260, “four diesel 
generators” 1991/COMM.344, “40 gas chlorinators” 1991/COMM.554; UN Department of 
Administration and Management: “building material and supplies, generators, air-conditioning 
units and other equipment and supplies” 1991/COMM.282; UN Office of General Services: “spare 
parts for two Iraqi helicopters” 1991/COMM.391; UNICEF: “480 ball bearings” 
1991/COMM.582, “12 small water treatment units” 1991/COMM.528, “108.8 tons of chlorine” 
1991/COMM.318, “6993 kg of nitrous oxide”, 1991/COMM.343, “540 metric tons of liquid 
chlorine”, 1991/COMM.374, “nine Lister diesel engine generating sets”, 1991/COMM.405, 
“1,100 chlorine test kits, 1,100 packs of AT0102 DPD1 R tablets, 1,100 packs of Phenol red 
tablets”, 1991/COMM.438, “320 single seal valves for standpipe installations, 100 spare packs 
including washer and nuts”, 1991/COMM.443, “chlorine pumps and connector tubes”, 
1991/COMM.470; WFP: “two Toyota Land Cruisers” 1991/COMM.478; WHO: “six vehicles”, 
1991/COMM.217, “supplies and equipment”, 1991/COMM.232, “educational equipment”, 
1991/COMM.261, “rehabilitation supplies”, 1991/COMM.262, “supplies and equipment”, 
1991/COMM.307, “supplies, equipment, nitrous oxide”, 1991/COMM.441. 
7 MSF branches: “water treatment supplies”, 1991/COMM.108, “medicines and various 
supplies”, 1991/COMM.118, “emergency humanitarian assistance” 1991/COMM.119, “articles 
meant for basic civilian needs”, 1991/COMM.174 and 1991/COMM.224, “water purification and 
treatment systems”, 1991/COMM.210; Oxfam Belgium: “two water purification and treatment 
systems, four generators and accessories”, 1991/COMM.126; Danchurchaid Denmark: “two 
generators and two refrigerators for medical purposes”, 1991/COMM.128, “Mitsubishi truck”, 
1991/COMM.142/158, “vehicles and equipment (…), two sets of satellite communication 
equipment to be reexported to Denmark upon completion [and](…) new clothes”, 
1991/COMM.189, “water purifying tablets and powder, high protein biscuits and hospital 
equipment (…) 2 Toyota (…) pick-ups and (…) reinforced plastic folio, for use (…) in the refugee 
camp in Sulaymanyah”, 1991/COMM.201, “reinforced plastic tarpaulins”, 1991/COMM.206; 
Danish refuge Council Denmark: “group equipment for volunteers”, 1991/COMM.167. 
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tractors”, 1991/COMM.179), Sweden (“3 containers of Water Treatment Plants”, 
1991/COMM.198) and Germany (“50 harvester threshers”, 1991/COMM.199). The 
committee took its first negative decision when Bulgaria sought to export Iraqi-
owned “zinc oxide” (1991/COMM.209). Iraq confirmed it was indeed for the 
“manufacture of automobile tires and batteries” (1991/COMM.229) and thus clearly 
subject to sanctions. Similarly, when Turkey requested to send “clutches and other 
parts and accessories of motor vehicles” (1991/COMM.218), the US objected: 
“According to the Ahtisaari report, parts for transport equipment fell into the category 
of essential items (…) by virtue of which the Committee could approve their delivery. 
(…)[The US] wished to receive an assurance that the export of the parts and 
accessories in question would actually facilitate the distribution of foodstuffs (…)” 
(US, SR.44). The Chair summarized that “[i]t was his understanding that the parts 
would be used solely for humanitarian purposes (…), and if the Turkish authorities 
gave a satisfactory response the Committee would approve the request. If not, 
authorization would be denied” (Chair, SR.44). After Turkey had only clarified that 
the parts would be used to repair civilian vehicles, the committee rejected the request 
(SR.47). 
Numerous cases illustrate that the committee gradually developed an increasingly 
consistent decision practice. The committee granted many requests it considered 
finished products satisfying the substantive criterion of essential civilian needs 
(Turkish shipment of “500 tons of mixed animal feed” (1991/COMM.216); Denmark, 
“equipment and spares (…) for repair work of the water supply in Sulalimaniya” 
(1991/COMM.239); Turkey, “16.200 tons of soap and 6.550 tons of detergent” 
(1991/COMM.240); Denmark, “2,010 rolls of reinforced polyethylene film to be used 
in the erection of tents/shelters for civilians” (1991/COMM.242); Germany, “800 
stove pipes as essential spare parts for steam baking ovens” (1991/COMM.245); 
Australia, “3,000 mt of aluminum hydroxide, required in the purification of drinking 
water” (1991/COMM.251); Austria, “chlorine and other materials, required in the 
disinfection of drinking water” (1991/COMM.252); Turkey, “50.4 tons of water tubes 
of steel” (1991/COMM.255); Netherlands, “spare-parts for a milk sterilizator” 
(1991/COMM.257); France, “400 tons of quinoleate 15” (1991/COMM.258)). 
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Other requests similar to earlier requests deemed essentially humanitarian were 
granted. This includes Turkey’s request to export “5,000 tons of soap and 20,000 tons 
of detergent” (1991/COMM.292) and a Dutch request to ship “20,000 metric tonnes 
of planting material for consumption potatoes” (1991/COMM.306). Germany was 
allowed to ship used clothes and shoes, soap and detergent, and books 
(1991/COMM.495). The committee also granted Japan’s request for “12 small water 
treatment units” (1991/COMM.528). A Brazilian request “to export four shipments of 
kraftliner and fluting paper to Iraq, for use in packaging and storage of foodstuffs and 
medical supplies” was granted accordingly (1991/COMM.631). Of Turkey’s request 
to provide Iraq with “1,000 tons soap, 105 tons of other ovens and 200 tons of 
detergent” the committee accepted soap and detergent, while the UK requested more 
information on “other ovens” (SR.47, 1991/COMM.316), which Turkey supplied 
clarifying that it concerned “small electric ovens (…), produced for home use” 
(1991/COMM.316/Add.1) so that the UK withdrew its hold. 
Requests that included more than one item or those without a clear humanitarian 
purpose illustrate that requests were carefully scrutinized against earlier precedents 
taking end-use into account as secondary rule. When Turkey requested to deliver 
“angora goat hair, soap, glassware and calcium” (1991/COMM.270), the UK rejected 
300 tons of industrial calcium as being non-essential (UK, SR.47). At the same time, 
the committee accepted requests for calcium for water purification (Jordan, 
1992/COMM.973, US, 1992/COMM.210, France, 1992/COMM.961), while rejecting 
it for other uses (Turkey, 1992/COMM.486). As Japan requested to send “radio 
communications equipment (…) for use in communication between hospitals and 
between local offices of the Iraqi Red Crescent” (1991/COMM.284), the UK objected 
because the exact humanitarian need of the radio equipment “had not been 
substantiated” (UK, SR.47). Sweden’s request to ship refrigeration equipment for use 
in beer brewing (1991/COMM.704) was rejected on grounds that this would not fall 
within the “category of exports intended to meet essential civilian needs” (US, 
SR.62). From a request to ship “polypropylene bags, grate cooler plates (…), artificial 
leather, wheat bran for animal feed and printed metallized film for use in the 
packaging of confectionery goods”, the committee only accepted animal feed 
(1991/COMM.430). While Turkey’s request to export wooden spools for use in 
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outdated weaving machines was rejected, it was allowed to ship jersey and used 
clothes to Iraq (1991/COMM.625). 
Even requests by powerful committee members were carefully scrutinized and 
rejected if they did not meet humanitarian purposes. When the USSR requested to 
trade “parts for grain elevators and for the installation of a drainage collection system, 
under contracts concluded with Iraq in 1986“ (1991/COMM.289), the committee 
granted grain elevators parts, but the UK rejected “automobile and tractor equipment 
and road-building machinery”, which the USSR representative criticized (UK, USSR, 
Chair, SR.47). Further, the committee blocked a French request for approval of “spare 
parts for refinery process pumps and fire pumps” (1991/COMM.649; SR.58). When 
the UK sought clearance for “Gulley Emptiers/Sewerage Equipment” 
(1991/COMM.560), the committee put the request on hold. Only after UK “[r]evised 
technical details”, the shipment was granted after almost four months (SR.55; 
1992/COMM.158). The US only lifted its hold on a UK request shipping “various 
chemicals and equipment for water purification” (1992/COMM.745) after the UK had 
supplied more specific information on items and end-use (SR.76). A UK request for 
“5,000 tons of polypropylene granules for the manufacture of flour bags” 
(1992/COMM.1062) met resistance. Japan argued that while it did not object to flour 
bags it “did object to exporting polypropylene granules for their manufacture“. The 
US “[e]ndorsed that objection” adding that polypropylene had “a variety of possible 
uses, and 5,000 tons was a very substantial amount. Moreover, since Iraq had always 
been authorized to import bags, there was no need for it to manufacture them” 
(SR.79). In anticipation of committee objections, the UK withdrew a request for 
shipping “500 tons of caustic soda for use in the manufacture of soap and detergent” 
(1992/COMM.1063).  
A particular controversy ensured over UK’s request to export “11,000 cases of 
scotch whiskey, 20,000 cases of canned beer, 19,200 cases of cigarettes” 
(1992/COMM.1065). The committee accepted cigarettes in line with previous 
approved requests (e.g. Cyprus, 1992/COMM.335; Bulgaria, 1992/COMM.375). 
However, Japan rejected ‘whiskey’ “based on consideration of what constituted a 
luxury item” not because it is an alcoholic beverage, while other delegations 
“questioned the criteria applied in approving of beer and disapproving of whisky” 
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(Ecuador, Cape Verde, SR.79). The Chair reminded that if the committee considered a 
product as being ‘foodstuffs’ it would only be notified, whereas a “no-objection item” 
would only be granted if it was for essential civilian needs (Chair, SR.79). The UK 
grudgingly accepted that “[t]here was clearly a perceived difference between certain 
items”. Indeed, “[t]he point being made by some delegations when objecting to goods 
they regarded as luxury items was whether they responded to essential civilian needs” 
and that “some alcoholic beverages had in the past been classified as foodstuffs” (UK, 
SR.79). Finally, the committee rejected whisky as non-essential item, while treating 
beer as foodstuffs (1992/COMM.1065). 
An initiative of skeptical states to formalize this decision practice through a 
Council or committee declaration of acceptable goods, however, failed. In December 
1991, during a regular sanctions review, several members pushed for a lifting of 
sanctions on particular goods, but sanctions enforcers disagreed. As a compromise, 
the UNSC requested the committee “to study immediately those materials and 
supplies for essential civilian and humanitarian needs (…) with the purpose of 
drawing up a list of items which may (…) be transferred from the ‘no-objection’ 
procedure to a simple notification procedure” (S/23305). Moreover, the Council 
decided that committee members objecting to requests had to provide a “specific 
explanation” (S/23305 as reproduced in United Nations 1996: 372), which would 
allow committee members to exchange more detailed arguments. Accordingly, on 
behalf of the non-aligned caucus, Zimbabwe requested transferring a list of items to 
the notification procedure (Chair, SR.61). In support, India stated that the list sought 
to formalize committee practice “in accordance with previous decisions to clear 
items” (India, SR.61). For almost three months, the Chair conducted inconclusive 
consultations (Chair, SR.62). While non-aligned countries favored the transfer of as 
many items as possible to the notification procedure (Ecuador, Zimbabwe, India, 
Cape Verde, SR.66), sanctions enforcers favored to keep the committee “as flexible as 
possible” (US, SR.66), argued against “any formal change in procedure (...) 
[restricting] the right of all delegations to raise objections where there was cause for 
concern” (US, SR.66) and generally resisted any formal agreement to transfer items 
to a notification procedure (Conlon 1996b: 260). While the UK admitted that it had 
not objected many such items in the past, if necessary it should have the right to raise 
objections (UK, SR.66). 
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Eventually, in the so-called “gentlemen’s agreement” adopted on 6 March 1992, 
the committee agreed on an informal set of rules that had emerged from previous 
decision practice. The committee, in a diplomatically phrased formula suggested by 
the Chair (SR.66), recognized that the “members did seem to agree to look favourably 
upon requests” for the following items under the no-objection procedure: (1) Medical 
equipment and supplies (2) packaging material for foodstuffs (3) civilian clothing (4) 
supplies for babies and infants (5) soaps and detergents (6) animal feed and 
agricultural seeds (7) animals and eggs for breeding purposes (8) materials for 
education (9) materials for water treatment and sewage disposal plants; and (10) 
storage facilities for grain and foodstuffs (on file with author, reproduced in Conlon 
2000: 61–62). This list is short of five additional categories that had been proposed in 
the non-aligned letter: electrical supplies for civilian use; refrigeration, heating 
equipment and their spare parts; kitchen supplies and spares; vehicles, spare parts for 
civilian use; and supplies for agricultural and cattle breeding sectors (Conlon 2000: 
62). The gentlemen’s agreement demonstrates that even states, which rejected formal 
rules because of their restricting effects on decision-making options could not avoid 
the constraining effects of informal rules “in practical terms” (Ecuador, SR.66). 
Overall, the committee decision practice unintendedly provided a working 
definition of “essential humanitarian items”, although powerful members rejected any 
formalization of substantive decision rules. According to that implicit definition, 
finished products for direct human consumption or clear civilian or humanitarian use 
including larger development projects (e.g. water purification) would be positively 
granted. Unfinished products that could be further manufactured and thus not for 
direct human consumption would contribute to Iraqi industry and would be rejected 
accordingly. For instance, this explains why caustic soda for the production of soap 
was withdrawn (UK, 1992/COMM.1063) but finished soap was granted (Turkey, 
1991/COMM.316). In the grey area between acceptable and unacceptable items, non-
committee members sought clarification as to which items would be acceptable and 
under which circumstances (Japan, pesticides, SR.55). Mostly, deliberations took 
place around the borders of the contested items groups. Text-based searches in the 
summary records reveal that during the first 117 committee meetings, committee 
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members in many instances explicitly invoked “precedent” (52 hits) and argued for 
the similarity of a particular case to earlier cases in 70 cases8. Elected members that 
joined the Council, thereby being faced with precedents they had originally not 
consented to, where forced to either forgo pursuing diverging case-specific interests 
or risk compromising established decision practice. For instance, Japan perceived 
‘cigarettes’ as an objectionable item per se, but did not formally object to not act 
against established practice (SR.73, see also Conlon 2000: 71). 
This established committee practice is strikingly consistent and gave committee 
members, as well as requesting states the possibility to judge the chances of getting a 
certain request approved based on the type of item, accompanying information and 
humanitarian justification. In an interoffice memorandum, Paul Conlon stated that 
“[b]ecause of its frequent dealings with the Committee in the past, the Jordanian 
Permanent Mission is very well able to predict which requests have some chance of 
being authorized“ (7 Sep 1993, on file with author). Thereby, a system of mutual 
behavioral expectations is created, where outcomes can be predetermined on the basis 
of the good and end-user (Kaul 1996: 101). To evaluate if a request is legitimate, 
information becomes a decisive variable so that even states highly critical of 
sanctions expressed concern about the vagueness of some requests. Yemen, for 
instance stated that “[a]pplications from Turkey tended to be very vague. The 
Chairman should inform (…) Turkey of the need for greater clarity in Turkey’s 
applications (…)” (Yemen, SR. 48). Similarly, even the committee Chair noted that 
“[s]ome countries supplied a very brief description of the items they intended to 
export. Others, (…) provided more detail concerning the humanitarian justification 
for the shipments. He suggested that Turkey should be asked to submit more detailed 
requests and explain the reasons for the export of various articles which, at first sight, 
did not seem justified” (Austria, SR.76). 
In sum, after the Gulf War, although several powerful members were highly 
skeptical of formalizing permissible exemptions, committee decision-making required 
                                                 
8 Proximity search within five words for term “same” combined with term “category” (8), 
“procedure” (6), “request” (6), “case” (5), “manner” (4), or “way” (4); proximity search within 
five words for term “similar” combined with terms “request” (17), “case” (9), “one” (8), “earlier” 
(2), or “circumstances” (1). 
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considerable elaboration of rules through precedents. Single-case decisions created 
precedents that guided subsequent decision practice. Openly inconsistent decision-
making would have risked committee deadlock against the background of strongly 
diverging interests among committee members. A purely case-by-case oriented 
decision-making would have triggered reciprocal behavior among committee 
members when objecting states also seek to achieve successful proposals (Kaul 1996: 
103). As a consequence, establishing a system of consistent decision practice 
following categories of acceptable and unacceptable items became “(…) the rational 
core of an attempt to define more clearly which sectors and activities should benefit 
from humanitarian mitigation considerations (…)” (Conlon 1996b: 259). 
 
5.2.3 Quality of requests, not power determines committee decisions 
While the previous case episode has demonstrated how the committee established a 
remarkably consistent decision practice, in this section I seek to demonstrate that 
committee members consistently applied the previously established precedents by 
taking a systematic large-n perspective on all 8,189 committee exemption decisions 
adopted from mid-1993 to early 1995. If the committee would indeed have adopted a 
power-based logic of decision-making, the expectation would be that powerful states 
fared considerably better than non-permanent members and non-committee members, 
regardless of the item requested. On the contrary, for a rule-based approach, the 
expectation would be to observe similar success rates of powerful and weak states for 
an item and that a request’s outcome could be mainly explained by whether or not the 
item falls under the category of humanitarian items. 
The Iraq sanctions committee, being confronted with a steadily growing stream of 
decision proposals, further routinized its decision-making. The number of 
communications increased dramatically from around 180 in 1990 to almost 9,000 in 
1995. Whereas the committee held about one meeting per week in 1990, it only held 
about one meeting per month in 1995. Consequentially, the committee processed an 
increasing number of communications: from about 20 per meeting in 1990 to about 
an astounding 800 per meeting in 1995 (S/1996/700, para. 37). Almost all 
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communications were exemption requests (Conlon 2000: 59–60; Kaul 1996: 100). 
Given an unchanged decision situation combined with a persistently diverging 
interest constellation, this points to a less politicized and more rule-based decision 
practice. 
The following descriptive statistics and regression analyses are based on the Iraq 
Sanctions Committee Decisions Dataset which contains 8,189 no-objection requests 
submitted by UN member states between the 99th meeting (26 June 1993) and the 
121th meeting (31 January 1995). The dataset used the committee’s “status of 
communications” lists, which were introduced due to the “sharp increase” of waiver 
requests (Chair, SR.98) and completely standardized their processing. For each 
meeting starting from the 100th meeting, the UN Secretariat provided a list detailing 
the requests received since the previous list, detailing the requesting country, the 
requested item, the decision (approved or rejected) and the justification for any 
objection. Across states, the number of requests varied. While 36 states made 10 
requests or less, only 14 states made more than 50 requests. Jordan (5,055 requests) 
and Turkey (1,148 requests) alone submitted 75.7 percent of all requests. The average 
approval rate was about 43 percent. Non-committee members and humanitarian 
organizations submitted 7,478 requests (91.3 percent), non-permanent committee 
members only 164 requests (2.0 percent) and permanent members 548 requests (6.6 
percent). Among the P5, the UK submitted most requests (443), followed by China 
(48), US (28), France (15) and Russia (14). The large number of UK requests can be 
attributed to the policy of government agencies to promote legitimate trade with Iraq, 
while the UK applied a thorough domestic vetting policy (Graham-Brown 1999: 73; 
Simons 1996: 113). 
The outcome of exemption requests is measured by a dichotomous dependent 
variable. Decision success indicates on the level of individual requests whether a 
request was approved (1) or rejected (0). Since during a meeting, any member of the 
committee could take up an individual request and provide counter-arguments, 
justifications and appeals to release holds or blocks (Conlon 2000: 33), meeting 
records were systematically screened to assess cases of released holds or objections. 
For regression analysis, humanitarian organizations’ requests (N=233), shipments of 
diplomatic goods (N=19) and items rejected for secondary reasons (e.g. ‘excessive 
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quantities’, ‘incomplete request form’, N=251) have been excluded because they 
follow distinct secondary rules. Apart from the information on the rejection 
justification, other information on secondary characteristics such as end-use or 
quantities is missing. 
The type of good being a proxy for rule-based decision-making is the major 
independent variable. The author coded almost 3,700 different goods into larger 
categories of goods according to the UN Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC, Rev. 4) reducing the number of item categories to 68.9 270 items could not be 
coded due to missing information on the exact material (e.g. “tubes”). Subsequently, 
the author assigned SITC item groups to eleven broad categories of goods as dummy 
variables.10 To control for the power-based decision-making explanation, which 
assumes a positive association between the approval rate and the power resources of a 
requesting state, two sets of independent variables being proxies for power resources 
were used. First, as institutional power proxies, P5-status applies to a Council 
permanent member’s request (1) and is (0) for any other country’s request and 
accounts for the often perceived P5 dominance. E10-status applies to a country’s non-
permanent membership at the time of a request (1) and is (0) for a non-Council 
member’s request. The non-permanent members were privileged because they 
decided about their own claims and thus could potentially extract package deals. 
Second, as other more remote power proxies, the economic power resources of a 
country are measured by the logged Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in billion USD 
(current prices) for 1994 as published by the International Monetary Fund World 
Economic Outlook Database. ‘Hard power’ resources are measured by the logged 
Composite Index of National Capability of the Correlates of War Project for 1994 
                                                 
9 The author used the updated version ‘SITC Rev.4’ as provided by the UN Statistics Division, 
available at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=28 [22 March 2016]. 
10 Food production raw materials includes SITC categories 0, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 22, 29, 42 (N=70). 
Precursors and medical supplies (non-end user) include SITC categories 54, 87 (N=211). Crude 
items include SITC categories 23 to 27, 32, 33, 41, 57 and 121 (N=284). Prefabricated items 
include SITC categories 61 to 69, 77, 661, 662, 8122, and 8519 (N=2768). Finished items include 
SITC categories 58, 81 to 83, 88, 89, 665, 666, 691, 764, and 775 (N=1430). Items for human 
consumption include SITC categories 55, 84, 85, 122, 642, 658 (N=591). Chemicals include SITC 
categories 50 to 53 and 59 (N=335). Agrochemicals include SITC categories 56 and 591 (N=27). 
Transportation items include SITC categories 78 and 79 (N=403). Machinery items include SITC 
categories 71 to 74 (N=659). Non-essential electrical appliances include categories 75 and 76 
(N=47). 
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(Singer 1987) comprising of military expenditure, military personnel, energy 
consumption, iron and steel production, urban population and total population. 
Finally, by using country dummies, the analysis controls for the requests by those 
states, which submitted most requests. This includes Jordan within the group of non-
committee members and the UK that submitted most P5 requests. 
The descriptive statistics support the presumption that the committee 
fundamentally determined whether to accept or reject a request based on primary and 
secondary rules. In fact, the committee applied a “modified categorical approach” 
when processing exemption requests (Conlon 2000: 60; S/1996/700, paras 38-44). 
Accordingly, the committee had to determine in which broader category the type of 
item would fall and thus which decision procedure was to be followed. An Algerian 
request to ship medicine, foodstuffs and other items (blankets, wheelchairs, candles 
and generators), illustrates this approach. First, the committee simply “took note of 
the intention to send medicines”. Second, the committee automatically acknowledged 
that the shipment of foodstuffs had been “duly notified”. Third, the committee 
granted all other items under its no-objection procedure (1991/COMM.143). 
Even though the embargo excluded supplies intended strictly for medical 
purposes and drugs and medical supplies in end-user form did not require 
authorization, the committee regarded precursors and more complex medical 
applications as no-objection items (e.g. X-ray machines, hospital furniture) (Conlon 
2000: 61, S/1996/700, para. 40). As concerns foodstuffs, the committee only regarded 
‘finished edible products’ for human consumption as foodstuffs and raw materials for 
food production (e.g. seeds, food coloring, emulsifier, bitter hops, malt) as no-
objection items (Conlon 2000: 61; internal memo, 27 October 1993, on file with 
author). As such, foodstuffs notifications were consistently acknowledged (Conlon 
notes notifications for a total value of 1.3 billion USD for 1993, 1.2 billion USD for 
1994, see Conlon 2000: 66–69). The Finnish and Belgian ‘sugar cases’ illustrate that 
even clearly fraudulent foodstuffs notifications could not be declined because these 
notifications fell outside the committee mandate. In 1993, Finland requested to ship 
three million tons of sugar, which would satisfy more than six years of Iraqi pre-war 
consumption, priced at 750 million USD (confidential note on the recent sugar case, 
16 December 1993, on file with author). Similarly, in 1994, Belgium requested to 
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ship one million tons of sugar per year, at a total value of 1.1 billion USD, in about 80 
shiploads over four years. These notifications with excessive quantities multiple times 
as much as Iraqi annual consumption, requiring hundreds of shipments and thus being 
totally infeasible (confidential note, see above) were only avoided by kindly 
requesting the submitting governments to withdraw these requests (Conlon 2000: 
127–129). Even sanctions enforcers never challenged foodstuffs notifications “since 
there were no grounds for disallowing a notification” (Conlon 2000: 141–142; 
internal memo, 27 October 1993, on file with author). 
The category of no-objection items included a vast range of different items, for 
which the committee had to distinguish humanitarian from non-humanitarian items 
solely through precedent and its decision practice since resolution 687 (1991) only 
provided a rather general definition. Specific lists of items have only been established 
later (i.e. positive items list (resolution 1284 (1999)) or negative items lists 
(resolution 1409 (2002)), see Malone 2006: 119–120). For this task, the committee 
considered the type of item as a primary criterion and the end-use, the end-user, and 
the quantity of the requested good as secondary criteria (New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995: 36).  
Considering the descriptive statistics for the aggregated decision success of item 
groups (approval rate) in the dataset, one observes that the committee applied a 
categorical approach whereby finished goods would be accepted, while only pre-
processed goods, which would run counter to the embargo, would be rejected. In fact, 
the approval rate varies extremely across different item categories, despite missing 
information on end-use. Table 7 classifies the approval rates of requested items across 
all 68 hand-coded SITC item categories, while the table does not contain any other 
secondary information such as end-use to explain remaining variation. The large 
majority of item categories have either a very high approval rate above 75 percent (21 
categories with 2,544 requests) or a very low approval rate below 25 percent (32 
categories with 3,910 requests). A request from any country in these categories has 
either a very high chance of approval or a very low chance of approval depending on 
the type of item. Only twelve categories are essentially contested (agrochemicals, 
fertilizer, paper, refractory bricks, power-generating machinery, machinery for 
particular industries, metal working machinery, other transport equipment, furniture, 
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photographic and optical goods, 969 requests). In these cases, the committee used 
secondary characteristics such as end-user to determine whether or not a request is 
permissible, which dataset does not systematically include. For instance, as the 
gentleman’s agreements items highlight, items for clear humanitarian purpose among 
contested categories (for instance, ‘paper for school’, or a ‘water purification plant’) 
were admissible. 
Several examples highlight the committee’s logic. The committee rejected raw 
tobacco for the production of cigarettes within Iraq (6 percent approval), but 
consistently accepted ready-made cigarettes for direct human consumption (100 
percent approval). Similarly, the committee rejected textiles, yarn and fabrics for the 
production of garments (6.8 percent approval), but accepted the shipment of ready-
made clothing in almost all cases (97.5 percent approval). Regarding manufactures of 
metals, the committee approved those items that were for direct human consumption 
such as razor blades, shavers or door locks (86.4 percent approval), however, 
disagreed with those manufactured items that would provide support for Iraqi 
production such as nails, screws, welding bars or reinforcement steel (4.8 percent 
approval). Among the non-metallic mineral manufactures, the committee rejected raw 
glass sheets (9.3 percent approval) or luxury products such as marble (0 percent 
approval), whereas it accepted drinking glasses (98.1 percent approval) and ceramic 
tableware for household use (100 percent approval). 
Some item groups exhibit specific secondary exemption rules. The committee 
regarded raw textiles only permissible in tightly circumscribed humanitarian uses 
including as coffin cloth, agricultural textiles, food packaging or school uniforms. 
Likewise, rubber manufactures, which mostly consist of ‘tyres for cars’, were 
disapproved, but ‘tyres’ for ambulances, tractors and bicycles, were permissible. 
Beverages are acceptable, but hard liquors would be rejected. Among the essential 
oils, soaps and detergents were accepted, but cosmetics, incense, and show polish 
were rejected (also Conlon 2000: 61, 70–72). Within the seldom accepted category of 
electrical appliances, small electrical switches have been consistently accepted. 
Finally, while ‘miscellaneous manufactured articles’ were usually accepted, audio and 
video cassettes were consistently rejected as non-essential.  
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Table 7: Aggregated Decision Success (Approval Rates) by Standard International 
Trade Classification Categories 
SITC 
Code 
SITC Code Description Approval 
Rate 
Systematic Exceptions N 
0, 5, 8 Food and live animals 100%  16 
4, 9 Malt, hops, color, emulsifier 0% Food color pigment (+/1) 11 
11 Beverages 100% Liquor, whisky, wine (-/3) 5 
121 Raw Tobacco 6.1%  33 
122 Tobacco manufactures 100%  45 
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous 
fruits 
100%  4 
23 Crude rubber 0%  11 
24 Cork and wood 1.6%  61 
25 Pulp and waste paper 0%  5 
26 Textile fibers 0%  5 
27 Crude fertilizers, and crude 
minerals 
0% Filter perlite (+/1) 7 
29 Crude animal and vegetable 
materials 
100%  28 
32 Coal, coke and briquettes 0% Charcoal (+/3) 8 
33 Petroleum, petroleum 
products 
0%  2 
41 Animal oils and fats 0%  2 
42 Fixed animal or vegetable 
fats and oils, crude 
16.7%  6 
50 Chemicals 18.8%  16 
51 Organic chemicals 5.3%  19 
52 Inorganic chemicals 21.1%  232 
53 Dyeing, tanning and 
colouring materials 
0%  68 
54 Medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products 
93.8% Raw materials for 
medicine production (-/4) 
36 
55 Essential oils and resinoids 
and perfume materials; 
toilet, polishing and 
cleansing preparations 
98.4% Cosmetics, incense, shoe 
paint, shoe polish, 
shampoo elements, carnel 
olive oil (-/11) 
381 
56 Fertilizer 62.5% Contested 8 
57 Plastics in primary forms 0.7%  150 
58 Plastics in non-primary 
forms 
65.4% Contested 104 
59 Chemical materials and 
products 
1.0%  198 
591 Insecticides, rodenticides, 
fungicides, herbicides, anti-
sprouting products and 
plant-growth regulators, 
disinfectants and similar 
products, put up in forms or 
packings for retail sale or as 
68.4% Contested 19 
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SITC 
Code 
SITC Code Description Approval 
Rate 
Systematic Exceptions N 
preparations or articles 
61 Leather, leather 
manufactures 
0%  95 
62 Rubber manufactures 0.8% Partially: Tyres for 
bicycles, tyres for 
ambulances, tyres for 
agricultural vehicles (+/15) 
497 
63 Cork and wood 
manufactures (excl. 
furniture) 
2.6%  117 
64 Paper, paperboard and 
articles of paper pulp 
48.0% Contested 125 
642 Paper and paperboard, cut to 
size or shape, and articles of 
paper or paperboard 
[diapers, sanitary towels] 
100%  19 
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-
up articles 
6.3% Coffin cloth, agricultural 
textiles, food packaging, 
school uniforms textile 
(+/19) 
807 
658 Made-up articles, wholly or 
chiefly of textile materials 
[fishing nets, bed sheets, 
carpets, bedding] 
95.7%  140 
66 Non-metallic mineral 
manufactures 
9.3% Mill stones (+/3) 143 
661 Lime, cement, and 
fabricated construction 
materials [marble] 
0.0%  23 
662 Refractory bricks 68.8% Contested 16 
665 Glassware 98.1%  206 
666 Pottery [ceramic tableware] 100%  59 
67 Iron and steel 4.6%  175 
68 Non-ferrous metals 4.3% Aluminum for packaging 
(+/9) 
78 
69 Manufactures of metals 4.8%  355 
69(1) Manufactures of metals for 
Iraqi end-user 
86.0%  221 
71 Power generating machinery 
and equipment 
35.0% Contested 20 
72 Machinery specialized for 
particular industries 
54.2% Contested 369 
73 Metalworking machinery 50% Contested 2 
74 General industrial 
machinery and equipment 
60.4% Contested 
Valves (-/12) 
268 
75 Office machines and 
automatic data-processing 
20.0%  35 
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SITC 
Code 
SITC Code Description Approval 
Rate 
Systematic Exceptions N 
machines 
761, 
762, 
763 
Monitors and projectors, 
sound-recording and 
reproducing apparatus 
0%  12 
764 Telecommunications 
equipment 
80.0%  10 
77 Electrical machinery, 
apparatus and appliances 
14.6% Electrical switches (+/20) 281 
775 Household-type electrical 
and non-electrical equip. 
82.0%  189 
78 Road vehicles 5.2%  401 
79 Other transport equipment 50% Contested 2 
81 Prefabricated buildings; 
sanitary, plumbing, heating 
and lighting fixtures and 
fittings 
88.4%  285 
8122 Ceramic sinks, wash-basins, 
wash-basin pedestals, baths, 
bidets, water-closet pans, 
flushing cisterns, urinals and 
similar sanitary fixtures 
10.0%  30 
82 Furniture and parts thereof;  52.9% Contested 17 
83 Travel goods, handbags and 
similar containers 
75.0%  8 
84 Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories 
97.5%  315 
85 Footwear 97.2%  72 
8519 Parts of footwear 18.5%  27 
87 Professional, scientific and 
controlling instruments and 
apparatus 
94.7% Adhesive for medical use 
(-/4) 
175 
88 Photographic apparatus, 
equipment and supplies and 
optical goods; watches and 
clocks 
57.9% Contested 19 
89 Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles 
81.9% Audio/Video cassettes  
(-/13) 
311 
D Diplomatic Goods 100%  19 
99 Not categorized 51.9%  270 
Total    7693 
Notes: Based on Iraq Sanctions Committee Decisions Dataset. Excludes 251 requests rejected for 
secondary reasons (incomplete request form, large quantities), 232 requests from humanitarian 
organizations and other missing values. Approval rate excludes systematic exceptions. Systematic 
exceptions column contains information if exception is positive ‘+’ or negative ‘-’ and the how many cases 
the exception concerns (N). Categories between 0.25 and 0.75 approval are considered contested. 
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Moreover, the descriptive statistics reveal that the Iraq sanctions committee 
consistently applied its previously established specific exceptions. First, the 
committee generally granted requests made by UN humanitarian agencies (e.g. WHO, 
UNHCR), the ICRC, other UN entities (e.g. UNSCOM, UNESCO), or by member 
states on behalf of humanitarian agencies (e.g. Kurdish Life Aid, Save the Children, 
Mine clearance). From 1993 to early 1995, the committee approved 225 out of 233 
such requests. Notably, the committee granted these requests regardless of the type of 
items shipped even if the requests involved items that the committee had usually 
rejected (e.g. vehicles incl. spare parts and tires, glue, paint, iron and steel) and thus 
in line with earlier established committee practice (see 5.2.2). As an exception to this 
rule, the committee denied seven FAO requests on the basis of dual-use concern 
(spraying units, herbicides) and one WHO request (personal computer). Second, the 
committee generally granted member states requests to ship items under the no-
objection procedure to their diplomatic missions in Iraq without exceptions (see Table 
7). Of 19 such requests, many contained items that were usually rejected, including 
vehicles, building materials, communication devices and even unspecified 
“diplomatic goods” (the Yugoslavia committee established a similar exception, 
Scharf/Dorosin 1993: 789–791). Third, the committee consistently dismissed Iraqi 
exemption requests arguing that Iraq as a sanctions target and potential importer 
could not request such clearances, but only exporters to which the trade restrictions 
applied (resolution 661 (1990), para. 3c, resolution 687 (1991), para. 20, see Graham-
Brown 1999: 71). Interestingly, even skeptical committee members did not question 
this perspective although they did have different views on the requests’ substance 
(e.g. Iraqi request to ship bank notes, bottled mineral water, turbine for power plant; 
thermoelectric plant project; raw material for anesthetics production; replacement 
parts for airfield, SR.42, 43, 47, 48, 57, 61, 62, 64). 
The descriptive statistics also show that committee members respected the 
previously adopted gentleman’s agreement items (see section 5.2.2) as acceptable 
items, which accounted for about 17 percent of all requests (1,274 requests). As a 
result, the committee granted requests containing such items regardless of requesting 
states with few explainable exceptions (see Table 8) despite missing information on 
end-use. In contrast to the overall approval rate of about 43 percent for all items, the 
gentleman’s agreements items fare significantly better at about 95.6 percent on 
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average. Most of the rejected items in these categories are unfinished products such as 
raw materials for producing food packaging or baby diapers or are considered non-
essential or even luxury items, for instance, leather jackets. Since the dataset only 
contains information on the items concerned, the remaining variation could 
potentially be further reduced if the dataset would contain missing information on 
end-use and quantities. The only contested category concerns water and sewage 
treatment. While items of this category (83 percent) still fare considerably above the 
overall acceptance rate, the category contains many items deemed dual-use such as 
water treatment chemicals. For instance, caustic soda is usable in embargoed industry, 
but also has non-embargoed civilian uses as cleaning agent in food production, for 
sewage treatment or drug precursor (UK, SR. 112), while the dataset does not contain 
end-user information. However, in this category, the committee also rejected a 
permanent member’s request and other Western states’ requests. 
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Table 8: Gentleman’s Agreement Items Approval Rates by Item Group 
Item Group Requests Approval 
Rate 
Negative Exceptions 
medical equipment 
and supplies, incl. 
packaging material 
202 91% Bulgaria: med. material; Jordan: adhesive, tape 
f. med. belts/use, hospital fabric, phenol f. med. 
use, med. mould, raw materials, med. glycerine; 
Netherlands: cosmegenlyovac injections; Turkey: 
hematocrit centrifuges, pharmaceutical products; 
India: atenolol, cetrimide; Pakistan: med. 
supplies 
packaging material 
for foodstuffs 
70 97% Jordan: tin plate sheets f. vegetable ghee 
packaging, polypropylene compound (food 
packaging grade) 
civilian clothing 387 98% Jordan: industrial gloves (2), outfit f. carpenters 
(2), steel shank pairs; Korea: ski gloves, leather 
jackets; Spain: children clothing (part of large 
request); India: children shoes 
supplies for babies 
and infants 
80 * 94% Jordan: fluff pulp f. baby diapers, treated pulp f. 
baby diapers, alum. seals f. babies’ feeding cups; 
India: cotton garments, baby suits, underwear, 
socks, children shoes; Spain: children clothing 
(part of large request) 
soaps and detergents 373 98% Egypt: detergent; Jordan: carnel olive oil, dry-
cleaning detergent agent, liquid soap, soap 
flakes/powder; Turkey: detergent, soap 
animal feed and 
agricultural seeds 
40 100% - 
animals and eggs for 
breeding or hatching 
purposes 
7 ** 100% - 
books, materials and 
supplies for primary 
and secondary 
education 
38 87% Jordan: cartons for schools, cassettes for schools, 
exercise books; Turkey: school bags; Korea: 
drawing boards 
spare parts and 
materials for water 
treatment and 
sewage plants 
63 83% Italy/Jordan/Lebanon: Water treatment chemicals 
(7); Finland: water purification plant; Italy: water 
filtering, desalination and purification system, 
water treatment system; Jordan: filter elements f. 
water purification, spare parts f. pumping 
stations/water treatment plants, spare parts f. 
water treatment, water treatment 
additives/material; Lebanon: water treatment 
equip.; Sweden: water treatment plants, 
pumps/electrical equip. f. water treatment plants; 
UK: sewer cleaning equip. 
storage facilities for 
grain and foodstuffs, 
incl. silos 
24 100% - 
Total 1274 95.6% - 
Note: Author’s illustration based on Iraq Sanctions Committee Decisions Database. Excludes requests by 
humanitarian agencies and requests rejected for secondary rules (e.g. ‘incomplete request’). Approval rate 
includes exceptions. 
* These items were often submitted as ‘supplies strictly intended for medical purposes’ or as ‘foodstuffs’.  
** These items were often submitted as ‘foodstuffs’.  
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The items, which have been requested 10 times or more, further illustrate the rule-
based nature of committee decision-making. These items comprise of 114 single 
items – for example, ‘plywood’, ‘batteries’ or ‘textiles’ - and total 2,834 individual 
requests (about a third of the dataset). Figure 4 shows the approval rate by the number 
of requests of such items. Of these items, the committee consistently rejected 46 (0 
percent approval), whereas it consistently accepted 33 items (100 percent approval). 
Furthermore, 39 items had an approval rate of more than 90 percent, while 62 items 
had an approval rate of 10 percent or less. Indeed, only eight items comprising 186 
requests were essentially contested (between 25 percent and 75 percent approval rate: 
caustic soda, agricultural spare parts, spare parts, printing paper, hand tools, 
stationery, and paper). Accordingly, the distribution of approval rates approximates to 
a logistic function with either high or low probability for most items. In addition, if 
one compares an item’s approval rate with the number of times it was requested, one 
can observe that contested items come in rather low numbers. The only outlier is 
‘caustic soda’ (92 times, 0.27). The remaining variation could be potentially further 
reduced if the dataset would contain information on end-use. 
Figure 4: Approval Rates of Single Items Requested 10 Times or More 
 
Note: Author’s illustration based on Iraq Sanctions Committee Decisions Database. 
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The descriptive statistics show that even powerful UNSC members had to accept the 
previous decision practice even if it applied negatively to their own requests within 
the dataset. Other committee members challenged several requests from fellow 
permanent members on the basis of the type of good or end-use. The committee 
approved only 57 percent of Russian, 75 percent of US, 79 percent of Chinese, 80 
percent of French and 98 percent of UK’s requests. Notably, even requests submitted 
by the powerful P3, which themselves were responsible for most objections, were 
rejected in accordance with established practice (UK requests for “paint for domestic 
use”, “hand tools”, SR.101, SR.103; 7 separate US request for “generator”, SR.116, 
121; French requests for “material for the manufacture of electric transformers”, 
“concrete slabs of wood” and “textiles”, SR.112, SR.113, SR.114). Much to the 
surprise of other committee members, the US blocked even a US company request to 
ship “5.000 mt of water pipes” submitted by Jordan for lack of assurance that they 
would not be used in industry (US, France, Ecuador, SR.76, 1992/COMM.696). 
Similarly, Russia and China had to accept that fellow committee members rejected 
their requests arguing they were “non-essential”, would constitute “industrial input” 
or because the request lacked information. These exemption requests included raw 
materials (e.g. building material, wood for building purposes) and other non-
humanitarian product categories (e.g. equipment and spare parts for power plants, 
batteries, wire, generators, tires) which were principally rejected. Remarkably, 
requesting P5 members did not call committee rejections into question during 
committee meetings or tried to pressure dissenting members with threats and bribes 
into compliance (all see SR.101-2, 110-3, 116-7, 120-1). Moreover, since all cases 
were considered separately during committee meetings, including the objected P5 
requests, there is no evidence that the P5 or other committee members ever 
accumulated decisions into larger decision. 
In Table 9, five logistic regression models test whether a request was approved 
(1) or rejected (0) as dependent variable and item categories as well as power proxies 
as independent variables, while non-coded requests serve as baseline model (52 
percent approval). The statistical analysis reveals that committee decisions were 
largely rule-based and item groups are the best predictors of getting a request 
approved, even without having information on end-use. 
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Model 1 tests for the effect of rule-based decision-making variables on decision 
success and provides for a substantial overall model fit. All item categories have 
highly significant positive or negative effects except for the agrochemicals and 
machinery categories. Here, food production raw materials and finished items 
positively affect decision success and improve the odds by a factor of 2.89 and 5.35 
respectively. Furthermore, precursors and medical supplies (non-end user) and items 
for direct human consumption have a strong positive effect on decision success and 
increase the odds by a factor of 10.6 and 28.45. Instead, crude items decrease the 
odds by a factor of 0.03, prefabricated items by a factor of 0.11, chemicals by a factor 
of 0.11, transportation items by a factor of 0.06 and electrical appliances by a factor 
of 0.17. Overall, the item categories as proxies for rule-based decision-making 
variables already show a considerable model fit in explaining decision success. 
Model 2 tests for the effect of power-based decision-making variables on 
decision success and produces a lower overall model fit. In fact, only P5-status, E10-
status and GDP are significant, but show some contradictory results. Whereas the P5-
status and GDP increase the odds of getting a request approved by a factor of 5.48 
and 1.58 respectively, E10-status in fact decreases the odds by a factor of 0.34. This 
result is largely driven by the fact that on average, the non-permanent members got 
more of their requests rejected. Compared to the rule-based model, the power-based 
model yields a considerably lower model fit.  
Further, models 3 and 4 assess the factors driving the power variables in the data. 
Being a permanent member (model 3) tested in isolation increases the odds for 
getting a requests accepted by 28.03. Instead, controlling for Jordan and the UK 
(model 4) reveals that this effect is largely resulting from UK submissions. 
Incorporating rule-based decision-making variables with the P5-status and the 
country dummies (model 5) and further including the three remaining power-based 
decision-making variables (model 6) shows that item categories are better suited to 
predict decision success than power variables. In both models, the rule-based 
decision-making variables provide for a large share of explanatory power. Above all, 
the effect sizes of the rule-based variables by far exceed the effect sizes of the power-
based variables. Each item category either strongly increases decision success 
(precursors and medical supplies, finished items, items for direct human 
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consumption), strongly decreases decision success (crude items, transport, 
prefabricated items, chemicals, Non-essential electrical appliances) or does not affect 
decision success (agrochemicals, machinery). Concerning the model fit, adding the 
power-based variables to the rule-based variables does - but only slightly so - increase 
the model fit. When one considers that six new variables have been included, the 
model also gets way less parsimonious than the model using rule-based decision-
making variables alone. The results for the ‘food production raw materials’ item 
category are in need of explanation. The variance can be accounted for if one 
considers the fact that while the committee considered foodstuffs as notification items 
and items for their production as generally exemptible no-objection items, the 
category in the dataset also comprises of items the committee rejected as luxury 
items. For instance, this includes malt and bitter hops for beer brewing, whiskey and 
white wine. 
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Table 9: Decision Success of Requests (Logistic Regression) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Food production raw 
materials 
2.89 *** 
(0.87) 
   2.18 * 
(0.68) 
1.83 
(0.58) 
Precursors and medical 
supplies (non-end user) 
10.67 *** 
(2.95) 
   7.35 *** 
(2.11) 
7.02 *** 
(2.03) 
Prefabricated items  0.11 *** 
(0.02) 
   0.12 *** 
(0.02) 
0.13 *** 
(0.02) 
Crude items  0.03 *** 
(0.01) 
   0.03 *** 
(0.01) 
0.03 *** 
(0.01) 
Finished items 5.35 *** 
(0.78) 
   5.75 *** 
(0.88) 
6.07 *** 
(0.93) 
Items for human 
consumption 
28.45 *** 
(6.18) 
   28.32 *** 
(6.28) 
30.57 *** 
(6.81) 
Chemicals 0.11 *** 
(0.02) 
   0.12 *** 
(0.02) 
0.13 *** 
(0.03) 
Agrochemicals 2.00 
(0.85) 
   1.71 
(0.77) 
1.43 
(0.68) 
Machinery  1.26 
(0.19) 
   1.26 
(0.20) 
1.22 
(0.19) 
Non-essential electrical 
appliances 
0.17 *** 
(0.08) 
   0.08 *** 
(0.05) 
0.07 *** 
(0.04) 
Transportation items 0.06 *** 
(0.01) 
   0.07 *** 
(0.02) 
0.07 *** 
(0.02) 
E10 membership 
 
0.34 *** 
(0.06)  
  0.61 * 
(0.15) 
P5 membership 
 
5.48 *** 
(1.13) 
28.03 *** 
(5.49) 
2.33 *** 
(0.60) 
3.19 *** 
(1.03) 
2.85 ** 
(1.00) 
logGDP 
 
1.58 *** 
(0.07)  
  1.45 *** 
(0.11) 
logHardPower 
 
0.90  
(0.05)  
  0.75 *** 
(0.06) 
Jordan 
 
 
 
0.27 *** 
(0.01) 
0.45 *** 
(0.04) 
0.84 
(0.17) 
UK  
 
 
 
14.96 *** 
(6.55) 
16.15 *** 
(7.92) 
11.37 *** 
(5.70) 
Constant 1.00 
(0.13) 
0.00 *** 
(0.00) 
0.63*** 
(0.02) 
1.52 *** 
(0.07) 
1.37 * 
(0.19) 
0.00 *** 
(0.00) 
Log Likelihood -2711.05 -4541.68 -4873.80 -4537.37 -2467.93 -2452.46 
AIC 5446.1 9093.4 9751.6 9082.7 4965.9 4940.9 
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden) 0.481 0.131 0.067 0.132 0.528 0.531 
N 7660 7660 7660 7660 7660 7660 
Note: Unstandardized Logistic Regression Results (odds ratios). ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05. 
Excludes objections based on secondary reasons (e.g. ‘large quantities’), humanitarian organizations’ 
requests and requests for shipping diplomatic goods. 
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Table 10 shows the predicted probabilities of an item being approved by the item 
categories and provides further evidence for the presumption of committee rule-based 
decision-making. Items belonging to the item categories ‘food production raw 
materials’ (65 percent chance), ‘precursors and medical supplies’ (87 percent chance), 
‘finished items’ (72 percent chance) or ‘items for human consumption’ (92 percent 
chance) had a significantly higher likelihood to get a committee approval. Items had a 
significantly lower probability to get committee approval if they belonged to ‘crude 
items’ (2 percent chance), ‘prefabricated items’ (14 percent chance), ‘chemicals’ (8 
percent chance), ‘transportation items’ (6 percent chance) or ‘electrical appliances’ 
(10 percent chance) categories. The item categories ‘agrochemicals’ and ‘machinery’ 
did not significantly affect predicted probabilities. 
Table 10: The Predicted Effect of Item Categories on Decision Outcome 
 Item not in 
category 
Item in category 
Food production raw materials 0.39 0.65 
Precursors and medical 
supplies (non-end user) 
0.38 0.87 
Crude items 0.43 0.02 
Prefabricated items 0.60 0.14 
Finished items 0.32 0.72 
Items for human consumption 0.30 0.92 
Chemicals 0.43 0.08 
Agrochemicals 0.40 0.57 
Transportation items 0.43 0.04 
Machinery 0.39 0.45 
Electrical appliances 0.40 0.10 
Note: Probabilities obtained from Model 1 above. 
 
In sum, as concerns the effects of developed rules in the previous case episode, the 
Iraq sanctions committee’s processing of almost 8,200 single case decisions provides 
strong support for the rule-based decision-making approach. Both descriptive 
statistics and regression analysis demonstrate that the power resources of states, 
including P-5 status, economic resources and material power cannot sufficiently well 
explain decision success on exemption decisions. On the contrary, the item categories 
provide a particularly powerful explanation of a request’s decision success. Finally, 
even powerful committee members had to accept unfavorable decisions on their own 
decision requests. 
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5.2.4 The power of precedents in governing flight approvals 
In the following, two case episodes of Iraq sanctions committee decisions on granting 
exemptions from the aviation embargo demonstrate that committee governance 
triggered rule-based decision-making. Accordingly, both case episodes illustrate how 
consistent substantive and procedural rules established by the Council and previous 
committee practice empowered weak states to submit successful requests in 
conformity with such rules and simultaneously restricted powerful member’s 
discretion in rejecting those requests on the committee level. In the next subsection, I 
analyze the process leading to a positive committee decision on the ‘Sudan meat 
flights’, a particularly controversial case exempting foodstuffs flights. In the second 
subsection, I studied the process leading up to a positive committee decision on the 
‘pilgrim’s flights’, a particularly contentious case exempting passenger flights and 
relying on committee precedents further defining UNSC rules. 
5.2.4.1 The power of decision rules on exemptions for foodstuffs flights: The ‘Sudan meat 
flights’ case 
The case episode of committee decision-making on exemptions from the aviation 
embargo on foodstuffs flights shows how the separation of rulemaking and rule-
application systematically altered committee members’ decision situation in favor of 
rule-based decision-making. The considerable expansion of flight approvals by 
committee practice enabled even weak states to use the formal and informal 
procedures to force powerful states to unwillingly accept dubious requests, if they 
complied with existing criteria. Although UNSC members did not intend to create 
such an effect and powerful members were highly reluctant to adopt any such 
regulation, the case demonstrates that such rules actually triggered rule-based 
decision-making. 
As concerns rulemaking, the UNSC provided two different sets of decision rules 
on exemptible foodstuffs flights to guide committee decision-making and thereby 
adopted a consistent rule set that did not favor any particular party. First, two months 
after the imposition of sanctions on Iraq, the UNSC tightened sanctions loopholes and 
clarified that comprehensive sanctions against Iraq included “all means of transport, 
including aircraft” (resolution 670 (1990)). Accordingly, the UNSC requested the 
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committee to decide about flight exemptions requests (para. 2), which, in effect, 
would be permissible upon committee consensus only if they were for the shipment 
of items exempted from sanctions (Conlon 2000: 87, 1995b: 644; Farrall 2007: 267). 
Second, after the Gulf War, the UNSC had designated foodstuffs as mere notification 
items, which the committee would automatically acknowledge (resolution 687 
(1991), para. 20) and which committee members in practice never challenged 
(internal memo, 27 October 1993, on file with author; Conlon 2000: 141). 
As concerns rule-application, the committee had approved all three flight requests 
carrying foodstuffs in the first half of 1992 without discussion (Algeria: “36 tons of 
baby formula”, 1992/COMM.45, similarly 1992/COMM.464, Germany “1 ton of 
milk powder”, 1992/COMM.57), when in July 1992, Sudan notified a shipment of 
20,000 tons of meat on behalf of Al Rawasi Charity Investment Company (Ltd) to the 
committee and simultaneously requested the committee to approve 500-550 flights. 
The consignment of meat would be airlifted onboard a Sudan Airways Boeing 707 
cargo aircraft on route Khartoum to Bagdad (1992/COMM.602). At a rate of four 
flights per week, if granted, the committee would have given advance approval for 
cargo flights over a period of two-and a half years (Conlon 2000: 94). According to 
the two Council rules combined, ‘meat’ clearly fell in the foodstuffs category and 
accordingly, ‘meat flights’ would be permissible. 
The US and UK found Sudan’s request to airlift meat to Iraq highly questionable 
for several reasons. First, sanctions enforcers as a matter of principle wanted to see 
the comprehensive embargo implemented as strictly as possible to increase incentives 
for Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions (Johnstone 1994: 17, 36; Conlon 2000). 
Approval of commercial flights would have run counter to that objective. Second, at 
that time, while Sudan had supported Iraq during the Gulf War, the US suspected 
Sudan to be an active state-sponsor of terrorism and that Sudan would harbor 
internationally wanted terrorists including Osama bin Laden (Schweid 1993; Comras 
2010: 41–45). Third, the dubious commercial nature of the Sudanese meat flights was 
clearly obvious because the cargo airlifting of meat imposed excessive unit costs 
($2,900/ton) and rather made the delivered meat a luxury item possibly to the benefit 
of Saddam’s closer circle (Conlon 2000: 97). As alternative, for transport by ship one 
single shipment instead of hundreds of flights would have easily sufficed and would 
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have been much cheaper (Rowe 1992a). Against this background, fourth, several 
diplomats found the motivation of Sudan “bizarre” (Rowe 1992b) or even “crazy” 
(Rowe 1992a) since Sudan largely depended on food aid by bilateral and multilateral 
donors for roughly seven million people within Sudan (Rowe 1992a; Gedda 1992). 
Fifth, close observers suspected probable “hidden functions” behind the cargo airlifts 
including illegally unfreezing Iraqi assets (later confirmed by Sudan, Conlon 2000: 
82, 95), kickback schemes or illicit passage of individuals, arms or other items 
(Conlon 2000: 97, 1996b: 266). Consequently, in the sanctions enforcers’ perception 
this request was illegitimate and the committee should disapprove it accordingly. 
Even the neutral Austrian Chair publicly supported this view: “We had a bad feeling 
in the committee. (…) We didn’t think it was intelligent. People are starving and 
they’re exporting food” (Rowe 1992a, 1992b). 
Within the committee, the Sudan meat flights request was contentious and 
sparked an intensive debate over several meetings around the terms of the flight 
embargo and the possibility of exemptions on foodstuffs flights. Many committee 
members including Yemen, Zimbabwe and China immediately welcomed the request 
and opted for a quick positive decision in line with Council rules and previous 
committee decisions (SR.57). Even sanctions enforcers reluctantly acknowledged that 
the shipment of ‘meat’ to Iraq clearly fell into the category of ‘foodstuffs’ and hence 
was simply a “matter of notification” (UK, Chair, SR.57). At the same time, the 
transportation arrangements were contentious as even humanitarian flights to Iraq had 
to be approved by committee consensus (resolution 670 (1990), para. 3). As a positive 
decision would grant a large number of flights, which were clearly commercial and 
not humanitarian in character, the UK and US expressed serious concerns, noted that 
the flight scheme would be “not acceptable” (UK, SR.61) and suggested that Sudan 
should use different transportation arrangements instead (UK, US, SR.61). However, 
despite significant reservations and after delaying the decision by demanding more 
detailed information on the flights from Sudanese authorities, ultimately the sanctions 
enforcers accepted the request because flights carrying “food in humanitarian 
circumstances” would be clearly acceptable under resolution 670 (1990) (see 
1992/COMM.602). Instead, they insisted on using non-Iraqi aircraft, cargo 
inspections and reporting after each flight (UK, US, France, Chair, SR.74). When 
UNDP Khartoum, which supported the meat export scheme as a development project, 
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assumed responsibility to pursue the requested cargo inspections of meat flights, the 
sanctions enforcers found no further reason not to approve the request (UK, Chair, 
SR.76; Conlon 2000: 94). 
On a whole, though it would have been reasonable to disapprove Sudan’s flight 
request in line with powerful member’s interests, Sudan succeeded and made a 
successful request for daily commercial flights from Khartoum to Bagdad 
transporting meat. Although the US and UK could have simply objected to the 
exemption request, which would have violated established rules, they were anxious 
that such rule violation would affect their own future requests as other committee 
members could reciprocally reject legitimate US or UK flight exemption requests (for 
instance US, 1991/COMM.168, 1992/COMM.174; UK, 1992/COMM.326, 338, 422, 
505). In essence, “[s]till, the committee was forced to approve the request because its 
mandate allows it only to ensure that goods sent to Iraq are strictly for humanitarian 
purposes. Because Sudan’s proposal did not violate the terms of U.N. sanctions 
against Iraq (…), the committee could not block the request” (Rowe 1992a, 1992b). 
Only after evidence was mounting in late 1994 that Sudan, in violation of the 
approved transportation scheme, had illegally unfrozen Iraqi assets, transported 
“passengers” for unknown purposes and diverted the flights to other locations such as 
Amman in case of “bad weather” (1992/COMM.1280/Add.9; Conlon 2000: 95, 
S/1996/700, paras 49-50), the P3 could withhold consensus for further such flights, 
which anti-sanctions states strongly criticized (SR.117). 
This case episode shows that the separation of rulemaking and rule-application 
prompted rule-based decision-making on foodstuffs flight exemptions. Consistent 
rules provided by the Council enabled even weak states that aligned their decision 
proposals to established rules to submit successful decision proposals. Despite the 
concerns of powerful UNSC members, the request could not be rejected because it 
would be completely in line with established procedures on foodstuffs flight 
exemptions. In effect, the episode shows that rules – once they are established – limit 
the leeway even of powerful states and restrict options to object to unfavorable 
requests. 
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5.2.4.2 The power of decision rules on exemptions for passenger flights: The ‘Pilgrim’s 
flights’ cases 
The episode of exemptions on passenger flights shows how the separation of 
rulemaking and rule-application prompted rule-based sanctions governance in the 
particularly contentious ‘pilgrim’s flights’. Consistent rules adopted by the Council 
and further refined by committee practice enabled less powerful states to align their 
requests to earlier precedents and accordingly, to accomplish successful requests 
against the will of powerful sanctions enforcers that preferred an absolute closure of 
Iraqi airports. 
Subject to the constraints of rulemaking, when the Council imposed aviation 
sanctions in 1991, it supplied a consistent rule-set further refined by committee 
practice on passenger flights, which did not favor powerful members. Under 
resolution 670 (1990) exemptions would be permissible only when they were for the 
transport of approved “cargo” and after committee approval (Conlon 2000: 87, 
1995b: 644; Farrall 2007: 267). However, since resolution 670 (1990) did not 
explicitly mention passenger flights, the committee had developed its own decision 
practice on flights. Earlier, the terms of the resolution 670 (1990) were promptly 
subject to discussions. Many delegations felt that a case-by-case approach for 
granting flights created considerable workload. Canada, supported by Colombia, 
USSR and the Chair proposed that “the Committee should consider the first specific 
cases, from which parameters for future action could be derived (…) for dealing with 
requests from other countries” (Canada, SR.15). Accordingly, the committee 
approved an Indian request for an evacuation flight as a precedent based on the 
prerequisite that appropriate inspections would commence (Chair, SR.15). 
Afterwards, other slightly different requests considerably broadened the application 
of flight exemptions. Hence, the committee accepted a Belgian request for a flight 
“carrying only medical supplies to Baghdad and returning only with passengers” 
(1990/COMM.109) and a Vietnamese request flight for its diplomatic personnel 
(1990/COMM.123). While the UN Disaster Relief Office merely notified UN entities 
flights, the committee approved UN member states flights without consideration (US, 
1991/COMM.115; UK, 1991/COMM.116; Denmark, 1991/COMM.128). As a 
secondary rule, the committee had consistently rejected Iraqi flight requests 
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(information for the chairman, 14 March 1995, on file with author, see above). 
Singular flights to be undertaken with Iraqi aircraft were accepted as long as they 
were not requested by Iraq and would return to Iraq (US, 1991/COMM.18; India, 
1991/COMM.28; Iraq, 1991/COMM.291 (not approved)), while blanket approval of 
flights with Iraqi aircraft was rejected (1991/COMM.377, Iraq, 1992/COMM.249).  
In their application, these rules also determined the outcome of the particularly 
contentious case of whether or not flights transporting pilgrims to Iraq would be 
permissible, despite the resistance of powerful committee members. In April 1993, 
Iraq requested to transport pilgrims from Baghdad to Mecca during the annual 
pilgrimage on-board Iraqi Airways aircraft (1993/COMM.781). Iraq emphasized that 
the “request was being made on humanitarian grounds” as road travel was strenuous 
(Chair, SR.92, Xinhua 1993). According to resolution 670 (1990) and committee 
precedents, while Iraqi ‘pilgrim’s flights’ would not be permissible, ‘pilgrim’s flights’ 
orchestrated by third countries clearly fell in the category of permissible flights. 
The UK and the US regarded the pilgrim’s flights requests problematic for 
several reasons. First, sanctions enforcers wanted a strict implementation of the 
comprehensive embargo as a matter of principle (Johnstone 1994: 17,36; Conlon 
2000). Accordingly, sanctions enforcers preferred a closure of Iraqi airports unless in 
humanitarian emergency (e.g. US, SR.115). Second, the P3 were suspicious of Iraq 
and sympathetic anti-sanctions states that had an interest in resuming commercial 
international flights to and from Iraq and claiming humanitarian motives provided an 
avenue to set a precedent to that end (Conlon 2000: 90; Zhang 1994). Iraq in 
particular sought to regain control of its aircraft fleet mostly sheltered in Iran, Jordan 
and Tunisia (The Associated Press 1993). Third, the P3 had an interest in upholding a 
strict no-fly zone. Because any accepted flight would eventually cross, this could 
endanger the P3’s air patrolling efforts (Cockayne/Malone 2006: 132–134; Malone 
2006: 97–101). 
Although the sanctions enforcers refused the Iraqi request based on the secondary 
rule that Iraq could not requests such flights, particularly not those using Iraqi aircraft 
(Chair, SR.92), they unintendedly set a precedent for future pilgrimage flights. The 
UK accepted that “[t]he pilgrimage was a sensitive humanitarian issue. There was a 
case for carrying elderly or infirm pilgrims to Makkah by air, but that should not be 
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done by Iraqi Airways. However, the Committee had previously agreed to the use of 
non-Iraqi aircraft for humanitarian flights, for instance for the import of foodstuffs 
from the Sudan. The pilgrims might be carried by, say, Jordanian aircraft, subject to 
normal checks by the United Nations and with due authorization by the Saudi Arabian 
authorities” (UK, also Japan, France, SR. 92). Similar views were exchanged when 
Iraq had submitted a repeated request in January 1994 (1994/COMM.871). Again, 
sanctions enforcers doubted that the transport of pilgrims on Iraqi airplanes would be 
permissible because “resolution 670 (1990) prohibited the use of Iraqi aircraft for any 
purpose other than to carry food in humanitarian circumstances” (France, SR.109). 
Accordingly, “based on precedent, it was unlikely that the use of Iraqi aircraft in that 
situation would be approved” but “[h]e would even go as far as to say that the 
Committee could approve the use of non-Iraqi aircraft” (US, SR.109). Anti-sanctions 
states and others heavily criticized this position, argued for an immediate granting of 
the flights on Iraqi airplanes and questioned the principle that Iraqi planes could not 
be used (Djibouti, Oman, China, Spain, Nigeria, Brazil, Nigeria, SR.109). The matter 
subsided as Iraq refused to alter its request. 
Shortly after, Pakistan (1994/COMM.2658), a committee member at that time, 
seized the opportunity that the sanctions enforcers had clarified the modalities for 
pilgrimages in their endeavor to avoid the Iraqi request, and submitted a request 
aligned to what the US and UK had outlined to be permissible: Flights for Pakistani 
pilgrims, many of them “aged and infirm” to Iraqi Shiite shrines “intended solely for 
transporting pilgrims to Iraq and would be carried out solely by Pakistani civilian 
aircraft (…) in accordance with the usual practice, permit inspections by United 
Nations authorities in Pakistan both before and after each flight” (Pakistan, SR.112). 
First the sanctions enforcers were able to defer the request because the request 
suggested the flights to be “regularly scheduled flights” and not on case-by-case basis 
(UK, similarly US, SR.112). After two months of “strenuous consultations” (UN 
Secretariat summary 112th meeting), Pakistan had adapted its request accordingly so 
that it would now constitute “special pilgrimage flights (…) for a limited period” on 
Pakistani aircraft with only Pakistani nationals on-board as well as an inspection 
scheme, the sanctions enforcers were stripped of any possibility to legitimately reject 
the request (SR.114). Accordingly, the request “confirmed the P-3’s worst fears that a 
precedent had been set” (Conlon 2000: 91). 
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In essence, though powerful members would have preferred to disapprove 
Pakistan’s pilgrim’s flight request, Pakistan succeeded and made a successful request 
for its pilgrim’s flight. The US and UK could reject the earlier Iraqi request following 
established committee practice on Iraqi flights. However, although they could have 
simply rejected to consent to the Pakistani exemption request, this would have 
violated established committee practice, so they were anxious that such rule violation 
again would affect their own flight exemption requests. The US and UK could only 
avert another similar Indian request (1994/COMM.4609) by pointing to irregularities 
with the Pakistani flight, mainly that it did not carry elderly and infirm passengers 
and that it has violated the no-fly zone (Zhang 1994) and that in the Indian case, the 
possibility to travel by other means has not been convincingly ruled out, while it 
accepted that a precedent had been set (US, similarly France, SR.115). Because the 
sanctions enforcers could not go back to what was agreed earlier, they accepted that it 
was “the general principle that the Committee was willing to look into strictly 
humanitarian flights in exceptional circumstances” framed as “an individual request 
for a flight to transport pilgrims” (Pakistan, UK, SR.116). Ultimately, in resolution 
1284 (1999, para. 26), the UNSC moved pilgrimage flights to a notification procedure 
(Manusama 2006: 147). 
In sum, the case episode of passenger flights shows that the separation of 
rulemaking and rule-application prompts rule-based decision-making. While the 
Council rules refined by committee practice were consistent, weak requesting states 
aligned their decision proposals to earlier committee practice to increase the prospects 
of their requests and limit the leeway of arguments of inadmissibility. In effect, 
powerful states had difficulties in rejecting unfavorable requests from weak states, if 
these requests complied with the rules. 
 
5.3 Chapter summary 
The Iraq sanctions committee is a confirmatory case for the causal model of 
committee governance. The preference constellation among committee members, 
where one camp favored strict implementation of the comprehensive embargo, 
whereas the other camp favored to gradually lift the sanctions regime, created a 
 
210 
coordination situation in which all constituents preferred coordination over blockade. 
As theoretically expected, the Iraq sanctions regime operated in the mode of rule-
based decision-making and even powerful actors were pressed towards rule adherence 
in spite of their outspoken resistance to be bound by rules. The Iraq sanctions regime 
is strongly characterized by the spontaneous rule adherence through precedents in the 
absence of unambiguous Council rules. 
The effects can be systematically traced back to the separation of rulemaking and 
rule-application. Rule-based decision-making is rooted in the specific decision 
situation of the Iraq sanctions committees that faced a steady stream of numerous 
small exemption requests, which could not be meaningfully accumulated into 
decision packages. Because the Council did supply ambiguous rules, the committee 
mostly relied on precedents. Thereby, the Iraq sanctions committee showed that 
precedents also created the pressures of consistency because any precedent is equally 
applicable to later similar cases. After the committee had elaborated such rules, they 
profoundly transformed decision-making from power-based to strikingly rule-based 
decision-making. Even the world’s most powerful states could not randomly ignore 
such rules, although they had been originally highly skeptical about adopting such 
rules in the first place. 
As concerns rulemaking, even though the Council mostly delegated decision 
competencies to its committee without providing rules, the presumption according to 
which a group of states that delegates implementation decisions to a committee and 
concentrates on guiding decisions in the subsequent implementation stage is expected 
to adopt consistent substantive and procedural decision criteria, can be confirmed. In 
the case episode of the ‘Sudan meat flights’, the empirical evidence shows that if the 
Council adopts a consistent rule defining flights with a cargo of foodstuffs as 
permissible, which is consistent and does not favor any particular party to the 
conflict. 
As concerns rule-application in the committee stage, hypothesis 1, which holds 
that if committee members process separate and asymmetric decision proposals of 
limited scope, they are expected to abide by given substantive and procedural rules, 
even if these rules contradict situation-specific preferences of some members, can be 
confirmed. In the ‘Sudan meat flights’ case episode, Sudan as a seemingly weak state 
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succeeded in successfully submitting a request for foodstuffs cargo flights to Iraq 
despite resistance from powerful committee members because Sudan’s request was in 
conformity with what Council resolutions outlined. Accordingly, powerful committee 
members faced difficulties in rejecting an unfavorable, but permissible request from 
less powerful states, because they feared that such objection would cause committee 
blockade on their own legitimate flight requests in the future. 
The Iraq sanctions committee systematically confirms hypothesis 2 according to 
which a committee facing a stream of separate decision proposals is expected to abide 
by precedents, even if such precedents contradict situation-specific preferences of 
committee members. The first case episode of foodstuffs exemptions before the Gulf 
War provides confirmatory evidence for rule adherence to precedents. As Council 
rules on foodstuffs exemptions from the comprehensive trade embargo in 
“humanitarian circumstances” to Iraq were overly ambiguous, committee members 
required mutually accepted substantive and procedural decision criteria to guide their 
case-specific decisions under strongly diverging interests. Because states in 
opposition to sanctions and their non-committee supporters closely aligned their 
exemption requests to positive earlier decisions, they could set precedents and 
consecutively enlarge the range of potential foodstuffs beneficiaries. In a step-wise 
fashion, the committee enlarged its decision practice on foodstuffs shipments in 
humanitarian circumstances, initially only to third-country nationals, and finally 
granted to ship foodstuffs to ordinary Iraqi citizens, even against the will of powerful 
members. 
The second case episode also confirms hypothesis 2. While the Council amended 
the terms of the comprehensive embargo after the Gulf War and the ensuing 
humanitarian crisis, the decision situation was not systematically altered so that the 
coordination situation prompts committee members to adopt substantive rules on 
acceptable and unacceptable categories of goods through decision practice. The 
demand for rules on acceptable and non-acceptable categories of goods created an 
increasingly consistent decision-practice, although powerful members were opposed 
to formally adopt a list of acceptable goods. In the long run, the committee employed 
a system of rule-based decision-making, were the quality and the type of item 
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concerned determined the prospects of a request, and not the power of the requesting 
state. In this stage, even powerful members get several unwarranted requests rejected. 
In addition, the hypothesis of adherence to precedents (hypothesis 2) receives 
strong support through a dataset comprising of all 8,200 exemption requests made 
from 1993 to early 1995. The data demonstrates that the committee systematically 
operated in a rule-based decision-making mode. Whereas a requesting state’s power is 
an inferior predictor for decision outcomes, on the contrary, in line with observations 
of former Iraq sanctions committee practitioners, committee decisions are best 
modeled by item categories that explain decision outcomes. In total, the chance to get 
a request approved depended on the item belonging to either a previously exempted 
category of items or a previously rejected category of items. As such, while the 
committee rejected unfinished items, transportation items and chemicals constituting 
input to Iraqi industry or a dual-use concern, the committee accepted items for direct 
human consumption including clothing, sanitary articles and supplies for infants, as 
well as medical supplies and gentleman’s agreements items. Finally, even powerful 
members were forced into accepting unfavorable decisions on their exemption 
requests. 
As concerns the alternative explanation according to which decision making and 
the content of decisions are determined purely by the constellation of interest among 
powerful members, the committee summary records show that single cases are 
entirely treated separate from each other so that there is little evidence that package 
deals, decision power or side payments provide a meaningful alternative account of 
empirically observed phenomena. This finding is systematically confirmed in the 
large-n analysis in which the effects of the rule-based variables by far exceed the 
effects of power-based variables. 
In sum, the Iraq sanctions regime demonstrates that the effects of committee 
governance are also similarly present for a sanctions regime based on a 
comprehensive trade embargo and not being subject to the due process criticism 
inherent to targeted sanctions. Because the governance structure prompted an 
equivalent decision problem for committee members, namely processing many 
unrelated single-case requests in light of UNSC resolutions, the effects are entirely 
comparable.  
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6 The Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee – Administrating 
Targeted Sanctions in the Context of Counter-terrorism 
In October 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1267 (1999) to counter 
increasing global terrorist activities and imposed mandatory targeted sanctions on 
individuals and entities associated with transnational terrorism. Initially, the Council 
sanctioned Taliban controlled airlines and froze Taliban held financial assets. The 
continued refusal of Taliban authorities to comply with Council demands combined 
with continued terrorist attacks attributed to Taliban hosted Al-Qaida affiliates 
induced the Security Council to impose targeted sanctions against Usama bin Laden 
and Al-Qaida associates (resolution 1333 (2000)). The central sanctions measures 
include imposing targeted sanctions, including an assets freeze, a travel ban and an 
arms embargo on designated individuals and entities to disrupt or at least constrain 
Al-Qaida terrorist activities. The UNSC further strengthened the sanctions regime 
after 9/11 (resolution 1390 (2002)) and transformed it into a global counter-terrorism 
effort without sunset clause (Comras 2010: 59–85). Since then, the UNSC and its 
sanctions committee procedurally advanced the sanctions regime significantly, and 
created the Office of the Ombudsperson as an independent review mechanism to 
review petitions from listed individuals and entities. In 2011, the UNSC decided to 
split the sanctions regime into an Al-Qaida sanctions regime and a Taliban sanctions 
regime in support of the Afghan peace process (resolutions 1988 and 1989 (2011)). 
Although there is abundant literature on the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime, it 
does not yet fully account for the effects of committee governance. While many 
studies cover committee decision-making, the literature predominantly focused on the 
infringement of fundamental human rights of listed individuals inherently associated 
with targeted sanctions (Foot 2007; Keller/Fischer 2009; Gutherie 2005; Fassbender 
2006; Heupel 2008). In particular the ‘Watson Report’ has questioned, which kind of 
procedural changes would better reconcile the sanctions measures with fundamental 
rights of individuals (Biersteker/Eckert 2006, 2009; Eckert/Biersteker 2012). In the 
center of discussion were court decisions (Bowring 2010; Keller/Fischer 2009; 
Hoffmann 2008), in particular the ECJ decisions on Kadi, which annulled the 
application of sanctions within the EU because the respective EU directive violated 
fundamental rights of sanctioned individuals (Feinäugle 2010; Goede 2011; 
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Michaelsen 2010). As a result, the procedural innovations are mainly explained with 
externally applied pressure for due process reforms (Kanetake 2008; Biersteker 2010; 
Bothe 2008; Heupel 2013), diplomatic initiatives of interested states (Cramér 2003) 
or national and regional court cases (Tzanakopoulos 2010). It also fared prominently 
within the debate about the emergence of a global administrative (sanctions) law 
(Kingsbury et al. 2005; Krisch 2006; Kanetake 2008). Finally, the Al-Qaida/Taliban 
sanctions regime was considered as an integral part of more general UNSC counter-
terrorism efforts (Heupel 2007; Rosand 2010, 2004; Romaniuk 2010). 
Contrasting the prevailing literature, in this empirical chapter, the consequences 
of committee governance within the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime for the 
regime’s decision-making and the content of the decisions taken are traced. In this 
chapter, I seek to analyze whether or not the causal mechanism is present and actually 
prompts rule-based decision-making in this case. In a step-wise fashion, the Al-
Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime transformed from a largely unconstrained sanctions 
regime into a tightly regulated decision-making apparatus. In the beginning, the 
sanctions committee operated in a laissez-faire decisions making mode simply 
accepting all decisions across the board, which quickly gave rise to grave 
implementation issues und severely undermined the legitimacy of the sanctions 
regime. In addition, also decision-making blockades, in particular on delisting, 
exemptions and the Taliban section of the list, provided governance issues. To remedy 
these issues and to secure their long-term interest in the sanctions regime, even 
powerful Council members gained an interest in restricting their discretion by means 
of Council and committee rules. In effect, this pushed committee members 
increasingly towards rule-based decision-making, where decisions are determined by 
the merits of a request vis-à-vis decision criteria. 
The global Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime is particularly insightful as it 
allows analyzing the effect of functional differentiation on decision-making within a 
sanctions regime applying assets freeze, travel bans and arms embargoes with a very 
high decision workload. This sanctions regime has the largest sanctions list and has 
adopted the highest number of listing and delisting decisions. It is also the most 
procedurally advanced of all sanctions committees which allows to study the 
determinants and consequences of many procedural changes particularly well 
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(Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 25). Although it is also unique as it is the sole global 
sanctions regime, targets individuals and entities that do not have state advocates and 
is preventive in nature, the regulatory decision problem is entirely comparable. 
The chapter proceeds in four steps. First, the chapter weighs the distribution of 
UNSC member’s preferences, which actors are the sanctions drivers within the 
regime and if we thus would anticipate the postulated causal mechanism to be 
present. Second, the chapter traces the causes and consequences of changes in the 
rule-set on four major committee functions, all of which gave rise to substantive 
regulation: the designation of individuals and entities, delisting and the review of the 
sanctions list, the granting of exemptions to the sanctions measures, and separation of 
the Taliban list in 2011. Third, the role of the Office of the Ombudsperson as an 
independent review mechanism and its effects on decision-making within the 
committee will be scrutinized. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of 
major findings. 
 
6.1 The origins of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime 
The UNSC established the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime to curb the increasing 
terrorist threat that had manifested in several major terrorist attacks by means of 
imposing sanctions on presumed terrorists and their supporters. In particular, while 
the Taliban provided a safe haven for alleged terrorists, the UNSC initially targeted 
the Taliban government of Afghanistan to coerce the Taliban into ceasing to provide a 
sanctuary and training ground for terrorists, cooperating with international efforts to 
bring terrorists to justice and extraditing Usama Bin Laden, who was suspected of 
being responsible for major terrorist attacks including the 1998 US Embassy 
bombings in Nairobi and Darussalam (resolution 1267 (1999), paras 1-2). In reacting 
to continued Taliban non-compliance (resolution 1193 (1998), para. 15, 
S/PRST/1998/9, resolution 1214 (1998), para. 13) and after further terrorist bombings 
such as the attack on the USS Cole in Aden in 2000, the UNSC extended sanctions to 
Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and Al-Qaida associates. The UNSC significantly 
strengthened the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime thereafter, particularly in the 
wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York as well as the Pentagon 
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on 11 September 2001, and since then transformed the sanctions regime into a long-
term global counter-terrorism sanctions regime subject to continuous refurbishment 
(Farrall 2007: 374–375; Romaniuk 2010: 53–55; Rosand 2004; Comras 2010: 59–
85). 
The members of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee faced a specific 
regulatory decision situation considerably different to that of the UNSC. The 
committee’s main decision function is to adopt case-specific sanctions 
implementation decisions, mainly the listing and delisting of individuals and entities 
as well as reviewing the accuracy of current listings (Comras 2010: 94–95; Rosand 
2004: 748). In addition, the committee decides about exemptions to the assets freeze 
(e.g. for foodstuffs, rent, or expenses for medical treatment) or to the travel ban (e.g. 
for religious obligation or judicial proceedings). Accordingly, UN member states 
including committee members should submit listing requests, later also delisting and 
humanitarian exemptions requests, to the sanctions committee, which would 
consecutively determine the appropriateness of any particular request. In contrast to 
the early phase, where UN member states submitted only few names, the committee 
listed over 260 individuals and entities in 2001 alone (Cortright 2009: 8). While each 
of these decisions is of marginal importance, the viability of the sanctions regime 
depends on its ability to adopt reasonable decisions on a larger scale. 
In response to increasing terrorist threat, a broad coalition of states pushed for the 
establishment of sanctions and the subsequent strengthening of measures. Usually 
three or four permanent members (US, UK, Russia and sometimes France) as well as 
non-permanent members from all regions and other states including those 
Afghanistan’s neighbors sponsored sanctions resolutions (sponsors of initial 
resolutions included Canada, the Netherlands, Russia, Slovenia, the UK and the US 
(resolution 1267 (1999), S/1999/1054), India, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and the 
US (resolution 1333 (2000), S/2000/1202), as well as Colombia (resolution 1363 
(2001), S/2001/741). Except for resolution 1333 (2000), where China and Malaysia 
abstained, the UNSC adopted all Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions resolutions unanimously. 
Because terrorism principally can affect any UN member state, UNSC members 
and non-members widely supported the sanctions regime as a viable counter-
terrorism instrument on UN level (Doyle 2004: 86; Gutherie 2005: 496–497; Comras 
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2010: 57–58; Romaniuk 2010: 64–72) despite the possible infringement of 
fundamental human rights of targeted individuals. While the interest in the regime 
was lower in its very early days, states widely supported it after 9/11. Simultaneously, 
states’ interests in the sanctions regime also diverged because states might want to 
abuse the sanctions regime for their own interest, be it to criminalize and constrain 
domestic opposition activities or to pursue other geopolitical interests (Rosand 2004: 
752; US Embassy Paris 2005b). For instance, after the Beslan terrorist attack, Russia 
continuously insisted on a relationship between Chechen rebels and Al-Qaida and 
unsuccessfully pushed for transforming the Al-Qaida/Taliban regime into a general 
counter-terrorism regime (Rosand 2010: 264). Moreover, China tried using the 
sanctions regime for designating domestic separatists such as the East Turkestan 
Liberation Organization (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2006a). Consequently, a 
successful regulatory outcome depends on the ability of the sanctions committee 
members to effectively scrutinize listing proposals vis-à-vis Council resolutions. 
The theoretical expectation is that the postulated causal mechanism is present and 
works as expected so that functional differentiation in the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions 
regime creates strong demand for substantive and procedural regulation, which in turn 
have an effect on committee decision-making. While UNSC members have a strong 
general interest in the counter-terrorism sanctions regime, they have diverging 
preferences within the regime. Therefore, committee decision-making will likely be 
subject to coordination problems associated with such decision situations under 
diverging preferences. Hence, substantive and procedural rules provided by the 
UNSC or the committee as well as precedents could provide focal points to 
coordinate behavior. Because UNSC members have a particularly pronounced interest 
in the regime, at least after 9/11, we would expect that the regulatory density should 
be particularly high, since the large number of decisions provides substantial demand 
for rules. 
Initially, the UNSC supplied the sanctions committee with very little substantive 
and procedural rules, presumably because UNSC members did not expect principal 
decision-making issues ahead. Concerning its main function, the UNSC requested the 
committee to unspecifically “designate the aircraft and funds or other financial 
resources” (resolution 1267 (1999), para. 6e) that would be “owned or controlled 
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directly or indirectly by the Taliban”, later complemented with “Usama bin Laden and 
individuals and entities associated with him” (resolution 1333 (2000), para. 8c), while 
it already provided that exemptions would be permissible “on a case-by-case basis on 
the grounds of humanitarian need” (resolution 1267 (1999), para. 4b). With the 
imposition of a mandatory travel ban, the UNSC shifted the designation criteria to 
“Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them” (resolution 1390 
(2002), para. 2). 
 
6.2 Theoretically-relevant case episodes of committee decision-making 
The organization of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime created governance issues 
associated with the separation of rulemaking and rule-application in several instances. 
The following sections analyze, separately for five case episodes, the specific need 
for rules, in a second step the consequences associated with rule-making and in a 
third step, if and how the rules actually affected committee decision-making and the 
content of decisions. 
6.2.1 The absence of substantive and procedural rules on the listing of individuals 
and entities prompts laissez-faire decision-making 
This case episode illustrates that the absence of rules on committee designations 
prompted a laissez-faire mode of decision-making, which undermined the regime’s 
effectiveness and legitimacy. The initial phase reveals that an underdeveloped listing 
process caused significant governance issues. Before 2005, committee members had 
enormous discretion on listing decisions, in particular because there was no definition 
of who should be listed and designating states were not required to provide reasons 
for listing proposals. In turn, while the list substantially grew after 9/11, the 
unconstrained laissez-faire listing undermined the effectiveness and the willingness of 
the wider UN membership to implement the sanctions regime (Gehring/Dörfler 2013: 
574–576; Dörfler/Gehring 2015: 68–70). 
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Before and immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the governance system lacked 
reliable and detailed decision criteria for the listing process and operated in a laissez-
faire mode. Initially, the listing process was not particularly problematic as the 
committee exclusively listed high-level and publicly known Taliban leaders, which 
rather resembled a country-specific diplomatic and financial sanctions regime. Not 
until six months after resolution 1267 (1999), the committee started to issue a first 
sanctions list including the Taliban leader Mullar Omar, Ariana Airlines and four 
Afghan banks including the Afghan Central Bank (SC/6844, SC/6938, SC/6955). In 
2001, the committee increasingly resorted to targeted sanctions and listed 30 Taliban 
ministers and governors (SC/6998). In March 2001, the Council adopted resolution 
1333 (2000), which allowed for the listing of “Usama bin Laden and individuals and 
entities associated with him” (resolution 1333 (2000), para. 8c). While now being 
able to list individuals not associated to the original target (i.e. Taliban government), 
the focus remained on the Taliban leaders. Before 9/11, the list comprised of 152 
Taliban including ministers, deputy ministers and governors, the seven entities listed 
earlier and ten individuals and one entity associated with Usama bin Laden, including 
Aiman Al-Zawahiri and Usama bin Laden himself (SC/7028, SC/7124). 
Shortly after 9/11, as the committee was used to target a swiftly increasing 
number of Al-Qaida associates, many unresolved issues concerning the specific 
listing procedure became apparent. First, the Council left it open to interpretation, 
which individuals and entities the committee should regard as “associated with” Al-
Qaida and the Taliban. The original designation criteria of association with Usama bin 
Laden, Al-Qaida and the Taliban were overly vague and provided actors with as much 
flexibility as possible (Hoffmann 2008: 547; Heupel 2009: 310–311). Second, the 
governance system did not provide any reference point as to how the merits of a 
listing proposal should be processed. The Council merely provided that the committee 
should “update regularly the list (…), on the basis of relevant information provided 
by Member States and regional organizations” (resolution 1390 (2002), para. 5a, 
similarly 1333 (2000), para. 16b). Yet, it did not state, if at all and what kind of 
information should be provided to warrant a listing, which parties should be involved 
and what information is made available to listed individuals and the public. 
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As a result, the listing procedure grew problematic because committee members 
were faced with a decision situation that precluded committee members from 
rejecting non-eligible listing proposals. First, the absence of clear procedures and 
reliable decision criteria prevented distinguishing acceptable from non-acceptable 
decision proposals. This provided committee members with almost unrestricted 
discretion. Listing decisions ultimately became single politicized issues, while the 
costs of blocking a listing request through raising concerns about its appropriateness 
outweighs the benefits as every single decision is of marginal importance to most 
committee members (Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 29). Committee members navigated 
with a laissez-faire attitude presuming that designations would be accurate (Gutherie 
2005: 511; Rosand 2004: 748–749). As a consequence, committee members virtually 
accepted all decision proposals “without much ado“ (Comras 2010: 95) and without 
substantially scrutinizing them or later reviewing these decisions (Miller 2003: 47). 
New listing requests did contain only minimal information on the individual 
concerned and lacked evidence of the connection to Al-Qaida (Rosand 2004: 748–
749; Heupel 2009: 310; Eckert 2008: 223). In fact, a large majority of designations 
right after 9/11 to early 2002 directly stemmed from US domestic designations 
(Cramér 2003: 88; Comras 2010: 94; Gurule 2002). In essence, all US listings 
requests were adopted unchallenged assuming that the US “must have good reasons”, 
even though they were regularly based on classified material (Biersteker 2010: 88; 
Rosand 2004: 749). In this stage, not even committee members were able to evaluate 
the evidence that gave rise to a designation and requests for disclosure of confidential 
information were futile because they would be rejected (Hoffmann 2008: 546). In 
2001 alone, the committee designated 123 individuals and entities allegedly 
associated with Al-Qaida (Cortright 2009: 9–10). 
Second, the listing process placed the burden of proof on the objecting states. 
Under the routinized no-objection procedure applicable to all committee decisions, 
committee members have to actively object to a decision proposal while acceptance 
requires no action. In addition, for the committee to collectively consider a listing 
request, this required a member to actively seek to include the request on the 
committee agenda (a formal rule was only introduced in the July 2010 guidelines, 
para. 6j). Furthermore, the short timeframe for raising objections associated with the 
no-objection procedure, where objections had to be raised within 48 hours, effectively 
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excluded objections from states that did not have the capacity to quickly acquire 
disconfirming information, which additionally created a bias towards generally 
accepting decisions (Kanetake 2008: 147; Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 29; for the 
procedure see guidelines November 2002, para. 8b). 
Two episodes serve to illustrate the broad discretion of committee members as a 
result of the lack of a reliable “associated with” standard. Some governments 
designated members of the domestic opposition, separatist or rebel groups that had 
little connection to Al-Qaida, the Taliban or transnational terrorism to postmark them 
as international terrorists and to legitimize counter-terrorism activities (Comras 2010: 
95; Rosand 2004: 749-750, 761; Hoffmann 2008: 546). In one instance, the 
committee listed the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, a Chinese separatist group 
on 11 September 2002. The listing was criticized for its lack of evidence on the 
groups association with Al-Qaida (Rosand 2004: 752; DeYoung 2002). Four states, 
including China, the US (allegedly to garner Chinese support for the Iraq war), 
Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan had requested the listing, while European committee 
members “expressed concern” and requested “more evidence” from the US. The 
skeptical members, asserting that the US documentation merely resembled unproven 
Chinese allegations admitted that they ultimately “acquiescenced into the United 
Nations listing only to preserve unity” of the committee (Eckholm 2002; DeYoung 
2002). In a second instance, the US along with Russia and other states moved to 
request the listing of three Chechen entities (SC/7676) and two individuals (SC/7803; 
SC/7842), allegedly to garner Russian support for the Iraq war. While the US 
previously considered Chechen rebels as separatists, Russia had for long claimed 
connections to Al-Qaida (Agence France Presse 2003; La Franiere 2003; Reuters 
2003). Finally, the literature notes other instances of political listings (Hoffmann 
2008: 546; Schorlemer 2003: 275; Bowring 2010) and ASSMT statements suggest 
that the committee made dubious listings to serve the political interests of particular 
states (S/2004/679, para. 34). 
The specific organization of the committee’s listing function lacking clear 
decision criteria and procedures caused functional problems for the governance 
system. First, the committee’s laissez-faire attitude undermined the effectiveness of 
the sanctions regime. UN member states frequently reported “a lack of clarity 
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concerning the process and procedures for submitting to the Committee names to be 
added to the list (…). They also noted a lack of established guidelines or evidentiary 
criteria for determining which names should be added to the list” (S/2002/1050, para. 
26). As the ASSMT recognized, the “[p]rovision of a basic definition of terms by the 
Security Council or the Committee, particularly of ‘associated with’, would provide 
States with a better understanding of when to propose names for listing, thereby 
encouraging new listings” (S/2005/572, para. 27; Germany in S/PV.4798, p.14; 
Kanetake 2008: 147). 
Second, the poor quality of identifiers provided by designating states posed 
serious obstacles for effectively implementing the travel ban and assets freeze (for 
Taliban leaders the list merely included the full name and function, see SC/6998, 
SC/7009, SC/7028, SC/7124; Comras 2010: 95; Rosand 2004: 751; Kanetake 2008: 
146–147; Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 29). Already in its first report, the Monitoring 
Team recognized the issue of “insufficient identifiers” and recommended to list at 
least basic identifiers including gender, date of birth and nationality (S/2002/541, 
paras 8, 10-17; S/2002/1050, para. 29). For instance, the Monitoring Team 
documented that in 2003 still 34 listed individuals only had one single name 
(S/2003/669, para. 74). Later, the ASSMT expressed serious concern about lacking 
basic identifiers “which makes enforcement action virtually impossible” (S/2004/679, 
para. 37). As a consequence, UN member states and domestic financial institutions 
could not readily identify and freeze funds of targets (S/2007/572, para. 65). In 
addition, border control officials could not effectively implement travel bans 
(S/2007/572, para. 121). In fact, often names were not even entered into domestic 
stop lists (S/2003/1070, paras 95-96). Indeed, lacking identifying information posed 
the risk of wrongly identifying innocent individuals, in particular when common 
names were involved (S/2007/677, para. 29; S/2007/137, para. 9-10; Bianchi 2007: 
898). Even a Council diplomat stated that he knew instances of “an individual on the 
sanctions Committee list, which identified him as coming from a certain country and 
being between the ages of 32 and 35. However, there were thousands of individuals in 
that particular country with that name and matching that age range” (S/2007/137, pp. 
9-10). Even the committee itself has recognized that “65 Member States have 
addressed the problem of sanctions not being implemented against certain entries (…) 
because there are insufficient identifiers” (S/2005/761, pp. 2-3; Kanetake 2008: 146–
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147). These issues equally affected even Western states (see fn. 86, 87 in Bianchi 
2007: 898). 
Third, UN member states increasingly regarded the sanctions regime as 
illegitimate. The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change acknowledged 
that the sanctions regime “suffers from lagging support and implementation” 
(A/59/565, para. 153). This has been manifested in more than 50 states that had 
expressed serious concerns about designating new individuals in the absence of clear 
listing and delisting procedures and the recognition of due process rights for listed 
individuals (S/2005/761, para. 37; Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 36; Biersteker et al. 2008: 
247). Up until 2004, only  
“(…) 21 States have submitted names for inclusion on the List (…). The 
number of contributors to the List suggests that many States are reluctant to 
provide names. Issues of due process may be holding some States back, as may 
concerns over the definition of Taliban and Al-Qaida. In addition, the List has 
had to avoid accusations of political point scoring, and of subjectivity to any 
particular agenda” (S/2004/679, para. 34). 
This increasingly reflected member states reluctance to implement targeted 
sanctions against Al-Qaida and undermined the cooperation to implement targeted 
sanctions in general (Keller/Fischer 2009: 266; Biersteker 2010: 91). On the one 
hand, Council sanctions regimes depend on the UN member states to forward names 
to the committee. Therefore, UN sanctions regimes can be significantly undermined 
when states cease to submit names. In effect, designations in the Al-Qaida sanctions 
regime were heavily based on information garnered by domestic intelligence services, 
which exemplified the reliance on states’ willingness (Kanetake 2008: 134; Comras 
2010: 90). On the other hand, UN member states may have ceased to implement 
sanctions and as a result undermined the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. This is 
especially true for Al-Qaida, which as a global phenomenon materialized in many 
states and thus required global implementation of sanctions (Kanetake 2008: 135; 
Comras 2010: 90). 
The early listing case episode illustrates the lack of regulation of the listing 
process prompted serious governance issues. In absence of meaningful designation 
criteria and prescriptions on the listing procedure, committee members adopted a 
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laissez-faire mode of decision-making simply adopting all decision requests 
regardless of its merits. The quickly growing sanctions list posed substantial problems 
for member states implementation and undercut the willingness of UN member states 
to cooperate. 
6.2.2 Substantive and procedural criteria trigger rule-based decision-making on the 
listing of individuals and entities 
This case episode highlights that the effective separation of rulemaking and rule-
application on listing decisions provides incentives for rule-based decision-making. 
When the Council provided new designation criteria and a refined listing procedure in 
reaction to the laissez-faire decision-making, this allowed other committee members 
to reject poorly substantiated decision requests even before the creation of the 
Ombudsperson mechanism. On the Council level, despite the skepticism of 
permanent members, decision-making on rules confirms the need for adopting 
consistent decision criteria. On the committee level, the increased regulation 
transformed the decision situation profoundly towards rule-based decision-making 
and provided incentives to submit well-reasoned decisions, to scrutinize decision 
requests vis-à-vis established committee practice and to reject requests that fall short 
of established standards (Gehring/Dörfler 2013: 576–579; Dörfler/Gehring 2015: 70–
72).  
For Council members the apparent functional issues and lacking effectiveness 
could only be resolved through applying extensive pressure on states to comply, a 
governance tool that is not readily available, or alternatively to restore member states 
cooperation through rulemaking (Meerpohl 2008: 259–260). In essence, it became 
apparent that, the sanctions regime required more regulation in terms of consistent, 
general decision criteria applicable for a whole range of cases, while at the same time 
not too narrowly limiting the flexibility of the sanctions committee to effectively 
address the threat. Clear criteria would promote implementation of the sanctions 
regime. And member states would know better whom they should propose for 
possible listing to the committee. In fact, designation criteria would provide a 
yardstick for sanctions targets as to what behavioral change would be required to get 
the sanctions lifted (Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 38). 
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As concerns rulemaking, in reaction to these inhibiting governance issues 
resulting from the laissez-faire decision mode, proactive states reluctantly provided 
generally-applicable substantive and procedural criteria that allowed for 
distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable decision proposals and significantly 
restricted the discretion of committee members, although particularly the “US and 
Britain argued strongly against an evidence-based system of extending these 
sanctions, on the grounds it would compromise intelligence sources” (Doyle 2004: 
86). Slowly, the UNSC members deliberated about suitable rules and adopted more 
specific decision criteria to remedy regulatory deficits. Moreover, the Council 
repeatedly requested the committee to refine its committee guidelines to ensure that 
“fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on the 
Consolidated List and for removing them as well as for granting humanitarian 
exemptions, and directs the Committee to keep its guidelines under active review in 
support of these objectives” (resolution 1822 (2008), para. 28, see resolutions 1617 
(2005), para. 18; 1730 (2006), para. 2; 1735 (2006), para. 13; 1822 (2008), paras 21, 
25, 29; 1904 (2009), paras 7, 17, 35, 41, 42; 1989 (2011), paras 10, 42, 43; 2083 
(2012), paras 45, 46; 2161 (2014), paras 24, 25). 
First, although the permanent members were skeptical of any regulation that 
“would make it any harder to designate supporters of terrorism” (US Embassy Paris 
2005b), while acknowledging the need “to be careful about allowing governments to 
misuse the 1267 listing process for other internal purposes” (US Embassy Paris 
2005b), the UNSC refined the listing criteria significantly (Wadhams 2005c). While 
the UNSC has earlier requested designating states to supply the committee with 
sufficient identifiers and information on the particular association with Al-Qaida 
(resolution 1526 (2004), para. 17), listing requirements spelled out in resolutions and 
committee guidelines essentially remained unchanged until 2005. Consequently, it 
was left unclear which group of individuals would be considered “associated with” 
Al-Qaida and the Taliban and which not (resolutions 1267 (1999), 1390 (2002), 
guidelines November 2002, April 2003, December 2005). According to resolution 
1617 (2005) adopted on 29 July 2005, individuals and entities  
“(…) participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or 
perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on 
behalf of, or in support of; (..) supplying, selling or transferring arms and 
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related materiel to; (..) recruiting for; or (..) otherwise supporting acts or 
activities of (..) Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, 
splinter group or derivative thereof [and] any undertaking or entity owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by, or otherwise supporting, such an 
individual, group, undertaking or entity associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin 
Laden or the Taliban shall be eligible for designation” (resolution 1617 (2005), 
paras 2, 3). 
This criterion is consistent and does not include any exceptions that one-sidedly 
favor any powerful member. Notably, the Council under the constraints of rulemaking 
adopted generalized criteria that would be applicable to all current and future cases. 
These criteria specify which particular acts of an individual or an entity would 
constitute an association with Al-Qaida and which not. The committee incorporated a 
corresponding rule stipulating that this standard forms the basis of the listing decision 
into its guidelines (guidelines November 2006, para. 6c). Indeed, the committee 
hoped that the definition of “associated with” would indeed increase future listing 
requests (S/2006/22, para. 32). 
Second, the UNSC substantially increased the evidentiary requirements for any 
listings regardless of the submitting state (Prost 2012a: 417). While in early years, 
evidentiary requirements were unclear and designations could be made just “on the 
basis of relevant information provided by Member States” (resolution 1390 (2002), 
para. 5a), designating states must (‘shall’) now provide a detailed ‘statement of case’ 
(resolution 1617 (2005), paras 4, 6). Initially, the Council did not provide a clear 
definition of what such a statement would need to incorporate, and left the 
contentious decision on the precise criteria to the committee (S/2006/154, para. 27; 
S/2006/635, para. 6). In its November 2006 guidelines, the committee defined that the 
statement of case should incorporate 
“as much detail as possible on the basis(es) for listing (…), including: (1) 
specific findings demonstrating the association or activities alleged; (2) the 
nature of the supporting evidence (e.g., intelligence, law enforcement, judicial, 
media, admissions by subject, etc.) and (3) supporting evidence or documents 
that can be supplied. States should include details of any connection with a 
currently listed individual or entity. States should indicate what portion(s) of the 
statement of case the Committee may publicly release” (guidelines November 
2006, para. 6d). 
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The UNSC subsequently formalized the evidentiary requirements that established 
a general standard for statements of case (resolution 1735 (2006), para. 5). Redacted 
versions of these statements of case should be provided to the sanctions targets 
(resolution 1735 (2006), para. 10; Biersteker 2010: 97). These proscriptions were 
later slightly changed. States should submit additional information on “relevant court 
cases and proceedings” on the individuals and designating states should state which 
portions of the reasons are confidential and should not become subject to public 
release (rather than which portions could be released as in previous version) 
(guidelines July 2010, para. 6e). In addition, the designating states would need to 
supply sufficient identifying information including names, additional names, and 
aliases, date of birth, place of birth, gender, nationality, residence, addresses, 
occupation, and travel document numbers. The committee adopted similar 
requirements for designating entities (guidelines November 2006, para. 6e, refining 
guidelines November 2002, para. 5c). 
Third, the UNSC required that the committee issues publicly available reasons for 
listing (‘narrative summaries’) for each current and future listed individual or entity. 
The narrative summary would be based on the publicly releasable portions of the 
statement of case and outlined how the individual or entity is associated with Al-
Qaida or already listed members thereof and what specific acts gave rise to the listing 
decision. The ASSMT would assist in making this information available (resolution 
1822 (2008), para. 13). While originally, there was no time frame when the narrative 
summary has to be provided (guidelines December 2008, para. 6h), the committee 
adopted a rule that the narrative summaries have to be issued on the same day of 
listing, thus the committee has to elaborate them even before listing can commence 
(guidelines July 2010, para. 6k). 
Fourth, the committee completely standardized the submission of listing 
proposals. Attached to its guidelines it introduced a ‘Cover Sheet for Member State 
Submissions to the Committee’, which states should use to designate individuals or 
entities. The cover sheets required the designating state to list identifying information 
for the requested individual (entity) on the basis of the guidelines, the reasons for 
listing based on the ‘associated with’-standard as well as identify a point of contact 
for further inquiries (Cover sheet see S/2006/750, Annex II, as incorporated in 
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guidelines November 2006, later published with minor revisions in resolution 1735 
(2006), Annex I, Section II). The cover sheets were revised after adoption of 
resolution 1822 (2008) that requested the committee to incorporate publicly 
releasable narrative summaries. For this, the ASSMT had proposed new draft seven-
page cover sheets, which were more fine-grained and expanded for original script in 
different languages, physical details for Interpol-UNSC special notices and annexes 
for details on identification documents (resolution 1822 (2008), para. 14). 
Fifth, to allow more time for consideration of listing requests, the duration for 
responding to listing requests under the no-objection procedure was significantly 
extended, first from two working days (guidelines November 2002) to five working 
days (guidelines December 2005) and later to ten working days (guidelines July 2010; 
Biersteker 2010: 97). 
As concerns rule-application, the refined substantive listing criteria and 
procedures had a significant constraining effect on the behavior of committee 
members, even before the creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson. The 
committee operated under an increasingly dense set of rules. Designating states had to 
provide substantial information on the proposed individual or entity, including 
detailed reasons for why they should be listed and what their concrete association 
with Al-Qaida, bin Laden or the Taliban were. All these proposals had to be 
channeled through a detailed procedure. This enabled committee members to evaluate 
decision proposals against mutually accepted general standards provided by Council 
resolutions and committee guidelines. 
Notably, the provision of detailed substantive and procedural criteria significantly 
raised the threshold for a successful designation. The designation criteria provide a 
point of reference for the members of the committee to evaluate listing proposals 
against the so-called “associated with”-standard (Mimler 2013: 124). The ASSMT 
noted that the committee practice followed a threshold level of evidence of 
association with Al-Qaida that was needed for a successful listing and recommended 
that the committee should reflect this information threshold “commonly required for a 
successful listing request” into a cover sheet, including the “associated with”-standard 
to guide member states and the committee in the evaluation of listing request against 
these standards (S/2006/154, para. 27). States, which have not consulted the 
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committee guidelines or were unclear about how to submit a request or what kind of 
information would be required, risked the rejection or significant - sometime 
indefinite - delay of their listing proposal (S/2006/154, para. 25). As the ASSMT 
points out, “(…) a successful listing is most often linked to a complete and thorough 
account of the basis for listing, including the nature of the subject’s association with 
Al-Qaida or the Taliban. The Team believes that successful listings generally are 
factual, avoid unsupported allegations or broad assumptions and reference supporting 
evidence or documentation to the greatest extent possible. To speed up the approval 
process, States might be encouraged to provide the Committee with any available 
supporting evidence or documentation, such as arrest warrants, existing Interpol 
notices, indictments or judicial decisions or transcripts” (S/2006/154, para. 27). 
These effects have been recognized in an ASSMT report outlining the listing 
procedure. First, listing proposals from committee members, including the permanent 
members, and non-committee members are handled in the same manner (S/2007/132, 
paras 42, 46). Second, while the time to place a successful listing in the beginning of 
the regime was only a few days, in 2005 and 2006, the committee completed most 
listings after about three weeks of consideration and thus substantially longer than 
just the five working-days no-objection procedure. The time spent on listing decisions 
also depended on the “amount and quality of information provided at the time of 
submission” (para. 44). Third, listing proposals, including those originating from 
permanent members, are in fact held up and both permanent and elected members 
place holds on submissions (para. 46). As an example, the report cites the listing 
requirements applied by Denmark (Council member in 2005/06) that domestic 
authorities would scrutinize the listing proposal against the “associated with”- 
standard and have set the standard of two reliable sources of information 
corroborating the request’s plausibility. Moreover, Denmark has placed “numerous” 
proposals on hold, some of them for substantial time (pp. 18, Box II). 
Close observers also recognized these effects. The Watson report acknowledged 
that the more detailed listing requirements would prevent further unwarranted listings 
(Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 7). Known single cases serve illustrate this effect. The report 
cited three instances where either above threshold information led to successful 
listings while the lack of information led to rejection. In a first case, the committee 
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granted a listing request of three individuals accompanied by one general paragraph 
and a six detailed paragraphs on each individual. In another case, the committee 
accepted a listing request of six individuals bolstered with 70 pages of documentation 
including arrest warrants. On the contrary, the committee rejected a listing request, 
probably by Libya, accompanied by a statement of case that included references to 74 
names justified by a single paragraph (Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 26; Secretary of State 
2008d). 
Finally, the provision of requirements on identifying information required for 
listing significantly affected the amount of information provided for a successful 
designation (Biersteker et al. 2008: 235; Biersteker et al. 2005: 22). While the 
committee had not adopted “minimum criteria for listing, it is unlikely that it would 
accept a new submission for the listing of an individual which lacked basic 
identifiers” (S/2008/324, para. 26). The committee had recognized that member states 
required basic identifiers to effectively implement the sanctions imposed on list 
entries and had adopted a listing procedure that ensured that “a new listing with 
inadequate identifiers is virtually unthinkable” (S/2009/502, para. 14). 
The second case episode on the committee’s listing behavior reveals that 
functional problems caused by the early laissez-faire decision-mode prompted 
Council members to substantially regulate committee decision processes under the 
constraints of rulemaking. The strengthened rules are strikingly consistent and do not 
particularly favor any powerful member. Within the committee, the increasingly 
dense set of substantive and procedural criteria allowed committee members to reject 
unsubstantiated listing requests and transformed the committee listing process 
towards rule-based decision-making. 
6.2.3 Decision blockade on delisting creates demand for establishing meaningful 
delisting and review procedures 
In the sanctions regime’s early stage, the complete absence of a delisting procedure 
coupled with the lack of criteria and evidentiary standards as to when a delisting 
should commence sparked a committee blockade. Because the existing no-objection 
procedure was biased against delisting decisions, the functionality of the regime was 
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threatened, which provoked even skeptical members to adopt consistent rules on 
delisting. Within the committee, substantive and procedural criteria on delisting 
enabled committee members to delist unwarranted listings, while additional 
committee rules reduced the discretion of committee members to prevent undesired 
delisting decisions by the means of delaying decisions. 
The problem took its outset as Sweden requested to delist three Swedish citizens. 
The episode of the Swedish citizens illustrates exemplarily that the logic of rule-
making forces the adoption of a general rule, even if it emanates from a case-specific 
single-case decision. In addition, it shows that powerful members are skeptical 
towards such regulation. 
On 9 November 2001, the committee had listed three Swedish citizens and two 
Swedish entities associated with the individuals after they had been previously added 
to the US sanctions list. The Swedish government, under public pressure, first 
bilaterally requested information from the US about the reasons leading to listing. 
The US supplied 27 pages of information mostly comprising news-releases (New 
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2012: 10; Comras 2010: 97). Swedish 
security officials inspected the material and established that the evidence could not 
confirm the accusations and that the individuals were not suspected of any crime 
(Cramér 2003: 90–91; Gutherie 2005: 512). In addition, the US authorities refused to 
provide additional evidence to not disclose their counter-terrorism operations (Zagaris 
2002; Doyle 2004: 86). 
When Sweden requested to delist the individuals, however, the US turned down 
the request arguing that the individuals had failed to present new disconfirming 
evidence, which is impossible to present against an unknown charge (Miller 2003: 
48). After adoption of resolution 1390 (2002), on 22 January 2002, Sweden as a non-
Council member formally requested to undergo a general review of the sanctions list. 
In addition, Sweden, based on the Council’s call on the committee “to promulgate 
expeditiously such guidelines and criteria” (resolution 1390 (2002), para. 5d) 
requested the committee to establish guidelines and criteria for the implementation of 
targeted sanctions (Boustany 2002). France supported the Swedish initiative and 
proposed to establish “rules of the game” including more specific criteria and a 
regular review mechanism. However, the US disagreed to be obliged to provide 
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justification and threshold burden of proof for a listing in order not to compromise its 
intelligence gathering (Schmemann 2002; Zagaris 2002). In response, Sweden 
forwarded a de-listing petition on behalf of the three Swedish citizens on 25 January 
2002 (Cramér 2003: 92–93). Under the no-objection procedure, the US and the UK 
objected and Russia placed a hold (Cramér 2003: 93; Zagaris 2002; Ritter 2002). A 
repeated request by Sweden was turned down on the basis that no new information 
had been provided (Cramér 2003: 94). When the Swedish authorities bilaterally 
supplied information to US authorities, the US was willing to evaluate the case and 
requested more information from the individuals, including their business relations 
and travels to Somalia and Afghanistan. Finally, the US accepted to delist two of the 
individuals concerned domestically based on the information provided (Cramér 2003: 
94). 
The effects of committee governance prompted the committee to engage in 
selective rulemaking. While the request concerned a single case, many committee 
members had acknowledged that a potential decision would go beyond the scope of 
the very case and that a general rule was required (S/2002/1423, para. 11; Lederer 
2002). The Council had already recognized the need for the committee to 
“promulgate expeditiously such guidelines and criteria” required for sanctions 
implementation (Miller 2003: 49). In parallel, the committee over the course of eight 
months had negotiated a de-listing procedure, which was later incorporated into the 
committee guidelines “following several months of intensive consultations” 
(S/2002/1423, paras 6, 15; Doyle 2004: 86). On 15 August 2002, the committee Chair 
announced that the committee had decided to establish a new de-listing procedure 
(SC/7487). The adopted purely intergovernmental procedure stipulates that petitioners 
should request the government of citizenship or residence to bilaterally negotiate with 
the designating state based on the justification provided in support of the de-listing 
request. Either the petitioned state or the designating state (or both) could formally 
request a de-listing decided by consensus in the committee (SC/7487). Ultimately, 
every committee member could reject the de-listing without any justification 
(Gutherie 2005: 514). Under the new provision, Sweden and the US submitted a de-
listing request that was finally approved (SC/7490 of 26 August 2002; BBC 2002). 
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This episode illustrates the distinctive feature of an unregulated committee 
process. First, the committee lacked a specific procedure for the de-listing of 
individuals, i.e. who could potentially trigger such a procedure, who is to supply what 
degree of information and how the final decision is taken (Eriksson 2010: 164). 
Without such procedure, committee members enjoyed wide-ranging discretion as how 
to deal with the case under the simple no-objection procedure. Second, the episode 
highlights that the burden of proof rested with the state requesting de-listing. This 
state had to convince those committee members, which favored a continued listing, of 
the listing’s inappropriateness (Miller 2003: 48; Gurule 2002; Lynch 2002). Once a 
listing was accepted, any committee member could prevent the delisting without 
presenting information that warranted a continued listing. Third, committee members 
sought to remedy this issue by negotiating a general rule on de-listing and thus 
became subject to the constraints associated with rulemaking. The fact that 
negotiations on a purely intergovernmental rule took eight months implies that 
powerful members were hesitant to adopt such a rule (Lynch 2002). 
However, this original purely intergovernmental delisting procedure proved to be 
inadequate. In this procedure, the state of nationality and residency of a listed 
individual or entity constituted gatekeepers that the petitioner could not circumvent. 
In fact, should the petitioned state have rejected to support a delisting request on 
behalf of the petitioner for any reason, this would have constituted a denial of access 
to the review procedure (S/2005/83, para. 56). It is not known how many individuals 
and entities actually requested a delisting via any of the states of nationality/residency 
as these petitions have never reached the committee stage and accordingly 
unsuccessful complaints were not registered (Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 36). In fact, the 
ASSMT emphasized that such reforms would be in the committee’s long-term 
interest: 
“The Team recommends that the guidelines be amended to allow explicitly for 
the possibility of de-listing when a party demonstrates (…) that it no longer is 
associated with Al-Qaida or the Taliban (…). Such revisions to the process 
could help to reduce the possibility of one or more potentially negative court 
decisions (…). The establishment of this process would cost the Committee 
nothing. In the end, no de-listings will occur without the consent of all 15 
Committee members. Therefore, the Committee would be able to ensure that 
parties linked to Al-Qaida and the Taliban are not removed from the List 
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without sufficient evidence; (…) and States could propose names for listing 
with the assurance that, if circumstances change, a robust de-listing system is 
available” (S/2005/83, paras 57-59). 
Hesitantly, the committee and the Council engaged in rulemaking to secure the 
effectiveness of the sanctions regime, however, the negotiations were protracted 
because permanent members refused any outside review of sanctions designations. In 
resolution 1617 (2005), the Council requested the committee to continue its work on 
its guidelines, in particular on listing and delisting issues (para. 18). In January 2006, 
the committee issued a Note Verbale to member states that it is still undergoing 
revisions of the guidelines and that it had not yet reached an agreement (guidelines 
December 2005, see fn. 2 and section 6/8, S/2006/153, para. 45). Though the 
committee was able to agree to revise the section on listings in November 2006, it 
was unable to agree on a revised delisting provision (S/2007/59, para. 9). Ultimately, 
upon a French-US initiative, the issue was taken to the UNSC. The two permanent 
members had joined forces in opposition to other European countries’ preference for 
an independent ombudsperson, to ensure that a changed delisting process would not 
restrict committee prerogatives, limit the number of states involved and to secure that 
the mechanism would work merely as a “mailbox” (US Embassy Paris 2006b). 
In 2006, the UNSC created the ‘Focal Point for De-listing’ (resolution 1730 
(2006)) as a UN Secretariat entity and provided direct access to the governance 
system for petitioners that could now circumvent their potentially unwilling states of 
nationality or residence and directly forward delisting petitions to the committee. The 
Focal Point transmits petitions to relevant states and the committee, and serves as a 
means of communications between committee and petitioner. It was innovative that 
listed individuals and entities would get direct access to the committee, so that 
individuals could directly trigger a delisting procedure and force the committee to 
consider their petition even if their states of nationality/residency did not support such 
a petition. However, the Focal Point merely functioned as a registrar of petitions and 
had no independent review or decision-making capacity, a factor that was already 
criticized at its very adoption (Denmark, Greece, Qatar, S/PV.5599; Kanetake 2008: 
162–163). 
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The organization of the purely intergovernmental and largely unregulated de-
listing procedure, at least concerning its decision-making, caused further functional 
problems for the governance system. On the one hand, while new listings would have 
to meet the increased listing standards including identifiers and reasons for listing, 
this does not solve the issues associated with already existing listings that did not 
have to meet equally high standards previously. In 2008, of the 488 entries almost 270 
stemmed from designations made in 2001 alone before any informational 
requirements had been established (Prost 2012a: 418). Similarly, this also concerned 
the narrative summaries of these listings (S/2009/502, para. 29). As the ASSMT has 
repeatedly noted with alarm, these listings would undermine the credibility of the 
sanctions list and inhibit sincere implementation. In early 2008, almost 90 entries 
lacked even the most basic identifiers, which made implementation highly ineffective, 
diverted limited resources of the private sector and border officials to identify not 
confirmable assets or individuals, risked targeting the wrong individuals or made 
implementation even completely impossible. In effect, these entries have “limited or 
no operational value” (S/2008/324, paras 24-25; S/2009/502, para. 13). 
On the other hand, de-listings through the intergovernmental de-listing procedure 
are unlikely to occur. First, UN member states, in particular those not having 
designated individuals or not having own nationals on the list, would have little 
interest in taking up any case of marginal importance to them. Those states that were 
indeed concerned may have been hesitant to advocate a de-listing of an alleged 
terrorist. Second, the reluctance of the committee to grant de-listing requests 
discouraged member states to invest into submitting de-listing requests with 
perceived little chance of succeeding (S/2009/502, para. 16). Third, as most 
designations stemmed from P5 members, which would have functioned as 
gatekeepers and objected to the delisting of any of their initial designations if there 
were no good reasons that would have warranted a delisting. Fourth, an earlier 
regulation according to which the Secretariat had to circulate all listings that have not 
been updated for four years has resulted in merely two reviews of 115 entries eligible 
because a committee member had to actively pursue such a review and provide 
justification, which posed a high hurdle for cases of limited importance (guidelines 
November 2006, para. 6i, S/2010/497, para. 13). Even the US recognized that the de-
facto “life-sentence” of sanctions applied to individuals undermined Member States 
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cooperation in submitting new names and that therefore the list is increasingly 
outdated and “irrelevant to global counter-terrorism actions”, while delistings would 
enhance state cooperation (Khalizad 2008a). 
Functionally, these listings are useless and create the demand for substantive and 
procedural guidance on how to review existing entries, which subjects UNSC 
members to the logic of rulemaking. In order “to ensure the Consolidated List is as 
updated and accurate as possible and to confirm that listing remains appropriate”, the 
UNSC requested the committee to undergo a ‘comprehensive review’ of all 488 list 
entries separately by 30 June 2010 (resolution 1822 (2008), para. 25; S/2010/497, 
para. 1). Upon completion of the comprehensive review, the UNSC directed the 
committee to annually review the list to ensure that every listing is reviewed at least 
every three years (resolution 1822 (2008), para. 26). The UNSC also tasked the 
committee to elaborate a specific procedure on how such reviews were conducted 
(resolution 1822 (2008), paras 25-26). In addition, the Council requested the 
committee to produce narrative summaries for those entries retained in the review 
process (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2009b). 
After negotiating for more than five months, where specifically the scope of 
narrative summaries was highly contentious “with the United States and European 
countries favoring summaries that were more expansive and included information 
dating from both before and after a name was designated, while Russia preferred a 
much narrower scope” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2009b), the committee 
adopted new guidelines outlining how the review should pursue (guidelines 
December 2008, para. 9a-e; Biersteker/Eckert 2009: 16). Every trimester, the 
committee would circulate a subset of names to the designating states and the states 
of residence/nationality to provide any additional reasons for listing and identifying 
information. Subsequently, the cases along with the information provided would be 
circulated to all committee members and the ASSMT for information collection. After 
this, each case was automatically put on the committee’s agenda upon which the 
committee would amend the original entry. At every stage, any designating state, 
committee member, or other UN member state could file a de-listing request if it had 
determined that the listing was no longer warranted (guidelines para. 9a, e; 
Biersteker/Eckert 2009: 16–17). 
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The formalized comprehensive review procedure was further elaborated thorough 
committee practice, where members developed a “standard pattern” for consideration 
of a single case (S/2010/497, para. 31). After the ASSMT presented the case and 
newly available information, the committee would discuss the case on the basis of the 
updated information. In case no committee member or other reviewing state requested 
a de-listing, the entry remained valid. In case a state (including non-committee 
members) filed a de-listing request, the Chairman circulated the request under the no-
objection procedure. In the evaluation of a single request, the committee applied the 
decision criteria for new listings, in particular the “associated with” standard and 
concerning the identifiers, the ‘INTERPOL – United Nations Security Council 
Special Notices’ requirements. However, in terms of procedure, a listing was retained 
even if only one committee member objected to the name’s removal (S/2010/497, 
paras 29-34). 
The comprehensive review shows that the regulation has indeed affected 
committee behavior in the rule-application stage. On the one hand, the considerable 
number of delistings shows that individual cases were actually carefully scrutinized 
during committee meetings and that the review has indeed increased the hurdles for 
retaining an entry. During the comprehensive review, the committee delisted 45 and 
amended 465 list entries (S/2010/497, para. 43). In essence, the review significantly 
decreased the number of entries lacking adequate identifiers (S/2012/729, para. 38). 
On the other hand, the considerable number of rejected de-listing requests shows that 
committee members still had considerable discretion in dealing with individual 
requests and that the procedure “tends to be biased against making changes to the list” 
(Biersteker/Eckert 2009: 22). Even the US acknowledged that “Committee members, 
including the United States, may be reluctant to remove any names (…). Keeping a 
name on the list may be seen as the ‘safe’ option, which avoids the risk of delisting an 
individual who might still pose a threat. Nevertheless, a willingness to de-list weak 
designations will show that the Committee is serious about clearing away the 
inappropriate designations that have tarnished the legitimacy of the regime” (US 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2009b). The committee accepted 45 out of 161 de-
listing requests, while 39 had been rejected, 14 withdrawn and the remaining 
postponed. Interestingly, most of the rejected de-listing requests stem from permanent 
members (S/2010/497, para. 25). 
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During the comprehensive review, the behavior of committee members caused an 
additional issue of committee governance. Even before the comprehensive review, the 
committee had encountered the issue of unregulated holds in the no-objection 
procedure, where some requests remained undecided for years (see like-minded letter 
S/2012/805, 3.2.), and the need to restrict the use of holds became apparent 
(Biersteker 2010: 98–99; Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 42). For instance, whereas there 
was a time limit for responding to delisting petitions, there was no time limit to 
placing holds in the no-objection procedure. Therefore, delisting petitions could be 
deliberately diluted through placing a hold (Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 36). This 
similarly applies to exemption requests (see Swiss exemption request for assets held 
by Nada pending for three years, Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 32, S/2003/1070, para. 78). 
As a result, listings of potentially dangerous terrorists and delistings of potentially 
innocent individuals were undermined by the excessive (ab)use of holds 
(Biersteker/Eckert 2006: 42). During the comprehensive review, the committee was 
unable to reach mutually acceptable solutions to a growing number of cases as 
committee members extensively put decisions on hold, not least to avoid delistings in 
absence of reliable information (interview with UN member state official, August 
2012). In December 2009, 31 issues were on hold and thus indefinitely unresolved 
unless the hold would be voluntarily released (S/2010/497, para. 93). 
To remedy the problem, the UNSC engaged in rulemaking and directed the 
committee to ensure that committee members may place holds for no longer than six 
months or after the committee decides to extend the period. In addition, all current 
pending issues have to be resolved until the end of 2010 (resolution 1904 (2009), 
paras 41-42). The committee, faced with the request to adopt a generalized rule on the 
conduct of holds, decided that a pending issue would be automatically deemed 
approved unless the committee would extend the hold for three additional months 
(guidelines July 2010, para. 4c). Later, the committee adopted this rule for all 
committee decision procedures including future ones where the Council has not 
specifically provided a different time limit (guidelines April 2013, para. 4j, k). Earlier, 
the committee already decided that holds placed by non-permanent members will 
cease to have effect after they rotate off the Council (guidelines December 2005, para. 
4c). 
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Consequently, these rules significantly restricted the discretion of committee 
members under the no-objection procedure. The rule guaranteed that pending issues 
are finally resolved by positive or negative decisions. Essentially, regulating holds 
ensured that a hold would now be useful only for the originally intended use, namely 
to request additional information, rather than to dilute or to avoid unfavorable 
decisions. The regulation has resulted in a significant reduction of the number of 
holds during the conclusion of the comprehensive review (S/2010/497, para. 93) after 
since (interview with UN member state official, New York, March 2012). 
In conclusion, this episode of committee governance illustrates that the initial 
blockade of delistings contributed to functional problems that gave even skeptical 
Council members incentives to regulate committee decision-making under the 
constraints of rulemaking. In turn, within the committee, substantive and procedural 
criteria on delisting provided the opportunity for committee members to delist 
unwarranted listings, while further self-regulation restricted the committee member’s 
discretion to dilute decisions through excessively using holds. 
6.2.4 Decision problems associated with exemptions from targeted sanctions spark 
the introduction of generally-applicable exemption procedures 
The case episode shows that apart from listing and de-listing procedures, the question 
of how exemptions to the travel ban and the assets freeze were to be processed 
became a pressing issue that required Council regulation. Single cases triggered the 
adoption of consistent rules that would allow for granting exemptions to all 
individuals on the basis of abstract decision criteria and procedures. In terms of rule-
application, the committee effectively decided along the lines of these exemption 
procedures. 
Concerning the travel ban, early resolutions already had established exemptions 
and used language similar to existing sanctions regimes. In resolution 1390 (2002) 
strengthening the non-mandatory travel restrictions of resolution 1333 (2000), the 
UNSC stipulated three possible exemptions: “(…) nothing in this paragraph shall 
oblige any State to deny entry into or require the departure from its territories of its 
own nationals and this paragraph shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary 
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for the fulfilment of a judicial process or the Committee determines on a case by case 
basis only that entry or transit is justified” (resolution 1390 (2002), para. 1b). In the 
Abdelrazik case, the application of the travel ban exemptions had been particularly 
contentious. Abdelrazik was prevented to travel from the Canadian embassy in 
Sudan, where he sought refuge, to Canada on the grounds that this would violate the 
sanctions imposed on him (Tzanakopoulos 2010). While this was associated with an 
overly strict reading of the resolutions provisions by Canadian authorities, 
nevertheless, the ASSMT had recommended providing a “standard procedure” for 
member states. The ASSMT acknowledged the need for member states to reconcile 
their obligation towards sanctions implementation with the need to allow travel, in 
particular for religious purposes (S/2007/677, paras 95-96). In 2008, the committee 
refined the procedure for granting travel ban exemptions on a case-by-case basis, 
determined that exemption requests should be accompanied by travel documentation, 
reasons for travel and details on the funds to cover travel expenses (guidelines 
December 2008, para. 11 a-k). The rule was consistent and did not favor powerful 
members. Concerning rule-application, the committee granted the few travel ban 
exemptions it received (S/2009/502, para. 71, S/2012/729, para. 57). 
As regards the assets freeze, single-case issues raised the need for a committee 
procedure on exemptions. For instance, as the Swedish authorities had continued to 
issue welfare payments to listed individuals and their families in accordance with 
domestic law (Cramér 2003: 91), Sweden automatically violated its obligations under 
UNSC resolutions. However, the original exemption procedure (resolution 1267 
(1999), para. 4b) proved inadequate because it did not specify which circumstances 
would allow for an exemption and under what procedure such a request would be 
processed (S/2006/154, fn. 19). The Monitoring Team early on recognized that 
several states reported the issue of releasing funds for the basic needs of listed 
individuals and informed that governments already had begun to release portions of 
the frozen funds to satisfy domestic laws (e.g. Switzerland, S/2002/1050, para. 42, 
S/2002/1338, para. 20). 
To remedy the issue, the Council adopted a consistent regulation that does not 
favor any powerful state. In August 2002, the US circulated a draft resolution which 
suggested the possibility of unfreezing assets for “payments for foodstuffs, rent or 
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mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public 
utility charges” (Agence France Presse 2002; Lynch 2002). However, the fact that the 
procedure has not been incorporated into the November 2002 committee guidelines 
and that it took over four months of negotiations suggests that the regulation was 
contentious. On 20 December 2002, the UNSC adopted an exemption procedure 
(resolution 1452 (2002)). The resolution stipulated that funds may be unfrozen for the 
payment of basic expenses (foodstuffs, rent, medical treatment, taxes, insurance 
premiums, public utility charges, legal services, routine holding of financial assets) 
after notification in absence of a negative committee decision within 48 hours, and 
other extraordinary expenses after committee approval. In addition, member states are 
allowed to add financial assets to frozen accounts for interest earning or payments 
originating from contracts prior to listing (resolution 1452 (2002), paras 1ab, 2ab; 
Farrall 2007: 380; Gamel 2002). In December 2006, the UNSC extended the period 
of considering exemptions notifications for basic expenses to three working days 
(resolution 1735 (2006), paras 15-16; Farrall 2007: 380). 
Since the adoption of the rule, the committee “approved virtually all requests for 
routine and extraordinary expenses” (S/2006/154, para. 57, S/2007/132, para. 47). 
From adoption of resolution 1452 (2002) until early 2006, 29 exemption requests had 
been received and 25 of which approved while one was withdrawn and three were 
pending. Most requests concerned basic expenses related to accommodation and legal 
representation, while only two requests concerned extraordinary expenses 
(S/2006/154, 51-60). 
Concluding, this case episode demonstrates that issues of committee governance 
on exemption procedures prompted Council and committee rulemaking. In both 
cases, single cases triggered the adoption of a rule that allowed for granting 
exemptions to individuals on the basis of general criteria and procedures. In effect, 
committee decisions on exemption requests largely followed these procedures. 
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6.2.5 Decision blockade on Taliban section of the sanctions list prompts the 
separation of the sanctions regime in 2011 
The case episode highlights that the blockade of the decision process on Taliban 
delistings prompted the separation of the sanctions regime and allowed for rule-based 
decision-making on Taliban delistings despite the skepticism by a permanent member. 
In June 2011, the Council decided to separate the Taliban list from the Al-Qaida list 
and established a separate Taliban sanctions regime including a separate sanctions 
committee. Political developments in Afghanistan had made it increasingly difficult 
to treat the Taliban and the Al-Qaida sections differently under the same set of 
procedural and substantive decision criteria. Thereby, the comprehensive sanctions 
regime was split into a global Al-Qaida sanctions regime and a country-specific 
Taliban sanctions regime focused on the Afghan peace process. In terms of rule 
application on Taliban delistings, the adopted rules bound even powerful members 
and the Taliban sanctions committee operated in the rule-based decision-making 
mode. 
Besides the symbolic value of demonstrating support for the Afghan peace 
process, taking the situation in Afghanistan more into account and enhancing the role 
for the Afghan government, the sanctions regime experienced a procedural issue that 
underlay the separation: it became increasingly difficult to treat Al-Qaida and Taliban 
members differently having uniform decision criteria. For instance, whereas the 
Taliban would need to satisfy specific delisting criteria, where renouncing terrorism is 
only one aspect, the Al-Qaida regime focused on the prevention of transnational 
terrorism and would require different criteria (three separate interviews with UN 
member state official, New York, March 2012, October 2013). In committee practice, 
this created repeated necessity for justifying the different treatment (interview with 
UN member state official, New York, March 2012). These issues were reflected in 
statements by Germany, UK and France favoring the split of the list and refined 
criteria for both groups, whereas Russia considered the split “unwarranted” 
(S/PV.6536, pp. 6, 12, 22). The ASSMT noted the increasing discrepancy: 
“While the nature of the Taliban threat may differ from that presented by Al-
Qaida, and is certainly different from the combined threat that both groups 
presented in 2001 when the majority of the Taliban listings occurred, the 
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Committee has, since November 2001, treated all listed persons in the same 
way. The Guidelines (…) make no distinction between the Taliban and Al-
Qaida sections of the List. Some have argued that it is now time to treat listed 
Taliban and listed members of Al-Qaida and its affiliates differently. They 
suggest that if the Committee dealt with the two parts of the List in isolation 
from one another, and under different guidelines, there would be greater scope 
to use the List more creatively in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. 
They argue that the criteria for the removal of Taliban names cannot be identical 
to those for Al-Qaida” (S/2011/245, para. 16). 
In addition, the committee faced a stream of delisting decisions that concerned 
the Taliban sections of the list. In early 2011, the committee considered delisting 
requests for more than a third of the 137 Taliban names on the list (consolidated list 
March 2011, on file with author), while “[t]he Afghan Government complains that the 
process of de-listing is too uncertain, too slow and too complicated; it is unsure what 
it has to do to persuade the Committee to agree to a de-listing” (S/2011/245, para. 
20). The ASSMT further noted that the committee should first decide on some “basic 
criteria that would have to be met” before considering these requests and provide a 
check list for the Afghan government to prepare delisting for those who fulfilled these 
criteria (para. 23). 
The opacity of the decision criteria led to a blockade of the de-listing process on 
Taliban members. Although the UNSC had called on the committee to list new 
Taliban, delist individuals that are no longer associated with the Taliban and update 
the information on listed Taliban (resolution 1735 (2006), paras 24-26), the ASSMT 
noted that the committee had been highly reluctant to grant delisting requests for 
Taliban: “It is not easy to get off the List. Judging by its past decisions, the 
Committee will take a cautious approach to removing any Taliban name without clear 
indications, over a sustained period, that the individual concerned is fully committed 
to the democratic principles enshrined in the Afghan Constitution, has renounced 
violence, and has severed connection with Al-Qaida and its associates” (S/2011/245, 
para. 14). Internal US sources reveal that the Taliban section had not changed since 
2001 with some corrections in 2003, mainly because three permanent members 
(France, UK, Russia) which designated all Taliban entries in 2001, constituted 
gatekeepers to delisting. Therefore, 20 delisting requests by Afghanistan concerning 
Taliban engaged in reconciliation in 2005 and 2006 had been put on hold for over two 
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years (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007b). While France and UK were willing 
to review their stances, the Afghan requests have in particular met outright Russian 
rejection, but also China and India were hesitant (Riechmann 2011; Agence France 
Presse 2011c; US Embassy Moscow 2008; Hindustan Times 2011; US Permanent 
Mission to the UN 2007n; Secretary of State 2007a). When Russia continued to block 
the Afghan request, the UK observed that “Moscow should not employ a higher 
burden of proof for de-listing than for listing” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 
2007n). The ASSMT informally recommended that for overcoming Russian 
objections and the “lack of a structured mechanism for removing reconciled or former 
Taliban”, the P5 should first agree on general criteria defining when reconciled 
Taliban should be delisted and then submit a few cases which satisfy these criteria to 
show that the mechanism actually works (US Embassy Kabul 2009). 
To remedy the issues associated with a comprehensive sanctions regime, with 
resolutions 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011), the UNSC separated the sanctions list into 
two separate lists and created a new sanctions committee to manage the separate 
Taliban section. To ensure an immediate separation, the former Taliban sections of the 
comprehensive list were simply moved to the newly created sanctions regime (para. 
2). While the UNSC recognized the need to treat the two groups differently in a 
preambular paragraph, the UNSC directed its newly created 1988 committee to “(…) 
remove expeditiously individuals and entities (…) that no longer meet the listing 
criteria (…)” (para. 18) and established delisting criteria especially for the Taliban. 
The committee should “(…) give due regard to requests for removal of individuals 
who meet the reconciliation conditions (…), which include the renunciation of 
violence, no links to international terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaida, or any 
cell, affiliate, splinter group, or derivative thereof, and respect for the Afghan 
Constitution, including the rights of women and persons belonging to minorities” 
(resolution 1988 (2011), para. 18). Accordingly, eligible for listing under this regime 
are individuals and entities “(a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, 
preparing or perpetrating of acts (…) on behalf of, or in support of; (b) Supplying, 
selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; (c) Recruiting for; or (d) 
Otherwise supporting acts or activities of those designated and other individuals, 
groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat 
to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan” (resolution 1988 (2011), para. 3). 
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To align the objectives of the Afghan peace process and the objectives of the 
sanctions regime, the Council enhanced the role of the Afghan government so that it 
is regularly consulted, provides information on reconciled individuals and can trigger 
early review of individuals deemed reconciled (resolution 1988 (2011), paras 18-29). 
The UK summarized the intention of these amendments: 
“Creating a new and separate regime for Afghanistan (…) sends a clear signal 
that now is the time for the Taliban to (…) join the political process. It also 
allows for more specific procedures tailored to (…) Afghanistan. The resolution 
introduces broader listing criteria and a greater role for the Afghan Government 
in consultation on listing and de-listing decisions. It also explicitly links de-
listing individuals with the Kabul communiqué’s reconciliation conditions of 
renouncing violence, cutting ties with Al-Qaida and accepting the framework of 
the Afghan Constitution” (S/PV.6557, pp. 5-6). 
The separation had significant implications for the sanctions regime. First, the 
Council created a completely separate sanctions regime including a new sanctions 
committee and established separate rules. Thereby, the Council significantly 
decreased the prospects of making package deals across committee boundaries. 
Second, the two groups can be treated differently under specialized substantive and 
procedural decision criteria. This alleviates the previous need to justify why the 
decision criteria could be stretched in particular cases (interview with UN member 
state official, New York, March 2012). Third, whereas the Ombudsperson procedure 
was extended in scope (see section 6.3), it was simultaneously restricted to the Al-
Qaida regime exclusively, in particular because some permanent members were 
anxious of establishing a precedent to apply the Ombudsperson outside the Al-Qaida 
sanctions regime. This was only possible because at the time, none of the Taliban was 
challenging the listing via the Ombudsperson (interview with UN member state 
Official, New York, March 2012). As a result, for the Taliban sanctions regime, the 
Focal Point would receive delisting petitions. 
The new rules provided a focal point and restricted the discretion of unwilling 
committee members to object to warranted Taliban delistings. Before the split, states 
requesting delisting of Taliban had to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the 
individuals were no longer associated with terrorism (US Embassy Moscow 2008), 
while now different criteria would apply. Whereas the committee has removed only 
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very few Taliban from the original list (Nordland 2011), within one month after the 
separation of the list, the 1988 committee delisted 15 individuals, all of which were 
listed before 9/11 (SC/10306; SC/10328). Initially, the Afghan government had 
requested about 50 delistings before the split and committee members expected 
resistance from Russia, China and India (Agence France Presse 2011b; Nordland 
2011). Because it included a high number of individuals, the committee extended the 
consideration of the request (Lederer 2011). Since the split, the committee has 
delisted 32 individuals (S/2012/971, fn. 16; S/2014/402, para. 16), i.e. one-fourth of 
all entries, despite the initial resistance of a permanent member to any delisting on the 
Taliban section of the formerly comprehensive list. 
This case episode shows that the blockade of Taliban delistings by a permanent 
member could be alleviated through rulemaking, in this case, by separating the 
sanctions regime. In fact, the Council developed of two different sets of eligibility 
criteria (S/2011/790, paras 20-21), both of which confined decision-making within 
the respective committee to a restricted circle of sanctions targets. In effect, even 
powerful committee members abided by the adopted rules on Taliban delistings. This 
transformed the Taliban sanctions committee into the mode of rule-based decision-
making. 
 
6.3 The Ombudsperson as institutionalized safeguard of rule-based 
decision-making 
The creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson as a powerful mechanism to review 
existing listings and its subsequent strengthening fosters committee members 
adherence to existing rules, however, without systematically changing the incentives 
of committee members (Gehring/Dörfler 2013: 579–582; Dörfler/Gehring 2015: 72–
74). 
Although the Focal Point (resolution 1730 (2006)) had granted targeted 
individuals direct access to the committee, the Focal Point procedure proved 
inadequate to restore the regime’s effectiveness (Biersteker/Eckert 2009: 31–32). 
First, while Council members recognized the negative impact of original delisting 
 
247 
procedure (France, Denmark, Greece, S/PV.5599), Denmark, Greece and Qatar 
immediately criticized the Focal Point procedure (S/PV.5599) at its adoption. Like-
minded and other states (incl. Switzerland, Sweden, Germany) deplored its 
intergovernmental character and advocated for an independent and more powerful 
review mechanism (Kanetake 2008: 161–164; on like-minded initiative see 
Biersteker/Eckert 2009: 15). Second, in face of various court challenges that 
undermined sanctions implementation, member states were increasingly in a dilemma 
between either violating international law or ignoring domestic court decisions 
(Biersteker/Eckert 2009: 31; Sievers/Daws 2014: 543). Third, besides the criticism by 
UN actors (Fassbender 2006, Ben Emmerson report, A/67/396), academics 
(Biersteker/Eckert 2009) and non-governmental organizations (Amnesty International 
2008), the ASSMT has called on the Council to adopt procedural reforms that would 
restore the effectiveness of the regime through adopting a more independent review 
mechanism before national or regional courts would impose their own standards of 
review (S/2009/502, para. 42). Finally, between 2007 and 2009, the Focal Point 
received delisting requests for 18 individuals and 22 entities, the committee only 
removed three individuals and 17 entities (for Focal Point statistics see section 4.5 
above; Security Council Report 2013: 21; Cortright et al. 2009: 4–5). 
According to US diplomatic cables, even powerful members recognized that the 
existing procedure was dysfunctional (also US Embassy London 2009b; US 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2009d, Biersteker 2013: 10): 
“Bold U.S. action is needed to salvage an irreplaceable UN counter-terrorism 
tool (…). Yet concerns about the fairness of the (…) procedures (…) combined 
with errors on the 1267 Committee’s List, including inappropriate listings (…) 
have gravely undermined the regime’s credibility and perceived legitimacy. (…) 
Dead people are still on the Committee’s List, de-listing requests get stuck in 
Committee limbo and designees who want off the List must navigate an opaque, 
Kafkaesque process. (…) The status quo, however, is not sustainable -- the new 
UNSCR must continue the regime’s trajectory of reform if the regime is to 
remain viable. (…) Would (…) proposed enhancements satisfy international 
courts, especially in Europe? Would it stop the slow erosion of this tool’s 
perceived legitimacy? The answers are unknown. These measures, however, 
combined with a redoubling of U.S. efforts to scrub the 1267 List of 
inappropriate entries, would go far toward restoring confidence in the regime 
and heading off more radical and dangerous proposals. (…) New safeguards 
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will probably make it harder to designate and/or retain on the list some 
individuals (…). This will be particularly true in cases where we lack recent and 
convincing declassified information to justify a designation. (…) Instead of 
viewing this consolidation as a failure to designate terrorists, the United States 
should welcome the emergence of a smaller -- but much more credible and 
better implemented -- List. The preservation of the tool, (…) is far more 
important than the designation of a handful of marginal figures (…). If we fail 
to accept this shift, then the 1267 sanctions regime will remain mired in critical 
debate, fail to evolve in pace with the threat and gradually atrophy as states shy 
away from using and defending a discredited regime” (Rice 2009c). 
In 2009, the UNSC created the Office of the Ombudsperson as independent and 
impartial entity to review delisting petitions of individuals and entities and adopted a 
detailed procedure as how the governance system should review such petitions 
(resolution 1904 (2009)). First, in a two-months ‘information gathering’ stage, after a 
formal check and acknowledgement of receipt (para. 1a-e), the Ombudsperson 
forwards the petition to the committee, designating states, state of 
nationality/residency, and other relevant states or UN bodies (para. 2a,b), the ASSMT 
(para. 3a-c), and informs the committee about the progress of information collection 
(para. 4). Second, in a two-months ‘dialogue’ stage, the Ombudsperson directly 
interacts with the petitioner to request additional information and to provide a means 
of communication between petitioner and states involved (paras 5, 6a-c). Afterwards, 
the Ombudsperson provides a ‘Comprehensive Report’ to the committee which 
should “[s]ummarize (…) all information (…) relevant to the delisting request (…), 
[d]escribe the Ombudsperson’s activities (…) and, [b]ased on an analysis of all the 
information available to the Ombudsperson and the Ombudsperson’s observations, 
lay out for the Committee the principal arguments concerning the delisting request” 
(para. 7 a-c). Finally, in the ‘Committee discussion and decision’ stage, the 
Ombudsperson presents the report to the committee (paras 8-9) after which the 
committee will decide upon the request “through its normal decision-making 
procedures” (para. 10). The committee conveys the decision to the Ombudsperson 
including “explanatory remarks” in case of a negative decision, which the 
Ombudsperson conveys to the petitioner (paras 11-14). The Secretary-General 
appointed former ICTY judge, Kimberly Prost, to serve as the first Ombudsperson. 
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Although the Ombudsperson did not have the right to introduce a formal delisting 
recommendation in the early stage, a fact that was widely criticized (e.g. like-minded 
letter April 2011, B6(b), S/PV.6247, p.3), the procedure already affected committee 
decision-making. As the sanctions committee is required to formally decide upon the 
delisting request, the petitioner is relieved from having to seek the support of any 
particular state to file a de-listing request. In addition, the petition triggers an 
impartial investigation and contributes to information gathering. Although the 
Ombudsperson has no formal power in information production and has to rely on 
states willingness to share critical information, the procedure provides incentives for 
cooperation. Her information requests are made on basis of a legally-binding Chapter 
VII authorization and she is mandated to report on which states have provided 
information and which not. In a comprehensive report, gaps between information 
requested and information received would become obvious. In addition, in the 
biannual public reporting to the Security Council, the Ombudsperson would report on 
non-cooperative states (Prost 2012a: 419). Only six delisting petitions had been filed 
under this first Ombudsperson procedure, which resulted in four individuals being de-
listed, one petition was rejected and one petitioner withdrew (S/2012/49). 
To remedy the imminent danger that sanctions will be partially suspended by 
domestic or regional actors including parliaments11 and courts based on the lack of 
due process, and in particular the right to effective remedy, the UNSC revised the 
Ombudsperson procedure in June 2011 and provided the Ombudsperson with the 
right to issue formal recommendations (resolution 1989 (2011)). Since then, a 
delisting recommendation by the Ombudsperson will automatically lift the sanctions 
measures on the targets after 60 days in case the recommendation is not overturned by 
a consensus decision within the committee or the decision is referred to the UNSC by 
a committee member (so-called ‘trigger mechanism’) (Prost/Wilmshurst 2013: 7). 
This provides the Ombudsperson with an agenda-setting function.  
                                                 
11 The Swiss parliament suspended sanctions under specific circumstances in protest of due 
process infringements (exchange of letters 
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/07122010_blacklists.pdf [last access: 14 October 
2014]; Paulus 2012: 1006). 
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The heightened role of the Ombudsperson was highly contentious as it touches 
upon Council prerogatives, which in particular the permanent members were keen to 
uphold (SCR Forecast June 2011). In particular, the US mission in New York and the 
administration in Washington DC disagreed about the Ombudsperson’s enhanced 
role. Washington was opposed to the idea, but the US Mission saw the functional 
advantage of granting the Ombudsperson more power while retaining the right to 
refer any Ombudsperson delisting request to the UNSC (interview with UN member 
state official, New York, December 2013). 
The Ombudsperson actively intervened in the decision process and fostered the 
committee members’ adherence to mutually accepted rules. In essence, the enhanced 
Ombudsperson procedure substantially increased the hurdles to overturn an 
Ombudsperson recommendation (Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 24). In contrast to the 
previous procedure, a dissenting committee member would have to convince all other 
members that the Ombudsperson recommendation was inappropriate and demonstrate 
why the listing was still warranted. As a result, the negative consensus procedure 
shifted the burden of proof on the state that favors a continued listing. In essence, the 
Ombudsperson decision almost predetermined the outcome and “Member States (…) 
have recognized that in a case where the Ombudsperson recommends a delisting, it is 
extremely unlikely that the Committee will reject that conclusion by consensus” 
(S/2012/968, para. 12; Paulus 2012: 1007–1008; Mimler 2013: 122–125). There was 
a “widespread perception among Member States that it would be politically difficult 
and costly to overturn a decision of the Ombudsperson” (Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 37). 
In fact, this procedure provides incentives for state cooperation as states seeking to 
retain listing had to convince the Ombudsperson through supplying information 
during the process, otherwise delisting would ensue rapidly (S/2012/49, para. 41). 
Indeed, the procedure has led to increased willingness to share such information 
(S/2012/968, 14). 
The considerable amount of successful de-listing petitions signifies that 
committee members accept the Ombudsperson procedure including her 
recommendations, even if designations stemmed from powerful members. Until 
March 2016, 66 petitions were filed and 63 cases were completed. Upon the 
recommendation of the Ombudsperson, the committee delisted 43 individuals and 28 
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entities (S/2015/533, para. 6).12 One entity was removed as an alias of a listed entity, 
and one petition has been withdrawn. Moreover, the committee delisted three 
individuals before completion of the Ombudsperson process (S/2014/553, paras 3-7). 
While the many successful de-listings have attracted a flow of additional petitions 
(S/2012/729, para. 30), interestingly, 11 delisting requests have been rejected (one 
under resolution 1904 (2009)), all of which the Ombudsperson recommended 
continued listing (S/2013/467, para. 34). While the comprehensive reports are not 
public, the procedure stipulates that the listing is maintained and the request 
automatically rejected in case the Ombudsperson recommends continued listing. In 
the five cases under resolution 1989 (2011), the date of the rejection coincide with the 
report’s presentation, which is different in all other cases (S/2014/553). 
Since 2009, the Ombudsperson procedure became increasingly consolidated. All 
actors associated with the Ombudsperson procedure experienced an increasing 
number of comprehensive reports, which signifies the standardization of the review 
procedure (Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 15). The Ombudsperson procedure developed into 
an integral element so that it “highly unlikely that the Security Council would abolish 
the Ombudsperson mechanism before it brought the regime as a whole to an end” 
(S/2012/968, para. 15). This resembles the proponent’s view that it will be difficult to 
scrap the Ombudsperson from the regime if it is well-established and works according 
to its original objective, i.e. to provide a means for individuals to petition their listings 
and to ensure that continued listing is warranted (interview with UN member state 
official, August 2012). 
In several cases, delisting ensued although committee members, in particular 
powerful permanent members had diverging positions (S/2012/968, para. 12), few 
were almost being overturned while none of these cases have been referred to the 
UNSC (Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 18). 
The exiled Saudi dissident Al-Faqih residing in the UK was delisted on 1 July 
2012, as the UK, Germany, South Africa and Guatemala rejected to overturn the 
Ombudsperson recommendation because the provided information would not warrant 
                                                 
12 Status of Cases available at: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sc/ombudsperson/status-of-cases 
[last access: 15 March 2016]. 
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continued listing. This is remarkable as the large majority of committee members 
preferred continued listing. Reportedly, the non-member Saudi Arabia had applied 
heavy pressure on committee members to overturn the decision (Eckert/Biersteker 
2012: 20, Charbonneau 2012a, 2012b; BBC 2012). Members who have requested 
additional information from Saudi Arabia had been supplied with merely six pages in 
Arabic language that showed little connection of Al-Faqih to Al-Qaida (interview 
with UN member state official, August 2012). After the decision, Al-Faqih was 
maintained on the US domestic sanctions list showing the US’ diverging preference 
(BBC 2012). 
Also the Kadi case came very close to a Security Council referral (UN official at 
UN sanctions workshop for incoming members, December 2013). In the past, Kadi 
had challenged his listing in various countries, before the Al-Qaida committee 
(interview with UN member state official, New York, March 2012) and finally 
petitioned his listing via the Ombudsperson. His listing dates back to the time 
immediately after 9/11 (Gerth/Miller 2001). After reviewing the case for more than 10 
months, Kadi was delisted upon an Ombudsperson recommendation, because 
European members refused to overturn the Ombudsperson recommendation 
(Charbonneau 2012c; Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 20; interview with UN member state 
official, New York, December 2013). Simultaneously, a US court maintained that his 
“listing in the United States was ‘amply supported’ by both classified and unclassified 
materials” (S/2012/968, para. 7). 
The individual Jim’ale listed directly after 9/11 initiated an Ombudsperson 
procedure in March 2011. According to his October 2009 narrative summary, he was 
“closely linked” to Usama bin Laden. As a founder of the Barakaat network he was 
responsible for Barakaat, which had channeled weapons and employed 1,000 fighters 
(on file with author). On 21 February 2012, the committee delisted Jim’ale upon an 
Ombudsperson recommendation (Prost 2012b: 5). On the same day, he was re-listed 
in the Somalia sanctions regime, which employs identical sanctions measures 
(Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 19). In the justification for his re-listing, the Somalia 
sanctions committee stipulates that Jim’ale was the ‘chief financier’ of Al-Shabaab 
(SC/10545). The crucial point is that Al-Shabaab was listed on the Somalia sanctions 
list in 2010, and not on the Al-Qaida/Taliban list, which would require an association 
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with Al-Qaida. While it was established that Jim’ale had a relationship with Al-
Shabaab, the association of Al-Shabaab to Al-Qaida had not been formally 
established. As a consequence, the individual was listed under the Somalia sanctions 
regime (interview with UN member state official, August 2012). 
In a fourth case, on 3 January 2014, the committee delisted a Kuwaiti individual 
Al-Jalahmah based on the Ombudsperson recommendation and immediately re-listed 
the individual on the same day on the basis of new information made available to the 
committee. Reportedly, a permanent member did not share confidential information 
concerning the individual’s recent association with Al-Qaida with the Ombudsperson 
during the Ombudsperson process, to not compromise its sources. Accordingly, the 
Ombudsperson recommended delisting based on the information available to her. As a 
result, the committee removed the individual from the list based on the 
recommendation and decided to instantly re-list the individual based on the new 
information provided (SC/11241). 
Interestingly, none of the cases under the Ombudsperson procedure have been 
referred to the UNSC, although this option is explicitly provided for in Council 
resolutions and committee guidelines (S/2012/590, para. 30, S/2014/73, para. 32). In 
fact, in principle the Security Council is still the master of the procedure and retains 
its role as a general political body (Mimler 2013: 123). However, this decision option 
comes with severe disincentives. It is difficult to imagine a case where a dissenting 
committee member would refer a case to the UNSC unless the member would have 
assurances that it will receive nine votes on a resolution that would challenge the 
Ombudsperson’s judgment. Furthermore, such a move would politicize an issue of 
limited scope and reveal that the committee is lacking consensus while the dissenting 
member had to convince the same group of (dissenting) members with potentially 
sensitive information in a public setting (S/2012/968, para. 12; two separate 
interviews with UN member state officials, New York, March 2012). 
In absence of clear de-listing criteria, the Ombudsperson also engages in 
rulemaking. The adoption of any type of review mechanism presupposes the adoption 
of general criteria for how individual cases are to be reviewed and under what 
circumstances de-listing would ensue. Supporting evidence would then be considered 
in view of prior accepted standards (Kanetake 2008: 168–169 prior to resolution 1904 
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(2009)). Consequently, since the UNSC has not provided any specific criteria that the 
Ombudsperson should apply, the Ombudsperson developed her own negative listing 
criteria. Accordingly, the Ombudsperson does not verify if the original listing was 
appropriate. Rather the Ombudsperson would recommend a delisting if no reliable 
information could be generated that would warrant a listing at the time of 
consideration (Prost/Wilmshurst 2013: 4–5). Therefore, the listing request has to pass 
the test of “whether there is sufficient information to provide a reasonable and 
credible basis for the listing” (‘sufficiency, reasonableness, credibility’ test, Prost 
2011). These criteria provide a benchmark evaluating a delisting request and the 
information provided. This standard along with the increasing number of petitions 
received standardizes the de-listing process, while the Ombudsperson still is flexible 
to take specifics of each case into account (Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 15). 
Concerning the effect on listing, the Ombudsperson has actually raised the 
incentives to provide well-reasoned listing proposals. This reinforced the committee 
members’ incentives to offer as much information as possible to place a successful 
listing request. Besides, this provides incentives to seriously consider the listing 
criteria and to adopt listing decisions not based on political considerations, because 
unreasonable decisions can be easily overturned (S/2012/49, para. 39; S/2012/590, 
paras 12-13, 31; Prost/Wilmshurst 2013: 5). Diplomats widely recognized the ex-ante 
effect of a potential future Ombudsperson petition: Designating states seek to provide 
listing requests that would stand an Ombudsperson procedure (interview with UN 
member state official, New York, March 2012). First, the information content for new 
designations was increased, a process that began even before the Ombudsperson. 
Second, designating states seek to rely more on unclassified material to bolster their 
cases and securing their sources (interview with UN member state official, New York, 
December 2013). Third, several frequent designating states including the US, which 
had been most reluctant to share confidential information in the past, have made so-
called ‘arrangements’ with the Ombudsperson on sharing confidential information 
(Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 20–21). 
As the Ombudsperson de-listing criteria mirror the listing criteria, Council 
members gain an interest in developing listing criteria that provide a useful basis for 
the review through the Ombudsperson ex-post. There is evidence that this had indeed 
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taken place (S/2012/968, para. 13). The Ombudsperson operates under specific 
opportunity structures that give incentives to not overstretch her competences. The 
prerogative of every committee member to take any petition to the Council provides 
incentives to provide only well-reasoned delisting recommendations because the 
Council could overturn her decisions. In addition, the fact that the Council has to 
extend her mandate regularly provides incentives to align her activities to the long-
term interests of committee members rather than the Ombudsperson’s own interests. 
Recently, the UNSC appointed Catherine Marchi-Uhel, former ICTY Head of 
Chambers, as new Ombudsperson when the incumbent reached her five year 
consultant contract limit (S/2015/459). 
In sum, the Ombudsperson review mechanism fosters the adherence of the 
committee members to previously agreed rules without systematically altering the 
opportunity structure of actors. It complements an increasingly well-advanced 
governance system that commits even the powerful permanent members to their long-
term interest in rule-based governance while preserving their principle privileges in 
decision-making. 
 
6.4 Chapter summary 
The Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee is a confirmatory case for the causal 
model of committee governance. While Councils members widely supported the Al-
Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime as a viable counter-terrorism tool, states’ interests 
within the sanctions regime diverged as states might abuse the sanctions regime to 
criminalize domestic opposition groups or for other geopolitical interests. As a result 
of this coordination situation, Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee mainly adopted 
rule-based decisions and even powerful committee members adhered to rules even if 
they had diverging case-specific preferences. 
The Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime provides confirmatory evidence for the 
effects of rulemaking, namely that if a group of states delegates implementation 
decisions to a committee and concentrates on guiding decisions in the subsequent 
implementation stage, under the constraints of rulemaking, these states adopt 
consistent substantive and procedural decision criteria. When the UNSC as primary or 
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the committee as secondary rulemaker elaborate rules to govern committee decision-
making, both face the expected effects of rulemaking associated with negotiating a 
consistent rule-set applicable over a range of cases. The constraints of rulemaking 
occur systematically and this finding is robust in four case episodes. In the second 
case episode, the Council members substantially regulated committee listing 
processes under the constraints of rulemaking to overcome the functional issues 
associated with the previous laissez-faire decision-making. The strengthened rules are 
strikingly consistent and do not particularly favor any powerful member. In the case 
episode on delistings, the initial blockade of delisting requests contributed to 
functional problems that created incentives for skeptical Council members to regulate 
committee decision-making under the constraints of rulemaking. In a fourth case 
episode, issues of committee governance on exemption procedures prompted Council 
and committee rulemaking. Single cases triggered the adoption of a rule that allowed 
for granting exemptions to individuals on the basis of general criteria and procedures. 
In the case episode on the blockade of Taliban delistings by a permanent member, 
creating a separate Taliban sanctions regime and the associated process of rulemaking 
created a set of consistent eligibility criteria despite the hesitation of one permanent 
member for Taliban delistings. 
As concerns rule-application, the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee strongly 
confirms that if committee members process separate and asymmetric decision 
proposals of limited scope, they abide by given substantive and procedural rules, even 
if these rules contradict situation-specific preferences of some members (hypothesis 
1). This effect is robust in four case episodes. The second episode of listing decisions 
shows that the separated processing of single case decisions on listing and the 
increasingly dense set of substantive and procedural criteria allowed committee 
members to reject unsubstantiated listing requests and transformed the committee 
listing process towards rule-based decision-making. In a third case episode, 
substantive and procedural criteria on delisting allowed committee members to delist 
unwarranted listings, while further self-regulation restricted the committee member’s 
discretion to dilute decisions through excessively using holds. The fourth case 
episode on exemptions decisions additionally confirms that committee decisions on 
exemption requests largely followed established procedures. Remarkably, the last 
case episode on Taliban delisting decisions shows that even powerful committee 
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members abided by the adopted rules on Taliban delistings after the committee was 
split. This transformed the Taliban sanctions committee into the mode of rule-based 
decision-making. 
The Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime yields three additional insights. First, the 
case episode of listing in the early phase of the sanctions regime provides a striking 
and unexpected case episode, which highlights that the causal mechanism only 
becomes relevant, if there is a conflict of interest among committee members and 
committee members are interested in the decisions taken. After 9/11, the committee 
listed a high number of individuals and entities suspected of being associated with Al-
Qaida neither prompting blockade nor rule-based decision-making. In absence of a 
conflict of interest and meaningful listing designation criteria, committee members 
simply adopted all decision requests regardless of their merits in a laissez-faire 
decision-making mode. However, the rapidly growing sanctions list posed substantial 
problems for member states implementation and undermined the willingness of non-
committee members to cooperate. In theoretical terms, this empirical finding 
highlights that sanctions committee members’ adherence to rules relies on a conflict 
of interest among Council members and their willingness to scrutinize decisions. 
Only such a conflict prompts the danger of blockade and the associated incentives for 
rule-based decision-making. Indeed, this mutual system of control was observed more 
intensively in later stages of the sanctions regime, which accordingly created the 
postulated effects of committee governance.  
Second, the separation of the Taliban sanctions regime from the Al-Qaida 
sanctions regime demonstrates that the committee cannot treat two entirely different 
types of sanctions targets with the same set of substantive decision criteria. When the 
Taliban increasingly disassociated from Al-Qaida, the committee could no longer 
meaningfully take any decision on the Taliban section of the sanctions list because 
decision rules did not reflect their changed characteristics as an Afghan political 
actor. Accordingly, the Council split the regime and provided separate decision 
criteria for Taliban members. Strikingly, the analysis has illustrated that the 
institutional separation of the Al-Qaida and the Taliban regimes provided completely 
different incentives, although the same group of states is present in the Council and in 
both committees, because each regime operates under regime-specific rules. 
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Third, the effects of committee governance occur even in the purely 
intergovernmental phase before the Council delegated competencies to the 
Ombudsperson. Although the Ombudsperson mechanism allows for reviewing and 
potentially overturning decisions of the Security Council, the creation of the 
Ombudsperson does not fundamentally alter the decision situation of committee 
members. Nevertheless, committee members gain additional incentives to adopt rule-
based and consistent decisions because unwarranted decisions can be quickly 
overturned. From a theoretical point of view, this episode highlights that independent 
agents with decision competencies can foster rule-based decision-making. However, 
the fundamental effects of committee governance occur even if the same group of 
actors retains all decisions for themselves. 
The alternative explanation, which holds that decisions produced in UNSC 
sanctions regimes can be explained by the interest constellation among powerful 
states, is not supported by empirical evidence. Neither is rulemaking abused by 
powerful members to insert exceptions into Council or committee rules, nor is there 
evidence that package deals or side payments provide a meaningful alternative 
explanation in this case. 
Overall, the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime provides for a well-suited case for 
analyzing the effects of committee governance within a sanctions regime with a 
particularly high decision workload. This regime is significant in as much it is the 
only global targeted sanctions regime countering transnational terrorism, has the 
largest sanctions list and developed particularly well-advanced procedures. At the 
same time, it is chiefly infamous among human rights scholars for the infringement of 
due process guarantees and fundamental rights of listed individuals. It sparked many 
court decisions and diplomatic initiatives to bring it more in line with fundamental 
rule of law principles. 
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7 The Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Committee 
– Targeted Sanctions and Civil War 
In July 2003, concerned about the continuing civil war in the Eastern provinces of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) resulting in large scale violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law and to support the peace process and the 
disarmament of militias, the Council imposed an arms embargo on armed groups 
operating in Eastern DRC (resolution 1493 (2003), paras 20, 21). Several months 
later, the UNSC created the DRC sanctions committee to monitor the arms embargo 
and to provide recommendations on further measures. Additionally, the UNSC 
established a Group of Experts to monitor the arms embargo and to provide a list of 
individuals who violate the arms embargo (resolution 1533 (2004), paras 8-10). In 
response to the ineffectiveness of these measures, in April 2005, the UNSC expanded 
the arms embargo to the whole DRC excluding only UN peacekeepers and integrated 
DRC army units (resolution 1596 (2005), paras 1-2), and adopted targeted sanctions 
including a travel ban and assets freeze on individuals and entities that violate the 
arms embargo (paras 13-16), which the committee should designate (Farrall 2007: 
410–418). Since then, the UNSC regularly extended, adapted and refined the 
sanctions measures, which are designed with a sunset clause.13 Overall, the sanctions 
committee is one of the mid-active committees and has engaged in modest listing and 
delisting activities. As of March 2016, the committee has adopted 41 listing decisions 
on individuals and entities, delisted one deceased individual and rejected eight 
delisting petitions. The DRC sanctions committee met about three to six times a year, 
with the exception of the particularly busy early years (up to 17 meetings per year 
from 2005 to 2007, see Table 1). 
The literature on the Security Council’s involvement in the DRC conflict 
predominantly neglects the DRC sanctions regime and in particular the workings of 
the sanctions committee. The conflict-oriented literature focusses on the origins and 
history of the conflict and the conflict parties (Prunier 2009; Ngolet 2011; Soderlund 
                                                 
13 Resolutions 1552 (2004), 1616 (2005), 1649 (2005), 1654 (2006), 1698 (2006), 1768 (2007), 
1771 (2007), 1799 (2008), 1804 (2008), 1807 (2008), 1857 (2008), 1896 (2009), 1952 (2010), 
2021 (2011), 2076 (2012), 2078 (2012), 2136 (2014), and 2198 (2015). 
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2012: 1–18; Carayannis 2013) the regional (Cassimon et al. 2013; Reyntjens 2010) 
and global ‘geopolitics’ (Gegout 2009; Turner 2013; Curtis 2013), the various 
peacekeeping missions ranging from ONUC and MONUC to MONUSCO (Doss 
2014; Soderlund 2012: 19–39; Tull 2009) and the EU missions (Major 2008; 
Brummer 2013; Gowan 2011). The sanctions-oriented literature exclusively deals 
with either descriptive accounts of UNSC sanctions measures and mandates of 
sanctions bodies (Farrall 2007: 411–418; Charron 2013: 80–83, 2011: 73–78; 
Sievers/Daws 2014: 526; Gambino 2014), the role of the DRC Group of Experts 
(Boucher 2010: 17–20; Boucher/Holt 2009: 31–34), the significance of sanctions on 
natural resources (Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2013) or the effectiveness of the sanctions 
regime (Wallensteen/Grusell 2012). In fact, an analysis of decision-making within the 
DRC sanctions regime is missing. 
Contrasting the existing literature, this chapter empirically traces the 
consequences of committee governance within the DRC sanctions regime for its 
decision-making and the content of the decisions taken. This chapter aims at 
analyzing whether the causal mechanism is present and actually leads to rule-based 
decision-making here. While one observes less procedural regulation than in other 
sanctions regimes, nevertheless, functional differentiation between UNSC and its 
committee created decision problems that are not the result of a conflict between the 
P3 on the one hand and China and Russia on the other hand, but rather resulting from 
the diverging interests among the P3, which have stakes in the sanctions regime. The 
DRC sanctions regime shows that committee members separately process listing 
requests. In addition, requestors align their decision proposals to relevant decision 
criteria, while the committee rejects decision proposals which diverge from decision 
criteria. Furthermore, Rwanda’s UNSC membership provides an exemplary case of 
how UNSC members anticipate a complete blockade of the committee’s work and 
how they deal with potentially obstructionist members through preventive procedural 
regulation and adoption of early decisions. All things considered, the DRC sanctions 
regime demonstrates that the theoretical mechanism provides a powerful explanation 
of decision-making in a case where the conflict is not between the P3 and Russia and 
China, but between the proactive P3 members. 
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The DRC sanctions regime complements the analysis with a sanctions regime 
listing individuals and entities that was way less in the focus of media reporting, 
policy makers and the human rights discourse as, for instance, the Al-Qaida/Taliban 
sanctions regime. The major attention to this regime was paid to the peacekeeping 
mission, one of the largest UN missions, and its EU support missions, while the 
sanctions regime was relatively marginalized in public attention. Even though this 
complicates data generation, the DRC sanctions regime provides a comparative 
perspective that controls for drawing premature and case-specific conclusions about 
the effects of external pressure gleaned from the particularly well-known and publicly 
scrutinized Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime, because factors usually associated 
with the development of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime were absent in the 
DRC sanctions regime. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: In the first section, the distribution of interests 
of the UNSC members, which actors drive the sanctions regime and if we therefore 
would expect the mechanism to be present are evaluated. In the second section, 
theoretically-relevant case episodes concerning the major functions of the sanctions 
regime, namely listing and delisting, are traced to explicate, how regulation is 
adopted and how the substantive and procedural decision criteria affect committee 
decision-making. In the third section, the theoretically relevant phase of Rwanda’s 
UNSC membership and how UNSC member preventively regulate committee 
procedures to overcome anticipated future blockade are analyzed. The final section 
concludes with a summary of major findings. 
 
7.1 The origins of the Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions 
regime 
Since the end of the Cold War, the DRC experienced three wars that had their origin 
in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the first of which led to the ousting of president 
Mobutu. In the second Congo war (‘Africa’s World war’, Prunier 2009), involving 
virtually all neighboring states, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, originally allied to the 
new president Laurent Kabila sought to replace Kabila by backing Congolese rebel 
militias resulting in one of the deadliest African conflicts prompting the intervention 
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of other neighbors on the governments side (Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe). After the 
unsuccessful 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the conflict parties could finally 
negotiate a peace deal in the Pretoria Agreement in 2002. The third Congo war began 
after foreign troops had withdrawn, which left a power vacuum in many areas, in 
particular in Eastern Congo. This vacuum led to the break out of a conflict made up 
from latent local, regional and international interlocking conflicts. The inability of the 
Congolese military to effectively control the territory and successfully reintegrate 
former combatants resulted in grave violations of international humanitarian law, 
human rights law, gender-based violence and the abuse of children as soldiers. Up 
until today, the conflict is further fueled by the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources financing rebel groups as well as the strong security interests of 
neighboring states (Soderlund 2012: 1–18; Carayannis 2013; Prunier 2009). 
The conflict was and still is characterized by the widespread proliferation of rebel 
groups, local militias and their splinter groups, which are supported to varying 
degrees by neighboring states. Roughly four groups of conflict actors can be 
distinguished. First, adversaries to Eastern neighbors, which include the Forces 
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), formed from Rwandan members 
of the 1994 ousted government seeking regime change in Rwanda, the FDLR splinter 
group Ralliement pour l’Unité et la Démocratie (RUD-Urunana), Mayi-Mayi militias, 
Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI), Forces de Résistance Patriotique 
d’Ituri (FRPI), all adversaries to Rwandan influence in Eastern DRC. In addition, the 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan predominately Muslim rebel group, 
allegedly supported by Sudan, is an adversary of the Ugandan government. The 
second group of conflict actors are rebel groups supported by Eastern neighbors, 
which include the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), adversary of 
the FDLR and in political opposition to the Kinshasa government, allegedly 
supported by Rwanda, since 2012, the Mouvement du 23-Mars (M23), supported by 
Rwanda and Uganda to counter the FDLR presence and the l’Union des patriotes 
congolais (UPC) also supported by Rwanda and Uganda. The third group of conflict 
actors are other relatively independent rebel militias and include the Forces Armées 
du People Congolais (FAPC) and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA). The fourth 
conflict actors is the regular Congolese military Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) (For an overview of non-state conflict actors, 
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Monusco 2015; Enough Project 2015; Integrated Regional Information Networks 
2010; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2014; Prunier 2009). 
In response to the situation in the DRC, Western powers, especially France, 
pushed for an increased UNSC involvement (Annan 2012: 117). Before creating the 
sanctions regime, the UNSC devoted significant attention to other tools of conflict 
resolution and had authorized an initial deployment of military observers (resolution 
1258 (1999)), which had been transformed into one of the largest UN peacekeeping 
operations (MONUC, resolution 1279 (1999), later MONUSCO) to monitor the - 
albeit unsuccessful - Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The UNSC expanded the 
peacekeeping operation in several follow-up resolutions and EU missions provided 
temporary support (1291 (2000), 1565 (2004), among others; Soderlund 2012: 28–39; 
Carayannis 2013: 189–194; Major 2008). Additionally, from 2000 to 2003, the UNSC 
established an “expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other 
forms of wealth” (S/PRST/2000/20, Repertoire 2000-3, Chapter V: 178-180; Rupiya 
2005: 5–9). Early on, this panel had suggested imposing targeted sanctions on 
individuals and entities illegally exploiting natural resources to build and sustain 
private militias in rebel-held areas (S/2001/1072, para. 160, S/2002/1146, para. 176; 
Carisch/Rickard-Martin 2013: 5–6). 
Even though the level of interest in the DRC sanctions regime was way less 
pronounced than in other sanctions regimes (for instance, UNSC members did not 
deliver statements on DRC sanctions, S/PV.4797, S/PV.4926, S/PV.5163), mainly due 
to UNSC’s focus on peacekeeping as conflict resolution tool, Council members had 
diverging interests. Among the P5, the interests diverged not along usual lines, but in 
between the states that favored sanctions (mainly France, UK and US), while China 
and Russia were largely indifferent or cautiously skeptical to sanctions. France, 
resulting from its historically grown commitment towards francophone African 
countries positioned itself as the leading permanent member on DRC and usually 
drafted resolutions under this agenda item (Agence France Presse 2005c; Leopold 
2005c). Thus, the French had a traditionally strong interest in the francophone DRC, 
subsequently contributed military units to stabilize the country (Annan 2012: 117; 
Doyle 2004: 89), donated significant development aid and tended to be supportive of 
the DRC government (SC/7057; Gegout 2009: 236). After the failure to stop the 
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Rwandan genocide, the UK tended to be supportive of the post-genocide anglophone 
Rwandan government and also supported its former colony Uganda (Doyle 2004: 89; 
Gegout 2009: 235). The US took a more modest position in between the two (Doyle 
2004: 89; Gegout 2009: 236). China, although it was generally skeptical about the use 
of sanctions and interference into domestic affairs of sovereign countries (see e.g. 
SC/7057), had resource interests, in particular in the conflict-prone but resource-rich 
Eastern DRC. In fact, “China’s economic involvement in Africa makes it sensitive to 
instability” (Curtis 2013: 559) so that China tended towards supporting the DRC 
government, including by providing military aid and contributing to peacekeeping 
operations (Wuthnow 2013: 33–35 at fn. 144; Holslag 2009; US Embassy Kinshasa 
2005b). Russia was mainly indifferent to the conflict, and cautioned not to adopt 
“hasty decisions based on emotions” (SC/7057). Apart from the permanent members, 
non-elected European members, including Belgium as former colonial power, were 
traditionally interested in the conflict and had pushed for a more pronounced Council 
involvement, including by authorizing EU missions (Major 2008: 15–16; Gegout 
2009: 236). Colombia and Mauritius as non-aligned UNSC members were skeptical 
of imposing sanctions (SC/7057). The DRC itself had urged that the UNSC “must act 
swiftly” on imposing sanctions (SC/7057). 
The fact that the DRC sanctions committee for most of the time had to deal with 
members, which are neighboring countries of the DRC and directly or indirectly 
involved in the conflict in one way or another posed a particular issue (Turner 2013: 
46–73). This is mainly due to the rotating system of the African non-permanent seats, 
where usually either a member of the Southern African subgroup or the Central 
African subgroup is represented (Security Council Report 2014: 6–7; 
Vreeland/Dreher 2014: 100, 103). For instance, when sanctions were imposed, UNSC 
members Zimbabwe and Namibia “fully supported the conclusions” of the expert 
group, the imposition of sanctions and further “preventive measures” on behalf of the 
DRC government (SC/7057). However, several potentially ‘problematic’ member 
states have served in the committee: Angola in 2003-2004, Republic of Congo (sic!) 
in 2006-2007 (both siding with the DRC government, Cassimon et al. 2013: 57; 
Carayannis 2013), and Uganda in 2009-2010 (supported DRC rebel militias since the 
second Congo war, Prunier 2009: 293–294; S/2001/357; S/2012/843). Of particular 
importance is Rwanda, non-permanent member in 2013-2014, which long-term 
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‘active role‘ in the conflict has been extensively documented (Security Council 
Report 2012a: 5; Cassimon et al. 2013: 48–58; Carayannis 2013, Group of Experts 
reports e.g. S/2012/348.Add1; S/2012/843). Most recently, Angola took a seat for the 
2015-2016 tenure (Security Council Report 2014: 4). 
As a result of the preference constellation, one would expect that committee 
governance has a substantial effect on committee decision-making. Although the 
Council members share an interest in the regime, or at least are indifferent towards it, 
the proactive P3 have diverging preferences within the sanctions regime and thus are 
likely to face coordination problems in situations of diverging interests. In such 
situations, substantive and procedural rules or precedents could provide focal points 
to coordinate behavior. Indeed, this would lead to expect that decision-making would 
be rule-based. However, because UNSC members generally have a less articulated 
interest in the sanctions regime than in other sanctions regimes, in effect, the 
regulatory density should be lower. 
With respect to the sanctions committee’s decision functions on individual 
targeted sanctions, the Council initially provided a set of substantive decision criteria, 
while it only fixed rudimentary decision procedures for the committee. The Council 
broadly mandated the committee to monitor the arms embargo and “to take 
appropriate action on (…) alleged violations [of the arms embargo]” (resolution 1533 
(2004), para. 8). Concerning the substantive decision criteria, with imposing targeted 
sanctions in resolution 1596 (2005), the Council provided initial listing criteria: 
Individuals and entities “as acting in violation of the [arms embargo]” (para. 13). 
Exemptions to the travel ban would be possible in case of “humanitarian need, 
including religious obligation, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption 
would further the objectives of the Council’s resolutions” (para. 14). Assets freeze 
exemptions were available for “basic expenses” upon notification and in absence of a 
negative committee decision and for “extraordinary expenses” subject to committee 
approval (para. 16, cf. Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime). Concerning the 
procedural criteria, the Council decided that the committee should “designate persons 
and entities (…) and regularly to update its list” (para. 18a), decide upon exemptions 
(para. 18d), but left the concrete procedures and required level of evidence up to the 
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committee, which should adopt committee guidelines “as may be necessary to 
facilitate implementation [of sanctions measures]” (para. 18e). 
 
7.2 Theoretically-relevant case episodes of decision-making 
The sanctions regime’s original decision-making procedures in several instances 
created governance issues associated with the separation of rulemaking and rule-
application. The following sections first study the particular demand for procedural 
and substantive rules, second, how rulemaking in the particular cases affected the 
creation of rules and third, if and how the rules actually changed committee members 
decision-making. 
7.2.1 Listing of individuals and entities – The struggle for decision criteria 
Two case episodes highlight the effects of committee governance within the DRC 
sanctions regime on the committee’s listing function. In a first case episode, the 
proactive members first need procedural rule to process decisions. In a second case 
episode, the P3’s diverging interests give rise to taking designation criteria as focal 
points. The case episode provides evidence that proactive members engage in a 
rigorous screening process of each individual request separately to place successful 
listings before proposing formal designations. 
7.2.1.1 The committee requires procedural criteria to adopt its first listing decisions 
The episode of initial listing decisions illustrates that the committee could overcome 
decision blockades by accepting procedural rules as focal points, even if those have 
been elaborated in a different sanctions committee. In effect, the absence of 
procedural rules precluded the committee from adopting listing decisions. In 
response, because the committee could not agree on its own committee guidelines, the 
committee used an external focal point, namely the relevant section of the Cote 
d’Ivoire guidelines, as a set of preliminary rules to process listing requests. 
Afterwards, the proactive committee members aligned their proposals to the 
substantive and procedural criteria and deliberated about the viability of listing 
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requests. Finally, the presence of rules prompted committee members to adopt a first 
set of individuals and entities subject to sanctions in line with the listing criteria. 
The resolutions establishing the sanctions regime provided substantive listing 
criteria, however, left the determination of exact listing procedure to the committee. 
Resolution 1596 (2005) stipulated that “(…) all persons designated by the Committee 
as acting in violation of the [arms embargo](…)” should be subject to travel ban and 
assets freeze, which included the so called “provision of any assistance (…) to all 
foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias” (1493 (2004), para. 13) and was 
specified to include “financing and financial assistance related to military activities” 
(1596 (2005), para. 1). In fact, while this provided a clear listing criterion and the 
Group of Experts previously had supplied abundant information on such alleged 
violations that would give rise to early designations, the procedural aspects of how a 
listing should commence were not yet fully determined. After a final deadline to 
conflict parties to comply with Council demands, the UNSC extended the sanctions 
regime for 12 months in July 2005 (resolution 1616 (2005); M2 Presswire 2005; 
Lederer 2005d) and the P3 started to gather listing proposals. 
The absence of a listing procedure initially prevented the committee from 
adopting listing decisions and the committee first had to engage in a difficult stage of 
rulemaking to process such listing requests, while no attempts for UNSC listing 
packages are observable (SCR Forecast November 2005a). The adoption of 
committee guidelines was particularly problematic. Although the committee came 
into existence in 2004, it took until 2010 to finally adopt a set of guidelines. The 
adoption of committee guidelines was discussed several times during these years. 
However, in absence of a consensus among committee members, no formal decision 
on the adoption of guidelines could be taken (e.g. S/2008/17, para. 28). 
Because the committee failed to agree on its own committee guidelines, in the 
meantime, to secure the committee’s ability to operate, the committee provisionally 
agreed to use the guidelines of another committee as precedent. Almost four months 
after the imposition of targeted sanctions, on 9 August 2005, during an informal 
committee meeting, the committee considered a set of “draft procedures for 
establishing and maintaining a list of individuals and entities subject to [targeted 
sanctions]”. However, as it was unable to agree on those draft procedures, the 
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committee approved the “temporary use” of the Côte d’Ivoire committee guidelines 
“for establishing its list” (S/2006/54, para. 12). 
The Cote d’Ivoire sanctions committee guidelines proved a useful precedent as 
focal point in case of no-agreement for two reasons. First, at the time these guidelines 
were the most recent and most elaborate of all committees.14 While other sanctions 
committees’ guidelines were outdated or nonexistent, the Cote d’Ivoire sanctions 
committee only recently, on 13 June 2005, had established its guidelines. These 
guidelines were even slightly more detailed than the Al-Qaida/Taliban committee 
guidelines. Because the Cote d’Ivoire guidelines itself had also been quite contentious 
and had only been adopted after “extensive discussions during various Committee 
meetings” (S/2006/55, para. 13), they provided a possibility to overcome conflict by 
simply accepting the precedent that was achieved by consensus decision of the same 
group of actors albeit within the Cote d’Ivoire committee. Second, although both 
committees had different Chairs, however, these usually worked closely together with 
the committee secretary who likely served both committees at the time and supported 
the Chair in drafting committee guidelines as sanctions branch secretaries are usually 
assigned to similar conflict portfolios.15 
The substantive and procedural criteria conform to the expected consistency 
requirement associated with rulemaking. The rules do not favor any particular party 
to the conflict and therefore any actor engaging in violations of the arms embargo 
could be subject to targeted sanctions. This included the exploitation of natural 
resources in rebel-held areas if it financed arms trafficking. Specifically, the Cote 
d’Ivoire guidelines stipulated that the committee decides by consensus on a listing 
proposal (para. 8a) within two days after receiving the request (para. 9a) under no-
objection procedure. Concerning requirements on the form of the listing proposals, 
the guidelines specified that UN member states have to submit a listing proposal in 
                                                 
14 As of August 2005, all other committees’ guidelines were substantially older or nonexistent: 
Sierra Leone sanctions committee (10 November 2004), Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee 
(10 April 2003), Iraq sanctions committee (11 June 2003), Liberia sanctions committee (16 March 
2004/31 August 2004). No guidelines: Sudan sanctions committee, Rwanda sanctions committee, 
Somalia sanctions committee. 
15 A website search using the “Way Back Machine” (http://web.archive.org/) reveals that the 
secretary served both committees at least in 2007 through 2013. 
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writing (para. 9a) and should provide a “narrative description of the information that 
justifies how that individual or entity fits within the [decision criteria]” (para. 8b). 
Further, designating states should provide “to the greatest extent possible, relevant, 
specific and up-to-date” identifying information (para. 8c). Finally, a listing decision 
should be published in a committee press release (para. 8e). 
After the committee had agreed on draft procedures for listing, the P3 decided to 
propose a first list of potential designees (SCR Forecast November 2005a) and sought 
to pursue those requests that best fit the listing criteria. A US cable from its Kinshasa 
embassy provides reason to believe that the lists were carefully scrutinized and at 
least one individual (FARDC Air Force Commander John Numbi) was not further 
pursued because the US expressed its concerns about listing the individual “unless 
there is viable evidence (…) demonstrating his involvement with illegal arms 
trafficking”, i.e. the listing criterion and further noted that adding “a government 
official on the list based on nothing more than rumors would risk undermining the 
credibility of the sanctions program” (US Embassy Kinshasa 2005a). 
The P3 proposed a list of 15 individuals and one entity for designation under no-
objection procedure. The listed individuals were all associated with major rebel 
groups operating in Eastern DRC including Rwandan and/or Ugandan supported 
groups (Frank Bwambale, RCD-ML leader; Germain Katanga, FRPI chief, now 
General in FARDC; Jérôme Kakwavu, Former President of UCD/FAPC, now General 
in FARDC; Kawa Panga Mandro, PUSIC Ex-President; Laurent Nkunda, Former 
RCD-G General), anti-Rwandan/Ugandan militias (Bosco Ntaganda, UPC/L military 
commander; Thomas Lubanga, UPC/L President; Sylvestre Mudacumura, FDLR 
Commander; Ignace Murwanashyaka, FDLR President; Matthieu Ngudjolo, FNI 
Chief of Staff; Floribert Ngabu, FNI President) and other individuals and entities 
implicated in violation of the arms embargo (Jules Mutebusi, Former FARDC Deputy 
Regional Commander; James Nyakuni, weapons trader; Ozia Mazio, President 
Fédération des enterprises du Congo in Aru territory, providing financial assistance to 
FAPC rebel group; Douglas Mpano, Manager of Compagnie Aérienne des Grands 
Lacs, weapons airlifts; Tous pour la Paix et le Developpment, supplying trucks for 
arms smuggling to RCD-G). The list includes mostly DRC nationals, but also 
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Rwandan and Ugandan nationals. The committee adopted the list on 1 November 
2005. 
The successfully adopted requests provide reason to believe that committee 
members indeed decided according to rules and there is little evidence for a package 
deal. While a package deal could not principally be ruled out as alternative 
explanation, it is unlikely. First, the information provided for listing requests 
resembles the listing criterion of violation of the arms embargo. As for justification, 
six individuals were designated for direct weapons transfers in violation of the arms 
embargo, seven individuals were designated for being in direct command of a major 
rebel group found in violation of the arms embargo and two individuals and one 
entity were designated for other forms of “provision of assistance” in violating the 
arms embargo (SC/8546, States News Service 2005c; BBC 2005; Agence France 
Presse 2005d). Second, for all proposed designations, the listing request includes a 
short justification as how the individuals are linked to the listing criteria. Third, for 
seven individuals and the listed entity, arms embargo violations had been previously 
documented in Group of Expert reports (S/2005/30, S/2005/436, S/2004/551). 
In sum, this episode shows that the causal mechanism of functional 
differentiation prompted the committee to adopt rule-based decisions. Initially, while 
being supplied with substantive rules, requests by proactive members could not be 
processed in the absence of procedural rules due to a committee blockade on 
committee guidelines. To remedy the situation, the committee proceeded through 
preliminarily adopting the relevant listing section of the Cote d’Ivoire guidelines as 
precedent. Then, committee members aligned their decision proposals to pre-defined 
criteria to place successful decision requests. At least one non-conforming request 
was previously sorted out. All adopted decisions resembled the decision criteria and 
justifications relied on the decision criteria to build strong cases. Neither a 
comprehensive package deal nor bribes to change the calculation of dissenting 
committee members can be observed. 
7.2.1.2 Substantive decision rules provide focal points for listing requests among P3 
The episode of listing proposals in the wake of the DRC elections 2006 illustrates that 
new designation criteria served as a focal point to overcome diverging interests 
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among the powerful P3. On the Council level, defining decision criteria was subject 
to a consistency requirement. On the committee level, the proactive members wishing 
to place successful listing requests needed to carefully assemble convincing listing 
proposals. Although these states principally want sanctions imposed, they rigorously 
ensure that each proposed individual separately conforms to the designation criteria 
as well as fulfills informational requirements and evidentiary standards, usually two 
sources of evidence. Five batches of listing requests demonstrate that functional 
differentiation within the DRC sanctions regime indeed prompts rule-based decisions 
through a detailed screening process of proactive members. While below threshold 
requests are rejected, above threshold requests are accepted. Even powerful states 
pursuing listing requests have to provide convincing arguments to garner support. 
At this stage, generally, none of the Council members vocally opposed the 
sanctions regime and there was widespread support for the sanctions regime and 
potential new listings (SCR Forecast July 2006), while the proactive members and 
neighboring states of DRC had diverging interest. Whereas the UK was leaning 
towards supporting Rwanda, France tended to support the DRC government (see 
Doyle 2004). In this phase, Council members UK, France, and Tanzania were 
particularly concerned about the lack of progress in disarming foreign militias and 
suggested new targeted sanctions against political and military leaders of such groups 
(SCR Forecast April 2006a; SCR Forecast June 2006a). Earlier, Burundi, the DRC, 
Uganda and Rwanda, despite tensions between them, had called upon the UNSC to 
impose sanctions on rebel leaders (Agence France Presse 2006d, 2006e). 
On the Council level, upon a French initiative, in the wake of a Council mission 
to the Great Lakes region and although the sanctions regime had already been 
extended well into July, the Council adopted a new resolution to increase pressure on 
the conflict parties through a refinement of designation criteria (resolution 1649 
(2005), Deutsche Presse Agentur 2005; Wasswa 2005). Accordingly, the change in 
criteria was not sparked by committee decision-making issues. Rather the Council 
refined designation criteria for overarching political considerations to increase 
pressure on belligerents and their supporters (Wasswa 2005; Lederer 2005e; SCR 
Update Report 2005). While the draft resolution had been relatively uncontentious, 
despite some general skepticism by Algeria, China and Russia on sanctions, the 
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resolution drafters mainly sought to gain support of the DRC and its neighboring 
states Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, which all have direct security interests in the 
DRC. Without these states’ support, sanctions implementation would be patchy at 
best (SCR Update Report 2005). 
Accordingly, in December 2005, the UNSC unanimously extended the applicable 
listing criteria to “(a) political and military leaders of foreign armed groups operating 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who impede the disarmament and the 
voluntary repatriation or resettlement of combatants belonging to those groups, [and] 
(b) political and military leaders of Congolese militias receiving support from outside 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in particular those operating in Ituri, who 
impede the participation of their combatants in disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration processes” (resolution 1649 (2005), para. 2ab). In addition, in July 2006, 
the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1698 (2006) as a regular sanctions 
extension with some modifications. The Council further extended the listing criteria 
to include “[p]olitical and military leaders recruiting or using children in armed 
conflict” and “[i]ndividuals committing serious violations of international law 
involving the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict, including killing 
and maiming, sexual violence, abduction and forced displacement” (para. 13) 
reflecting the Councils thematic agendas on ‘Children and Armed Conflict’ and the 
‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’. Concerning procedural provisions, the 
Council again delegated the listing decisions following the refined designation criteria 
to the sanctions committee (Lederer 2005e). The mandate of the Group of Experts 
was extended to include assisting the committee in designating individuals (para. 5h) 
and to present more detailed recommendations on preventing illegal exploitation of 
natural resources (para. 6). 
On 13 March 2008, responding to the continued violence from FDLR and other 
Rwandan armed groups operating in the DRC opposing the Rwandan government, 
which had not been parties to the Goma agreements of 23 January 2008 (BBC 2008), 
the UNSC adopted a FDLR-specific resolution 1804 (2008) to signal its support for 
the peace process (Agence France Presse 2008b; Secretary of State 2008b). The 
UNSC demanded that all such Rwandan groups lay down their weapons and stop 
recruiting children and stop all forms of gender-based violence, while reaffirming the 
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sanctions designation criteria that would also apply to “leaders of the FDLR, ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and other Rwandan armed groups” (Xinhua 2008; Agence France 
Presse 2008b). While there was some haggling over the text of resolution 1804 (2008) 
and there was no specific listing criterion for the FDLR before (Secretary of State 
2008b), the previous designation criteria of “foreign armed groups” or “Congolese 
militias receiving outside support” would have included the FDLR. 
The amended substantive criteria confirm the expected consistency requirement, 
which should be observable in Council rulemaking under diverging interests. The 
substantive listing criteria do not one-sidedly favor any of the powerful members or 
conflict parties. Hence, any political or military leader of principally all conflict 
parties engaging in violations or refusing to disarm could be designated to the 
sanctions list. This would include the FDLR, but also a range of other armed groups. 
As such, the adopted resolution simply acknowledges previously existing listing 
criteria, which were consolidated into one comprehensive paragraph shortly 
afterwards (resolution 1807 (2008), para. 13). 
All five subsequent listing initiatives until late 2012 prove that proactive 
members aligned their listing proposals to substantive rules to overcome diverging 
interests on new designations in a coordination situation and that the committee 
indeed adopted rule-based decisions. As a first listing initiative, after the adoption of 
resolution 1649 (2005), the UK and France considered to pursue further listings based 
on the annexes of groups of experts reports that suggested several names for inclusion 
into the sanctions list (S/2006/1048, para. 21; Bolton 2006b). In a first rudimentary 
proposal, the UK circulated a list of 35 potential sanctions targets belonging to 
several rebel militias in May 2006. 23 individuals were associated with the FDLR, 
three with the Mayi Mayi, both groups opposed to the Rwandan government, four 
with the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC) and five other (including 
members from The Rastas, an FDLR splinter group) (Bolton 2006a). 
However, the UK did not further pursue this listing request for two reasons. First, 
the listing suggestion did not provide sufficient information to place a successful 
listing. The listing request did not establish why particular individuals should be 
listed and also lacked any substantive identifying information on the large majority of 
individuals (Bolton 2006a). Second, the UK, supported by France and the US, 
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deferred to push for further sanctions until early 2007, mainly because they did not 
want to destabilize the fragile situation surrounding the 2006 presidential and 
parliamentary elections (SCR Forecast July 2006; SCR Forecast November 2006a), 
which sparked subsequent post-electoral violence and allegations of election rigging 
(Prunier 2009: 309–315). In addition, the major focus of Council members was drawn 
on securing the election process through the UN stabilization mission (MONUC) and 
the EU-led peacekeeping mission (EUFOR) (Major 2008) and possible MONUC 
draw down after the election due to budgetary concerns (SCR Forecast September 
2006). 
Internally, however, the P3 continued to exchange detailed arguments about who 
should be listed and for what reasons against the Council designation criteria. All 
such proposals were based on the condition that a convincing P3 proposal would be 
elaborated to prevent holds of other P3 members (Bolton 2006a, 2006b). Notably, the 
UK assembled a new, different and much shorter proposal based on listing 
recommendations that the Group of Experts issued in their June 2006 report. The UK 
considered possessing enough evidence on two individuals (Kisoni Kambale, Omar 
Oria) and two entities (Uganda Commercial Impex (UCI), Machanga Ltd.). 
Regarding the two individuals, the UK argued that Kisoni “is referred to in the 
Group’s confidential annex as ‘an economic proxy of the FNI’, and the Group 
documented his role in militia-financing gold trading (buying from the FNI and 
selling to UCI) in their report S/2005/30 paras 127-130” (Bolton 2006b). In addition, 
the UK noted that the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report ‘Curse of Gold’ “supports 
these allegations, and also refers to the use of Kisoni’s aeroplanes to fly in military 
supplies to the FNI. It is our view that Kisoni’s support of the FNI constitutes 
‘provision of assistance’ to illegal armed groups, in breach of the arms embargo as per 
[paragraph] 18 of SCR 1493 and [paragraph] 1 of SCR 1596” (Bolton 2006b). In 
contrast, regarding Omar Oria, the UK only stated that they considered him eligible 
for designation “for the same reasons as described above for Dr. Kisoni”, without 
provided particular evidence as how Omar Oria fits the listing criteria (Bolton 
2006b). 
Concerning UCI, the UK believed “the Group of Experts’ claim that UCI has 
bought from gold traders in the DRC who have financed illegal armed groups in the 
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DRC is well-founded. This was well-documented in the Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
report ‘The Curse of Gold’ (2005), as well as in the Groups’ own reports. We consider 
this to constitute ‘provision of assistance’ to illegal armed groups, in breach of the 
arms embargo as per [paragraph] 18 of SCR 1493 and [paragraph] 1 of SCR 1596” 
(Bolton 2006b). Concerning Machanga, the UK maintained that Machanga “is 
documented as having bought from Ozia Mazio (now himself listed) in the Group of 
Experts report S/2005/30 (paras 116-126) and from Omar Oria in the HRW ‘Curse of 
Gold’ report. Both of these individuals (…) are collaborators and financial backers of 
Commandant Jerome and his FAPC illegal armed group. Listing Machanga would not 
only be consistent with listing UCI; it would increase the effectiveness of the 
measures” (Bolton 2006b). 
Simultaneously, the UK argued extensively for not listing two other entities 
(Hussar/Hussar Services, a British company, and Argor-Hereaus, a Swiss company) 
and one individual (Modeste Makabuza). The UK stressed that these entities had 
already changed behavior as a result of public criticism and have cooperated with the 
Group of Experts (Bolton 2006b). Concerning Modeste Makabuza, while the UK 
acknowledged that his activities including “provision of assistance to ‘men from 
Nkunda’s group’ in December 05 to be in breach of the embargo to which targeted 
sanctions might be an appropriate response (…)”, however, objected to listing 
because “the Group of Experts quotes only one source (Colonel Kasikila) to support 
this allegation. We believe Kasikila is a fundamentally unreliable source, particularly 
since he is likely to view Makabuza as a rival in the mining business. We have not 
been able to confirm this allegation from any other sources ourselves” (Bolton 
2006b). 
To achieve consensus, the P3 dropped weakly supported or outdated requests 
(Omar Oria, Modeste Makabuza, Hussar/Hussar and Argor-Hereaus) and further 
elaborated on those which fitted the decision criteria and were equipped with 
convincing documentation, while adding two entities associated with the well-
founded Kisoni designation (Butembo Airlines, Congocom Tradinghouse), one entity 
associated with the already listed Douglas Mpano (Great Lakes Business Company) 
and one FDLR leader (Straton Musoni). Butembo Airlines, directed by Kisoni, was 
implicated in gold smuggling financing arms embargo violations (S/2005/30, paras 
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127-130). Congocom Tradinghouse is a gold trading entity owned by Kisoni (van 
Woudenberg 2005). The cargo airline Great Lakes Business Company, owned by 
Douglas Mpano, was implicated for using its aircraft to transfer weapons in violation 
of the arms embargo (S/2005/30, para. 144, S/2006/53, paras 154-155). In addition, 
the P3 added Straton Musoni as leader of FDLR, and for being associated with the 
already listed Ignace Murwanashyaka, thus fulfilling the designation criteria of 
resolution 1649 (2005). 
In December 2006, after the DRC elections, the P3 presented separate listing 
proposals comprising of two individuals and five entities to the sanctions committee 
(US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007m; SCR Forecast December 2006). In effect, 
the listing proposals built upon earlier UK and French proposals, while taking the 
requests with the most reliable identifiers and evidentiary information available 
bolstered with additional information. Before formally introducing the listing 
requests, the P3 sought to garner the support of other committee members arguing 
that the proposed individuals and entities “(…) have been involved in violations of 
the weapons embargo, in gold trade with rebel groups and have otherwise played a 
role in undermining stability in the DROC”, which were sanctionable acts under 
relevant UNSC resolutions (US Embassy Beijing 2007b; US Embassy Rome 2007a). 
Accordingly, two individuals (Straton Musoni, FDLR leader; Kisoni Kambale, gold 
trading and financing of FNI illegal armed group) and five entities (Uganda 
Commercial Impex, gold trade linked to militias constituting “provision of 
assistance” in violation of arms embargo; Machanga Ltd., gold trade linked to militias 
constituting “provision of assistance” in violation of arms embargo; Butembo 
Airlines, smuggling of gold and arms; Congocom Tradinghouse, owned by Kisoni 
and involved in gold trade linked to militias constituting “provision of assistance” in 
violation of arms embargo; Great Lakes Business Company, transport of arms) were 
added to the sanctions list on 29 March 2007 (SC/8987, US Department of Treasury 
2007). 
The listing requests following resolution 1649 (2005) suggest that committee 
members adopted decisions in line with decision criteria. Again, a package deal is 
unlikely. First, sanctions proponents explicitly aligned the listing requests to the 
designation criteria of resolutions 1596 (2004) and 1649 (2005). In addition, besides 
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FDLR leader Musoni, all of the designated individuals and entities have also been 
mentioned for violations in earlier Group of Experts reports (S/2005/30; S/2006/53). 
Then, the P3 dropped weakly supported requests and finally continued to pursue only 
those requests for which they had well-documented evidence and argued why a 
particular individual or entity should be included and why others should be dropped. 
A second listing initiative, on 15 May 2008, the conflict-party Rwanda made use 
of the applicable resolutions and sent a list of 19 individuals for designation to the 
committee (S/2010/93, p.2). These requests solely concerned individuals associated 
with the FDLR rebel group, an adversary of the Rwandan government and its 
interests in Eastern DRC. Four Western committee members, US, UK, France and 
Belgium immediately placed holds on the Rwandan request for two reasons (US State 
Department 2008d; SCR Forecast May 2010). First, the list lacked even basic 
identifiers such as date of birth, full (correct) names and aliases as well as additional 
essential information on location, nationality, passport numbers, among others (US 
State Department 2008d), which clearly did not conform with the requirements set 
out in the committee guidelines (see Cote d’Ivoire guidelines Apr 2007, para. 8c; US 
State Department 2008d). Second, more importantly, the listing requests fell short of 
explaining how “each individual meets the listing criteria” as outlined in UNSC 
resolutions (US State Department 2008a, 2008c, 2009). Interestingly, also the UK, 
which usually tended to be supportive of the Rwandan government and also had 
pursued FDLR sanctions before (see section 7.2.1.2), placed a hold (US State 
Department 2009; US Permanent Mission to the UN 2008e). 
Although the proactive members including the P3 and Belgium supported new 
sanctions principally, they carefully screened each individual listing suggestion if 
each of them individually met both informational and evidentiary requirements of the 
sanctions committee (US Embassy Paris 2008c). In early August 2008, because the 
P3 did not support the listing in their current form, the US, in collaboration with 
France, UK and Belgium took the initiative for new listings including some of the – 
albeit rudimentary – suggestions from Rwanda. While the UK was the most 
progressive, the French were hesitant among the P3. Thus, the US expected 
disagreements even among its “allies” so that it requested the four countries to first 
keep potential designations within the group of “like-minded Council members” to 
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avoid “public disagreements in the sanctions committees” (US State Department 
2008d). On 5 June 2008, the US circulated a list of eight “primary” targets, for which 
the “preliminary assessment of the evidence available to the (…)[US Government] 
indicates that there may be sufficient available information to designate these 
individuals” (US State Department 2008a) requesting the allies to contribute 
information to bolster the requests. While dropping one entry (Anastase 
Munyandekwe), for which no information on any current involvement with FDLR 
was available, the US incorporated incoming information from the UK, France, 
Belgium and Rwanda on the seven remaining targets into their proposal and added 
eight other individuals as potential targets, which did not have any identifiers (US 
State Department 2008c). The US embassy in Kigali was requested to seek to obtain 
relevant information from Rwandan authorities, explicitly demanding basic identifiers 
and highlighting that for successful designation “[p]ersons or entities proposed for 
listing must meet one or more of the listing criteria from operative paragraph 13 of 
UNSC resolution 1807 (2008)” (US State Department 2008c).  
After the information gathering phase, to place successful requests, the proactive 
members decided to pursue only those listings, which best fulfilled the evidentiary 
standards and informational requirements. The US, UK, France and Belgium entered 
into an arguing process on who should be designated and for whom more information 
would be required to meet committee standards. After France had voiced concerns 
about listings that only have one information source, in this case Rwanda, the initial 
list was split into “two potential tiers” according to the quality of information 
available. While tier one constituted six names “for which our governments have 
significant information”, the second tier consisted of eight names, however, with 
incomplete information (US State Department 2008d). While the UK signaled 
support for five tier one names (US Embassy London 2008b), in October 2008, two 
names of tier one were transferred to tier two. The first individual was removed as it 
had less information compared to other tier one requests and for the second 
individual, while the UK and France requested more information, Belgium believed 
that “the information available on Hakizimana does not confirm that the individual 
currently meets the designation criteria” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2008e). 
The information available was formed into four listing requests each accompanied 
with identifying information and a justification for listing (“evidentiary package”). 
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Before submission, the UK insisted that it “strongly prefers” to include explicit 
references as to which designation criterion applies for each individual and to bolster 
three of the four requests with further information on the recruitment of child soldiers 
from Panel of Experts reports (US Embassy London 2009a; Secretary of State 
2009a). To finalize tier one listings, US, France and UK (Belgium had rotated off the 
Council), requested Rwanda to re-submit these four names as provided by the US 
because “[n]on-western governments should be encouraged to propose listings (…)” 
(US State Department 2009). However, Rwanda refused to re-submit the four names 
instead of the 19 originally proposed. Accordingly, to process the requests, the US 
turned its “temporary ‘hold’” on Rwanda’s request to a “permanent ‘block’ due to 
inadequate identifiers in the 2008 submission” and emphasized that “Rwanda will 
need to provide the required information for any subsequent submissions” (Secretary 
of State 2009a). The committee accepted the four tier one requests on 3 March 2009 
(SC/9608). 
The P3 repeated the same arguing and screening process for the remaining five 
FDLR tier two names whereby the individuals with little substantiating information 
were deleted, while other well-documented names were added in reaction to newly 
reported violations (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2009c). France agreed to 
designate Gaston Iyamuremye (“Second Vice President of FDLR”, US State 
Department 2008d), Emmanuel Ruzindana (“FDLR Political Commissioner”, US 
State Department 2008d), and Juma Ngilinshuti (“FDLR external relations 
commissioner”, S/2008/43, para. 40) while the UK and US regarded all three 
individuals as suitable target “provided receipt of more information”. There was little 
support for Apollinaire Hakizimana (“FDLR Defense Commissioner”, US State 
Department 2008d) and Leodomir Mugaragu (“FOCA Chief of Staff”, US State 
Department 2008d). In essence, the P3 agreed that more information was needed on 
all candidates to submit individually successful proposals (US Permanent Mission to 
the UN 2009c). Therefore, because information gathering endeavors for Hakizimana, 
Ruzindana and Ngilinshuti were unsuccessful (for instance, panel of expert reports 
contained no evidence for violations by these individuals, S/2008/43, S/2008/772, 
S/2008/773) and the individuals being of a lower rank, these individuals were 
dropped. On the contrary, the proposal on Iyamuremye was bolstered with additional 
information stemming from Group of Experts reports that provided evidence that he 
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is second vice-president of FDLR and core member of the “FDLR military high 
command” (S/2009/603, para. 91, Annex 16-17). The individual Mugaragu was 
relatively uncomplicated and augmented with evidence stemming from “open-source 
and official reporting” (SC/10099), since it was well-established that Mugaragu was 
FOCA Chief of Staff, the FDLR’s armed wing (e.g. see S/2009/603, para. 91, Annex 
16-17; International Crisis Group 2009: 34). Further, the P3 prepared a listing request 
for two additional individuals based on new Group of Experts evidence. Félicien 
Nsanzubukire, 1st FDLR battalion leader would be implicated for violations of arms 
embargo citing Group of Experts evidence (S/2009/603, paras 70-71). Felicien 
Zimurinda, former Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) member now 
integrated into FARDC, would be designated being responsible for deliberate attacks 
against the civilian population (S/2010/596, paras 135-136; S/2009/603) and as a 
“notorious perpetrator” of recruiting child soldiers (S/2010/596, paras 135-136; CAC 
report S/2010/369, para. 65). The P3 co-designated the four individual requests, 
which the committee adopted accordingly on 1 December 2010 (SC/10099; Agence 
France Presse 2010). 
A third listing initiative, a subsequent Rwandan attempt to list individuals 
(S/2010/93) reflects the tendency of committee members to carefully scrutinize listing 
requests and to reject listing proposals that are below a certain threshold level of 
information so that every request has to rely on at least two or more sources of 
information. This time building upon a Group of Experts report, which cited FDLR 
sanctions violations, however, without calling for listings (S/2009/603), Rwanda 
requested the listing of one RUD-Urunana supporter, a FDLR splinter group, and four 
FDLR supporters (S/2010/93 of 19 February 2010). The five requests were 
reasonable to be rejected for four reasons. First, three requests completely lacked 
sufficient identifying information. Second, the five requests did not contain at least 
two sources of information as they built solely on the Group of Expert reports that the 
Group itself did not mean to provide as sanctions designations. Some parts of the 
listing request consisted of complete sections of the report. Third, the justification, at 
least for two individuals, relied only on outdated or singular events. For instance, the 
request to add Lt. Col. Nizeyimana was merely founded on allegations of activities in 
1994 (death of Belgian soldiers), 2001 (leader of a small rebel group), 2004 (RUD 
liaison officer) and an incident of recruitment based on two unidentified interviews 
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(S/2010/93, pp. 3-4). Fourth, Rwanda further weakened its own listing requested by 
submitting it in a public letter, as this would give sanctions targets plenty of 
opportunities for assets flight. Holds have been placed on these listings for further 
information (SCR Forecast May 2010). To date, none of these names have been 
listed. 
A fourth listing initiative concerned a Ugandan listing request of late 2010, 
proposing Jamil Mukulu associated with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (SCR 
Forecast February 2011; What’s in Blue 2011b) and shows that even small states can 
place successful listing requests if they conform to the listing criteria and the 
evidentiary threshold. ADF is a Ugandan rebel group in opposition to the Ugandan 
government operating in DRC which seeks introduction of Sharia law in Uganda 
(Monusco 2015), and is allegedly support by Sudan. Several P5 committee members, 
including Russia, placed a hold on the request, while Russia lifted its hold in July 
2011 (What’s in Blue 2011b). On 13 October 2011, after P3 members had assembled 
additional information and lifted their holds, the individual was listed based on his 
position as “the military leader of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a foreign 
armed group operating in the DRC that impedes the disarmament, (…) repatriation or 
resettlement (…), as described in paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1857 (2008)” and 
providing information based on “multiple sources” (SC/10410, SCR Forecast 
November 2011). 
A fifth listing initiative successfully commencing the Mayi Mayi listing of 28 
November 2011 shows that even disputed listing criteria of human rights violations 
can lead to successful listing requests, if requestors are able to assemble strong 
evidence for their case. Generally, pursuing listings based on human rights violations 
proved difficult because identities of perpetrators are rarely reliably reported in the 
quality needed for successful listing (S/2009/253, para. 87; SCR Forecast November 
2009; Charron 2011: 101). For that reasons it was disputed among committee 
members as a suitable listing criterion. Upon a P3 initiative, the committee listed 
Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, the “Commander-in-Chief of the political branch of the Mayi 
Mayi Sheka” as a “political leader of a Congolese armed group” (SC/10461). For 
justification, the decision notes his responsibility for the “series of attacks in Walikale 
territory” resulting in mass violation of children’s rights (Worsnip 2011; UN 
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Permanent Missions of France, UK and US 2011). This case of well-documented 
mass rape (e.g. Worsnip 2011) gained the attention of Margot Wallström, the UN 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, who 
advocated for Council action on such violations in the DRC, and had been previously 
condemned in a UNSC presidential press statement (SC/10016; see Carisch/Rickard-
Martin 2011: 12). 
Concluding, this case episode shows that the listing process in the DRC sanctions 
regime prompted rule-based decision-making. On the Council level, decision criteria 
adopted to address the situation in DRC were quite consistent. On the committee 
level, the episode demonstrates that powerful members could meaningfully use 
designation criteria and informal rules as focal points to solve problems of diverging 
interest among themselves. Thereby, the listing process and P3 prescreening of 
potential listing candidate followed informal rules. First, individuals needed to be 
either high-level political or military leaders of an armed group or otherwise directly 
related to one of the Council listing criteria. Second, the request had to be 
accompanied by evidence, usually from two sources, and sufficient identifying 
information for implementation. Third, the individual’s sanctionable behavior had to 
be in close temporal relation to the listing. In effect, proactive members consistently 
sorted out listing proposals that fell below the established standards concerning 
justification and identifiers. At the same time, well-documented listing proposals were 
accepted even if they originated from less powerful states. 
 
7.2.2 Delisting procedure prompts rule-based decisions 
The episode of the committee’s consideration of delisting requests exemplifies that 
committee members processed such requests in the mode of rule-based decision-
making. While committee members accepted to accede to one substantiated delisting 
request, they refused to delist unsubstantiated delisting requests. At least in one case, 
objecting committee members felt compelled to justify why the individual warrants 
continued listing even though there was no obligation to provide new information. 
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In the early phase of the DRC sanctions committee, there was no need for 
regulating its delisting procedure, simply because no individual or entity requested 
delisting and therefore no decision-making issues could have been prompted by 
individual single cases.16 Nevertheless, in 2005, when the UNSC added targeted 
sanctions to the DRC sanctions regime, it was already a standard procedure for 
sanctions committees, following the Al-Qaida/Taliban precedent, to adopt some form 
of delisting procedure, because any listing could lead to a potential delisting request. 
This is a viable strategy to signal to sanctions targets that their behavioral change 
might eventually result in their delisting. Hence, the UNSC and the committee 
preventively adopted a rudimentary delisting procedure that was subsequently 
refined. Because there were no decision proposals, adopting decision packages to 
circumvent rulemaking was out of question. Rather, after the committee had agreed 
on a rudimentary and intergovernmental delisting procedure, the UNSC slightly 
changed the procedure in response to the criticism associated with the lack of due 
process guarantees for listed individuals that had led to the introduction of the Focal 
Point procedure (see section 6.2.3 above; Biersteker/Eckert 2006, 2009). 
Essentially, concerning substantive decision standards, the UNSC and the 
committee established purely negative listing criteria in accordance with the Focal 
Point procedure as a basis for delisting (Kanetake 2008: 162–163; Biersteker/Eckert 
2009). Previously, the UNSC merely tasked the committee “regularly to update its 
list” without saying under which substantive criteria a delisting could commence 
(resolution 1596 (2005), para. 18a), a formulation reiterated until resolution 1807 
(2008, para. 15e). In resolution 1857 (2008), the UNSC for the first time directly 
ordered the committee to consider delisting requests of individuals and entities “who 
no longer meet the criteria” (para. 23) for listing and acknowledged the Focal Point 
procedure (paras 21-22). On the committee level, concerning the procedural criteria, 
the committee slightly changed initially committee delisting procedure that relied on 
the member states cooperation in forwarding petitions to the committee, to account 
                                                 
16 The first 16 listings had been adopted on 1 November 2005 (SC/8546). The Focal Point was 
introduced in December 2006. Committee annual reports and Security Council Report as well as 
searches in the WikiLeaks and LexisNexis databases revealed no information on any delistings 
prior to the Focal Point. 
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for petitions received via the Focal Point mechanism, although this did not 
substantially change the intergovernmental decision procedure, because a petition at 
least required one UN member state to support the request and relied on a consensus 
committee decision (guidelines April 2007, para. 10). Because all DRC designations 
had been proposed by at least one permanent member, essentially, the designating 
states could block any delisting petition. The committee adopted a more refined, but 
principally unchanged intergovernmental delisting procedure in its own guidelines in 
August 2010, highlighting the committees mandate to “confirm that [each] listing 
remains appropriate” (para. 2f). The committee clarified that besides individuals via 
the Focal Point, every UN member state could principally submit such delisting 
requests. In addition, the committee provided that petitioners “should explain in the 
de-listing request why the designation does not or no longer meets the [decision] 
criteria (…), through countering the reasons for listing as stated in the narrative 
summary”, including supporting documentation (para. 7e). 
One can observe that the rules were consistent and did not contain any special 
exceptions that would benefit only one party as a result of superior bargaining power 
in the negotiation process. The rules merely stipulated that a listed individual or entity 
was eligible for delisting if the individual or entity did no longer meet the listing 
criteria. In turn, the listing criteria itself were consistent and did not contain 
exceptions that would benefit only a few potentially powerful committee members 
(see 7.2.1). This is particularly revealing since there were three permanent members 
that had stakes in the conflict and that had submitted all committee designations, 
while at the same time their case-specific interests diverged. 
Generally, this form of intergovernmental delisting procedure laid the burden of 
proof on the individual petitioners (or states on their behalf) to provide reasons why 
they did no longer fulfill the listing criteria on the basis of the narrative summary in 
accordance with the listing criteria. A delisting application would only be granted by 
a consensus committee decision, which included the permanent members as 
designating states. Committee members’ adherence to the delisting criteria rested on 
the ability of other committee members to challenge inconsistent behavior. 
Nevertheless, any delisting request also applied pressure on designating committee 
members to deliver evidence showing that the listing is still warranted. Overall, 
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because so far no state actors have pursued delisting requests, it cannot be said if 
member states align their delisting proposals to adopted decision criteria. 
Even though the delisting procedure was quite restrictive, committee members 
adhered to the decision criteria adopted. Since its establishment, the committee 
received nine delisting requests including seven individuals and four entities 
exclusively via the Focal Point for Delisting (One recent request is currently under 
consideration). Of these, only one individual was delisted, while all other requests for 
delisting have been denied because originally designating P3 rejected the respective 
request (For Focal Point statistics see section 4.5). The requests were made in 2008 
(two individuals and four entities), in 2009 (one individual), and one individual each 
in 2012, 2013 and 2014.17 Because no direct committee documentation on the 
delisting requests is available, the analysis pursues with an indirect measurement 
triangulating committee annual reports, expert panel reports and diplomatic cables. 
The first three requests were submitted in December 2007 by the individual 
Dieudonné Ozia Mazio and the entities Machanga and UCI (S/2008/17, para. 31), all 
three of which have been rejected on 8 January 2008 (S/2008/832, para. 23). While 
both companies have been listed less than 12 months earlier, the individual was listed 
since 2005. At the time of the delisting request, all three were reportedly involved in 
the trade of natural resources, thereby funding illegal armed groups and indirectly 
fueling the conflict in Eastern DRC. While sanctions effectively prevented further 
business activities of Machanga and UCI, the individuals behind these companies 
sought to bypass the assets freeze using front companies. For instance, the Group of 
Experts noted that both entities continuously violated relevant provisions of the 
sanctions regime (Carisch 2014: 41, 63, 71; S/2008/773, para. 92; S/2007/423, para. 
137-138; US Permanent Mission to the UN 2008b). 
Second, in late April 2008, the committee delisted Kisoni Kambale after a request 
to Focal Point submitted on his behalf (S/2008/832, para. 24). The delisting was 
relatively uncontroversial and not commented on by any of the designating states, 
states of nationality/residency and subsequently not opposed to because the individual 
                                                 
17 The chronological order was established using WayBackMachine (http://archive.org/web/) on 
Focal Point statistics website, triangulated with DRC sanctions committee annual reports. 
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had been previously killed on 5 July 2007 (SC/9312, US Embassy Kinshasa 2007). 
Nevertheless, there was ample evidence that the individual had not seized his illegal 
activities in natural resources exploitations financing the FNI rebel militias and that 
even the circumstances of his killing revealed his illegal activities. Thus, he would 
not have met the preconditions for delisting (Carisch 2014: 67–68; US Embassy 
Kinshasa 2007). Logically, the asset freezes imposed on entities (Butembo Airlines, 
Congocom Trading House) associated with Kambale were maintained based on their 
separate involvement in violation of the arms embargo as gold smugglers and arms 
exporter in rebel held territory (SC/9312, US Embassy Kinshasa 2007; S/2008/772, 
para. 99k, S/2010/596, para. 294). 
Third, in early November 2009, the committee denied a request by Ignace 
Murwanashyaka after at least the US objected (Secretary of State 2009b; S/2009/667, 
para. 27). Although, the US did not have to provide reasons for its decision, it felt 
compelled to argue for his continued listing. The US reasoned that as a president of 
the FDLR, Ignace Murwanashyaka “continues to pose a serious threat to the peace 
and security of the entire Great Lakes region. (…) Paragraph 5 of resolution 1804 
(2008) stressed that the targeted measures that apply to political and military leaders 
of armed groups operating in the DRC who impede the disarmament and the 
voluntary repatriation or resettlement of combatants belonging to those groups are 
applicable to leaders of the FDLR” (Secretary of State 2009b). Furthermore, the US 
argued that “Ignace Murwanashyaka’s Focal Point delisting request does not contest 
his leadership role in the FDLR” (Secretary of State 2009b). In fact, also the expert 
panel documented his implication in the civil war at the time (S/2009/253, para. 57; 
S/2009/603, para. 91). 
Fourth, the committee rejected a delisting proposal by Floribert Ngabu in October 
2012 (S/2012/979, para. 37). The individual is still listed despite the fact that DRC 
authorities had arrested him in 2005 and since then Ngabu has been in custody in the 
DRC as well as an ICC witness in The Hague and has been deported back to the DRC 
to stand trial. The narrative summary still lists him as president of the Front des 
Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI), a foreign armed group operating in the 
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DRC.18 Unfortunately, the circumstances of this request are unknown. Finally, the 
committee rejected two further delisting request concerning both an individual in 
2013 (between 18 July and 4 September) and 2014 (between 16 June and 31 
December) respectively (S/2014/919, para. 23). However, there is no information 
available on the individual’s names and the merits of their requests. 
In conclusion, the effects of committee governance prompted rule based-
decisions on delisting. The preemptively adopted substantive and procedural delisting 
criteria by the Council are consistent. In the application, for those cases, for which 
sufficient information is available, we observe evidence that committee members 
engaged in rule-based decision-making in processing delisting requests. Committee 
members acceded to one warranted delisting request and in another case, a state in 
favor of the individual’s continued listing even felt compelled to justify why the 
individual still fulfilled the listing criteria although the committee member was not 
forced to do so. 
 
7.3 Handling the dissenting committee member Rwanda 
The episode of Rwanda’s 2013-2014 UNSC tenure as a non-permanent member 
demonstrates how Council members anticipated a future committee deadlock by a 
relatively weak state that had dissented to sanctions and how Council members tried 
to sidestep possible decision blockades. Rwanda was elected as a non-permanent 
Security Council member in October 2012 replacing South Africa following the 
African rotational system (Security Council Report 2012a: 6–7). Rwanda’s election 
incidentally commenced as Eastern Congo experienced yet another escalation of 
violence, this time associated with the Rwandan-backed Mouvement du 23 Mars 
(M23), which quickly advanced its area of influence in Eastern Congo resulting in the 
capture of the province capital Goma in late 2012 (Carayannis 2013: 196–197). 
                                                 
18 For Ngabu’s narrative summary, see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/CDi021.shtml [26 
March 2015]. 
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For Council members interested in the functioning of the DRC sanctions regime, 
Rwanda’s UNSC tenure was highly problematic because Rwanda had strong 
situation-specific interests in the DRC sanctions regime and had been involved in the 
conflict in Congo for a long time. Earlier, a report issued by the Group of Experts 
revealed the involvement of Rwanda (and to a lesser extend of Uganda) in the civil 
war in Eastern DRC. According to a 2012 report, Rwanda was accused of violating 
the sanctions regime through providing direct assistance for the creation of M23, 
including recruitment for and provision of arms to M23, Rwandan military forces 
direct incursions into Congolese territory and violation of the assets freeze and travel 
ban of sanctioned individuals, among others (S/2012/348.Add1). A subsequent report 
outlined similar and further violations by Rwanda, even including the involvement of 
senior government officials. The report established a direct chain of command from 
M23 to the Rwandan Defense Minister (S/2012/843). Rwanda repeatedly denied the 
charges and accused the Group of Experts of misrepresenting Rwanda’s role (Rwanda 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation 2012). While the Group of Experts 
report was still under committee consideration, it was leaked to the press before the 
UNSC elections presumably to derail Rwanda’s election prospects 
(Charbonneau/Nichols 2012; Smith 2012).  
Consequently, for other committee members it was immediately obvious that, 
Rwanda as an incoming committee member would be in a privileged position “to halt 
ongoing investigation and protect its officials from UN sanctions” (Manrique Gil 
2012: 5) and would do everything to deflect criticism of its own role. Western 
diplomats acknowledged that “getting unanimity among the 15 council members on 
Congo’s rebellion would be difficult with Rwanda in the room” (Smith 2012; Security 
Council Report 2012b). Since all substantive decisions in the committee were adopted 
under consensus rule, listing proposals including the listing of Rwandan individuals, 
publication of unfavorable Group of Experts, action on the reports contents, or re-
appointment of Group of Experts members would be much more difficult - if not 
impossible - during Rwanda’s tenure (Smith 2012; Security Council Report 2012b; 
SCR Forecast November 2012; What’s in Blue 2012). 
Proactive Council members basically had two options, i.e. either adopting 
sanctions necessary implementation decisions before the beginning of Rwanda’s 
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tenure, or adopting decision rules that would restrict the discretion of committee 
members for arbitrary behavior, which they both made use of. First, the interested 
Council members instantly sought to get relevant M23 listing decisions adopted. In a 
first step, on 20 November 2012, escalating several press statements (including 
SC/10819, SC/10736, SC/10709) and a Presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/22), the 
UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 2076 (2012), which nine Council co-sponsors 
(including France, UK and US, S/PV.6866) specifically tailored to the M23 
insurgency (Agence France Presse 2012b; Spielmann 2012). The UNSC 
acknowledged that members of M23 would in principle be eligible for listing and that 
the DRC sanctions committee should review possible individuals for listing “as a 
matter of urgency” (para. 7, Agence France Presse 2012b). Moreover, the UNSC 
recalled that also external supporters of M23 and sanctions violators may be eligible 
sanctions targets and that UN member states should provide suitable proposals (para. 
8). In addition, the UNSC expressed its concern about “external support” for M23 
without specifically naming Rwanda (para. 4). The first French draft initially already 
included an annex imposing sanctions on two M23 individuals, which was not 
included in the final resolution (What’s in Blue, 20 November 2012). 
The rulemaking process paved the way for the committee to adopt a number of 
last-minute listing decisions before Rwanda became non-permanent member on 1 
January 2013. This required significant investments on behalf of designating states to 
assemble well-reasoned listing proposals under lacking intelligence information in 
Eastern Congo coupled with severe time constraints (interview with UN member state 
official, New York, December 2013). The committee listed one military leader of 
M23 on 13 November 2012 (SC/10812) as well as a M23 military leader and another 
individual, a sector commander of M23, on 30 November 2012 (SC/10842). Finally, 
on 31 December 2012 the committee listed five additional individuals associated with 
the M23 movement, and two entities: the M23 itself and the FDLR, which is an 
adversary of Rwanda (SC/10876). All listed individuals were military leaders, 
commanders or political leaders of M23. The justifications for the listings drew 
extensively on the Group of Expert’s evidence, which Rwanda strongly contested, as 
well as other sources of evidence. Indeed, the committee even directly mentioned the 
support of the Rwandan Defense Forces for M23 of “general military supplies” in its 
reasons for listing M23 (SC/10812 of 13.11.2012; SC/10842 of 30.11.2012; 
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SC/10876 of 31.12.2012), something Rwanda would have prevented at all costs. As a 
result, because Rwanda was not yet a member, it was disabled from blocking those 
decisions. 
Second, as regards the Group of Experts, which in the past had generated 
information that frequently led to the reshaping of sanctions measures and whose 
findings were strongly contested by Rwanda, the Council adopted both rules and 
implementation decisions before the turn of the membership cycle (Boucher/Holt 
2009: 31). Concerning rulemaking, anticipating that Rwanda would likely block 
future Group of Expert reports, the UNSC entirely removed any discretion of 
committee members to obstruct the publication of expert group reports. To become a 
public document, the earlier procedure worded “to report to the Council in writing, 
through the Committee” (resolution 2021 (2011), para. 4) in practice required the 
committee to adopt procedural consensus decision forwarding the report to the 
Council. Instead, on 28 November 2012, the UNSC adopted a French drafted 
resolution 2078 (2012), which reiterated several provisions of resolution 2076 (2012), 
and stipulated that the Group of Experts should submit “(…) a written final report 
before 13 December 2013, (…) and further requests that, after a discussion with the 
Committee, the Group of Experts submit to the Council its final report upon 
termination of the Group’s mandate” (resolution 2078 (2012), para. 5, emphasis 
added). Thus, regardless of the outcome of the committee’s discussion of the report, it 
would be submitted to the Council as a public document. 
Concerning implementation decisions on the Group of Experts, proactive Council 
members sought to adopt further decisions in anticipation of Rwandan blockade. In 
turn, on 12 November, after one month of consideration, the committee transferred 
the latest Group of Experts report to the Council for publication (see S/2012/843). In 
this context, the committee adopted an unusual press release (SC/10872) that drew 
UN member states attention to two aspects of the Group of Experts report, one being 
a call upon rebel groups including M23 to stop recruitment of children, to release all 
child soldiers and to cease any future recruitment of minors, while the other called 
upon companies to use due diligence “in order to halt cross-border smuggling and 
preserve the credibility of the Rwandan tagging scheme” (S/2012/843, para. 243ej). 
In addition, proactive committee members pushed for the early re-appointment of the 
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Group of Experts because they anticipated Rwanda’s objection (SCR Forecast 
February 2013). Thus, shortly before the turn of the year on 28 December 2012, the 
committee adopted the new configuration of the Group of Experts, which the 
Secretary-General appointed accordingly (S/2012/967, S/2013/1). All three tasks 
would probably have been challenged by Rwanda. 
The change of Council composition provides evidence that proactive Council 
member’s rationale was well-founded in fact since Rwanda immediately sought to 
undermine the committee’s work (What’s in Blue 2013a). On the Council level, 
Rwanda blocked or significantly delayed consensus-based UNSC decisions including 
presidential press statements (SCR Forecast July 2013a; What’s in Blue 2013c; SCR 
Forecast October 2013) and presidential statements (What’s in Blue 2013b). In a 
particularly contentious case of an M23 attack on UN peacekeepers, despite the fact 
that in such cases the Council always issued a statement of condemnation and that a 
rejection would set a dangerous precedent, Rwanda blocked several draft statements 
until Rwanda achieved to introduce more “balanced” language including calling upon 
all belligerents to cease violence (Charbonneau 2013; SC/11108). Rwanda voiced 
serious concerns over a UNSC draft resolution extending the DRC sanctions regime 
and its Group of Experts (What’s in Blue 2014a), but finally decided to support it 
(resolution 2136 (2014); SCR Forecast March 2014; S/PV.7107). Similar haggling 
commenced over the language of the MONUSCO re-authorization resolution 2147 
(2014) (What’s in Blue 2014b). On the committee level, during Rwanda’s tenure, the 
committee has not adopted any listing, even when powerful committee members 
sought listings.19 In August 2013, Rwanda blocked a US-French proposal to list 
Vianney Kazarama, M23 military spokesman, and Erick Mboneza, M23 commander. 
Rwanda was the only committee member to oppose the request arguing that the 
request was based on “very poor” evidence, even though it was supported by several 
evidentiary sources including Group of Expert reports (Charbonneau 2013). While in 
principle the designating states would have had the option to sideline Rwanda through 
a pursuing Council resolution, they rested with the negative committee decision (SCR 
Forecast October 2013; S/2013/747, para. 47).  
                                                 
19 See press releases section of 1533 committee website, available at: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pressreleases.shtml [24 September 2015]. 
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However, when the Group of Experts submitted its final report during Rwanda’s 
tenure to the committee on 12 December 2013 and accordingly to the Council at the 
end of its tenure on 1 February 2014 (S/2014/42), the report’s publication could no 
longer be impeded because the committee was no longer competent to decide upon its 
publication. The report again highlighted Rwanda’s involvement in the conflict, its 
support for M23, recruitment of rebel fighters, arms transfers to the DRC and even 
direct military involvement (see S/2014/42, paras 28-31). During the consideration of 
the Group’s report in a committee meeting, Rwanda denied the accusations, dispelled 
the evidence and blocked the implementation of all recommendations made in the 
report on committee level, including recommendations not connected to Rwanda. 
While Rwanda challenged the procedure to submit the report directly to the Council, 
other committee members rejected this claim based on the relevant Council resolution 
provision adopted earlier (What’s in Blue 2014a). 
After the end of Rwanda’s tenure, the committee pursued a complete overhaul of 
sanctions list in February 2015 and updated the identifying information and listing 
justifications for all listings (SC/11772). This would have certainly been more 
difficult with Rwanda as a committee member. 
In sum, the case episode of Rwanda’s Council tenure highlights that sanctions 
committees are indeed subject to the danger of decision blockade, even by relatively 
small states, and that there are limits to the potentials for rule-based committee 
governance. Under the restrictive consensus procedure, as long as Rwanda preferred 
non-agreement over agreement, it had a dominant interest in abiding by its situation-
specific interests because rule compliance would have resulted in a negative payoff. 
At the same time, the proactive members were not at the mercy of the dissenting 
member. Instead, members interested in the functioning of the sanctions regime 
pursued a strategy of restricting decisional options for committee members and 
adopting implementation decisions prior to the dissenting member’s Council 
membership. 
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7.4 Chapter summary 
The DRC sanctions committee provides a confirmatory case for the postulated 
mechanism of committee governance. Although the Council members shared a 
common interest in the regime, or at least were indifferent towards it, the proactive P3 
had diverging preferences within the sanctions regime and thus faced coordination 
problems in situations of diverging interests. As expected, committee governance 
largely prompted rule-based decision-making. 
The DRC sanctions committee provides confirmatory evidence for the effects of 
rulemaking according to which Council members are expected to adopt consistent 
decision criteria to guide subsequent rule-implementation. As concerns the listing 
function, initially, the committee could not process listing requests in the absence of 
procedural criteria so that the committee used the externally produced guidelines of 
the Cote d’Ivoire committee as a focal point. These rules were consistent and guided 
the committee listing process in subsequent rule-application. In a second case episode 
on listing of individuals and entities, the Council adopted consistent decision criteria 
to address the civil war in DRC by means of targeted sanctions. As concerns the 
delisting function, the Council adopted substantive and procedural criteria on 
delisting are consistent and do not include exceptions for powerful members. 
The DRC sanctions committee case provides confirmatory evidence for 
hypothesis 1 according to which committee members facing a stream of separate 
decision proposals are expected to abide by given substantive and procedural rules, 
even if these rules contradict situation-specific preferences of some committee 
members. Within the DRC sanctions committee, two listing episodes support the 
presumption that procedural and substantive decision criteria were decisive in 
explaining committee decision-making and the content of decisions taken. Even 
powerful members acceded into dropping decision requests, where no reliable and up-
to-date information from at least two sources could be assembled. Decision requests 
that fulfilled the informational requirements were successfully presented, even if they 
stemmed from seemingly weak states. As a result, the substantive decision criteria 
served as a filter for determining substantiated from unsubstantiated decision 
requests. Instead, while decision requests usually came in sets, members actually 
discussed and weighed the merits of each proposed individual separately against 
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established formal and informal committee standards. In fact, member states invested 
significant resources over substantial periods of time in assembling convincing listing 
proposals based on more than one source of information. Effectively, all successfully 
submitted decision requests fit to the decision criteria, whereas the proponents 
dropped below threshold requests. 
Equally, the delisting episode demonstrates that the effects of committee 
governance prompted rule based-decisions on committee delisting decisions and 
provide confirmatory evidence for the causal mechanism. The committee delisting 
decisions on cases with sufficient documentation provide evidence that committee 
members processed delisting requests in a rule-based fashion. Committee members 
acceded to one delisting request that fit to the rules and in a second case, a state 
favoring the petitioner’s continued listing justified why the individual warranted 
continued listing. For other rejected delisting requests, information alleging the 
continued activities of petitioners suggests rule-based decision-making on these cases. 
The case episode of Rwanda’s UNSC membership illustrates that the effects of 
committee governance do not occur, if at least one committee member favors 
blockade over a coordinated solution. Because rule-based solutions are in fact situated 
outside the win-set of one single committee member, Rwanda cannot be bound by 
substantive rules because blockade is Rwanda’s preferred outcome. Essentially, 
Rwanda had not originally consented to sanctions as it had not been a Council 
member when sanctions were imposed. However, the episode of Rwanda’s tenure 
also shows that proactive member states have opportunities to cope with an 
uncompromising committee member through restricting the discretion of individual 
committee members to block decisions, for instance on expert panel reports, and 
adopting early implementation decisions. 
Apart from the Rwanda case episode, the alternative explanation, which holds 
that decision-making and the content of the decisions taken can be sufficiently well 
explained by the interest constellation of powerful members, cannot convincingly 
explain observed patterns of decision-making. On the Council level, one cannot 
observe that powerful members pushed for or even achieved exemption provisions 
that would have one-sidedly favored any of the members, but rather one observes 
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quite consistent decision criteria. On the committee level, one cannot observe 
package deals. 
The DRC sanctions committee complements the analysis of committee 
governance with a case that has gained less attention, public scrutiny and due process 
criticism as the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime or other country-specific regimes. 
While this makes data generation more demanding, the DRC sanctions regime 
enriches the analysis through controlling for alternative empirical explanations drawn 
from targeted sanctions regimes subject to due process criticism as aspects usually 
associated with the evolution of such sanctions regimes cannot be observed here. 
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8 The Sudan Sanctions Committee – UN(Administrating) 
Targeted Sanctions 
After the onset of the Darfur conflict in early 2003, the Security Council’s sanctions 
regime started only in 2004 when it first imposed an arms embargo (resolution 1556 
(2004)). Resolution 1591 (2005) expanded the sanctions with targeted individual 
sanctions, including a travel ban and assets freeze. A newly created sanctions 
committee should designate potential sanctions targets. Additionally, the UNSC 
established a Panel of Experts to monitor the arms embargo and targeted sanctions as 
well as to provide recommendations for improved sanctions implementation. Since 
the sanctions committee was unable to designate individuals, the UNSC designated 
four individuals through adopting a package deal in resolution 1672 (2006). While the 
Council took relatively far-reaching decisions on peacekeeping (resolution 1769 
(2007)) and on accountability including the International Commission of Inquiry 
(resolution 1564 (2004)) and the referral of Darfur to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) (resolution 1593 (2006)), the sanctions regime only has been insignificantly 
altered in substance, in particular because there had not been any further designations. 
Despite its inability to adopt decisions, the committee is among the mid-active 
committees with an average of eight meetings per year, particularly active in the 
beginning (16 meetings in 2005), with a slight downward trend since 2011 (see Table 
1). 
There is a large body of literature on the Darfur conflict, yet the literature mostly 
sidelines UNSC sanctions governance on Sudan, mainly because of the shared view 
that there are no such sanctions or that those sanctions are completely dysfunctional. 
The conflict-oriented literature predominantly focuses on the conflict’s roots (Cockett 
2010; Daly 2007), the warring parties (Flint 2007; Haggar 2007), the humanitarian 
consequences (Totten/Markusen 2006; Daly 2007), the civil society and media 
campaigns (Murphy 2007; Hamilton/Hazlett 2007; Grzyb 2010) or the inadequate 
international response (Traub 2010; Prendergast/Sullivan 2008; Totten 2010). The 
Council’s response to Darfur also gained major attention in the debate about a 
‘responsibility to protect’, however, with providing little insights into why the 
sanctions regime is dysfunctional (Badescu/Bergholm 2009; Williams/Bellamy 2005; 
Lanz 2011). Many studies particularly draw attention to the reasons for the Council’s 
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failure in Darfur (MacKinnon 2010) and highlight the decisive role of China 
(Wuthnow 2013, 2010; Large 2008; Holslag 2008; Taylor 2010) and other permanent 
members (Stedjan/Thomas-Jensen 2010; Williams 2010; Charbonneau 2010). The 
sanctions-oriented literature either primarily displays the Sudan (Darfur) sanctions 
regime as a failure and does not further analyze, why it is dysfunctional in contrast to 
other regimes or provides descriptive narratives of sanctions bodies’ mandates and 
Council sanctions measures (Farrall 2007: 430–439; Charron 2013: 80–83; 
Sievers/Daws 2014: 527). Above all, an empirical-analytical account for the blockade 
of the Sudan sanctions regime vis-à-vis the rule-based sanctions governance in many 
other UNSC sanctions regimes is missing. 
The chapter analyzes if and how committee governance affects decision-making 
and the content of the decisions taken within the Sudan sanctions regime. On the 
Council level, committee decision-making issues are not resolved through providing 
generalized decision criteria and procedural prescriptions, mainly because at least one 
permanent member rejects imposing sanctions on Sudan. On the committee level, this 
leads to a decision blockade. Neither is the blockade resolved through selective self-
regulation, nor is there a sufficient decision-making routine that provides focal points. 
Instead the Council circumvents decision-making issues within the committee by 
deciding upon listing decisions in a cumulative decision package following the mode 
of power-based decision-making. The chapter concludes that regulating the 
committee decision-making process does not work when at least one committee 
member rejects imposing sanctions on Sudan. Skeptical committee members have no 
incentives to violate their situation-specific interests because not rule-based 
governance, but blockade is in their long-term interest. On the macro level, this 
results in poor sanctions management, inadequate enforcement, and insufficient 
reaction to reported sanctions violations. Consequently, the sanctions regime unfolds 
little impact. 
The Sudan sanctions regime allows for studying decision-making problems that 
arise in listing individuals and entities to the committee’s sanctions list. Although 
there was demand for listing decisions and several decision proposals have been 
brought forward, the Sudan sanctions committee has not been able to adopt any 
listing decisions. The Sudan sanctions regime constitutes a case, in which the creation 
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of a sanctions committee and the transfer of decision-making competencies do not 
automatically lead to rule-based decision-making because every Council member can 
block decisions within committee confines. Principally, such a decision blockade 
could be bypassed through Council rule-making or a Council package decision. 
Certainly, rule-making is not very promising if one or more of the Council’s 
permanent members disapprove of imposing sanctions on Sudan. The causal 
mechanism can only work if actors are in a coordination situation where focal points 
provide suitable coordination mechanisms. As a result, not the question, why the 
regime is blocked, is in need of explanation, but rather the question, why decision 
competencies are actually transferred if skeptics do not want to see sanctions imposed 
on Sudan. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the following section, the interest distribution 
of powerful UNSC members on Sudan sanctions is evaluated and the question, if we 
would expect the causal mechanism to be present and working as postulated is 
assessed. In the second section, four case episodes are analyzed with a focus on how 
proactive actors deal with the absence of a common interest in the sanctions regime. 
In the first case episode, the process up until the imposition of sanctions is traced and 
the question, why reluctant powerful members actually agreed to establish a sanctions 
regime, although there were opposed to sanctions, is particularly looked into. In the 
second case episode, the effects of preference constellation within the sanctions 
committee led to stalemate because two permanent members block listing decisions. 
In the third case episode, proactive members sought to overcome the blockade and 
since rulemaking failed, these members submitted a listing proposal to the Council. In 
the fourth case episode, although preferences remained essentially unchanged and 
proactive members sought to propose further listing decisions, they neither engaged 
in rulemaking nor did they submit formal requests because they no longer expected 
positive outcomes. The chapter is concluded with a short summary of major findings. 
 
8.1 The origins of the Sudan sanctions regime 
The Darfur conflict violently erupted in early 2003 when two loosely aligned rebel 
groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation 
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Movement/Army (SLA) (on armed groups, Flint 2007), seeking to put an end to the 
political and economic marginalization of African tribes, attacked Sudanese Armed 
Forces (SAF) and government facilities in Western Sudan. In response, the 
government initiated a brutal counter-insurgency campaign that resulted in sustained 
hostilities causing large-scale humanitarian consequences as well as gross violations 
of international humanitarian law and human rights. The government’s use of 
Janjaweed militias as proxy force was particularly associated with atrocities (Flint 
2007: esp. 152-155; Haggar 2007: 128–130; International Crisis Group 2003; 
Flint/Waal 2009: 116–149). There are multiple underlying causes of the conflict 
including rebels versus government, government versus civilian population and 
power struggles between the various Darfurian communities and tribes. Initially, the 
Darfur conflict did not draw much attention. However, in late 2003, the Secretary-
General and other UN officials started to make public references to Darfur. In early 
2004, Western newspapers and civil society groups rallied for an international 
response to the humanitarian situation in Darfur (Murphy 2007; Hamilton 2011: 27–
53). The conflict has the potential to destabilize governments beyond Darfur, in 
particular potentially disrupting the peace process between Sudan and South Sudan 
(International Crisis Group 2004: i; Williams/Bellamy 2005: 30–31; MacKinnon 
2010: 72–73; on roots of the conflict, Cockett 2010: 170–184; Daly 2007; Cassese et 
al. 2005: paras 61-72). 
After reports on the grave humanitarian situation mounted in early 2004, Western 
powers and their allies demanded increasing Council intervention and pushed for 
sanctions. Generally, the P3 were the driving force on Darfur, but to varying degrees 
on the three intertwined UNSC agendas: peacekeeping, sanctions and accountability. 
Whereas the P3 collectively pushed for sanctions and supported peacekeeping (Bosco 
2009: 246), on the accountability track, the US opposed the ICC referral and favored 
a special hybrid-tribunal, while France and the UK strongly supported an ICC referral 
(Bolton 2007: 349; Schabas 2010: 138–141; Bosco 2014b: 108–115). Early sanctions 
resolutions were mostly entirely sponsored by the UK and the US, accompanied by 
France (resolutions 1556 (2004), 1672 (2006)), other Western states such as 
Denmark, Germany, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and associated states Argentina, Chile, 
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Japan and Peru.20 The UK has been the penholder on Darfur (Security Council Report 
2015). 
Within the Sudan sanctions regime, the preferences of UNSC permanent 
members regarding the imposition of sanctions were diametrically opposed. Whereas 
the P3 strongly supported sanctions, China fiercely opposed sanctions and to a lesser 
degree Russia was skeptical towards sanctions. When fighting erupted in 2003, 
among the P3, none of the permanent members had an interest in bringing Darfur on 
the UNSC agenda, because they feared that pressure on Khartoum might jeopardize 
their efforts to achieve a peace deal between Sudan and South Sudan, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), where the US and the UK were deeply 
involved (Cockett 2010: 175–180), or might jeopardize the counter-terrorism 
cooperation with the Sudanese government (Prendergast 2007: 2–4; Huliaras 2006: 
718–719; Xu 2004; on a different view Stedjan/Thomas-Jensen 2010: 164–165). 
Furthermore, the US and the UK were seeking a diplomatic success after the invasion 
of Iraq and wanted to avoid further military engagements beyond Afghanistan and 
Iraq (Cockett 2010: 176–178; Stedjan/Thomas-Jensen 2010: 157–169; Williams 
2010; Williams/Bellamy 2005: 34–35). 
However, after the signing of the CPA in January 2005, the P3 strongly favored 
imposing sanctions on Sudan. In general, Western governments were relieved of 
accommodating the Sudanese government since a North-South peace deal was now in 
place (Cockett 2010: 223–224). Indeed, the aggravating humanitarian situation in 
Darfur and reports about large-scale violations of international humanitarian law 
mounting, a large civil society campaign strongly pressured Western governments and 
legislators, particularly in the US and the UK, to do something about Darfur 
(Happaerts 2009: 108; Grzyb 2010: 77–86; Stedjan/Thomas-Jensen 2010: 158–160; 
Flint/Waal 2009: 183–187; Hamilton/Hazlett 2007; Hamilton 2011). Simultaneously, 
neither the US, nor the UK nor France had any significant economic interests in 
                                                 
20 Resolution 1556 (2004): Chile, France, Germany, Romania, Spain, UK and the US 
(S/2004/611); resolution 1564 (2004): Germany, Romania, Spain, the UK and the US (S/2004/74), 
resolution 1574 (2004) during consultations (S/2004/903); resolution 1591 (2005) US 
(S/2005/206); resolution 1672 (2006): Argentina, Denmark, France, Japan, Peru, Slovakia, UK 
and the US (S/2006/255). 
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Sudan that would provide disincentives for sanctions (see Table 11, Williams 2010: 
202–203). On the issue of counter-terrorism cooperation, although the US 
administration had offered to remove Sudan from its list of state-sponsors of 
terrorism, it had lost its political maneuverability due to the immense domestic 
pressure (Cockett 2010: 180; Stedjan/Thomas-Jensen 2010: 157–169). The UK 
government had developed a distinct interest in pushing the concept of responsibility 
to protect and was under immense domestic pressure (Williams 2010: 201–203). 
France, as a former colonial power of neighboring Chad and CAR and having strong 
military interests in francophone Africa, also became a strongly interested in 
maintaining regional and Chadian stability as a result from the conflict’s spill-over 
(Charbonneau 2010: 221–224; Happaerts 2009: 108). As a result, for the P3, 
sanctions provided a reasonable option to create visible action responding to domestic 
pressures, without straining too many resources in the wake of Iraq, which removed 
credible outside options such as an intervention or no-fly zone from the policy menu 
(Cockett 2010: 223-225, 272-284; Bolton 2007: 348–361; Daly 2007: 294–295, 297-
298). 
Table 11: P5 and EU Trade Volume with Sudan in Billion USD, 2002-2012 
Year 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
06-10 % 
change 
China 0.89 1.55 2.52 3.35 8.20 8.62 157 
France 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.34 0.23 0.18 -47 
Russian Federation 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.18 65 
United Kingdom 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.30 0.27 0.23 -23 
USA 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.13 175 
EU-28 0.67 0.80 1.39 2.11 2.05 1.54 -27 
Total 1.83 2.64 4.49 6.30 11.02 10.88 73 
Note: Total Trade Volume combines Import and Export. Data as reported by respective state 
(Reporter) to Sudan (Partner). Source: UN Comtrade Database, available at: 
http://comtrade.un.org/data/ [31 July 2015]. 
 
China and Russia strongly supported the Sudanese government and were highly 
reluctant to impose sanctions. China, although showing an increasingly proactive role 
in convincing the Sudanese government to give its consent to the UN/AU 
peacekeeping mission (Holslag 2008: 74–81), maintained an “anti-sanctions line” 
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throughout the conflict (Taylor 2010: 184; Holslag 2008: 79, 81-82; Lee et al. 2012). 
First, China had increasing economic interests in Sudan and was the only significant 
trade partner among the P5 (see Table 11, Holslag 2008: 71–74; Wuthnow 2013: 95–
96; Traub 2010: 11; Oertel 2014; Happaerts 2009: 108), not least interested in 
Sudanese oil with Sudan being the fifth largest Chinese supplier (Wuthnow 2013: 95). 
Even shortly after imposing sanctions, China increased its trade volume more than 
150 percent compared to pre-sanctions times. Second, China was a large supplier of 
conventional arms to Sudan amounting to seven percent of Chinese exports. 
Moreover, China provided 90 percent of small arms sales to Sudan (Wuthnow 2013: 
95–96; Department of Defense 2009: 58; Wezeman 2007: 3). China had supplied 
heavy conventional weapons including fighter jets, helicopters, tanks and armored 
vehicles (Human Rights First 2008: 11–16). Third, China principally rejected the 
notion of sanctions as a relevant policy tool to address the Darfur conflict (Traub 
2010: 11; Taylor 2010; Daly 2007: 297–298; Happaerts 2009: 108). Russia mainly 
followed the Chinese lead and was reluctant towards imposing sanctions for various 
reasons, including the sale of military equipment (Wezeman 2007: 3), an oil deal with 
Sudan, and sanctions being a threat to Russian interest in receiving payments in 
connection with these contracts. Most importantly, Russia principally rejected any 
form of outside intervention in Sudan including sanctions (Williams/Bellamy 2005: 
32–33; Cockett 2010: 199, 224; Wuthnow 2013: 104–105; Happaerts 2009: 108; 
Oertel 2014).21 
As a result from the distribution of interests, where on the one hand, the P3 want 
to see sanctions imposed, whereas on the other hand, China and Russia seek to 
prevent the imposition of (meaningful) sanctions, the postulated causal mechanism is 
not expected to be present because the basic condition for its presence is not met. In 
fact, several UNSC members have abstained on resolutions threatening, imposing or 
strengthening sanctions, including five abstentions by China and three abstentions by 
Russia (see Table 12). Several statements of China and Russia made clear that they 
                                                 
21 According to SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, both China and Russia have continuously 
provided arms to the regime in Khartoum from 2000 to 2010. Data available at: 
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade [last visit: 08 September 2015]. 
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strongly opposed the idea of imposing sanctions on Sudan (China, Russia, S/PV.5015, 
S/PV.5040). For instance, China raised “serious reservations” against proposed 
sanctions resolutions and reinforced that “China’s position against sanctions remains 
unchanged” (China, S/PV.5040). Because two permanent members generally object to 
imposing sanctions on Sudan, it is reasonable to expect that they have no interest in 
rule-based governance. In this case, one would also expect that rules and precedents 
as focal points could not provide suitable reference points for coordinating behavior, 
but instead that powerful members would seek to compensate individual preferences 
through Council package deals as alternative. 
Table 12: Selected Resolutions Sudan Sanctions Regime 2004-2006 
Date Resolution Countries Abstaining 
Verbatim 
Record 
30 July 2004 1556 (2004) China, Pakistan S/PV.5015 
18 September 2004 1564 (2004) Algeria, China, Pakistan, 
Russia 
S/PV.5040 
19 November 2004 1574 (2004) none S/PV.5082 
29 March 2005 1591 (2005) Algeria, China, Russia S/PV.5153 
31 March 2005 1593 (2005) Algeria, Brazil, China, USA S/PV.5158 
25 April 2006 1672 (2006) China, Qatar, Russia S/PV.5423 
Note: Author’s illustration. Source: http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings [08 September 2015]. 
 
Nevertheless, when the UNSC imposed sanctions on Sudan, it provided the sanctions 
committee with substantive and procedural rules. Resolution 1591 (2005) introduced 
listing criteria but no concrete procedure on listings. The delisting procedure has been 
created as a purely intergovernmental procedure, but as a result of lacking listings has 
not been used so far. The Council introduced the possibility to grant humanitarian 
exemptions from the travel ban and the assets freeze, but no requests for exemptions 
have been made so far. However, both delisting and exemption procedures were not 
resulting from internal decision problems but rather constituted spill-overs from other 
sanctions regimes, in particular the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime. The Panel of 
Experts and its mandate received little refinement through Council resolutions or 
committee guidelines. 
 
 
305 
8.2 Theoretically-relevant case episodes of decision-making 
The Sudan (Darfur) sanctions regime’s fundamental interest divergence on the 
question, if sanctions should be imposed at all, created a situation in which a 
committee blockade cannot be resolved through Council or committee regulation. 
Instead, only the UNSC decision-making path allowed for fulfilling the proactive 
members demand for decisions by means of Council bargaining. The following 
sections first study the particular UNSC decision-making process leading up to the 
creation of a sanctions committee, with a particular view on the puzzling observation 
that sanctions are imposed although powerful members rejected the creation of a 
sanctions regime. The second episode sheds light on decision-making issues within 
the sanctions committee emanating from two permanent members’ interest in 
obstructing the committee decision process. The third episode takes the second 
possible decision path resolving deadlock, a Council resolution, into perspective. The 
fourth episode evaluates the consequences for committee decision-making in the 
wake of UNSC decision-making. 
8.2.1 The creation of the Sudan sanctions regime 
The early phase from conflict onset to the creation of the sanctions committee shows 
that the Security Council members did not share a common goal of cooperation. The 
group of sanctions supporters pushed for a credible sanctions threat and for the 
creation of a sanctions regime to administer targeted sanctions against conflict parties. 
The group critical of imposing sanctions systematically undermined these efforts by 
watering down resolution language through veto threat. While the proactive states 
finally achieved to create a sanctions regime, after four rounds of negotiations over a 
sanctions resolution, skeptical members achieved their objective of avoiding 
measures most central to their interests or keeping in control of future decisions, 
while minimizing reputational costs. 
The phase of negotiations leading to resolution 1556 (2004) shows how divided 
the Council was on Sudan sanctions. After the UNSC had a first closed meeting on 
Darfur (Cockett 2010: 206–207; SC/8050) in April and issued a presidential statement 
demanding to uphold the ceasefire agreement and to disarm Janjaweed militias in 
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May (S/PRST/2004/18) as well as a resolution (1547 (2004)) repeating its request, on 
30 June 2004, the US circulated a first draft sanctions resolution. The draft suggested 
targeted sanctions including a travel ban coupled with an arms embargo solely on 
Janjaweed militia members. In addition, the draft included the threat to impose 
sanctions on those responsible for atrocities in Darfur, which included the Sudanese 
government (Marquis/Lacey 2004). A newly established sanctions committee should 
determine the specific targets (Lederer 2004a; Agence France Presse 2004). 
Meanwhile, on 3 July, following Kofi Annan’s diplomatic initiative, Sudan had 
agreed to a number of commitments including to disarm the Janjaweed in a UN-
Sudan joint communique (MacKinnon 2010: 74; Annan 2012: 128–129). 
The adoption of the joint communique further strengthened the opposition from 
China, Russia and Pakistan, so that the US revised its draft, dropped the targeted 
sanctions and reframed the arms embargo as applying to all armed groups, including 
Janjaweed and anti-government opposition groups. The US draft also dropped the 
sanctions committee alongside the targeted sanctions. Lastly, the revised draft 
included the Council’s intention to consider sanctions on the government in case of 
non-compliance within 30 days (Hoge 2004a; Lynch 2004a). Still, the US were 
running into stiff resistance of seven out of 15 Council members, including China and 
Russia, which even objected to explicitly using the term ‘sanctions’ and were pressing 
for allowing Sudan more time to comply with the UN-Sudan joint communique 
(Lederer 2004b; Hoge 2004a). After intense negotiations, the US decided to further 
revise the draft and substituted the threat of sanctions with the broader notion of “to 
consider further actions, including measures as provided for in Article 41 (…) on the 
Government of Sudan“ in case of Sudanese non-compliance, so that another 
resolution would be necessary to impose targeted sanctions (see resolution 1556 
(2004), para. 6; Hoge 2004b; MacAskill 2004; Williams/Bellamy 2005: 32; 
Lynch/Lee 2004). Finally, on 30 July 2004, the Council imposed an arms embargo on 
“non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed” operating in 
Darfur (resolution 1556 (2004), paras 6-9), with China and Pakistan abstaining.  
The UNSC member’s statements after the adoption reflected the preference 
constellation, where at least two permanent members rejected the notion of sanctions 
on Sudan. The sponsors (Chile, France, Germany, Romania, Spain, UK, and US, 
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S/2004/611) favored a clear sanctions threat and saw the main responsibility with the 
Sudanese government. Western governments perceived the Council resolution as 
providing Sudan with a final opportunity to avoid sanctions (France, Germany, UK, 
S/PV.5015, pp.5,7,9). The US also mentioned its initially hesitant position to not 
threaten the peace process: “For years, a number of nations (…) have worked hard to 
encourage a peace process in Sudan. (…) The last thing we wanted to do was lay the 
groundwork for sanctions. But the Government of Sudan has left us no choice. (…) 
Sudan must know that serious measures — international sanctions — are looming” 
(S/PV.5015, pp.3-4). The skeptical members mainly emphasized that there is no 
automaticity towards sanctions (Algeria, Brazil, China, Pakistan, and Russia, 
S/PV.5015). Brazil and Pakistan even mentioned that the resolution should not have 
been adopted under Chapter VII. China deplored that the “draft resolution (…) still 
includes mandatory measures against the Sudanese Government (…)[which] cannot 
be helpful in resolving the situation in Darfur and may even further complicate it 
(…). We can therefore only abstain in the voting” (S/PV.5015, pp.2-3). Finally, 
Russia lauded that “the resolution does not foresee possible further Security Council 
action with regard to Darfur” (S/PV.5015, p.7). 
In the face of Sudanese non-compliance, the Chinese delegation gave its 
acquiescence to the resolution (Ahmed 2010: 7), because the elements of critical 
Chinese concern were significantly watered down in a bargaining process. First, the 
arms embargo solely on non-governmental militias and applicable only in the Darfur 
region does not pose a threat to Chinas economic interests in arms exports to the 
Sudanese government (Holslag 2008: 82; Wezeman 2007: 5). Simultaneously, China 
avoided the establishment of a sanctions committee to monitor the arms embargo, 
without which even sanctions proponents doubted the arms embargoes effectiveness 
(Lynch 2004a; Lynch/Lee 2004; Ereli 2004). Other direct targeted sanctions on pro-
government Janjaweed were prevented. China also achieved to drop the direct 
‘sanctions’ threat from the draft and for the meantime precluded other more forceful 
measures (MacAskill 2004; Hoge 2004b; Totten 2010: 189). 
In late August 2004, when Special Representative of the Secretary-General Jan 
Pronk reported on Sudanese non-compliance on key Council demands, among others 
disarming the Janjaweed (S/2004/703, S/PV.5027), the proactive states again pushed 
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for sanctions (MacKinnon 2010: 74–75). The US circulated a new draft resolution on 
8 September 2004, which suggested creating an International Commission of Inquiry 
to investigate human rights violations in Darfur and if genocide had occurred and 
contained a threat of economic sanctions on Sudanese oil if Sudan would not comply 
with UNSC resolutions. Since the sanctions proponents had little confidence in 
getting a tougher resolution adopted, the draft did not incorporate targeted sanctions 
or the creation of a sanctions committee (Hoge 2004c; Federal News Service 2004: 
15, 28). Although the draft only included a sanctions threat, China, Russia, Algeria 
and Pakistan strongly opposed. China publicly announced to use its veto unless the 
language would be altered (Hoge 2004d). Finally, the US over the course of 
negotiations made four revisions. Most importantly, first, the sanctions threat was 
softened from “shall take“ to “shall consider“ (Hoge 2004d; Holslag 2008: 82) 
making the sanctions threat “more conditional and less automatic” (Hoge 2004e; 
MacKinnon 2010: 74, 95). Second, the drafters included language that the UNSC 
“welcomes” steps by the Sudanese government to refrain from obstructing 
humanitarian aid (Hoge 2004e). Finally, resolution 1564 (2004), co-sponsored by 
Romania, Spain, UK and US, established the International Commission of Inquiry 
(para. 12). Regarding sanctions, the Council mostly repeated previous language so 
that in case of non-compliance, the Council “shall consider taking additional 
measures as contemplated in Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, such as 
actions to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector and the Government of Sudan or individual 
members of the Government of Sudan (…)” (resolution 1564 (2004), para. 14). 
Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia abstained. 
Again, statements made after the adoption exemplify the interest constellation. 
The sanctions supporters, including the US, UK, France and Germany, outlined that 
although they had to compromise, they insisted on the usefulness of sanctions to 
enforce lacking Sudanese compliance. As the US delegate stated, “if the Government 
of the Sudan continues to persecute its people and does not cooperate fully (…), the 
Council will, indeed, have to consider sanctions (…). The resolution is the product of 
a negotiating process. It reflects the wishes of some delegations to recognize that the 
Government of the Sudan has met some of its commitments (…)” (S/PV.5040, p.5; 
UK, p.9). On the contrary, the skeptical members stated that they are “convinced that 
threatening sanctions is far from the best method of inducing Khartoum to fully 
 
309 
implement its obligations to the United Nations” (Russia, S/PV.5040, p.4). China 
noted that  
“[t]he Sudanese Government has shown its sincerity in trying to resolve the 
problem (…). For those reasons, the Chinese delegation has serious reservations 
about the resolution just adopted. (…) I wish to reiterate the fact that China’s 
position against sanctions remains unchanged. It has been our consistent view 
that, instead of helping to solve complicated problems, sanctions may make 
them even more complicated” (S/PV.5040, pp.4-5).  
Benin explicitly mentioned that the “controversial interpretations” about oil 
sanctions had threatened the adoption (S/PV.5040, p.9). Pakistan and Algeria, also 
welcomed the drafter’s “flexibility” in weakening the notion of sanctions (S/PV.5040, 
p.2,7). 
The veto-yielding China decided to abstain, since its major preferences had been 
respected. The resolution did not alter the previous arms embargo. Moreover, while 
positive language on Sudan’s behavior was included, threats to additional sanctions 
were significantly watered-down, so that another sanctions resolution would be 
needed, which China could veto (MacKinnon 2010: 75; Holslag 2008: 82; Totten 
2010: 190–191). As a result, “since a key element of the Council’s work at present is 
support for the African Union in extending its deployment in Darfur — reflecting the 
wishes of the African Union and of the Secretary-General, as well as the broad 
consensus view — the Chinese delegation refrained from blocking the adoption of the 
draft resolution (…)” (China, S/PV.5040, p.5; Ahmed 2010). 
In November 2004, when the UNSC held a meeting in Nairobi upon US initiative 
to support the North-South negotiations, the sanctions supporters desired to adopt a 
consensus resolution, in the bargaining over which the Darfur conflict was again 
highly contentious (MacKinnon 2010: 76; Lederer 2004c; Lacey 2004). Accordingly, 
besides focusing on the CPA process, the initial UK draft also called for “further 
urgent action” in case of Sudanese non-compliance. The draft did not foresee any 
tightened sanctions or a sanctions committee (Lederer 2004c). Immediately, sanctions 
skeptics including China, Russia, Algeria and Pakistan bargained to completely drop 
all references to Darfur arguing that such language could compromise negotiations 
(Farley 2004; Lacey 2004). Because the sanctions proponents did not want to risk a 
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split vote, recognizing that “[i]t would clearly be extremely difficult to get a 
resolution that actually imposes sanctions (…) adopted” (US, Lynch 2004b), the draft 
was amended and merely stated that the UNSC was “deeply concerned by the 
situation in Sudan” (Lederer 2004c). Consequently, resolution 1574 (2004) adopted 
contains calls for ceasing violence and compliance to international humanitarian law, 
but only suggests to take “appropriate action” in a future resolution (paras 11,12). 
To achieve consensus on resolution 1574 (2004), sanctions opponent’s concerns 
about sanctions threats were largely acceded to, so that their interests were entirely 
reflected. First, there were no new sanctions measures. Second, the sanctions threat 
was significantly watered-down. Third, any other demands on Sudan do not exceed 
what had been acceptable before. Strikingly, skeptical states did not even mention 
Darfur in their statements, while sanctions proponents cautiously reiterated that 
sanctions are still a viable option (China, Russia, UK, France, US, S/PV.5082). 
In January 2005, the conclusion of the CPA, coinciding with the International 
Commission of Inquiry submitting its final report, which found that all conflict 
parties had committed serious war crimes and crimes against humanity, but stopped 
short of finding that this amounted to genocide (Cassese et al. 2005: paras 630-642), 
and continued reporting of non-compliance by all conflict parties (e.g. S/2005/68), 
created a new situation and the urgent need to deal with three interrelated issues: the 
authorization of a peacekeeping operation required for successful CPA 
implementation, sanctions as well as holding perpetrators accountable (MacKinnon 
2010: 77). In addition, the little oversight over the arms embargo resulting from the 
absence of a sanctions committee, which left the compliance reporting merely to the 
Secretary-General, posed a serious impediment to effectively implement the arms 
embargo (Wezeman 2007: 5; S/2005/56 of 28 January 2005). 
On 14 February 2005, the US circulated a package draft resolution suggesting to 
create a peacekeeping operation and to strengthen sanctions, while perpetrators 
should be vaguely tried through “internationally accepted means”. To secure adoption 
of parts that had already been acceptable, the US later circulated three separate draft 
resolutions (Lederer 2005c; Wadhams 2005b). On the least-controversial 
peacekeeping track, resolution 1590 (2005) unanimously adopted on 24 March 
authorized a peace support operation transforming the UNAMIS into the UNMIS 
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mission with over 10.000 peacekeepers (MacKinnon 2010: 77). On accountability, 
upon an insistent French initiative departing from the strong US preference for a 
hybrid court (Hoge 2005a; US Embassy Paris 2005a), which had received little 
support (Lederer 2005a), the UNSC referred Darfur to the ICC because the US, after 
introducing provisions on financing, recognition of bilateral immunity agreements 
and limiting ICC jurisdiction on foreign personnel, as well as Algeria, Brazil and 
China abstained (resolution 1593 (2005), Cryer 2006: 203–205; Bosco 2014b: 108–
115). 
Regarding the sanctions track, the US draft resolution imposed targeted sanctions 
including an assets freeze and a travel ban on those impeding the peace process, 
threaten the stability of Darfur or violate human rights. The task to determine 
appropriate targets would be transferred to a newly created sanctions committee. The 
draft also extended the arms embargo to the Sudanese government so that the transfer 
of military equipment into Darfur would be subject to sanctions committee approval. 
The US draft provided for restricting military flights in Darfur and included the threat 
of further sanctions in case of non-compliance including “actions relating to Sudan’s 
petroleum sector” (Linton 2005; Carnegie 2005; Reuters 2005; States News Service 
2005a). Finally, the draft included establishing a panel of experts to identify potential 
individuals for sanctions (CNN 2005). Extending the sanctions ran into stiff 
opposition from China, Russia and Algeria (Wadhams 2005a; Lederer 2005b; Agence 
France Presse 2005a). China in particular stated that they “(…) have difficulties with 
the whole concept of sanctions” (Lederer 2005a, 2005b) and were willing to use their 
veto if their interests were at stake (Holslag et al. 2007: 50). 
Accordingly, permanent members bargained over the scope of targeted sanctions, 
the arms embargo, the role of the sanctions committee and the consequences of non-
compliance. Skeptical states demanded that if targeted sanctions are imposed, the 
specific targets would be determined by a new sanctions committee, which would 
give them full control over the implementation of measures (Holslag et al. 2007: 50), 
in return the assets freeze would be dropped, which proactive states also had 
considered as a potential means to win Chinese and Russian acquiescence. However, 
since proactive states would not want to make more concessions on what they 
regarded as an already weak draft or accept anything below targeted sanctions and a 
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broadened arms embargo on the Sudanese government in Darfur, resolution drafters 
only watered-down the consequences of non-compliance and deleted the threat of a 
future oil embargo (Leopold 2005a; MacAskill 2005; Traub 2010: 15). However, until 
the resolution was voted on in late March, proactive members still were uncertain if 
China and Russia would make use of their veto (Lederer 2005b, 2005c). 
Finally, on 29 March, after China, Russia and Algeria had decided to abstain, the 
Security Council decided to impose targeted sanctions including a travel ban and an 
assets freeze on individuals, which a newly created sanctions committee should 
determine. In addition, the UNSC extended the arms embargo to all belligerents in 
Darfur and arms transfers of the Sudanese government to Darfur were subjected to 
prior sanctions committee approval. Likewise, the Council created a four member 
Panel of Experts for a six months period (resolution 1591 (2005), paras 3,7, States 
News Service 2005b). 
After the vote, Russia and China made clear that they would stand ready to 
undermine implementing sanctions effectively. China noted that it had “serious 
reservations about the resolution” and reminded that “China has always taken a 
cautious approach to the issue of sanctions and we abstained on both resolutions 1556 
(2004) and 1564 (2004). (…) China has repeatedly stressed that the Security Council 
should exercise the greatest caution with respect to “measures” that could make 
negotiations more difficult” (S/PV.5153, pp.4-5). Russia in turn was “convinced that 
the potential of political and diplomatic measures to defuse the conflict in Darfur has 
by no means been exhausted” and that the UNSC needed “to draw up an effective 
mechanism to assist the parties to quickly resume the negotiating process [which] 
(…) [s]anctions against the Sudanese Government are hardly likely to promote”. In 
fact, the sanctions should be reviewed “as quickly as possible” (S/PV.5153, p.4). As 
such, opposing countries felt that sanctions on Sudan would be counterproductive, 
complicating the situation and would impede efforts for a political solution (Leopold 
2005b; Hoge 2005b; Agence France Presse 2005b). Two days later, China’s foreign 
ministry publicly claimed that China “opposes U.N. sanctions on Sudan“ or any other 
form of “constant pressure” on Khartoum, which could affect a political solution of 
the Darfur crisis (Associated Press International 2005). 
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While Chinese and Russian acquiescence with resolution 1591 (2005) seems 
puzzling, it can be explained mainly by two factors. First, the abstention is fully in 
line with the ultimate policy goal of blockade and the draft resolution did not affect 
their primary interest in Sudan. In fact, the skeptical members managed to rule out the 
threat of an oil embargo or other economic sanctions that would have threatened their 
economic interests in Sudan (Human Rights First 2008: 18). In addition, they 
managed to contain the arms embargo on Darfur, which allowed them to continue 
arms exports to the Sudanese government without violating the arms embargo 
because sanctioned arms transfers to Darfur would be the sole responsibility of Sudan 
(Wezeman 2007: 6, both Russia and China have since made use of this loophole, see 
Lewis 2009). Concerning targeted sanctions, the skeptical member’s insistence on 
creating a sanctions committee responsible for listing of sanctioned individuals 
allowed them to stay in control over sanctions and to block any implementation 
decisions including the formulation of rules. Without such implementation decisions 
there would be no targeted sanctions as the resolution itself did not determine any 
targets (Holslag et al. 2007: 46; Holslag 2008: 81; Løj 2007: 46; Prendergast/Sullivan 
2008). 
Second, abstaining provided a superior cost-benefit payoff since an abstention 
would best serve their interest in not further antagonizing the West through obvious 
obstructionism, while minimizing the impact on a strategic partnership with African 
nations as responsible power (Wuthnow 2010: 71; Taylor 2010: 187–188). 
Concerning the former, a public Council veto would have been increasingly difficult 
to sustain as sanctions would be the natural next step according to the logic of 
escalation in similar conflict settings. Even the Chinese did not challenge the 
magnitude of the crisis that all belligerents including Sudan were non-compliant 
(China, S/PV.5153, Oertel 2014: 154). At the same time, the transfer of political 
conflict into the sanctions committee provided a meaningful way to deflect 
international pressure from the Council. Concerning the latter, the Chinese had 
immediately assured the Sudanese government, that they did not intend to let the 
sanctions proponents follow through on implementation (Holslag et al. 2007: 50; 
Holslag 2008: 81). Nevertheless, a sanctions regime also entailed the danger of 
unfolding its own (unintended) dynamic, for instance that the Panel of Experts might 
scrutinize Chinese behavior on arms exports. 
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As resolution 1591 (2005) is not substantially different from other sanctions 
resolutions in terms of rulemaking at that time, and it does indeed provide decision 
criteria, there is no evidence that skeptical members systematically scaled down those 
initial rules. Resolution 1591 (2005) included a first set of listing criteria that the 
committee should observe while considering possible designations, including those 
individuals “(…) who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in 
Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human 
rights law or other atrocities, violate the (…)[arms embargo], or are responsible for 
offensive military overflights (…)” (para. 3c). The UNSC requested the committee 
“to designate those individuals subject to the measures”, omitting a concrete listing 
procedure, and simply directing the committee to establish guidelines as may be 
necessary for implementing sanctions. The UNSC also mandated the committee to 
monitor targeted sanctions and arms embargo implementation, to decide about 
exemption requests, to regularly report to the Council, and to assess Panel of Experts’ 
and member states’ reports on sanctions implementation (para. 3a). 
The early phase shows that although Russia and China finally acceded into 
establishing a Sudan sanctions regime, they have been reluctant to see sanctions 
imposed on Sudan. While minimizing the diplomatic fallout, skeptical members 
repeatedly expressed that they had no interest in effective sanctions implementation 
on Sudan. In fact, these members got the available option to block to the future 
committee decision process. Consequently, the political conflict inherent to imposing 
sanctions on Sudan was transferred from the Council to the Sudan sanctions 
committee. This marked the beginning of an intense phase of committee negotiations 
on how to proceed on Darfur ultimately resulting in a Council resolution listing 
individuals. 
8.2.2 Opposition of two permanent members on Sudan sanctions prompted decision 
blockade in the sanctions committee 
This case episode shows that decision-making blockade within a sanctions committee 
is indeed a viable outcome of collective decision-making, although the Council 
transferred decision competencies to the same group of actors. In the Sudan sanctions 
regime, committee governance was not at work because the basic condition, namely, 
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that all actors shared a more or less homogenous interest in maintaining a sanctions 
regime, was not met. Even though the sanctions regime was not merely an instance of 
symbolic politics, since other powerful actors actively and repeatedly pursued listing 
requests and invested considerable resources into the sanctions regime, at least one 
permanent member pursued blockade as a dominant strategy. Consequently, efforts to 
solve deadlock with rulemaking failed to substantially increase formal and informal 
regulatory density because actors skeptical of sanctions could systematically 
undermine additional rulemaking. As a result, in this episode, the committee was 
largely blocked and thus, functional differentiation was severely undermined. 
The delegation of listing decisions to the committee in spite of three committee 
members’ opposition to the implementation of sanctions rendered any kind of 
committee implementation decisions, i.e. listing, where not only the permanent 
members, but also the non-permanent members can block decisions, subject to 
potential blockade. Almost immediately after the imposition of sanctions, China and 
Russia began to undermine the committee’s work (Traub 2010: 16–17; 
Prendergast/Sullivan 2008), for instance on the Panel of Experts’ appointment by 
declining to accept several candidates based on arguments of lacking experience or 
being too critical of the Sudanese government (Leopold 2005d; Totten 2010: 193; 
Human Rights First 2008: 18). Thus, the Secretary-General appointed four 
individuals to the first Panel of Experts only after three months (Committee Annual 
Report, S/2006/543, para. 6). 
Up until the end of 2005, none of the committee members pursued listing 
requests (Couturier 2005) because even sanctions proponents hoped that the Abuja 
peace process involving the conflict parties in Darfur would progress and the UNSC 
had endorsed the 31 December 2005 as deadline for its conclusion. However, the 
progress of negotiations was slow and previous agreements such as the N’Djamena 
Ceasefire Agreement or the Declaration of Principles had been instantly, grossly and 
repeatedly violated (Nathan 2007: 248). At the same time, the conflict parties 
continued hostilities and large scale violations of international humanitarian law 
against the civilian population, a fact that even the divided UNSC accepted 
(S/PRST/2005/48, S/PRST/2005/67; Flint/Waal 2009: 150–166, see UNSG reports 
S/2005/378, S/2005/650, S/2005/719, S/2005/825). Thus, before the proactive states, 
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US, UK and France started to consider to designate individuals in late 2005 (US 
Embassy Paris 2005c), there had been little efforts to implement sanctions (SCR 
Forecast February 2006) with “[t]he sanctions committee (..)[being] still inoperative, 
with no agreement on guidelines and therefore no capacity to target sanctions against 
individuals” (SCR Forecast November 2005b). The Council merely extended the 
mandate of the expert body in December 2005 (resolution 1651 (2005)). 
The ending of the first Panel of Experts’ mandate cycle by 30 December 2005 
provided a window of opportunity for sanctions supporters to consider pursuing 
sanctions. The Panel report contained 13 recommendations to improve the sanctions 
regime (S/2006/250). Most importantly, it contained a list of individuals attached in a 
confidential annex that, in the view of the panel, fulfilled the listing criteria outlined 
in resolution 1591 (2005). In concrete terms, the confidential annex, suggested 17 
individuals for listing and “five others are cited as possible future targets for 
sanctions, including Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir and the President of Chad, 
Idriss Deby” (Goldberg 2006; Turner 2006; Lynch 2006a). The list contained 
government personnel such as the interior minister, the defense minister and the 
director of national security and intelligence services. Furthermore, the annex listed 
“several Sudanese military and police commanders, two Janjaweed militia leaders 
and five rebel commanders” (Human Rights Watch 2006; Turner 2006). Among the 
list of five additional names were “two top commanders of the rebel Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA)” (Human Rights Watch 2006). Although the Panel of Experts was 
providing a set of individuals, member states had to make formal designations so that 
the committee did not automatically have to consider all names in the confidential 
annex. 
In January 2006, the sanctions proponents including the Western Council 
members (Denmark, France, Greece, Japan, UK, US) took a more proactive stance on 
targeted sanctions and favored to initiate deliberations on listings despite resistance 
by China, Qatar and Russia (Lederer 2006b). The US started to gather and 
corroborate information provided by the Panel of Experts confidential list and 
requested their embassies to assemble and cross-check information to prepare listing 
requests (US Embassy Khartoum 2006a; US Embassy The Hague 2006). 
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Within the committee, sanctions skeptics undermined meaningful committee 
decisions by using procedural arguments (Prendergast/Sullivan 2008: 5–7). First, the 
Arab member Qatar and China had joined forces to seriously delay the transmission 
of the report, a matter which is usually of a routine nature, because they disagreed 
with the report’s conclusions (Lederer 2006a). The committee chair asserted that the 
issuance of the report had been delayed because the committee “does not agree with 
the recommendations” (Lederer 2006b), so that the committee “did not even get to the 
point of discussing its list, and other lists, of people who might be subject to sanctions 
(…)” (Lederer 2006b). However, finally the report was submitted to the Council for 
official publication in late January 2006 (S/2006/543, para. 17), and had not been 
altered in substance before transmittal (SCR Update Report No.3 2006). Second, the 
sanctions sceptics delayed the adoption of committee guidelines so that the committee 
lacked a set of concrete procedural criteria. Resolution 1591 (2005) did not establish a 
specific procedure under which individuals are to be designated, how to take other 
decisions related to its mandate and with what timeframe decisions are to be made. In 
effect, the committee could not process Panel of Experts listing suggestions, an 
instance that the supporters of sanctions perceived as a delaying scheme by Qatar, 
China and Russia, which insisted that first “the sanctions committee establish[es] 
criteria to determine who should be subject to sanctions (…)” (Lederer 2006b). China 
and in particular Qatar have continuously put up procedural objections during 
committee meetings (Goldberg 2006). Throughout February, committee discussions 
concerning possible listings were ongoing, however, without an agreement on 
committee guidelines, the committee would not be able to adopt listing decisions 
(SCR Forecast March 2006). 
While the committee finally agreed on a set of committee guidelines on 23 March 
2006 “[f]ollowing extensive discussions on the subject” (S/2006/543, para. 20), the 
guidelines did not significantly increase regulatory density and mostly repeated 
standard committee practice. The adopted committee guidelines consist of 11 pages 
including 27 numbered provisions. Although this is not particularly less than in other 
sanctions regimes, the other sanctions regimes had a much more detailed informal 
practice of how to handle cases codified at a later stage. According to the guidelines, 
“[t]he Committee will decide on the designation of an individual (…) on the basis 
of the criteria contained in (…) [resolution 1591 (2005)]”. As regards designation of 
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individuals “the Committee will consider information provided by Member States, 
the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Panel of 
Experts (…) and other relevant sources” (committee guidelines, para. 7a). Similar to 
the listings in other sanctions regimes, a designation should “be accompanied by, to 
the greatest extent possible, a narrative description of the information that justifies 
how that individual fits within the criteria (…) of resolution 1591 (2005)” (para. 7b). 
In addition, the designation should include “relevant, specific and up-to-date” 
identifying information such as “name, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, 
aliases, residence, passport or travel document number, professional or functional 
title” (para. 7c). In line with standard sanctions committee practice, decisions will be 
taken by consensus (para. 25) in a written “no-objection procedure” with a timeframe 
of two working days (para. 26). 
The P5 were still sharply divided over the issue of Sudan sanctions. On the one 
hand, the P3, in addition to other interested states (Greece, Denmark, Slovakia, 
Argentina, Peru, Japan, Ghana) now actively pushed for additional sanctions to 
uphold Council credibility and to provide incentives for the belligerents to achieve a 
negotiated settlement (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2006b; Lynch 2006b). On 
the other hand, China and Russia strongly opposed increasing pressure on Sudan 
through sanctions arguing that this would undermine the cooperation of Sudan vis-à-
vis the UN (Lynch 2006a, 2006b; Hoge 2006a; Løj 2007: 46). In private P5 
consultations, China made clear that it opposed any further pressure on Sudan in the 
form of sanctions designations or the possible extension of the arms embargo to the 
entire territory of Sudan (US Embassy Moscow 2006a). 
Because the preference constellation would not allow for a separate processing of 
listing requests in an arguing process, the sanctions proponents pursued active 
bargaining to get listings adopted. More than a year after the Council imposed 
targeted sanctions, on 1 March 2006, the UK proposed a considerably shorter list 
comprising of eight individuals for the addition to the consolidated list. The UK 
deliberately “had taken pains to draw up a ‘balanced’ list of up to eight leaders from 
both sides”, including a number of senior government officials (Penketh 2006; Lynch 
2006b; MacAskill 2006). The provision of a listing proposal containing a set of 
individuals enabled the committee members to engage in bargaining over the 
 
319 
proposal’s content. However, several committee members including China, Russia 
and Qatar, as well as the United States raised objections to the UK proposal partly on 
grounds of “insufficient evidence to implicate some senior Sudanese officials” (Lynch 
2006b). Even the Special Representative Jan Pronk, realizing that bargaining was a 
potential solution, suggested to “designate individuals from the middle of the list of 
names, rather than those at either extreme, in order to demonstrate greater flexibility 
and realism” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2006b). 
To placate opposition from China, Russia and Qatar within the committee, the 
UK and the US further trimmed down the list to four individuals and garnered support 
from other committee members. On 13 April 2006, the Chairman upon a joint 
designation by United States, Britain, France, Denmark, Argentina, Slovakia, Peru 
and Japan circulated the decision proposal of a shorter list of four individuals as a 
“balanced package” (Lederer 2006d) under the no-objection procedure. The proposal 
now deliberately included “individuals from all sides, but refrains from naming high 
officials” (Agence France Presse 2006a; SCR Forecast April 2006b). The US 
unwillingly accepted that the proposal merely resembled a “down payment on what 
we expect will be additional sanctions” (Lederer 2006c). Within the timeframe of two 
working days, China and Russia broke silence and placed a hold on the listing request 
(Hoge 2006c; Lynch 2006b; Aita 2006; US Embassy Paris 2006a). According to the 
Chinese ambassador, “[i]n the sanctions committee meeting, he had joined others in 
requesting clarifications on the inclusion of individuals on the sanctions list” 
(Security Council Press Release 2006). While China and Russia did not principally 
rule out that sanctions could be applied on the individuals, they criticized the timing 
of sanctions, stated that sanctions would undermine cooperation of conflict parties 
and requested additional discussions about the listing (Lederer 2006e, 2006f; Agence 
France Presse 2006b). Again, the proposed designation was discussed at informal 
committee consultations on 19 April 2006 (S/2006/1045, para. 14), with no change of 
positions. 
The case episode of committee decision-making in 2005 and early 2006 
illustrates that even though the Council has transferred such decision competencies to 
the identical group of actors, decision-making on small implementation decisions 
within sanctions committee, in this case listing of individuals and entities to the 
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sanctions list, indeed did fall victim to blockade. Still, whilst this left sanctions 
proponents with the option to submit decision packages, because skeptical members 
preferred blockade, they rejected the proposed listing decisions. 
8.2.3 Resolution of decision blockade through power-based decision-making in the 
Security Council 
In the third case episode, the blockade in the committee was resolved by referring the 
issue back to the Council. At this stage of the process, Council members principally 
had two options to alleviate the committee stalemate. First, Council members could 
negotiate about substantive and procedural decision criteria with the aim to provide 
focal points that indicate on which requests to compromise. However, since 
rulemaking efforts ran into resistance from skeptical permanent members, second, 
sanctions proponents rather sought to resolve the deadlock via adopting a Council 
package resolution. 
Before referring a listing proposal to the Council, sanctions proponents attempted 
to overcome committee blockade through adopting decision criteria for the 
committee. With respect to procedural criteria, in anticipation of the committee 
blockade, France pushed for dropping the standard committee practice of consensus 
in favor of a majoritarian decision-making procedure without veto, as had been 
previously used in the United Nations Compensation Commission (on UNCC, see Di 
Frigressi Rattalma/Treves 1999: 3). Since the early 2000s, in connection with the 
sanctions reform process, the French had been advocating for abolishing the 
consensus requirement (Brzoska 2003: 523; Weschler 2009-2010: 42; Sievers/Daws 
2014: 530). In bilateral US-French consultations on the Sudan committee blockade, 
the French diplomat “clarified, that designations are best taken by consensus at the 
committee level, however, ‘as a matter of doctrine,’ the principle of consensus should 
not become a straitjacket, and a sanctions committee should be allowed to overcome 
the obstacle of a hold, as in the Chinese/Russian hold over Sudanese names, through a 
simple procedural vote, without requiring recourse to Security Council deliberations” 
(US Embassy Paris 2006a). During the specific negotiations about committee 
guidelines, the sanctions skeptics objected to the French position. As a result, 
“France’s reservations against the consensus rule” (SCR Forecast April 2006b) could 
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not be accommodated and the guidelines instead used the standard language that “if 
(…) consensus still cannot be reached, the matter may be submitted to the Security 
Council” (guidelines, para. 25(c)). 
With respect to substantive criteria, “refusing to succumb to the stall tactics that 
have become standard operating procedures for the Chinese, Russian and Qatari 
delegations” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2006e), after the singing of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May 2006, which the JEM and a SLA splinter 
group rejected (Traub 2010: 17; Prendergast/Sullivan 2008: 5), the sanctions 
proponents made an effort to change designation criteria. The US submitted a draft 
resolution endorsing the DPA and preparing the AU-UN peacekeeping transition 
(Wadhams 2006a). Most importantly, the draft resolution, which met stiff resistance 
from China and Russia, included new listing criteria and explicitly task the committee 
to sanction any individual or group that violates the DPA or blocks its 
implementation, including the Sudanese government and Janjaweed militias, (Holslag 
2008: 81–82; Wadhams 2006b). In bilateral US-Chinese consultations, China 
“indicate[d] its strong preference for unanimity and provided a veritable roadmap of 
what it needed to secure this outcome: omission of a reference to UNSCR 1591 
(2005) on Sudan sanctions on which China had abstained” (US Permanent Mission to 
the UN 2006e). Therefore, to secure the passage of the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) transition resolution under Chinese veto threat “[a]fter three rounds of 
working-level negotiations and an eleventh-hour Ambassadorial exchange” (US 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2006e), instead of breaking the committee deadlock 
through Council rulemaking, Council members merely agreed to the soft formulation 
that the Council “expresses its intention to consider taking, ( … )  strong and 
effective measures, such as a travel ban and assets freeze, against any individual 
or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation” of the DPA 
(resolution 1679 (2006), para.1, emphasis removed) without requesting the 
committee to get active (Wadhams 2006c). Since any meaningful sanctions 
language directed towards the committee was deleted, the Chinese supported the 
draft resolution, which “(…) had a domino effect on the other dissenters, with Russia 
and Qatar ultimately voting in favor” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2006e). 
Resolution 1706 (2006), simply reiterated this intention (para. 14). 
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After two unsuccessful attempts to change substantive and procedural criteria, the 
sanctions proponents realized that rulemaking will not be an effective strategy and 
that their committee listing proposals would ultimately fail. On the on hand, actors 
that preferred blockade on Sudan sanctions had a veto position when it came both to 
Council or committee rulemaking. At the same time, Chinese and Russian opposition 
to substantive and procedural criteria points to the fact that rules were indeed 
dangerous to their interests. On the other hand, while running into stiff resistance 
from other permanent members, which successfully watered down sanctions 
measures, the significant investments of proactive members into negotiating previous 
resolutions and committee rules created an expectation that the Council would not 
adopt an improved rule-set. As a result, Council members could no longer expect 
rulemaking to be a viable strategy to overcome committee blockade. At some point, it 
would be more costly to engage in further negotiations about rules than to bypass the 
committee via adopting a Council resolution. 
Since rulemaking did not prove to be successful in adopting sanctions 
designations, the proactive states changed their strategy and pursued to designate 
individuals and groups by means of a power-based decision-making in the Council 
(Sievers/Daws 2014: 530), which “would have been unnecessary had the French 
position on procedures been accepted in the first place (…)” (US Embassy Paris 
2006a). During committee deliberations, sanctions proponents “ran into enormous 
difficulties, especially from China” (Bolton 2007: 352) because objecting states 
China, Russia and Qatar maintained that they generally opposed sanctions on Sudan 
(Lederer 2006e). Hence, on 18 April 2006, in response to the objections raised within 
the committee, the US presented a draft resolution containing the very same four 
individuals for listing as a sanctions package to the Council (Aita 2006; Lynch 
2006b). The US strategy to table the listing requests as draft resolution was intended 
“to circumvent the opposition from Russia and China with the hope that the two 
countries would not veto the text” (Aziakou 2006a; Agence France Presse 2006c). 
While the US requested other proactive countries to also support a sanctions 
resolution instead of further committee deliberations (US Embassy Paris 2006a; US 
Embassy Tokyo 2006), during Council consultations there was no apparent change of 
positions. Although the US was unsure if China and Russia would place a public 
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Council veto, they were “hopeful that it will pass” and noted that they “haven’t heard 
the ‘v’ word” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2006c; Aziakou 2006b). 
To achieve a negotiated bargaining outcome within the Council, the decision had 
to be put into an even larger package solution. After a compromise to couple the 
resolution with a presidential statement supporting the Abuja peace process and 
calling on the belligerents to cease hostilities (S/PRST/2006/17) in particular upon 
request of African members and “thereby sending a signal that the sanctions were not 
aimed at pressuring the talks per se, but in response to the ongoing violations of 
human rights and of the ceasefire” (SCR Forecast May 2006b), the UNSC adopted 
the resolution co-sponsored by Argentina, Britain, Denmark, France, Japan, Peru and 
Slovakia on 25 April 2006 with China, Russia, and Qatar abstaining. Resolution 1672 
(2006) implemented sanctions on four individuals, namely, Gaffar Elhassan (Western 
Military Region Commander, Sudanese Armed Forces), Sheikh Musa Hilal 
(Janjaweed), Adam Shant (SLA Commander), Gabril Badri (National Movement for 
Reform and Development Field Commander). The US hailed that “[u]ltimately, on 
April 25, we prevailed, but imposed sanctions on fewer individuals than we wanted“ 
(Bolton 2007: 352). Conversely, the skeptical members China, Qatar and Russia 
criticized the resolution in their statements saying that “this resolution might have a 
negative impact on the prospects for concluding a peace agreement” (Russia, 
S/PV.5423, 2), demanding that proactive states should have rather provided 
“supplementary material” and that going to the Council “is at variance with the 
Council’s practice of many years’ standing” (China, S/PV.5423, p.3). 
The puzzling Chinese acquiescence to sanctioning the four individuals can be 
explained by two main factors. First, the stakes of the sanctions designation had 
already been considerably lowered from the original confidential annex with 17 
individuals to four mid-level individuals, two of which were Darfur rebels, while only 
two where affiliated with the Sudanese government. Accordingly, Chinese and 
Russian abstention “indicates that neither may be willing to veto as long as proposals 
do not target the highest-ranking Sudanese officials at this time” (US Permanent 
Mission to the UN 2006d). In addition, “[n]one of the four had significant assets in 
foreign banks or indulged in foreign travel, so the impact of these sanctions was more 
symbolic than real“ (Prendergast/Sullivan 2008: 7). Second, China confirmed that 
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they wanted to avoid being isolated when Qatar and Russia had decided to abstain. In 
bilateral US-Chinese consultations after the adoption, a Chinese diplomat explained 
that “China decided to abstain (…), because going against a majority of the Council’s 
members would have been ‘unthinkable,’ (…)”. Further he  
“acknowledged that China had changed its tactics since April 17, when China, 
Russia, and Qatar blocked the [committee listing request](…), but reiterated 
that China’s fundamental opposition to sanctions had not changed. ‘Once 
Russia and Qatar decided to abstain, Ambassador Wang (Guangya) decided it 
was better to abstain than veto’” (US Embassy Khartoum 2006b). 
Still, the adoption of sanctions targets via Council resolution created immediate 
implementation issues because in contrast to a committee listing, which would have 
required a minimum identifying information, there were no such requirements for the 
Council. Without a certain quality of identifiers, enforcing a travel ban and 
identifying individual’s assets is difficult. As the committee Chair noted, the 
resolution “had not included sufficient identifying elements on the designated 
persons, despite the relevant provisions of the [committee] guidelines. There were 
fears that that might create problems for implementation of the targeted measures” 
(Press Release Briefing of 1591 Committee Chair; S/PV.5601). Indeed, even French 
officials mentioned “the inadequacy of identifiers in enforcing the travel ban and 
asset freeze” (S/2006/795, para. 119). Consequently, the Panel of Experts 
recommended increasing the amount of identifying information for effective 
implementation (S/2006/795, para. 120). As a response, the committee sent a note 
verbale to all member states requesting additional information, however, received not 
a single response (S/2006/1045, para. 19; S/2007/584, para. 154). Subsequently, when 
the Panel of Experts provided further identifying information (e.g. S/2006/795, paras 
115-123, S/2007/584, paras 142-157), the committee added this information to its 
sanctions list (SC/9093, SC/10938, SC/11112; S/2007/779, para. 26). 
In sum, the third case episode illustrates that Council members perceive 
rulemaking or Council package decisions as two possible options to overcome 
committee blockade on the Security Council level. However, as regards rulemaking, 
skeptical members objected to efforts of rulemaking, both on majority voting as well 
as on decision criteria. Although the Council was more active on Sudan since 2012, 
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the discussions still have not materialized into significant changes, and those adopted 
mostly remain at the level of declarations of intent.22 For instance, the Council 
requested the committee “to respond effectively to any reports of non-compliance, 
(…) including by engaging with all relevant parties” (resolution 2035 (2012), para. 
14) omitting the option of new listings. Instead, a Council package resolution under 
majority voting provided an alternative to rulemaking. This proved a successful 
strategy because sanctions opponents would have to publicly veto a resolution, the 
content of which was of marginal cost. 
 
8.2.4 Resulting decision situation in the committee 
The fourth case episode demonstrates that the continued opposition of two permanent 
members to sanctions on Sudan led to a sustained blockade of the committee decision 
process on listings and sanctions implementation. Since previous efforts to overcome 
blockade with rulemaking have been unsuccessful, proactive member states no longer 
considered rulemaking as a viable strategy. Hence, neither the Council, nor the 
committee took its regulating function seriously. Instead, proactive committee 
members sought to overcome blockade through pursuing package deals with the 
option of raising decision packages to the Security Council. Within the committee, the 
US, UK and France actively spearheaded listing requests in several instances, mostly 
with China, Russia and the Arab member opposing sanctions. Because sanctions 
proponents were no longer willing to risk failure of their proposals within the 
Council, as a consequence, the committee was largely blocked from making 
decisions. All further listing attempts have proven unsuccessful. In fact, the sanctions 
                                                 
22 Resolutions 1713 (2006), 1841 (2008), 1891 (2009), 1982 (2011) were technical roll-over 
resolutions. Resolution 1779 (2007) included two Panel of Experts mandate changes, to 
coordinate activities with UNAMID and to assess arms embargo violations (para. 3). Resolution 
1945 (2010) clarified that arms embargo exemptions are subject to committee approval and that 
exporting states should ensure end-user documentation (paras 9, 10). On listing criteria, sanctions 
would also apply to entities (resolution 2035 (2012), para. 3) and individuals and entities which 
“plan, sponsor or participate in attacks against UNAMID (…) may (…) meet the designation 
criteria” (resolution 2091 (2013), para. 8). Resolutions 2138 (2014), 2200 (2015) and 2265 (2016) 
issued further expressions of intent. 
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regime was entirely ineffective as there were only four sanctioned individuals and the 
sanctions measures remained unenforced. 
Whilst again committee members have two options to overcome committee 
decision blockade, rulemaking or package deal, actors no longer believe that 
rulemaking is a viable option. There is no indication that overcoming committee 
blockade was the motivation behind any further changes to the ruleset. Conversely, 
the committee does not engage in meaningful self-regulation besides symbolic 
changes of committee guidelines. In a first instance, when the Council introduced the 
Focal Point delisting procedure (resolution 1730 (2006)) to circumvent governments 
unwilling or unable to forward delisting petitions of individuals to the respective 
sanctions committee, the Council directed its sanctions committees, including the 
Sudan sanctions committee, to revise their guidelines accordingly. However, the 
Council did not set a timeframe for the amendments. Though this provided a window 
of opportunity to overcome decision-making difficulties, however, the amended 
guidelines adopted in December 2007, more than a year after the Council’s directive, 
did merely incorporate the focal point de-listing procedure.23 Although petitioners can 
directly petition their listing, it is without practical significance considering the 
extremely small size of the list and so far none of the individuals have done so (see 
section 4.5). Interestingly, the fact that neither individuals nor any governments have 
issued requests for delisting or humanitarian exemptions clearly confirm that the 
sanctions measures are not enforced (S/2013/79, para. 153). 
In a second instance, in late 2013, upon a committee Chair and UN Secretariat 
initiative, the committee updated the committee guidelines for three reasons. First, the 
Chair sought to bring the 2007 guidelines in line with the latest standard procedures. 
Second, the Chair sought to implement the now-standard rules extending the no-
objection procedure from two to five working days for listings since the Sudan 
sanctions committee was the only active committee that had a shorter than five days 
                                                 
23 A systematic lexical search of Security Council Report Forecasts, Lexis Nexis, Panel of Experts 
reports and Wikileaks have not yielded empirical traces that committee members sought to engage 
in self-regulation at this point. 
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no-objection procedure.24 Third, the chair sought to harmonize the remaining 
guidelines to now-standard language of committee guidelines. While all this followed 
a general trend to increase transparency (e.g. Working Group on General Issues of 
Sanctions, S/2006/997, para. 16a) and with the Sudan committee lagging behind 
most, the changes remain entirely symbolic, were not contentious and even agreed 
without requiring a single committee meeting (S/2013/788). Accordingly, the updated 
December 2013 guidelines incorporate a five working days no-objection procedure, 
restricting holds for a maximum of six months, restricting outgoing member’s holds, 
as well as harmonizing informational requirements for new listings and notification 
procedures (paras 2c, 4,5,10). Even skeptical members could easily agree to these 
changes since they would not have any practical consequences. 
Concerning sanctions measures, the sanctions opponents clearly signaled that 
they would undermine every effort to further strengthen the sanctions regime, 
particularly any geographical extension of the arms embargo or the enforcement of a 
no-fly zone (Happaerts 2009: 108–110; Wuthnow 2013: 99–101). Even when faced 
with compelling evidence that Chinese weapons were used in Darfur, China 
maintained that “its weapons sales to Khartoum are legitimate, since the embargo 
covers only the territory of Darfur, not all of Sudan”, so that it was not China but 
Khartoum that violated the sanctions regime (Rice 2009b). 
Since Council rulemaking was unrealistic, the sanctions supporters, encouraged 
by the successful attempt to sanction four individuals via a Council resolution (US 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2006d), actively strived for submitting new sanctions 
packages to the committee, however, they ultimately did not put them onto a Council 
vote because they did not expect to receive necessary majorities. After resolution 
1672 (2006), the UNSC predominantly focused on transferring the AMIS mission to a 
UN mission and haggled about the need for Khartoum’s “consent” to a peacekeeping 
mission (resolution 1706 (2006) with abstentions from China, Russia, Qatar), so that 
the proactive sanctions states held off until early 2007 to not provoke outright 
Sudanese rejection of ‘rehatting’ the peacekeeping mission (Wuthnow 2013: 98–99). 
                                                 
24 The inactive 1518/Iraq sanctions committee (three days) and the 1636/Lebanon sanctions 
committee (no defined timeframe) are exceptions, see Security Council Report 2013: Annex. 
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After Khartoum had obstructed DPA implementation and still refused to consent 
to a UN peacekeeping mission, the Western permanent members intensively 
consulted to devise a strategy overcoming blockade and present a new sanctions 
“package” (Lynch 2007; Borger 2007a). As early as 2 February 2007, the UK and the 
US consulted on “[p]ossible next steps”, which included additional sanctions targets, 
extending the arms embargo to all of Sudan, and imposing a no-fly zone over Darfur 
(US Embassy London 2007b). In addition, France, the UK and the US were 
exchanging lists of possible targets. The US proposed to designate the three 
individuals Awad Ibn Auf (Head of Sudanese Military Intelligence and Security), 
Khalil Ibrahim (JEM leader) and Ahmad Haroun (State Minister for Humanitarian 
Affairs), whereas the UK suggested an initial list of nine targets comprising of Ali al-
Sharif al-Tahir Ahmed (SAF Western Military Commander), Abdullah Khalif Bashir 
(Former SAF Western Military Commander), Mohammed Abdel Qadir (SAF Airforce 
Commander), Mahjzoub Hussein (SLM spokesperson), Commander Adam Abu 
Jimaiza, Sharif Harir (former SLM spokesperson, NRF member), Ali Karabino, 
Ahmed Haroun (State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs) and Ali Kosheeb 
(Janjaweed leader) (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007c; US Embassy Khartoum 
2007). Being skeptical about listing the high-ranking Awad Ibn Auf potentially 
triggering Chinese and Russian opposition and endangering UK-Sudanese counter-
terrorism cooperation (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007e), the UK explicitly 
“proposed to present the names for possible designation to Russia and China as an 
opening position, and use the threat of submitting the names to the Sudan Sanctions 
Committee to induce China and Russia to pressure Sudan to deliver 1) an immediate 
improvement in humanitarian situation (…), 2) an end to violations of the arms 
embargo and to offensive overflights, and 3) complete cooperation on the Heavy 
Support Package” for the AMIS mission (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007c). 
Within the P3, the French delegation was skeptical about the US list (Awad Ibn 
Auf and Khalil Ibrahim, for too senior rank, Ahmad Haroun for not endangering ICC 
proceedings against him) and rather wished to designate “intermediate-level” 
individuals and “criminal field commanders” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 
2007d; US Embassy Paris 2007a). Instead, on March 15, the French circulated a list 
among the P3 with five potential targets of more intermediate rank. The individuals 
included Abdallah Safi Al Nour (Former governor North Darfur, major general SAF), 
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El-Tijani Abdel Qadir Muhammad (Involved in Janjaweed attacks of April 2005 and 
April 2006), Mohammed Adam Naser (Former SLA chief of staff, member of NRF), 
Khatir Tor El-Khala (G-19 commander), and Adam Ali Shogar (member of joint 
committee of G-19 and general coordinator of operations). The Panel of Experts 
confidential annexes mentioned the latter four individuals (US Permanent Mission to 
the UN 2007i). 
Meanwhile, during sanctions committee meetings as well as P5 consultations, 
despite the support from many committee members on new sanctions measures and 
new designations (Casert 2007; Borger 2007b), China and Russia (as well as Qatar, 
South Africa, Indonesia) made clear that they generally opposed new sanctions 
including new designations, which would be a “mistake” (US Permanent Mission to 
the UN 2007e, 2007f, 2007h; Agence France Presse 2007a, 2007b; Lederer 2007d). 
China directly issued a veto threat in P5 consultations and warned that the US “should 
not bother to table a sanctions resolution, as Beijing had already decided it ‘could not 
be allowed to pass’ (…) and explicitly rejected sanctions as a threat to the political 
process and further dialogue with Khartoum” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 
2007g; Agence France Presse 2007a; Lederer 2007c). 
During two informal committee meetings in May 2007 discussing the results of 
the latest Panel of Experts report which had suggested extending the arms embargo 
and listing new individuals, among others, the sanctions opponents (China, Russia, 
Qatar, Indonesia) objected to all recommendations so that the proactive states (US, 
UK, Slovakia, France, Belgium) realized that any listing initiative in the committee 
would be futile. The US diplomat deplored that the Italian Chair’s “commitment to 
gain consensus on every issue, no matter how anodyne, has the effect of facilitating 
the obstructionism of Committee members sympathetic to Khartoum” (US Permanent 
Mission to the UN 2007k). Now even the Panel of Experts, “[n]oting that the 
Committee was constrained by the consensus rule for sanctioning individuals” urged 
UK and US diplomats in private consultations “to force a vote in the Council on new 
names and sanctions measures” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007h). 
The US did not raise the matter to the Security Council for several reasons. First, 
the US had received an explicit veto threat from China and other UNSC members 
including Russia had made clear that they would neither support new sanctions 
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measures nor any additional designations. Second, even the proactive P3 had different 
views on whom to designate. While the P3 certainly would have been able to 
overcome these differences, it was no longer a unified coalition of sanctions 
proponents. Even some Western states and allies were increasingly hesitant (Italy, 
Belgium, Germany, Peru, e.g. US Embassy Rome 2007b). Third, the UN Secretary-
General had requested not to pursue sanctions not to undermine his diplomatic 
initiatives. Fourth, as the US administration quickly wanted to send a visible sign of 
‘doing something’ instead of rallying support within the UNSC, with “remote” 
prospects to succeed (Abramowitz/Lynch 2007), a unilateral listing would counter 
domestic pressures for action and be more cost-effective. Accordingly, the US 
domestically designated three individuals and 31 government-run Sudanese 
companies on 29 May 2007 (Riechmann 2007; Abramowitz/Lynch 2007). 
In late 2007, suddenly Qatar signaled that it intended to designate rebels opposed 
to Khartoum, which called the P3 into action. During a committee meeting, Qatar 
requested other delegation’s comments on its suggestion to list “JEM leader Khalil 
Ibrahim and SLM faction leader Abdelwahid el-Nur for their failure to attend the 
UN/AU-led Darfur mediation talks” and argued “that Ibrahim’s and Abdelwahid’s 
absence at the talks constituted an impediment to the peace process per paragraph 3 
(c) of resolution 1591”. This offer received initial support within the committee 
(Khalizad 2007a; SCR Forecast December 2007b). Qatar even suggested 
circumventing the sanctions committee and submitting a Council resolution “to raise 
the profile of the designations” (Khalizad 2007a). While the sanctions proponents 
would welcome additional suggestions and realized that “Qatar’s unprecedented call 
for Committee action may represent a unique opportunity for Council action on 
sanctions (…), while also offering us the leverage to press for a broader list of 
targets”, the US inquired that listings should also include the Sudanese government, 
which Qatar objected to (Khalizad 2007a). 
Simultaneously, the preferences among committee members, including of the 
opposing permanent members, remained relatively stable, as the committee discussed 
the Panel of Experts final report in November 2007. The panel suggested to designate 
five individuals (Khalil Ibrahim, Adam Bahkit, Daoussa Déby, Mohamed al-Tahir al-
Aharif, SAF Western Region Commander, Mohammed Abdel Qadir, Commander 
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Sudanese Air Force), to extend the arms embargo, to impose aviation sanctions on jet 
fuel and sanctions on six cargo airlines for violations of UNSC resolutions 
(S/2007/584, pp.6-8). Within the committee, China “objected to any further 
discussion” about whether or not the arms embargo should be strengthened. Further, 
China and Qatar opposed aviation sanctions, while Russia reminded that only 
member states, not the Panel cannot make formal listing requests. In essence, 
“[c]onforming to predictable positions, China and Russia opposed all of the Panel’s 
substantive proposals, and Qatar and Indonesia attempted to block even the most 
basic recommendations (…), such as sending follow-up letters to states” that have 
failed to respond to Panel information requests (Khalizad 2007b). Internally, the P3 
agreed that they “should be prepared with a counterproposal” to the Qatari initiative 
(US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007o). 
While the Qataris did not follow through with their initiative on listing the two 
rebel commanders (SCR Forecast December 2007b) and all other Panel of Experts 
recommendations had been blocked (Khalizad 2007c), the Qatari attempt elicits 
revealing comments about the nature of sanctions committees. First, when committee 
members share a common interest in getting targeted sanctions to work, they might 
actually enter an arguing process about the applicability of sanctions on a certain 
group of individuals. Second, the episode generated an intriguing comment by the US 
ambassador in a cable to the State Department:  
“[T]he Committee is not empowered to adopt new sanctions measures--only the 
Council can do this—(…). Though the Committee did not agree to endorse any 
of the Panel’s substantive recommendations to the Council, the Council may 
consider these recommendations at any time on the initiative of a Council 
member. We should not read too much into positions taken in the Committee 
adverse to ours as consensus rules allow members a cost-free veto on any issue-
-no votes are taken and deliberations are not public. Elevating an issue for 
Council discussion or vote makes adverse positions more difficult to sustain. 
We should keep this avenue in mind if there is interest in enacting any of the 
recommendations” (Khalizad 2007b). 
In early 2008, the P3 began a new sanctions initiative to pressure Khartoum into 
finally consenting to UNAMID deployment, while China still opposed further 
sanctions (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2008a, 2007p). In May 2008, the US 
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forged a new sanctions list of four individuals (Khalil Ibrahim, Daoussa Deby Itno, 
Chadian government adviser providing support to non-state armed groups, Ahmad 
Muhammed Harun, and Awad Ibn Auf) and informally sought P5 reactions (US State 
Department 2008b; Khalizad 2008b). The UK supported the list. France supported 
three names, however, resisted to Deby, presidential advisor and half-brother of the 
Chadian president (S/2007/584, para. 124), because this would undermine Chadian-
EU cooperation on EUFOR. In turn, the US offered to support “one or two” Chadian 
rebels to win French support for Deby (US State Department 2008e). Russia 
informally pledged “not to obstruct (…) efforts to sanction any of the four” (Khalizad 
2008b). Crucially, China was opposed and reasoned that “[f]irst, (…) the imposition 
of sanctions could affect the Government of Sudan’s ‘fragile’ acceptance of the 
deployment of [UNAMID] (…). Second, sanctioning the four individuals could affect 
the Sudanese Government’s willingness to participate in political negotiations (…). 
Third, ‘technically speaking,’ China remains unconvinced that the information (…) 
provided so far makes a case for sanctioning the four individuals. Fourth, noting that 
China abstained on UNSCR 1591, (…) China continues to be skeptical of the utility 
of sanctions in solving the Darfur crisis” (US Embassy Beijing 2011). Importantly, 
China explicitly cautioned the prudence of the measure and urged “the United States 
to ‘think twice’ about adding the four names” (US Embassy Beijing 2008). 
To achieve a successful outcome, the US explicitly assembled a decision package 
coupled with a threat to use a public Council vote would win Chinese acquiescence 
within the committee. An internal US cable from Washington to New York outlined 
the envisaged strategy. The US hoped that China “may calculate that their national 
interests are better served by not opposing any of the four names in committee, which 
would avoid a very public vote in the Security Council to designate the four 
individuals. It would be an acceptable Committee outcome if consensus is only 
reached on designating IBRAHIM and DEBY” (US State Department 2008b). US 
diplomats should explicitly threaten the Chinese to refer the matter to the Council 
arguing that while  
“[t]he U.S. will propose a list of four names (…) to the UNSC Sudan Sanctions 
Committee”, achieving “Committee consensus would be quicker and generate 
far less media attention than proceeding in the Security Council [because] 
Committee meetings are closed to the public and no public vote is taken. If 
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consensus is not reached, we will be compelled to pursue imposition of 
sanctions on these individuals through a vote in the Security Council, as was 
done in 2006” (US State Department 2008b). 
After being focused on UNAMID extension (resolution 1828 (2008)), in early 
September 2008, the US called a final P3 meeting to discuss a potential listing 
proposal (US State Department 2008e). However, during the meeting the US realized 
that neither the French, nor the British any longer supported the proposal. France 
believed that “new sanctions would derail ongoing mediation and dialogue efforts 
underway involving Chad, Sudan and the various rebel movements (…)”. 
Procedurally, the French cautioned that pursuing a committee listing proposal might 
severely backfire. Because the committee did consider every listing request separately 
in a no-objection procedure as outlined in committee guidelines, “’Sudan’s friends’ 
might use the Sudan Sanctions Committee’s procedures to ensure that the Committee 
only approves sanctioning the anti-government rebel, Khalil Ibrahim, while rejecting 
the other three names. (…) If this were done, (…) Sudan would win a propaganda 
victory and be let off the hook“. The US acknowledged that “[t]his is theoretically 
possible. The Committee approves or rejects names individually, not on a slate -- 
therefore, Libya and/or China could theoretically place holds on all the names except 
Ibrahim” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2008d). The UK had concerns because 
“the timing of this proposal -- with the ICC issue looming and just before the UN 
General Assembly ministerial week – was poor” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 
2008d). 
Lacking P3 support and facing a likely failure, the US did not further pursue this 
listing request, neither in the committee, nor in the Council. The US Permanent 
Mission advised the State Department against any further committee action:  
“In light France’s (sic!) position (…), the UK’s lack of enthusiasm and China’s 
near-certain opposition (…), USUN recommends holding off temporarily on 
this initiative until we are able to move forward with firm P3 support. If we 
propose new names for sanctions without P3 support, we run a high risk of 
public failure that would undermine accomplishing our other goals in Sudan 
and antagonize our allies. USUN also recommends against (…) forcing a 
Council vote on our proposed names [because] this course of action would 
worsen an already tense atmosphere in the Council and have unpredictable 
consequences, such as the likelihood Council members would insist on 
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inserting unacceptable ICC language in an (sic!) any sanctions resolution“ (US 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2008d). 
To overcome committee stalemate when again all Panel recommendations had 
been rejected in late 2008 (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2008f), the P3 
deliberated on how they could increase pressure on Sudan and sympathetic committee 
members below the level of sanctions designations, without success. Such measures 
would have included media briefings “when China or Russia block a proposal”, 
summoning Sudanese and Chadian ambassadors “for direct questioning”, inviting 
“UN/AU/EU officials” and national experts to “highlight SCR violations”, and urging 
NGOs to submit reports to the committee (US State Department 2008f). In December 
2008, the P3 orchestrated that Belgium requested to invite the Sudanese and Chadian 
ambassadors, while Human Rights First offered to brief the committee on human 
rights violations. However, Russia and China fiercely objected even to soft measures 
so that the Chair was only allowed to “simply ‘remind’ the Perm Reps that they could 
address the committee if they so chose” (US State Department 2008g). In the 
following, Sudan simply refused to meet with the committee (Rice 2009a). 
The fact that two permanent members continued to oppose measures on Sudan 
stabilized the proactive members’ expectation that committee listing proposals would 
fail and that previous decisions would remain non-implemented. First, that even the 
proactive P3 do not submit listing proposals, although they strongly prefer listings 
and prepare relevant requests, is evidence of the members’ perception that any of 
their proposals would be rejected. Second, the sanctions regime provided for 
procedures to delist individuals and to grant humanitarian exemptions. However, 
neither have these provisions originated from decision problems, nor has any state 
filed delisting or exemptions request (S/2013/79, paras 140-149). Third, after 
resolution 1672 (2006), while the committee implemented some symbolic 
recommendations such as entering an Interpol Special Notice Agreement in 2012 
(S/2012/978, para. 15), updating the listing information in 2013 (SC/10938, 
SC/11112, SC/11436) or issuing narrative summaries for the four listed individuals in 
2014, none of the substantive Panel of Experts proposals have been incorporated, 
despite delivering specific names of violators (S/2007/584, S/2011/111, para. 208; 
S/2013/79, para. 16 and several Committee Annual Reports). Fourth, skeptical states 
 
335 
have seriously delayed one Panel of Experts report and blocked another referring to 
inaccuracies or that the committee does not have to publish the reports (What’s in 
Blue 2011a, for report see S/2011/111, (SCR Forecast April 2011; SCR Forecast 
January 2012; SCR Forecast April 2012; SCR Forecast July 2012)SCR Forecasts 
April 2011, January 2012, April 2012, July 2012). Fifth, that the Panel of Experts did 
not provide recommendations on committee procedures and even informally called 
upon proactive states to circumvent the committee highlights that panel members did 
not perceive rulemaking as a viable option. Thus, its recommendations mainly 
focused on arms embargo implementation, compliance with the targeted sanctions, 
and suggesting individuals for listing. Sixth, all sanctions measures remained 
essentially non-implemented, while systematic violations of the arms embargo and 
the targeted sanctions have been extensively documented (most recently, S/2011/111; 
S/2013/79, paras 144-145; S/2014/87; S/2015/31). 
In conclusion, the fourth case episode shows that proactive members did no 
longer believe that neither rulemaking, nor a Council resolution would yield 
successful outcomes, although these actors invested significantly into devising a 
strategy to overcome the skeptics’ blockade. Sanctions opponents over the years 
successfully achieved their desired outcome, i.e. to avoid any further pressure against 
Sudan. Overall, as a result from the preference constellation and the lack of 
implementation decisions, the effectiveness of the sanctions regime was severely 
limited. 
 
8.3 Chapter summary 
The Sudan sanctions regime represents a baseline case that operates according to the 
logic of power-based decision-making in uniform decision processes and displays the 
expected effects associated with this logic. At least one permanent member of the 
Security Council rejects the imposition of sanctions on the target country and pursues 
a dominant strategy of blockade. Therefore, the case lies outside the described scope 
conditions of committee governance. The effects of committee governance only 
occur, if actors face a coordination situation in which focal points are influential. 
Accordingly, the sanctions regime entirely follows a logic of bargaining over package 
deals. Hence, the decision taken within the Sudan sanctions regime mirror pure 
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bargaining outcomes in the form of package deals and reflect the constellation of 
interests among powerful Council members. Despite delegating to a committee, the 
case of the Sudan sanctions regime follows the logic of a uniform, undifferentiated 
decision process in which the sanctions committee does not play any major role. This 
finding highlights that power-based decision-making is a second logic besides rule-
based decision-making. 
The initial stage of the Sudan sanctions regime illustrates that the transfer of 
decision-making competencies to a sanctions committee does not inevitably prompt 
rule-based decision-making, because every member possesses the ability to block 
decisions in the committee. The appointed Sudan sanctions committee has not listed 
any individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions due to the veto position of 
three committee members. The preference constellation is also visible in the few 
committee listing proposals. Committee members do not even discuss the merits of 
listing proposals, but rather reject listings out of principle. This stage shows that the 
committee can indeed be subject to decision blockade. This finding does not 
contradict a theory of committee governance, because the committee can indeed fall 
prey to the danger of decision blockade, despite the fact that the Council actually 
assigned decision tasks to the committee. 
The second stage of the Sudan sanctions regime shows that proactive members 
principally consider rulemaking as a viable option to overcome committee stalemate. 
However, as some members prefer inaction over action, committee members do not 
find themselves in a coordination situation where focal points would provide 
opportunities to overcome blockade in the committee stage. The regulation of 
committee decision-making does not work, if even one member pursues blockade as 
dominant strategy and can therefore simply reject any set of unfavorable rules. 
Accordingly, skeptical members objected to all efforts for changing procedural (e.g. 
the consensus requirement) and substantive rules (e.g. listing criteria). 
The third stage illustrates that decision-making in a uniform decision process 
yields power-based decision-making. In fact, proactive members view bargaining 
over the contents of a Council resolution as a principle and constantly available route 
to circumvent the blockade in the sanctions committee. In this stage, because 
skeptical members block their decision proposals within the committee, the proactive 
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members elevate the listing request to the Council calculating that a public Council 
vote would raise disincentives to veto the marginally important requests. The content 
of the decision proposal reflected a balanced package that traded-off two rebel 
commanders with two mid-level Sudanese officials. This way, the Council imposed 
sanctions on four individuals (resolution 1672 (2006)). 
In a fourth stage, the proactive committee members sought to overcome blockade 
in the Sudan sanctions committee through pursuing further package deals with the 
option of raising decision packages to the Security Council. Within the committee, the 
three Western permanent members actively spearheaded listing requests, but faced 
resistance from China and Russia. The proactive members refrained from introducing 
a package deal in the committee because the committee treats decision requests 
separately, which in this case favors the skeptical members obstructionism. 
Ultimately, sanctions proponents were no longer willing to risk the failure of a 
Council draft resolution imposing sanctions on a second package of listing requests. 
As a consequence, neither the committee nor the Council has adopted any further 
meaningful decisions in the Sudan sanctions regime. Even proactive members no 
longer formally submitted further listing requests to the Council expecting a likely 
Chinese veto, while the committee remained blocked. In fact, the sanctions regime is 
entirely ineffective as there are only four listed individuals and the sanctions 
measures remain entirely unenforced. 
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9 The Iran Sanctions Committee – Sanctions in the Context of 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
On 31 July 2006, in reaction to the Iranian nuclear programme, the UNSC demanded 
that Iran ceases all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and resumes its 
cooperation with IAEA inspectors (resolution 1696 (2005), paras 1-2, 8). By adopting 
resolution 1737 (2006) in December 2006, the Council imposed an assets freeze, 
commodity sanctions on proliferation-related materials and items related to ballistic-
missile programs and provided a first list of sanctions targets as well as lists of 
embargoed items. The sanctions regime was modified and tightened through 
subsequent resolutions introducing an embargo on the import from (resolution 1747 
(2007), para. 5), the export to Iran of certain conventional arms (resolution 1929 
(2010), para. 8) and a travel ban on listed individuals (resolution 1803 (2008), para. 
5). The Council also adopted further subsidiary measures including providing a legal 
basis for unilateral and regional financial sanctions as well as for cargo inspections. 
The UNSC created a sanctions committee to monitor sanctions implementation and to 
add or remove individuals and entities from its sanctions list as well as to determine 
which additional nuclear- and ballistic missile-related goods should be subject to an 
embargo (resolution 1737 (2006), para. 18). In 2010, the UNSC established and 
subsequently extended a Panel of Experts (resolution 1929 (2010), para. 29). The 
sanctions committee was mid-active and met about six times a year (with the 
exception of 25 meetings in 2007). However, after the Al-Qaida and Taliban regimes, 
the Iran regime had the third-largest sanctions list.25 With the conclusion of the P5+1 
– Iran nuclear deal in July 2015, the sanctions regime was partially lifted (Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action, resolution 2231 (2015)). 
Despite the abundance of literature about the Iranian nuclear conflict, the 
predominant case-specific literature has so far neglected the workings of the Iran 
sanctions committee. A large share of the existing literature is foreign-policy oriented 
and analyzes foreign policy strategies in containing Iran’s nuclear program (Waltz 
2012), the effectiveness of sanctions (Takeyh/Maloney 2011), regime persistence in 
                                                 
25 See: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/1737.htm [last access: 29 April 2015]. 
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the wake of sanctions (Borszik 2014) or simply the conflict’s evolution (Kerr 2012, 
2014). More theoretically-driven scholarship focusses on the global non-proliferation 
regime (Verdier 2008) or the prospects of a negotiated settlement (Sebenius/Singh 
2013). The specific UNSC sanctions literature merely is of descriptive nature (Farrall 
2007: 458–463; Gottemoeller 2007: 105–107), or focusses on the patterns of targeting 
and the effectiveness of targeted sanctions (Wallensteen/Grusell 2012) and the UNSC 
negotiation process with a view on powerful actors (Wuthnow 2013, 2010; van 
Kemenade 2010). While transgovernmental networks tasked with producing dual-use 
items lists have been extensively studied, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the literature 
completely omits UNSC dual-use sanctions on Iran (Nikitin et al. 2012; Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2009; Lipson 2007; Anthony et al. 2007). 
To close the gap in the existing literature, the present chapter seeks to trace 
effects of committee governance on decision-making and the content of the decisions 
taken within the Iran sanctions regime. Although sanctions proponents favored 
power-based decision-making in the Council over committee decision-making for 
imposing sanctions and determining sanctions targets from 2006 to 2010, as soon as 
they transferred an explicit decision function to the committee and submitted first 
decision requests based on externally verified information, they established a system 
of divided labor that produces rule-based decisions. Concerning the sanctions on 
nuclear and ballistic missile related goods, the Council almost completely made use 
of externally provided trigger lists that introduce knowledge-based solutions to the 
regulatory problem. The episode on sanctions exemptions shows that sanctions 
committees operated according to the rules provided and that even powerful members 
have to accept decisions unfavorable to them when these conform to rules. 
The Iran sanctions regime allows for comparing the variation between Council 
power-based decision-making and committee rule-based decision-making. In fact, 
Council members have two equally plausible options to pursue a sanctions regime, 
but both come with significant consequences. While Council decision-making 
operates according to the logic of package deals, committee decision-making requires 
submitting well-reasoned listing proposals that suffice a high evidence threshold. 
Simultaneously, the Iran sanctions regime is suitable for a comparison of two 
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important decision functions within the same sanctions regime, namely determining 
individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions, granting exemptions to targeted 
sanctions on the one hand and determining embargoed dual-use items on the other 
hand, both of which present a similar regulatory decision problem. 
The chapter continues in the following order. In the next section, I assess the 
distribution of UNSC member’s interest on sanctions against Iran and whether or not 
I would expect the causal mechanism to be present in this case. In the second section, 
first, I consider the logic of decision-making in early phase of the sanctions regime 
entirely pursued within the Council without recourse to a sanctions committee. 
Second, I analyze three theoretically-informative case episodes subdivided along the 
major decision functions, the determination of dual-use goods subject to commodity 
sanctions, listing and delisting of individuals and entities, and granting of exemptions 
to targeted sanctions. The aim is to evaluate, if and how the UNSC and sanctions 
committee regulate committee decision-making, how the substantive and procedural 
decision criteria affect committee decision-making and how two different types of 
sanctions affect decision-making. The chapter is concluded with a summary of major 
findings. 
 
9.1 The origins of the Iran sanctions regime 
In the 1960s, with the assistance of Western countries, Iran initiated a nuclear 
program and built a first research reactor. At the same time, it concluded international 
agreements that commit Iran to peaceful use of nuclear technologies. Iran ratified the 
Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968, which obliges it “not to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (Article II) and requires 
any state party to adopt an IAEA safeguards agreement to verify compliance, which 
Iran and the IAEA concluded in 1974. IAEA’s role is to confirm if declared items 
were correctly declared and to investigate if and what was not declared (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 2002). A significant complicating factor is that nuclear-
technologies are inherently dual-use and can be used for peaceful purposes such as 
energy production and for nuclear weapons alike. For instance, any nuclear program 
requires the enrichment of 235U (uranium) isotopes, usually only concentrated around 
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0.7% 235U in natural uranium ore, to about 5% 235U for nuclear reactors and at least 
80% 235U for weapons-grade uranium. Alternatively, plutonium 239PU (plutonium) or 
233U within spent nuclear fuel can be reprocessed into weapons-grade material (Kerr 
2012: 1–7; Anthony et al. 2007: 7–11; Ronen 2010). 
The non-proliferation dispute surrounding the Iran’s nuclear program emerged in 
August 2002 when information surfaced that Iran has constructed secret nuclear 
facilities in Natanz and Arak. Since Iran had not declared these facilities to the IAEA, 
this constituted a violation of Iran’s obligations and led to IAEA investigations (Kerr 
2012: 1–7; Wuthnow 2013: 77–78). Subsequent IAEA reports found Iran in violation 
of the safeguards agreement because Iran had not sufficiently cooperated with IAEA 
and had developed new enrichment technologies including centrifuges. In fact, a 
military purpose of Iran’s nuclear program remained viable. The IAEA stated that 
“Iran’s policy of concealment (…) has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to 
comply” (GOV/2004/83, para. 107) and led to the IAEA Director-General’s 
conclusion “(…) that Iran had failed in a number of instances over an extended period 
of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the 
reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of 
facilities where such material had been processed and stored” (GOV/2005/67, para. 4; 
see virtually every IAEA report on Iran since 2002, e.g. GOV/2006/15, 
GOV/2006/27). In accordance with the IAEA statute, in 2006, after three years of 
unsuccessful EU-3 (i.e. France, Germany and UK) diplomatic efforts and continued 
Iranian defiance, the IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran to the UNSC 
(GOV/2006/14; see Bolton 2007: 323). 
In response to the nuclear conflict, Western powers, particularly the US, wanted 
an increased UNSC involvement and mainly pushed for sanctions. These powers 
sought to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear-weapons capability and invested 
significant diplomatic resources to this cause. Interestingly, Germany as an infrequent 
non-permanent member was engaged in all major sanctions resolutions since 2006, 
even in usually highly secretive P5 deliberations forming the so-called P5+1 group 
(i.e. P5 plus Germany, also referred to as E3+3 or EU3+3). This is mainly attributed 
to Germany’s economic relations with Iran and its leading role in EU foreign policy 
so that it became the “the sixth permanent member” on Iran (Sauer 2009: 119–121). 
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Thus, all major sanctions resolutions have been drafted by the so-called EU-3 which 
incorporates France, Germany and the UK, with the exception of resolution 1929 
(2010) which was sponsored by EU-3 and the US (see S/PV.5500, S/2006/589; 
S/PV.5612, S/2006/1010; S/PV.5647, S/2007/170; S/PV.5848, S/2008/141; 
S/PV.6335, S/2010/283). 
On Iran, the P5+1 faced a coordination situation. First, all P5+1 members shared 
a common interest in preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons. While Western 
powers perceived a nuclearized Iran as a direct threat to their and Israel’s security as 
well as to regional stability, also China and Russia had a strong interest in non-
proliferation. Both have repeatedly stressed their concerns about Iran’s nuclear 
program (S/PV.5500, S/PV.5612). China was worried about continued Iranian non-
compliance with IAEA and the destabilizing effects of a nuclearized Iran (Wuthnow 
2013: 75). Russia “(…) did not want ‘under any circumstance’ to see the emergence 
of a nuclear Iran (…). Not only would it upset the stability of the Gulf, but it would 
fatally compromise the nonproliferation regime”. In fact, Russia perceived Iran’s 
behavior as “incomprehensible” (US Embassy Moscow 2007a). Second, economic 
interests considerably varied (see Table 13). When the UNSC imposed sanctions in 
2006, among Iran’s major trading partners was the EU, with large trade shares held by 
Italy (6 percent), Germany and France (each 5 percent). China (12 percent) was about 
to become the single most important trading partner of Iran and had a strong interest 
in accessing Iranian oil and gas reserves for satisfying its growing energy 
consumption, but also re-exported refined petroleum. In particular, China was keen 
on avoiding trade sanctions on natural resources and goods as it frequently exchanged 
resources for goods (Kleine-Ahlbrandt/Small 2008: 41-42, 52; Wuthnow 2013: 75; 
van Kemenade 2010). Russia (2 percent) had little interest in Iran’s natural oil and 
gas, but was the Iran’s largest supplier of nuclear technologies, including constructing 
the Bushehr reactor and providing uranium supplies (Anthony et al. 2007: 60–63). 
The UK only held a small trade share (1 percent), while the US, having subjected Iran 
to sanctions since the Islamic Revolution, had almost negligible trade relations (0.2 
percent). 
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Table 13: P5+1 and EU Trade Volume with Iran in Billion USD, 2002-2012 
Year 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
06-12 % 
change 
China 2.5 3.7 7.0 14.4 27.8 29.4 36.5 152 
Russian Federation 0.7 0.8 2.0 2.1 3.7 3.6 2.3 9 
France 1.8 2.2 4.6 5.4 6.2 3.5 1.3 - 77 
United Kingdom 0.51 1.2 0.89 0.94 0.90 0.75 0.35 - 63 
United States 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.79 0.31 0.26 6 
Germany 2.0 2.4 4.9 5.7 6.6 6.3 3.8 - 34 
EU-28 12.8 13.2 25.1 32.3 37.6 34.2 16.7 - 48 
Total 20.4 23.7 44.8 61.1 83.5 78.1 61.2 0 
Note: Total Trade Volume combines Import and Export. Data as reported by relevant state 
(Reporter) to Iran (Partner). Source: UN Comtrade Database, available at: 
http://comtrade.un.org/data/ [31 July 2015]. 
 
Third, whereas the P3, in particular the US, had a strong interest in legally-binding 
sanctions (see e.g. US, UK, France S/PV.5500), Russia and China were skeptical of 
sanctions as an effective means to solve the nuclear crisis (Wuthnow 2013: 75–76; 
SCR Forecast May 2006a; SCR Forecast June 2006b). In essence, China warned that 
sanctions could “lead to complications” (China, S/PV.5500) and that “diplomatic 
efforts (…) should be strengthened” (China, S/PV.5612). Both were determined to 
prevent automaticity towards military intervention (Russia, S/PV.5500). Altogether, 
while all P5+1 had an interest in a non-nuclearized Iran, the US advocated sanctions 
most vocally, the EU-3 favored sanctions after expediting the negotiations track for 
economic interests (Bolton 2007: 130–164), and Russia and China were hesitant. 
Although members shared an interest in preventing Iran from gaining nuclear 
weapons, they differently assessed if and how sanctions should be applied. Further 
complicating, the strong economic interests involved required significant bargaining 
over the scope of sanctions measures.  
As a result of the diverging preference constellation, actors had principally two 
ways to solve the resulting coordination problem. Either the proactive members could 
pursue a larger package deal in a power-based bargain entirely on the Council level, 
including the sanctions measures and major implementation decisions such as 
sanctions targets. In this case, the outcomes are expected to entirely reflect the 
interest constellation among powerful members. Alternatively, proactive members 
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could transfer the task to determine implementation decisions to a sanctions 
committee. In this case, due to the diverging interests among committee members, 
one would expect to see the effects of committee governance that trigger rule-based 
decision-making. 
Despite the Council-centric decision-making on Iran sanctions in the initial stage 
of the sanctions regime, the Council formally provided initial decision criteria for the 
committee with respect to its decision functions on individual targeted sanctions and 
commodity sanctions. The Council determined that those individuals and entities 
“(…) as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon 
delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, 
or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means (…)” are 
eligible for listing (resolution 1737 (2006), para. 12). Since initially the travel ban 
was voluntary, the UNSC only provided for exemptions to the assets freeze for 
particular expenses (para. 13). Concerning the listing of non-proliferation related 
items, the Council stipulated that the committee should determine “any additional 
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, (…), which could contribute to 
enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the 
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems” (para. 3d). 
 
9.2 Theoretically-relevant case episodes of decision-making 
The Iran sanctions regime allows for comparing two logics of decision-making on 
UNSC sanctions within the context of the same conflict. As any UNSC sanctions 
regime, the Iran sanctions regime offered two institutional forms of decision-making, 
which UNSC members could equally pursue. Either, UNSC members could decide to 
retain the Iran issue in a uniform Council process without recourse to a committee. As 
a consequence, UNSC members, in particular the powerful P5 would engage in 
bargaining with the aim of accumulating larger sanctions decision packages through 
linkages and side-payments. Sanctions decisions on Iran would then have purely 
reflected the constellation of interests among powerful members. Alternatively, 
UNSC members could transfer sanctions decision functions to a sanctions committee 
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and thereby expectedly prompt the effects of committee governance. Because 
diverging preferences could no longer be compensated through linkages, decision in a 
sanctions committee would have reflected increasingly rule-based considerations. 
9.2.1 Power-based decision-making in the Council: The logic of imposing rounds of 
sanctions 
The first phase of the sanctions regime from 2006 to 2010 entirely follows the logic 
of grand politicized bargaining on the Security Council level. Sanctions supporters 
deliberately kept the Iran sanctions agenda within Council confines to escalate 
sanctions within larger decision packages including implementation decisions, after 
negotiation initiatives have stalled and the IAEA has determined Iranian non-
compliance. In essence, later sanctions resolutions did not replace but complement 
earlier resolutions with new or strengthened sanctions measures and none of them 
have a sunset clause. The P5+1 considered imposing sanctions on six different types 
of sanctions measures: arms embargo, targeted sanctions (travel ban and assets 
freeze), a trade embargo on proliferation related items for nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems including dual-use items, cargo inspections, sanctions on economic 
trade (e.g. oil industry) and access to financial markets. Altogether, this enabled 
sanctions proponents to adopt remarkably biting sanctions in four resolutions (1737 
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010)) including dual-use sanctions, 
arms embargoes, permissible cargo inspections and targeted sanctions with the third 
largest sanctions list in just four years of Council negotiations. 
The Iranian nuclear conflict posed significant challenges for UNSC members for 
two reasons. First, the P5 faced strongly diverging interests. While advocates (France, 
UK, US) and skeptics (China, Russia) agreed that “Iran’s unwillingness to comply 
with IAEA Board resolutions is unreasonable and constitutes a serious problem for 
the international community“, they significantly disagreed about the consequences of 
Iranian defiance (SCR Forecast May 2006a; SCR Forecast June 2006b). While the 
sanctions supporters wished to impose tough sanctions early on, sanctions sceptics, 
preferred measures tailored to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems and particularly vowed against sanctions that would undermine their business 
interest (SCR Forecast November 2006b). As a result, there was an unstable 
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consensus on a small but incremental escalation of measures to provide a “dual-track” 
approach consisting of incentives in terms of a negotiation package and applying 
dosed pressure (SCR Forecast May 2006a). However, the P5 still had to determine the 
exact type of pressure. Second, the strategy of sanctions rounds is closely tied to 
Iran’s behavior. To derail the delicate and unstable P5 consensus on sanctions, Iran 
continuously pursued a tactic of acceding to a negotiated settlement and ceasing its 
enrichment activities, only to withdraw from commitments shortly thereafter. For 
instance, Iran accepted to sign the IAEA additional protocol, only not to ratify it 
subsequently. Previously, this strategy prevented the IAEA Board of Governors from 
referring the Iranian nuclear dispute to the UNSC for three years (Kerr 2014: 3–5; 
Bolton 2007: 130–164; Sciolino 2006). 
Up until 2010, the proactive members preferred to pursue the Iran sanctions 
regime almost entirely on the Council level instead of the committee, even though 
implementation decisions could be taken within a sanctions committee. While 
sanctions measures have to be imposed and amended in a Council resolutions, even 
after resolution 1737 (2006), Council members preferred to keep negotiations on Iran 
sanctions including designations within the Council. Faced with two options how best 
to proceed, sanctions supporters believed to maximize their payoff in the Council 
rather than in a functionally differentiated governance system. In the Iran sanctions 
regime, proactive members deliberately did not invest into getting the functionally 
differentiated listing system operational, but preferred negotiations on the Council 
level for several reasons. 
On the one hand, besides seeking to impose new sanctions measures that required 
a Council resolution, UNSC resolutions had the advantage that they fixed the P5 
consensus at a given point in time and used a certain window of opportunity for 
adopting additional designations. These resolutions contained an annex listing the 
sanctions targets, which was part of Council negotiations. Thus, actors negotiated the 
measures and the targets at the same time. In fact, negotiations on the Council level 
resembled a pure bargaining logic involving significant trade-offs. This could mean 
that actors dropped one entry from the list but got something in return on a different 
operative paragraph (or the opposite way). In that respect, actors could trade sanctions 
measures and targets so as to compensate negative payoffs for a skeptical member. 
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Additionally, sanctions targets were negotiated as a comprehensive package and not 
as single, separated requests, and thus did not have to have any relation to decision 
criteria (two separate interviews with UN member state officials, New York, 
December 2013).  
On the other hand, sanctions proponents were insecure if their efforts might not 
be derailed or significantly delayed in a sanctions committee, even though they did 
not anticipate an outright decision-making blockade by sanctions skeptics (US 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2007a). Russia emphasized that they were prepared to 
prevent the sanctions regime from becoming a “life of (..)[its] own which could injure 
Russian interests” (US Embassy Moscow 2006c) and China was hesitant to move 
beyond resolution 1737 (2006) (US Embassy Beijing 2007a). Because the committee 
could easily fall prey to changing interests under consensus requirement, leaving it to 
the committee would have created a certain amount of uncertainty about listing 
prospects. For instance, the sanctions supporter’s concerns seem to have been 
immediately confirmed as skeptical members sought to delay the substantive 
committee work through haggling over procedures (US Permanent Mission to the UN 
2007a). In February 2007, the committee was “not yet fully operational because it has 
not yet adopted its procedural guidelines” (SCR Forecast February 2007). A US 
diplomat was concerned that “[a]s in the North Korea Sanctions Committee, we 
expect extensive and unconstructive edits from Russia and China to constrain the 
Committee’s substantive work” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007a). After six 
months and a number of almost weekly informal meetings discussing the guidelines, 
the committee adopted a short 3.5 page guidelines (S/2007/780, para. 6). 
Pursuing a strategy of enhancing sanctions within the Council (and not within a 
sanctions committee) followed the logic of package deals and power-based decision-
making, without recourse to a sanctions committee. The resolutions accumulated a 
number of issues, including implementation decisions, into larger package decisions. 
Powerful members devoted significant resources into the negotiation processes in 
order to bring the negotiated resolution language closer towards their ideal points. 
While rules did not become a source of influence, powerful members did not accept 
unfavorable resolution language unless negative payoffs were compensated through 
linkages. Consequently, the content of resolutions entirely reflected the distribution of 
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interests among powerful members. The sanctions proponents repeated the logic of 
package deal four times within the Security Council (see Table 14). 
Table 14: Iran Sanctions Resolutions 2006-2010 
Date Resolution Sanctions Measures Annexes 
23 December 
2006 
1737 (2006) - Targeted sanctions (assets freeze 
only) 
- Commodity sanctions (MTCR list, 
only NSG Part 1 list of nuclear 
material, equipment and technology) 
12 individuals 
10 entities 
24 March 2007 1747 (2007) - Embargo on arms exports by Iran 15 individuals 
13 entities 
3 March 2008 1803 (2008) - Extended targeted sanctions (travel 
ban) 
- Extended commodity sanctions 
(NSG Part 2 list of dual-use items) 
- Cargo interdiction regime 
13 individuals 
(AF) 
12 entities (AF) 
5 individuals of 
res. 1737 & 1747 
(TB) 
9 June 2010 1929 (2010) - Arms embargo on Iranian arms 
procurement 
- Strengthened cargo interdiction 
regime 
All previously 
listed individuals 
subject to AF and 
TB 
1 individual 
40 entities  
Note: Author’s illustration. Source: http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings [29 April 2016]. ‘AF’ 
translates ‘assets freeze’. ‘TB’ translates ‘travel ban’. ‘NSG’ translates ‘Nuclear Suppliers Group’. 
‘MTCR’ translates ‘Missile Technology Control Regime’. 
 
In a prelude to sanctions, after inconclusive EU3 – Iran negotiations, the UNSC 
issued a significantly watered-down presidential statement demanding Iranian 
compliance with IAEA Board of Governors resolutions and requesting a compliance 
report by the IAEA Director-General (PRST/2006/15; Hoge 2006b; Bolton 2007: 
324–325; Wuthnow 2013: 77). After the IAEA submitted its report with negative 
conclusions, the UK and France circulated a first draft resolution. Only after Iran 
rejected yet another P5+1 negotiation package, Russia and China accepted that the 
UNSC should take cautious further measures and accordingly, the UNSC adopted a 
first resolution in July 2006. The resolution demanded that Iran suspended its nuclear 
weapons program and fully collaborated with IAEA. In case of non-compliance, upon 
an IAEA compliance report, the UNSC threatened to impose “appropriate measures 
under Article 41 of Chapter VII” (resolution 1696 (2006)) thus ruling out military 
intervention (Wuthnow 2013: 77–78; Mousavian 2012: 250–251; SCR Forecast 
August 2006). 
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In August 2006, when the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance, the issue of 
sanctions imminently came up among the P5, which faced a considerable 
coordination problem. While the US favored tough sanctions, Russia and China were 
skeptical, with the UK and France in between (Wuthnow 2013: 78). For instance, US 
cables reveal that “China agrees Iran needs to be penalized for its behavior but the 
penalty should fit the crime” (US Embassy Beijing 2006a). This constellation led to a 
“long, complicated, sensitive” negotiation process (Gootman 2006) in which the 
permanent members had to carve out the exact type of sanctions measures, the 
applicable targets and the consequences of non-compliance. 
To impose sanctions on Iran, the sanctions proponents first had to negotiate 
within the Council, and engaged in a prolonged bargaining process over the scope of 
sanctions. On 22 October 2006, the EU3 and the US discussed a first draft resolution, 
which was circulated among the P5+1 on 24 October with the following measures: a 
trade embargo on “items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could 
contribute to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, including those set out 
in documents S/2006/814 [complete NSG list] and S/2006/815 [complete MTCR 
list]” (leaked draft resolution as per Japan Economic Newswire 2006a, para. 4) and 
the provision of technical, financial assistance and training for Iran’s nuclear and 
ballistic missile related activities (para. 5), a travel ban and asset freeze on individuals 
and entities involved in such programs named in a resolution annex (paras 7,9), 
sanctions exemptions for targeted sanctions (paras 8,10-12), exempting items for the 
construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor from measures (para. 14), but not the 
nuclear fuel (subject to prior UNSC approval), creating a sanctions committee for 
follow-up decisions on targeted sanctions and items (para. 16) and threatening further 
sanctions in case of non-compliance (para. 22) (Burkhardt 2006; Aziakou 2006c; 
Bolton 2007: 335–337). Russia and China rejected the text arguing that “the current 
draft is too broad” and that “[t]he focus of the resolution’s demands should be 
narrowed to preventing Iran from receiving assistance that would help with sensitive 
elements of a nuclear fuel cycle”. Therefore, the resolution’s annex and the 
“measures, such as a travel ban and assets freeze, go beyond what was agreed to by 
Foreign Ministers” (Bolton 2006c). Instead, Russia suggested “a phased approach” 
starting with measures on proliferation only (Lederer 2006g; Bolton 2006c). 
Concerning the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Russia resisted to be singled out and insisted 
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on a general rule because “[i]f an item were deemed safe for Bushehr, then certainly it 
would be safe for other peaceful projects as well“ (Bolton 2006c). 
In response to Russian objections, on 30 November, the EU3 dropped references 
to the Bushehr reactor and instead included an exemption for light-water reactors (US 
Embassy Moscow 2006b; Cooper 2006). To accommodate further Russian and 
Chinese opposition, on 7 December the EU3 circulated a revised draft. The draft 
lowered the scope of dual-use sanctions so that only “nuclear material, equipment and 
technology” (NSG Part 1) but not “dual-use” items (NSG Part 2) would be banned. In 
addition, an exemption to the MTCR list for short-range Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) was included. Individual targeted sanctions and a list of targets in the annex 
including its 12 person and 11 entities (Agence France Presse 2006f) were maintained 
but an exemption was added for international travel in the framework of IAEA 
cooperation. Moreover, the IAEA should report on compliance within sixty days, not 
thirty days. Finally, the draft suggested that sanctions would be immediately lifted in 
case of compliance (SCR Update Report No.4 2006; Lederer 2006h). While Russia 
and China now agreed to limited proliferation-sensitive sanctions, they still objected 
to WMD financing sanctions, the assets freeze and the travel ban, on which the US 
insisted (Lederer 2006i; Aziakou 2006d; US Embassy Beijing 2006b). A considerably 
contentious issue was how sanctions targets for the assets freeze and (potential) travel 
ban would be selected. Whereas the EU3 and the US wanted to include these in a 
resolution annex, Russia advocated for delegating the task to a sanctions committee 
(SCR Update Report No.4 2006). To win Russia’s and China’s support, the drafters 
dropped the travel ban, which now only calls upon member states to “exercise 
vigilance” in the travel of 12 designated individuals and demands committee 
notification, but the assets freeze and the annex was retained (Aziakou 2006e; Japan 
Economic Newswire 2006b). To accommodate last-minute Russian concerns about 
the assets freeze, the drafters deleted one entity (Aerospace Industries Organization) 
from the annex “in order to get the resolution passed” (Lee 2006; Gootman 2006; 
Lederer 2006j; US Embassy London 2007a). 
Finally, on 23 December 2006, the UNSC adopted its first round of sanctions 
(resolution 1737 (2006)) as a 9-page comprehensive package solution with one 
resolution annex detailing the sanctions targets. The resolution imposed an assets 
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freeze on 12 individuals and 10 entities, imposed commodity sanctions on nuclear 
proliferation and ballistic missile related items and created a committee to monitor 
implementation and adopt further decisions as required (Lynch 2006c; Gootman 
2006; Wuthnow 2013: 78–79). 
After the adoption of resolution 1737 (2006), there is no evidence that any actors 
pursued listing requests within the committee up until 2012.26 While Russia and 
China remained skeptical to new sanctions (US Embassy Beijing 2007a; Wagner 
2007), rather proactive members immediately sought to strengthen measures and 
applicable targets via a UNSC “package approach” (UK, in Lederer 2007a) when on 
22 February 2007, the IAEA director-general reported Iranian non-compliance 
(GOV/2007/08). Few days after, the P5+1 discussed potential elements of a resolution 
adding onto existing measures (Wagner 2007). The sanctions supporters proposed 
extended sanctions measures: an embargo on arms export to and imports from Iran, 
banning “all transactions or the provision of any technical assistance, training or 
financial assistance to entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs” as 
well as “grants, loans and credits to the (Iranian) government and state-owned 
institutions” and limiting export credits for commercial trade with Iran, a mandatory 
travel ban and expanded range of sanctions targets, including adding the 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (Aziakou 2007a; Olson 2007). To accommodate Russian 
and Chinese concerns, the sanctions supporters dropped the travel ban and export 
credit restrictions. Regarding the arms embargo, only the export of arms by Iran was 
censured, while the import ban was made voluntary and only applied to seven 
categories of heavy weapons including battle tanks, artillery and combat aircraft. The 
assets freeze on Revolutionary Guard Corps was also amended to name three specific 
entities and several key figures associated with the Revolutionary Guard Corps out of 
the 15 individuals and 13 entities in the resolution annex (Lederer 2007a, 2007b; 
Aziakou 2007b).  
Finally, in a second round of sanctions on 24 March 2007, the UNSC adopted 
resolution 1747 (2007) as a package deal with two annexes. The resolution imposed a 
                                                 
26 The author conducted systematic text-based searches in Lexis Nexis, Security Council Report 
and WikiLeaks. 
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ban on arms exports by Iran and added the 15 individuals and 13 entities subject to 
the assets freeze as legally-binding measures (Wuthnow 2013: 79; Mousavian 2012: 
273). 
Faced with an unchanged preference constellation, were Russia cautioned further 
sanctions steps (US Embassy Moscow 2007b), sanctions supporters kept initiatives 
on UNSC level. Again, the IAEA director-general 60 days report concluded that Iran 
failed to comply with UNSC resolutions (GOV/2007/22). The EU3 and the US 
considered a third sanctions round while interests remained essentially unaltered 
between “the US and the Europeans pushing for significant additional measures and 
Russia and China preferring small increments” (SCR Forecast May 2007; SCR 
Forecast June 2007; US Embassy Berlin 2007c). For some months, Iran achieved to 
unravel the shaky consensus by announcing to allow inspections. In September 2007, 
the P5+1 foreign ministers agreed to pursue a third sanctions round should the IAEA 
and EU foreign policy chief report negatively on Iranian compliance and EU-Iran 
negotiations (SCR Forecast December 2007a). After negotiations with Iran had failed, 
the P5+1 pursued a new sanctions round (Agence France Presse 2007c). While the 
P5+1 agreed about the need for a third resolution adding onto existing measures, 
members diverged about the appropriate scope of the “incremental increase”, with 
China and Russia being reluctant, in particular on economic sanctions (SCR Forecast 
January 2008; US Embassy Paris 2008a, 2007b; Lederer 2007e). 
In December 2007, the EU3 and US proposed first elements of a draft resolution 
to strengthen existing measures: an arms embargo on arms exports to Iran, an 
enlarged list of sanctionable items, a travel ban on all listed individuals, an expanded 
sanctions list including the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and three Iranian 
banks (Wright 2007; Lederer 2007e). Whereas China rejected any sanctions threating 
its trade interests, as well as the type and number of targets involved, Russia was 
particularly opposed to sanctions on Iranian banks (Gearan 2007; Lederer 2007e). In 
a first round of negotiations, the P3 dropped the arms embargo and two Iranian banks 
(Wright 2007). Unable to reach agreement (Carmichael 2007), the discussions were 
moved to the level of foreign ministers that agreed on a package on 22 January. The 
package included concessions to skeptical members, mainly on financial and 
economic sanctions. The sanctions supporters had to delete two further entities 
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(Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and two of Iran’s largest banks) 
(Wright/Lynch 2008; Agence France Presse 2008a). On 1 February 2008, the P5+1 
circulated a draft resolution based on those elements to the entire Council, with the 
following measures: voluntary travel ban for Annex I individuals, legally-binding 
travel ban on individuals listed in previous resolutions and Annex II, additional 
individuals and entities subject to assets freeze in Annex III, extending the 
commodity sanctions to NSG Part 2 dual-use items (except for light-water reactors), 
calls to “exercise vigilance” in granting export credits to Iran, activities of Iranian 
banks, and providing the legal basis for cargo inspections (SCR Update Report No.2 
2008). To accommodate skeptical non-permanent members, the drafters agreed to 
some final cosmetic changes (South Africa, Libya, Indonesia, Viet Nam, see US 
Embassy London 2008a; US Embassy Paris 2008b; Aziakou 2008). 
Accordingly, on 3 March 2008, the UNSC adopted resolution 1803 (2008) in a 
third round of sanctions as a package deal, which included a complex system of 
resolution annexes. Annex I (13 individuals) and Annex III (12 entities) would be 
subject to an assets freeze, while only a voluntary travel ban including notification to 
the committee. Annex II designations (5 individuals already listed in 1737 (2006) and 
1747 (2007)) would be subject to both assets freeze and travel ban. In addition, the 
UNSC extended commodity sanctions (see 9.2.2.1) and provided the legal basis for 
unilateral cargo interdictions and financial restrictions against Iranian banks 
(Wuthnow 2013: 80–81). 
While for the remainder of 2008 and 2009 UNSC action was sidelined due to the 
reinvigorated diplomatic track, including a new P5+1 proposal and an US offer to 
engage in direct negotiations, the EU3 and the US again pushed for new sanctions in 
mid-2009 after the diplomatic track had not yielded any tangible results and the IAEA 
reported non-compliance (e.g. GOV/2009/74, GOV/2010/10). As the failure of talks 
could be blamed on Iranian defiance, now even Russia was “’fed up’ with Iranian 
behavior” and accepted that a new sanctions resolution was required “to put pressure 
on Iran” although Russia maintained a cautious approach, in particular on sanctions 
that might infringe Russia’s economic interests (US Embassy Moscow 2010; US 
Embassy Paris 2010; Nowak/Lederer 2010). China remained the most hesitant among 
the P5 (US Embassy Beijing 2010; US Embassy Paris 2010; Wuthnow 2013: 81–82; 
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Nowak/Lederer 2010). Again, while additional sanctions targets could have been 
added via the sanctions committee, the drafters decided to use the new package draft 
resolution to include new sanctions designations on the Council level. 
Instead of the EU3, this time the US reached out on further steps supplementing 
resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008), in late 2009 (Secretary of 
State 2009c, 2010) and circulated draft elements among the P5+1 in early 2010 (US 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2010). These elements included new sanctions 
designations, in particular on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and “any 
individuals and entities acting on their behalf or at their direction”, but also 
significantly strengthened sanctions measures. The draft suggested complementing 
the export arms embargo on Iran with an import arms embargo including light 
weapons, an embargo against “Iranian state-owned air and shipping lines” subject to 
committee approval, an embargo on the “provision of insurance services to Iranian 
companies for international transport-related contracts”, and an embargo on “the 
purchase and sale of bonds from the government of Iran”. Finally, all previously 
listed individuals would be subject to both mandatory travel ban and assets freeze 
(Crawford et al. 2010; Lederer 2010a).  
Since China opposed measures which could threaten its interest in the Iranian oil 
sector including on the insurance of oil transports and financial investments, the US 
circulated a revised draft transforming the aviation and shipping embargo into a cargo 
interdiction regime similar to the one imposed on the DPRK. The US also dropped 
the insurance embargo and subjected the issuance of bonds to Iran to a notification 
procedure only (Crawford et al. 2010; Business World 2010). In a further step, the US 
weakened financial sanctions and dropped any reference to investments into Iranian 
energy sector and only called upon states to “’exercise vigilance’ in entering into new 
trade commitments with Iran, including granting export credits, guarantees or 
insurance” (Kuwait News Agency 2010; Lederer 2010b). Finally, in a US and Russian 
deal, to allow Russia the sale of S-300 anti-aircraft batteries to Iran, the US restricted 
the arms embargo to seven heavy weapons categories “as defined for the purpose of 
the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms”, which excluded ground-to-air 
missiles, and agreed to domestically delist four Russian entities implicated in 
transferring sensitive technologies to Iran (Baker/Sanger 2010; Sanger/Landler 2010). 
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Last minute bargaining ensued over the scope of the resolution annex. While all 
previously listed individuals would be subject to both travel ban and assets freeze, the 
new list included only one individual, and on Russian and Chinese intervention, all 
banks except for the First East Export Bank were dropped from the list of entities 
(MacFarquhar et al. 2010; Lederer 2010c). 
Finally, on 9 June 2010 the UNSC adopted its fourth round of sanctions 
(resolution 1929 (2010)) as an 18-page comprehensive package solution with four 
annexes. The measures included subjecting all previously listed individuals and 
entities to travel ban and assets freeze, as well as designating an additional 40 entities 
and one individual, among those 15 entities associated with the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (Annex II) and three entities associate with Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines (IRISL, Annex III). Further, the resolution added an arms embargo on 
Iranian major conventional arms procurement, “calls upon all States to inspect, (…) 
all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory”, authorized (voluntary) cargo inspections 
on high seas when flag state consented, (voluntary) tightening of sanctions on Iranian 
financial sector as well as created a Panel of Experts (Wuthnow 2013: 82). Since 
resolution 1929 (2010), due to the ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a nuclear 
deal, all subsequent resolutions simply extended the mandate of the panel of experts 
(resolutions 1984 (2011), 2049 (2012), 2105 (2013), 2159 (2104)). 
The predominant power-based decision-making on Iran sanctions through 
Council resolutions, which followed the logic of package deals and involved trade-
offs and linkages, prompted inadequate regulatory decisions. It demonstrates that 
bargaining is not suitable for providing well-reasoned listing decisions, which were 
required for effective sanctions implementation, because the Council in contrast to its 
sanctions committees did not satisfy listing standards and acceptability controls were 
absent. First, listings in the first three resolution annexes had little to no identifiers 
and only provided names and functions. Examples include listings of the form 
“Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)” (resolution 1737 (2006) or “Karaj 
Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEOI’s research division)” (resolution 1747 (2007). 
Although the individuals mostly held top-level positions in Iranian nuclear and 
ballistic-missile programs, there is evidence that implementation suffered. US 
diplomatic cables reveal that when Taiwan requested the US to supply sufficient 
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identifiers for implementation, the US admitted that “[o]f the 40 designated 
individuals (…) the United States government has identifier information for 17” and 
that “(…) the United States has only been able to designate 16 individuals thus far 
because we do not want to designate the wrong person” (Secretary of State 2008e). 
German authorities were similarly concerned and complained that “UNSC 1737 
Annex would be more helpful if it provided more information about the entities and 
persons, such as addresses and dates of birth” (US Embassy Berlin 2007a). Second, 
the large majority of listings did not contain any justification how designations met 
the listing criteria, which contributed to the success of a number of court proceedings 
annulling EU implementation (S/2013/331, para. 151; Eckert/Biersteker 2012: 30–
33). Only as recently as December 2014 the list has been substantially updated, 
however, still many designations lacked basic identifiers. 
In sum, the episode from 2006 to 2010 shows that although principally two 
options to adopt implementation decisions exist, UNSC members deliberately kept 
Iran sanctions on the Council level and imposed far-reaching sanctions measures and 
a considerable list of sanctions targets in four escalating sanctions resolutions. 
Council decisions characteristically resembled large package solutions including 
resolution annexes detailing sanctions targets to accommodate diverging interests of 
the permanent members and required negotiations over extended periods of time. The 
listing decisions resembled this pure bargaining logic. These packages were not 
problem-adequate and led to implementation issues. However, after 2010, the same 
Council members deliberately decided to pursue further sanctions designations within 
the sanctions committee thereafter (see section 9.2.2.2 below). 
 
9.2.2 Functional differentiation provides different opportunity structures: Rule-
based decision-making on dual-use items, individuals and entities 
While the sanctions supporters initially opted for keeping initiatives on the Council 
level for targeted sanctions, they later made use of functionally differentiated decision 
procedures. First, instead of deciding about the specific proliferation-related items to 
be covered by a trade embargo, the Council resorted to Nuclear Suppliers Group 
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(NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) produced export trigger lists 
of such items. Second, for further targeted sanctions on individuals and entities, the 
proactive members opted for getting the differentiated listing procedure operational 
through rulemaking, which led even powerful but skeptical members to agree to well-
substantiated requests. Third, concerning the procedure for sanctions exemptions, 
even proactive states had to accede to previously accepted decision procedures 
despite having diverging situation-specific preferences. 
9.2.2.1 Rule-based decisions through functional differentiation: Opting for NSG and MTCR 
lists of proliferation-related items 
The case episode shows that the outcome of trade restrictions on proliferation-related 
items is increasingly rule-based, because the implicit division of labor between the 
Council as political organ on the one hand and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the 
Missile Technology Control Regime as transgovernmental networks of technical 
regulators on the other hand provides disincentives for powerful members to 
introduce situation-specific interests. While the Council, instead of resorting to 
Council or committee decision-making, does not provide transgovernmental networks 
with a decision function to produce lists of proliferation-related items, it avails itself 
of transgovernmental networks as a source of externally provided focal points to 
determine the specific lists of proliferation-sensitive technologies subject to a trade 
embargo. First, because both transgovernmental networks focus on specific technical 
decisions on which items would constitute a proliferation risk or are dual-use in 
nature, situation-specific political interference is more difficult. In effect, if members 
are substantially interested in a meaningful regulatory outcome, the decisions need to 
be as comprehensive as possible. Second, in contrast to regulatory experts in 
transgovernmental networks, Council members can no longer meaningfully decide 
about the content of the lists. This transforms the Council’s decision-making rationale 
from adopting implementation decisions on ‘dual-use’ items towards focusing on 
larger political questions whether such commodity sanctions should be imposed at all, 
when this should be the case or which larger parts of the lists should be applicable. 
The effectiveness of any non-proliferation related export control regime rests on 
rule-based decision-making and poses a significant regulatory problem: Which 
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objects do, and which objects do not, fall under the category of “all items, materials, 
equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-
related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of 
nuclear weapon delivery systems” (resolution 1737 (2007), para. 3)? The small 
number of nuclear weapons states shows that developing such systems is difficult, 
because it requires developing or acquiring a multitude of parts and technologies and 
fusing them into a complex operable system. Thus, preventing proliferation requires 
executing strict export controls on an abundant range of items. For instance, for 
ballistic missiles as delivery systems this ranges from complete rockets, unmanned 
aerial vehicles and cruise missiles to subparts of such and even raw materials: rocket 
casings and motors, propellants, guiding systems, re-entry vehicles, and software, 
among many others. In addition, exporters face three additional complicating issues: 
First, there are a large number of goods that are inherently dual-use. For example, a 
turbofan engine can be used in a nuclear cruise missile but also in a small civilian 
airliner. Second, exporters need to control so-called “below threshold items”, which 
could be manufactured into dual-use items. Third, technological progress requires that 
export control is under almost constant revision to redefine potentially proliferation-
related goods (see e.g. MTCR handbook). Each decision about a singular item is a 
judgment if the item concerned indeed contributes to proliferation. Whereas failing to 
list a good that could in fact contribute to a nuclear weapons program would 
undermine the effectiveness, adding an unjustified item could hamper legitimate trade 
relations and impact the regimes legitimacy. As a consequence, these decisions give 
rise to the issue of incorporating technological expertise into a regulatory decision-
making in “high politics”. 
The NSG and the MTCR are both transgovernmental networks of domestic mid-
level regulators (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2009; Slaughter/Hale 2011; Lipson 2006). 
Canada, France, Japan, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States and West 
Germany established the NSG in 1974 as a transgovernmental network of like-
minded suppliers of nuclear technologies in response to India’s first nuclear weapons 
test by coordinating national export licensing (Nuclear Suppliers Group 2015a: 1–3). 
In 1987, the G7 members created the MTCR as a transgovernmental network of like-
minded members interested in preventing proliferation of suitable delivery systems 
(Missile Technology Control Regime 2015). The MTCR comprises of 34 members, 
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25 of which are Western (including Australia, New Zealand, South Korea), two Latin 
American (Argentina, Brazil), six Eastern European (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Russia, Ukraine) and one African member (South Africa).27 All 
MTCR members are also NSG members, but NSG has a total of 48 members also 
comprising of Belarus, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia (Nuclear 
Suppliers Group 2015b). Decisively, among the P5, China is member of the NSG, but 
not of the MTCR. However, China, not least to avoid sanctions from other suppliers, 
has pledged to adhere to MTCR guidelines and applied for membership in 2004 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2009: 220–221; Huang 2012). Neither the MTCR, nor the 
NSG has a secretariat. Both are not based on a formal legally-binding treaty and 
operate on the basis of consensus. Single-case export decisions by domestic 
regulators are solely made in accordance with domestic law (Lipson 2006: 187, 193). 
The NSG and MTCR transgovernmental networks are functional for their 
members and provide distinct advantages over institutionalized forms of governance. 
An uncoordinated system of export control is inadequate to address collective action 
problems associated with proliferation under conditions of globalized trade and 
technological progress (Lipson 2006: 184–186; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2009). First, the 
range of suppliers of nuclear technologies or delivery systems is confined to a small 
number of states that have more or less homogenous preferences, i.e. prevent 
transfers that may contribute to proliferation while trading these technologies among 
each other or with particular third parties. Similarly, because these clubs usually 
control large market shares, spoilers can be excluded in the beginning for setting 
standards and later might be compelled acceding to the adopted regulation or face 
exclusion from the clubs privileges such as access to new technologies (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2009: 209-210, 220-221, Anthony et al. 2007: 16–18). Second, because 
the great number of potential dual-use items and the highly technical nature of export 
controls exert states to uncertainties about future technological advances and their 
effects on proliferation, only a turn to regulatory experts instead of diplomats and a 
high degree of specialization seems feasible. Third, transgovernmental networks are 
                                                 
27 The other MTCR members are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. 
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highly flexible and responsive to environmental changes and enjoy a large degree of 
informality. In contrast to treaties, agreements can be made with considerably lower 
transaction and sovereignty costs and the staffing with experts, not diplomats, 
considerably enhances efficiency (Slaughter/Hale 2011: 343, 347). 
The major products of the two transgovernmental networks are three technical 
export trigger lists of proliferation and ballistic missile related goods to which NSG 
and MTCR export guidelines are applicable. The NSG adopts Part 1 and Part 2 as 
annexes to its NSG Guidelines (together about 120 pages). The former contains 
“items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use” including nuclear 
fuel, nuclear reactors and parts, non-nuclear reactor material, equipment for 
reprocessing, fabrication of nuclear fuel rods, isotopes separation and heavy-water 
production and was first issued in 1978. The latter “governs the export of nuclear 
related dual-use items and technologies, that is, items that can make a major 
contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but 
which have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in industry” and was first issued in 
1992 in reaction to Iraqi attempts at acquiring previously not regulated dual-use items 
(Nuclear Suppliers Group 2015b, 2015a: 4–6). The technical MTCR Equipment, 
Software and Technology Annex (about 75 pages) enumerates “a broad range of 
equipment and technology, both military and dual-use, that are relevant to missile 
development, production, and operation”. It contains two sections, Category I items 
consist of complete rocket or other delivery systems or major sub-parts, whereas 
Category II items consist of dual-use missile related equipment or parts. They differ 
in the agreed consequences of export denial (Missile Technology Control Regime 
2015). 
Decision-making in the context of transgovernmental regulatory non-proliferation 
networks reduces opportunities for situation-specific political interference. To 
effectively strengthen export controls in face of growing proliferation threat, trigger 
lists have to be as comprehensive as possible. Domestic mid-level officials with 
relevant portfolios in foreign affairs, trade, defense, customs, as well as nuclear or 
ballistic missiles experts elaborate trigger lists within technical committees, which are 
later adopted by annual plenary meetings (Lipson 2006: 187–191, on technical 
committees see Nuclear Suppliers Group 2015a: 6, Missile Technology Control 
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Regime 2015). Because the lists of items are negotiated to be applicable to all goods 
that could contribute to proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, 
actors that deliberate about such lists have to sort out extreme positions based on 
case-specific interests in a particular conflict (e.g. Iran). Actors negotiate under a 
significant veil of uncertainty because actors cannot know future case-specific 
interests in cases that have not emerged yet (e.g. Iran prior to 2002, earlier Libya, 
Syria, Iraq). The extremely technical nature of the endeavor increases the incentives 
for consistent rulemaking through arguing to the disadvantage of power-based 
bargaining. Previous research has shown that bargaining processes are not suited as 
interaction mode, if the specific task is to process validity claims for solving 
regulatory problems (e.g. Gehring/Ruffing 2008: 126; Risse 2000). Even more so, 
bargaining provides no suitable approach in cases with high uncertainty such as 
where there is no clear distinction between acceptable and unacceptable activities, 
such as in WMD export control (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2009: 218–222). In addition, 
technical experts as negotiators in export control policy operate with a higher degree 
of autonomy from their governments and related concerns of high politics (Lipson 
2006: 184). For all those reasons, it can be expected that political intervention in 
technical regulation of export control regimes is very difficult (see also Gehring 2004: 
682). 
The preexisting NSG and MTCR items lists had a significant effect on Security 
Council decisions-making. To solve the regulatory problem, the UNSC simply 
accepted readily-available NSG and MTCR lists of goods and subjected listed items 
to a mandatory trade embargo. In fact, it only left a subsidiary decision function to its 
sanctions committee (starting with resolution 1737 (2006)). While the intention was 
mainly to reduce the Council’s workload and to relieve it from overly technical 
discussions, it had a significant effect on the governance of dual-use commodity 
sanctions. Because the Council naturally focused on the broader political questions 
instead of technical details, this made decisions increasingly rule-based. 
Consequently, the Security Council had to determine, which parts of the lists were 
authoritative and whether or not specific actors or circumstances deserved 
exemptions. This also occurred every time when the Council had to replace the items 
lists, which the NSG and MTCR did regularly updated due to technical innovation 
(interview with UN member state official, New York, December 2013). Although 
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political interference is much more likely in the UNSC, due to the highly technical 
nature, the members are exposed to constraints associated with functional 
differentiation. 
The constraints for Council decision-making are empirically observable in the 
fact that the UNSC members did not haggle over technical details, but only disputed 
the timing of the imposition of broad trigger lists sections (e.g. Russia’s insistence on 
light-water reactors and its fuel supply). Yet, UNSC political dynamics of sanctions 
rounds led to a strategy of escalating the number of broad categories of items as 
determined by NSG and MTCR lists. Accordingly, in resolution 1737 (2006), the 
UNSC determined items on the NSG Part 1 list as embargoed items except for 
complete light-water reactors and components including low-enriched nuclear fuel 
(resolution 1737 (2006), para. 3ab), while NSG Part 2 dual-use expert controls was 
left to a state’s discretion (para. 4). Concerning ballistic missile items, the UNSC 
adopted an embargo on items listed in the MTCR annex (S/2006/815), with a tiny 
exception for complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems with more than 300km range 
(para. 3c, MTCR subcategory II, 19.A.3). Finally, the UNSC exempted “such items or 
assistance [that] would clearly not contribute” to Iran’s nuclear weapons program and 
delivery systems, for instance “for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian 
purposes” upon consensus committee decision (para. 9). In resolution 1803 (2008), 
the UNSC made NSG Part 2 list authoritative (S/2006/814), while maintaining the 
exception for dual-use items for “exclusive use in light-water reactors” (para. 8a). 
Concerning the MTCR list, the UNSC added the previously exempted unmanned 
aerial vehicles so that the complete MTCR list (S/2006/815) would be applicable 
(para. 8b). Two years later, in resolution 1929 (2010, para. 13), the UNSC simply 
replaced the lists with the new versions of NSG and MTCR lists 
(INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 and S/2010/263). In March 
2013, the Iran sanctions committee again updated the items lists with newer versions 
(SC/10928; Chair, S/PV.6930). Rev.9/Part 1 and Rev.7/Part 2 were superseded by 
Rev.11/Part 1 and Rev.8/Part 2 (adopted in November 2012 and June 2010 
respectively) and the MTCR list S/2010/263 was replaced by S/2012/947 (adopted in 
December 2012). 
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This raises the question, why the task to determine embargoed goods is not left to 
the committee. First, the NSG and MTCR lists are readily available. Since the 
creation of the transgovernmental networks in 1974 and 1987 respectively, such 
trigger lists have been developed and adapted to changing circumstances. 
Simultaneously, since they are adopted by consensus of the major producers of 
nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, and thus are known to their export control 
agencies, they are easily implementable by almost all potential exporters. Second, 
determining such goods within the confines of UNSC sanctions committees would 
create significant transaction costs. Since sanctions committees are staffed not with 
experts in the field but with lower-rank diplomats, and there is no strong secretariat or 
other expert body available, the “complexities of defining what ‘proliferation 
sensitive’ items are, this could lead to very significant challenges for the Committee” 
(SCR Update Report No.4 2006). According to diplomats involved, the regulatory 
issue is of such a technical nature impossible to negotiate for diplomats within the 
UNSC framework. Even within the two networks, determining these items for a 
single member state requires prolonged interagency processes (interview with UN 
member state officials, New York, December 2013). Third, the lists are not adopted 
against the background of a particular conflict, in this case Iran. For instance, since it 
was first issued up until the Iranian nuclear conflict, the NSG Part 1 list had been 
amended four times and the NSG Part 2 list three times. When the Iran nuclear 
conflict came up, the sanctions supporters could appeal to that list because that list 
was not generated to sanction Iran. Thus, it is to some degree externally validated 
independent of any conflict scenario (interview with UN sanctions expert, 
Washington DC, December 2013). Fourth, these lists had been adopted previously 
within the context of the DPRK sanctions regime as a precedent (resolution 1718 
(2006, para. 8), which would increase pressure to argue why one item would be 
sanctionable in one case but not in another although they are seemingly comparable. 
In conclusion, decision-making on proliferation-related items reflects the logic of 
rule-based decision-making using NSG and MTCR produced export trigger lists as 
external focal points to coordinate behavior. The technical nature of determining 
proliferation-related goods restricts the Council to deciding about whether or not 
those items should be sanctioned at all and when this should be the case. Because the 
Council cannot meaningfully decide about such detailed technical issues, using NSG 
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and MTCR trigger lists provides a viable alternative. Since UNSC members cannot 
re-negotiate the lists at acceptable costs, bargaining is extremely unattractive. 
Essentially, this leaves skeptical UNSC members with a take-it or leave-it option. In 
addition, the P5 members have accepted these lists in a different forum, which is 
based entirely voluntary participation. Simultaneously, large parts of the lists had 
been developed before the Iran conflict emerged. As a result, referring to NSG/MTCR 
lists does provide a rule-based solution to non-proliferation commodity sanctions. 
 
9.2.2.2 Substantive decision criteria and independent evidence determine committee listing 
decisions 
The 2012-2013 episode of the five committee designations allows for comparing 
Council and committee decision-making and shows that in contrast to the Council, 
the committee operates in the mode of rule-based decision-making. A systematic 
analysis of all listing initiatives on sanctions violations demonstrates that the mode of 
committee interaction did not rely on bargaining power but on supplying convincing 
arguments as to why a particular request was warranted against the substantive 
decision criteria established by the Council. Anticipating a committee blockade, 
sanctions proponents ex ante engaged in rulemaking to adopt general UNSC 
directives for the committee to designate sanctions violators, and the committee 
subsequently developed an (albeit high) evidence-threshold by precedent. Even 
reluctant powerful members accepted well-founded requests, while they rejected less-
documented requests. At the same time, there is no evidence for the main alternative 
explanation that decisions merely resemble package deals. Since late 2013 and after 
the election of the Rouhani government, sanctions proponents refrained from 
initiating further substantive committee decisions so as not to threaten a potential 
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negotiated P5+1-Iran nuclear deal (SCR Forecast June 2014; SCR Forecast December 
2014).28 
There are no known committee listing proposals up until the adoption of 
resolution 1929 (2010) despite repeated violations of the arms exports embargo.29 
The first clear violation of the arms exports embargo was discovered when Cyprus 
seized a consignment of ammunition aboard the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 
Lines (IRISL) chartered cargo ‘motor vessel’ (M/V) Monchegorsk in February 2009 
(S/2009/688, para. 20). However, even the US did not consider designations. Instead, 
as a first step the US sought to clearly establish the case as an Iranian sanctions 
violation by a low key committee decision. Accordingly, the US proposed simply 
sending letters to Iran and Syria requesting explanations and that the committee 
issued a Note Verbale to all UN member states later adopted as Implementation 
Assistance Notice, which determined that IRISL arms shipments had violated 
resolution 1747 (2007) (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2009a). The IRISL-
chartered container ship M/V Hansa India case, which “involved virtually identical 
circumstances”, led the committee to issue another Implementation Assistance Notice 
in January 2010.30 Before the Council imposed a fourth round of sanctions, including 
targeted sanctions on IRISL, the committee took no further action on sanctions 
violations. 
With the adoption of resolution 1929 (2010), the sanctions supporters deliberately 
changed their strategy and used the functional differentiated decision-making system 
on targeted sanctions to pursue new listings in reaction to Iranian sanctions violations. 
First, because the sanctions measures had been considerably extended by subsequent 
Council resolutions, the proactive states did no longer intend to impose tougher 
                                                 
28 For instance, explicitly, the Panel of Experts “[g]iven the ongoing negotiations, the Panel 
refrains from additional recommendations” (S/2015/401, summary). In its 2014 report, the panel 
did not make any recommendations concerning substantive decisions (S/2014/394, 
recommendations). 
29 Prior to resolution 1929 (2010), the committee has received four reports of sanctions violations: 
One case in 2007 and three cases in 2009 (Panel of Experts Iran 2011, para. 34, pp. 33). The 
author conducted systematic text-based searches in WikiLeaks and LexisNexis databases as well 
as Security Council Report publications to assess whether or not listing requests have been 
pursued. 
30 Also S/2009/688, paras 19-25. For M/V Monchegorsk and M/V Hansa India case see 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/selecdocs.shtml [last accessed: 04.05.2015]. 
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sanctions measures in a new sanctions resolution (SCR Forecast March 2011; SCR 
Forecast June 2012; SCR Forecast March 2013, among others). In anticipation of a 
potential committee blockade, the sanctions proponents did not simply seek a one-
time UNSC package deal in resolution 1929 (2010), but rather sought to adopt a 
general, less-ambiguous rule on committee designations to react on future reported 
sanctions violations. In fact, during negotiations on resolution 1929 (2010), the US 
deliberately included language on sanctions violators in the designation criteria to 
lower the threshold for a committee listing (interview with UN member state official, 
New York, December 2013). Consequently, since sanctions proponents concentrated 
on small-scale implementation decisions, it was reasonable to seek additional 
designations first within the committee and only if that failed, submit listing requests 
to the Council. 
The adopted rule was more precise, explicitly provided the mandate for the 
committee to impose targeted sanctions on sanctions violators and did not favor any 
of the powerful members. The UNSC straightly “[d]irects the Committee to respond 
effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 
(2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, and recalls that the Committee may designate 
individuals and entities who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading 
sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, these resolutions” (resolution 1929 
(2010), para. 26). This clarified the earlier more ambiguous reference to sanctions 
violations, which was aimed at “(…) persons and entities determined by the Council 
or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions 
of, or in violating the provisions” of previous resolutions (resolution 1803 (2008), 
para. 7). The committee amended its guidelines and acknowledged that it “will decide 
on the designation of individuals and entities” (as opposed to previous version: “the 
committee shall receive (…) proposals for additions to [the list]”, see guidelines April 
2008, para. 13), laid out detailed informational requirements concerning identifiers 
and reaffirmed that each proposal should be accompanied with a “narrative 
description” on how the individual or entity fits the decision criteria (guidelines 
August 2011, paras 20-25), namely being “engaged in, directly associated with or 
providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the 
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or (…) acting on behalf of such 
individuals and entities (…), assist designated persons or entities in evading sanctions 
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or in violating (…) Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) or 1803 
(2008)” (committee guidelines April 2008, paras 13-14). In addition, the consensus 
no-objection procedure was extended from five working days to 10 working days 
(paras 15, 21). 
Second, sanctions proponents strongly advocated for establishing a panel of 
experts, which would independently investigate violations. The availability of a panel 
of experts, proved useful for sanctions supporters because it provided independently 
investigated information on violations and potential designations (interview with UN 
member state official, New York, December 2013). The Panel of Experts regularly 
submitted reports to the committee and comprised of eight experts, while the P5+1 
Germany consistently had one national on the panel (see S/2010/576, S/2011/4, 
S/2011/405, S/2012/521, S/2013/375, S/2013/615, S/2014/464, S/2015/78). The 
UNSC instructed the panel to “gather, examine and analyse information (…) 
regarding the implementation of the measures (…), in particular incidents of non-
compliance (…)”, make recommendations and provide a final report before the 
termination of its mandate, subject to re-authorization after one year (resolution 1929 
(2010), para. 29). The panel did not have any formal decision function and while it 
worked under the direction of the sanctions committee, the panel could freely decide 
about the content of its reports collectively. For eventual decision requests, committee 
members could, but did not have to, pick up recommendations and evidence and turn 
them into formal decision requests. 
The committee faced a strongly diverging interest constellation where the P3 
favored additional designations in response to violations, whereas Russia and China 
were hesitant. In a Council debate on Iran sanctions in June 2011, the US, France and 
UK advocated for early adoption of new designations on sanctions violations, 
whereas Russia opposed the contents and conclusions of violation reports calling the 
information “[u]nverified and politicized” (Russia, S/PV.6563). Russia and China 
made clear that they opposed new sanctions and preferred negotiations (SCR Forecast 
December 2011; SCR Forecast June 2012; SCR Forecast September 2012). Russia 
was particularly determined to ensure that the committee “acted in a balanced and 
objective manner and has not overstepped its mandate” and cautioned that the “Panel 
[of Experts] must work impartially and independently and be guided (…) only by 
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reliable and objective information” (Russia, S/PV.6888, p. 4). China, added that it was 
“a firm supporter of diplomatic solutions, and is not in favour of putting excessive 
pressure or imposing new sanctions on Iran” (S/PV.6888 of 13 December 2012, p.12).  
In contrast to the Council level, where listing decisions were adopted in packages, 
Iran sanctions committee listing decisions were rule-based and followed substantive 
and procedural criteria. Overall, in nine alleged sanctions violation cases the newly 
established Panel of Experts confronted the committee with reports detailing the cases 
circumstances and investigating responsible individuals or entities for possible 
designations (see Table 15). Only on the five designation recommendations with 
strongest evidence stemming from three sanctions violations incidents, committee 
members made listing requests, and all of the five requests were granted despite the 
objections of powerful committee members. On the remaining incidents, the Panel 
drew no definite conclusions if violations had taken place. In the KAL Cargo 
(Republic of Korea) case, the panel concluded that the discovered item (rolls of 
phosphor bronze wire mesh) “does not fall under the list of items” subject to 
sanctions (Panel of Experts Iran 2011: para. 70). In the STX Patraikos (Singapore) 
case, the panel noted that there “are commercial applications for fine aluminium 
powder” but that “most likely end-use is solid propellant for missiles” (Panel of 
Experts Iran 2011: para. 75). Concerning the Safir/Rasad launch, the panel claimed 
that the “Safir space launch vehicle itself was not designed to carry a nuclear 
weapon” and three panel members concluded that the case did not constitute a 
violation (S/2012/395, para. 36).  
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Table 15: Panel of Expert Investigations and Committee Response 2012-2013 
Panel 
Report 
Case Panel Recommendation Committee 
Decision 
May 2011 M/V Hansa India - incident reported before resolution 1929 
(2010) 
 
 
Francop (Israel) - incident reported before resolution 1929 
(2010) 
 
 
Everest (Nigeria) - committee “should designate” two 
individuals (Tabatabei; Aghajani) and 
one entity (Behineh Trading) 
- committee “should consider, in view of 
information be received from Member 
States, the designation” of one entity 
(International General Trading and 
Construction) 
 
- committee 
listing  
 
- no listing 
request 
M/S Finland 
(Italy) 
- incident constituted a violation, but no 
recommendations 
 
 
KAL Cargo 
(Republic of 
Korea) 
- incident did not constitute a violation, 
because item did not fall under embargo 
(dual-use) 
 
 
STX Patraikos 
(Singapore) 
- investigation ongoing 
 
 
 
June 2012 Safir/Rasad 
launch 
- disputed whether or not case constituted 
a violation, no recommendation 
 
 
Yas Air (Turkey) - committee should designate one entity 
(Yas Air) 
 
- committee 
listing 
Kilis (Turkey) - committee should designate one entity 
(SAD Import Export Company) 
- panel “draws the attention of the 
Security Council and the Committee” to 
one entity (Chemical Industries and 
Development of Materials Group) 
- committee 
listing  
- no listing 
request 
Note: Author’s illustration. Source: Panel of Experts Iran (2011); S/2012/395; SC/10615; 
SC/10871. 
 
The level of evidence in the first panel of experts report in May 2011 explains the 
listing outcomes, while package deals are unlikely. Above all, the panel asserted that 
“(…) Iran’s circumvention of sanctions across all areas, (…) is wilful and continuing” 
(Panel of Experts Iran 2011, para. 5). Pro-active Western powers lauded the panel for 
its revelations, but Russia blocked its publication and China also fiercely rejected its 
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content (Agence France Presse 2011a, 2011d; Right Vision News 2011). The report 
was leaked (Panel of Experts Iran 2011). The Panel investigated six reported incidents 
of relevant arms and proliferation-related embargo violations, only two of which were 
further pursued since two cases were prior to the Panel’s establishment, one 
investigation was ongoing and on one case, the Panel concluded that it did not 
constitute a violation (Panel of Experts Iran 2011, para. 34).  
Both cases further investigated concerned violations of arms exports embargo 
from Iran, but differed in their evidential weight. In the less-substantiated ‘Finland 
case’, Italian authorities had discovered a concealed shipment of 200 sacks of T4 
explosives onboard the cargo ‘motor ship’ (M/S) Finland at the Port of Gioia Tauro, 
Italy. However, the sole source of evidence concerning was the bill of lading, which 
stated the shipping from an Iranian company to a Syrian company. Although the panel 
perceived the Finland incident as violation, it did not make recommendations for 
designating responsible individuals or entities. In the much stronger ‘Everest case’, 
Nigerian authorities seized a shipment of 240 tons of ammunition hidden in 13 
shipping containers onboard the cargo ship M/V Everest in the port of Lagos, Nigeria. 
In the wake of the seizure, two Iranian citizens, who had accompanied the shipment, 
fled to the Iranian embassy and prompted the Iranian foreign minister to 
diplomatically intervene to negotiate their repatriation. Subsequently, the foreign 
minister “acknowledged that the arms originated in Iran”. Accordingly, the panel 
concluded that “as confirmed by the Iranian Foreign Minister and confirmed by 
documentary evidence” the shipment was a violation of the arms embargo. Strikingly, 
concerning possible designations, in the stronger Everest case, the panel made 
differentiated recommendations. On the one hand, it recommended that “[t]he 
Security Council should designate” the two individuals directly involved (Ali 
Tabatabaei and Azim Aghajani) as well as the entity Behineh Trading of Tehran, 
which had “played the role of freight forwarder in Iran (…), made contact with the 
agent of shipping line, (…) provided stuffed containers with non-standard container 
identification codes [and](…) also provided a false declaration of their contents”. On 
the other hand, the panel having less evidence only recommended that “[t]he Security 
Council should consider (…) the designation of” one entity (International General 
Trading and Construction), because it had provided unspecified “support” to one of 
the individuals involved in the Everest case (Panel of Experts Iran 2011: 3, 60–61). 
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Even powerful members, in this case Russia, were forced into rule compliance 
although they objected to further sanctions, if the cases are bolstered with strong 
evidence and clearly fit to Council listing criteria. The UK transformed the panel 
recommendations listing two individuals and one entity with strong evidence into 
listing proposals in April 2012 (SCR Forecast June 2012). Because the committee 
was unambiguously directed to act upon violations and the evidence in the Everest 
case was independent and strong and even confirmed by the Iranian foreign minister, 
Russia gave in and the committee added Ali Tabatabaei, Azim Aghajani and Behineh 
Trading on 18 April 2012 (SC/10615; Agence France Presse 2012a). In this context, 
on the basis of emphasized Council language on sanctions violations, the committee 
could designate sanctions violators in well-documented cases. Since there were no 
immediate substantive committee decisions taken on other matters, a package deal to 
compensate skeptical members seems unlikely. 
These two cases functioned as a precedent and enabled proactive members to 
place subsequent committee designations based on similarly strong evidence, despite 
Russian and Chinese hesitance. In its June 2012 report, the Panel investigated 
reported embargo violations and again made differentiated listing recommendations 
(S/2012/395). In the ‘Yas Air case’, Turkish authorities interdicted an Iranian Yas Air 
operated Ilyushin-76 aircraft on its way from Iran to Syria and seized 19 boxes with 
assault rifles, machine guns, mortar shells and ammunition. Turkey had reported the 
interdiction with detailed cargo inventory and the panel had inspected and confirmed 
the sanctions violation on site (paras 33-34, 102-103, 156). In the ‘Kilis (Turkey) 
case’, Turkish authorities seized a truck from Iran bound for Syria at the Turkish-
Syrian border loaded with gunpowder, propelling charges, detonators, solid rockets, 
and 1,700 kg of explosives. The panel established that documents accompanying the 
shipment “including an invoice issued by the consignor of the shipment, SAD Import 
Export Company (…) further established the nature, origin and destination” (paras 
37-38, 104-106). The case involved another entity (Chemical Industries and 
Development of Materials Group), the alleged producer of propelling charges, while 
not being the direct violator (para. 229). The panel “(…) in accordance with existing 
practice” recommended to designate “Yas Air, for the transport of prohibited arms 
(…) and SAD Import Export Company, for its role as a trading agent of prohibited 
arms”. Further, the panel asserted that “[b]oth recommended designations are 
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supported by strong documentary and factual evidence” (para. 248). However, the 
panel merely “[drew] attention” to the Chemical Industries and Development of 
Materials Group” (para. 249). Crucially, the panel differentiated between Yas Air and 
SAD Import Export Company on the one hand, both supported with strong evidence 
and the Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group on the other hand, 
with less substantiated evidence. The sanctions proponents only submitted two listing 
requests for Yas Air and SAD Import Export Company, which Russia let pass and 
consequently were listed by the committee in December 2012 (SC/10871; Associated 
Press 2012). The fact that the US also unilaterally listed the Chemical Industries and 
Development of Materials Group shortly thereafter (Gladstone 2012) shows that the 
US could not assemble a case withholding arguments of inadmissibility against the 
committee standard. As the committee took no other immediate substantive 
committee decisions, a compensating package deal was unlikely. 
A recent alleged case of a sanctions violation shows that the evidentiary threshold 
is extremely high and that sanctions opponents would block requests if they could 
base their position on substantive criteria given by the Council. When Iran launched 
“Shahab 1 and 3, Zelzal, Fateh-110 and Tondar” ballistic missiles during its ‘Great 
Prophet 7’ military exercise in July 2012, the Panel asserted that these tests 
“constituted a violation (…) of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010)”, however, the 
Panel did not recommend any listing (S/2013/331, paras 82-86, S/2012/395, Annex 
VIII). Whereas the P3 clearly acknowledged the violation and demanded new 
designations or at least that the committee would officially determine the violation 
(see UK, US, France, S/PV.6999, S/PV.7028), Russia and China objected (SCR 
Forecast July 2013b). Russia, with reference to the qualification in resolution 1929 
(2010) that “Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable 
of delivering nuclear weapons” (para. 9, emphasis added), argued that the tested 
missiles were actually not designed to be used for nuclear warheads, thus would not 
be subject to sanctions so no sanctions violation had taken place (interview with UN 
member state official, New York, December 2013). Indeed, the launched missiles 
have been developed in the 80s and 90s before Iran’s nuclear ambitions became 
public. Following this line of argument, Russia blocked any kind of decision ranging 
from a common committee statement during the Chair’s regular Council briefing 
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(Chair, S/PV.6999, p.2), let alone any listings or implementation assistance notices 
(SCR Forecast September 2013; SCR Forecast December 2013, 2014). 
Since 2012, the Panel of Experts only in one instance recommended to pursue 
additional designations (S/2013/331, paras 18-22, 130, for 2014 see S/2014/394, for 
2015 see S/2015/401), in this case one entity (Pentane Chemistry Industries), which 
allegedly was used as front company in a partly successful attempt to procure valves 
for the Arak heavy-water reactor on behalf the Modern Industries Technique 
Company (MITEC). However, MITEC was already listed in in the annex of 
resolution 1929 (2010), Pentane Chemistry Industry had been subject to US domestic 
sanctions already in 2012, and four responsible individuals were sentenced in a 
German court proceeding in 2013.31 There is no evidence that any member proposed 
a designation in this case. In addition, Pentane Chemistry Industry had been 
previously acquitted of an alleged embargo violation through the expert panel in a 
different case (Panel of Experts Iran 2011: 14–15; Lynch 2013; Charbonneau/Nichols 
2013). 
In the last listing initiative in late 2013, the US sought to use the Iran sanctions 
committee to list a Syrian pro-government militia (Jaysh Al-Shabi), which was 
implicated as the benefactor of an alleged weapons transfer and military assistance 
from Iran and was previously listed under US sanctions (SCR Forecast December 
2013)(SCR Forecast December 2013, DeYoung/Warrick 2013). However, since the 
Panel of Experts noted that “[g]iven the deteriorating security situation in the Syria 
Arab Republic, there is no possibility of gathering evidence that would confirm or 
deny these allegations” (S/2015/401, para. 32), Russia placed a hold on the request 
(SCR Forecast December 2013; SCR Forecast March 2015). Since, the late 2013 
reinvigorated efforts of the P5+1 on negotiating a comprehensive agreement on the 
Iranian nuclear program, the committee had essentially been in the “waiting mode” 
and no further committee listing initiatives have been made (see e.g. SCR Forecast 
December 2014). 
                                                 
31 Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg 3. Strafsenat, Urteil vom 08.11.2013, 3 - 1/13, 3-
1/13. 
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In sum, the 2012-2013 committee case episode shows that in contrast to the 
Council’s package resolutions, the Iran sanctions committee operates in the logic of 
rule-based decision-making. The variance in Panel of Experts listing 
recommendations demonstrates that the degree of case evidence is a decisive variable 
in explaining outcomes. Successful listings had to suffice a high evidentiary 
threshold, whereas below-threshold proposals had little chance to succeed. In the 
Everest, Yas Air and Kilis incidents, the sanctions proponents were successful 
because they combined unambiguous evidence with a clear committee mandate to list 
sanctions violators. Whereas skeptical members did not block strong cases that fulfil 
the evidentiary threshold, they could avoid decisions on less clear-cut cases. This 
episode reflects the tendency of committee members to only accept water-tight listing 
proposals because reluctant committee members will dismiss those requests which 
expose the slightest degree of uncertainty. In this regard, deliberately making 
sanctions violations an explicit committee mandate made it difficult to reject 
substantiated decision requests (two separate interviews with UN member state 
officials, New York, December 2013). 
 
9.2.2.3 Procedural decision rules restrict powerful members discretion in objecting to well-
founded exemption requests 
The case episode on sanctions exemptions to targeted sanctions highlights that once 
the Council has adopted committee procedures these bind even reluctant powerful 
actors and ensure rule compliance. The committee processed incoming exemption 
requests according to distinct procedures for certain types of exemptions. Because 
resolution provisions on exemptions either excluded the committee from deciding 
about exemptions under a notification procedure or provided for negative consensus 
procedures on many types of exemption requests, committee members could no 
longer block such requests even if they had diverging situation-specific interest. Thus, 
rule-based decision-making on sanctions exemptions was not the result of convincing 
skeptical members. Rather it rested upon restricting the discretion of committee 
members to block requests in line with committee procedures, even if those requests 
violated powerful members’ interests. In effect, exemptions were shielded from 
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political interference by powerful members and decisions were rule-based regardless 
who submitted such requests. 
The drafters of sanctions resolutions included a set of standard exemption 
procedures to targeted sanctions that restrict the discretion of committee members 
without knowing potential future cases. Resolution 1737 (2006) provided the 
committee with three different exemption procedures allocating different decision 
powers, i.e. notification, negative consensus and consensus depending on the type of 
exemption request.  
First, the Council adopted a simple notification procedure without committee 
decision for funds to satisfy payments “subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral 
lien or judgement” as well as funds for “activities directly related to the items” for 
light water reactors and components (para. 13c, d). Also, upon notification, states 
could exempt payments by listed individuals or entities “due under a contract entered 
into prior to the listing” of the individual or entity provided that the contract was not 
related to prohibited activities and the payment was not made for the benefit of 
another listed individual or entity (para. 15). Apart from targeted sanctions, Council 
resolutions exempted nuclear equipment and fuel for use in light-water reactors 
subject to simple notification (para. 5). Second, the Council instituted a negative 
consensus procedure on funds for “basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, 
rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and 
public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and 
reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or 
fees or service charges, (…) for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other 
financial assets and economic resources”. Those had to be notified and were 
automatically granted within five working days “in the absence of a negative decision 
by the Committee” (para. 13a). Third, the Council provided for a procedure to 
approve funds for unspecified “extraordinary expenses” after a positive consensus 
decision in the sanctions committee (para. 13b). 
These procedural prescriptions restrict blocking powers of sanctions committee 
members and benefit requesting states, at least for the first two exemption procedures. 
Notification and negative consensus procedures transfer the burden of proof on those 
states wishing to block those requests through convincing fellow committee members 
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of the inadmissibility of a request as “basic exemptions” or being a payment subject 
to notification only. In this case, substantive criteria only play a secondary role as 
they define which types of requests are decided under which procedures.  
These provisions sparked a number of exemption requests and notifications. In 
2007, the committee received and granted six requests for granting exemptions for 
basic expenses and four requests for granting extraordinary expenses as well as 30 
notifications on assets released in connection to earlier contracts (S/2007/780, paras 
13-14). In 2008, the committee received and granted two requests for granting 
extraordinary expenses. In addition, the committee received four and five 
notifications for payments in connection of prior contracts in 2008 and 2009 
respectively (S/2008/839, paras 23,25; S/2009/688, para. 16). 
A particular controversy emerged over the assets freeze imposed on the Iranian 
Bank Sepah, because the US wanted to completely shut down the bank, while its 
European allies sought exemptions for the Bank’s assets (US Permanent Mission to 
the UN 2007j; US Embassy Berlin 2007b). The UNSC had designated Bank Sepah in 
March 2007 in the annex of resolution 1747 (2007), for providing financial support to 
entities sanctioned under resolution 1737 (2006) as being implicated in Iran’s missile 
program. Bank Sepah had been one of the few banks that serviced financial 
transactions for EU companies trading with Iranian counterparts, thus held financial 
claims by EU entities and had subsidiaries and local staff in many countries, 
including the UK, Germany and Italy. As a result, all three countries issued exemption 
requests for releasing certain frozen funds for the Bank’s expenses, for instance, to 
pay local employees that otherwise would have lost employment. 
The requestors deliberately aligned their exemption requests to earlier successful 
requests. Germany notified the committee about its intention to release funds “to pay 
for ‘basic expense’ business costs, tax and legal fees” and matched its notification to 
an earlier UK exemption that went through the committee “without issue”. The US 
had serious reservations about the request. In US-German bilaterals, a German 
diplomat “expressed surprise to hear of our concerns because Berlin copied almost 
identically previous UK exemption notifications” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 
2007j). In a slightly different case, Italia aligned an exemption request to these earlier 
requests. The Italian request contained two separate exemptions, first, an exemption 
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to cover local employees’ salaries, utilities, legal costs, and taxes, and second, a 
transfer of funds from the “parent bank” in Tehran to pay the bank’s “creditors, 
depositors, and customers” (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007j; US Embassy 
Rome 2007c). Again, the US had serious reservations. In US-Italian bilaterals, Italy 
argued that the “U.S. was unfairly singling out Italy. Italy believes it shares a common 
position with Germany and the UK on Bank Sepahs’ assets -- a common ‘EU 
approach’ [and] (…) that its UN proposal was in line with language in UNSCR 1737 
[and thus] asking for the same treatment that the UK and Germany are receiving at 
the UN” (US Embassy Rome 2007d). 
The committee granted the two basic expenses requests in the absence of a 
negative consensus and forced even powerful permanent members to accept decisions 
that are in line with exemption provisions, while it rejected the request for 
extraordinary expenses. The committee processed the incoming notifications 
according to its rules. First, both the German request and the first Italian request 
clearly fell into the category of the “basic expenses” exemptions provision of 
resolution 1737 (2006) and thus was only subject to negative consensus, which the 
US acknowledged (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007j). The US would have 
needed to convince all other committee members of the inappropriateness of these 
requests, which was impossible to achieve. Accordingly, the committee positively 
acknowledged these “basic expenses” notifications (US Embassy Rome 2007d). The 
US ambassador admits that procedural limitations preclude the US from stopping 
such eligible requests because “the Committee has limited ability to stop a 
notification for ‘basic expenses’ under paragraph 13(a) of resolution 1737 (2006) 
because blocking would require consensus of all committee members (15 no’s)” (US 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2007j). The UK made a similar point during committee 
discussions on exemptions a few months later (US Permanent Mission to the UN 
2007l). Second, the requested Italian transfer from the parent bank clearly fell into the 
category of “extraordinary expanses” and hence was subject to a positive consensus 
decision. In this case, the US objected to the request arguing that not Italy, but Iran 
had to submit an exemption request since it were Iranian assets that had to be 
unfrozen for the transfer (US Permanent Mission to the UN 2007j; US Embassy 
Rome 2007d). 
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The US was also displeased by many exemptions requests received in in relation 
to contracts entered prior to sanctions (for instance Secretary of State 2007b, 2008a, 
2008c). According to resolution 1737 (2006, para. 15), payments by designated 
individuals and entities resulting from contracts entered into prior to the listing of the 
respective individual or entity could be made unless the payment concerned 
sanctioned items or the beneficiary would be under UN sanctions, provided that such 
transfers are notified to the committee. This was particularly relevant for sanctioned 
banks that would serve as processing entities for financial transactions in relation to 
trade contracts concluded over substantial periods of time. In particular in the early 
phase of the sanctions regime, the committee received numerous such requests. 
According to committee annual reports, the committee received 30 notifications in 
2007 (S/2007/780, para. 14), four in 2008 (S/2008/839, para. 25), five in 2009 
(S/2009/688, para. 16), five in 2010 (S/2010/682, para. 15), and six in 2011 
(S/2012/193, para. 12). 
Within the committee the notifications were dealt with in accordance with 
exemptions provisions as provided by Council resolutions, which bereft committee 
members from blocking exemption requests and resulted in automatic 
acknowledgements of notification by the chair (Secretary of State 2007b). Because 
the exemption provision precluded the US from rejecting these transfers as they were 
only subject to notification, the US made bilateral attempts to inquire details to 
uncover if illegal activities were funded. For instances, cases include Sweden (US 
Embassy Stockholm 2007), China (Secretary of State 2008c), and the UAE (Secretary 
of State 2008a). Although some requestors felt compelled to supply more information 
(US Embassy Stockholm 2007), promised to supply more information (US Permanent 
Mission to the UN 2008c) or simply reject the inquiries (US Embassy Abu Dhabi 
2008), because their requests were in accordance with the exemption provision, all 
refused to withdraw their requests, which the US simply had to accept. 
The exemptions for the light-water reactor and nuclear fuel for such (resolution 
1737 (2007), paras 3b,5) were uncontroversial. Although this seemingly one-sided 
exemption that was clearly designed towards allowing Russia to uphold its economic 
interests in completing the Bushehr nuclear reactor and supplying the necessary fuel, 
the regulation was also in the interest of sanctions enforcers. Accordingly, the US 
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argued that there is no reason for Iran to pursue a policy towards handling the full 
nuclear fuel cycle and in particular enrichment since sufficient and reliable nuclear 
suppliers would be available and that Russia had guaranteed to supply fuel for the 
entire period of Bushehr’s operation (see S/PV.5807, p.3). Russia acknowledged this 
fact (US Embassy Moscow 2007a). Consequently, while Russia in many instances 
notified the committee of shipments for the Bushehr nuclear power plant (e.g. 
S/2009/688, S/2010/682, paras 12-15, S/2012/192, para. 15) there is no indication 
that the exemption was contentious within the committee. 
The episode shows that Council procedures on exemptions from targeted 
sanctions allocate decision powers and preclude powerful members from pursuing 
their situation-specific interests. In this case, rule-based decision-making is not the 
result of convincing skeptical members against substantive decision criteria as focal 
points, but rests upon the restriction of committee blocking powers. The exemption 
procedure ensures that requests which are in line with categories of exemptions 
succeed, despite great power interference. The sanctions committee processes 
decision requests according to rules, even if some members have deviating interests. 
Because most exemptions are processed via the notification procedure and thus 
preclude the committee from examining individual requests, this binds even reluctant 
powerful actors into rule compliance. As a result committee decisions on exemptions 
are increasingly rule-based. 
 
9.3 Chapter summary 
The Iran sanctions committee is a confirmatory case for the causal model of 
committee governance. While the permanent members had an interest in a non-
nuclearized Iran, the US most vocally advocated sanctions, the UK and France 
favored limited sanctions for economic reasons, and China and Russia were hesitant. 
Whereas the proactive members sought to overcome the danger of committee 
blockade by pursuing the sanctions regime largely without recourse to a sanctions 
committee, in a second stage, as expected, the diverging interest constellation 
prompted rule-based decision-making in coordination situations. Hence, the Iran 
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sanctions regime operates both in the logic of power-based decision-making and rule-
based decision-making.  
The Iran sanctions regime shows that the effects of a unitary decision process 
without recourse to a committee stage led to power-based decisions in the form of 
explicitly negotiated Council package resolutions. The early phase of the Iran 
sanctions regime confirms the baseline expectation that decisions taken in a uniform 
decision process will mirror pure bargaining outcomes and reflect the constellation of 
interests among powerful Council members. In this stage, proactive members 
deliberately chose to impose targeted sanctions and to simultaneously define a set of 
designations to which those sanctions were applicable in a Council package 
resolution. This strategy was repeated four times increasingly strengthening sanctions 
measures over time. As a consequence, these Council resolutions were taking in a 
bargaining process which aimed at accumulating several aspects into large decision 
packages. Then, bargaining resembled the interest constellation of powerful members 
and did not adhere to any kind of substantive decision criteria. Implementation issues 
resulting from lacking criteria suggest that bargaining might not be suitable to 
produce problem-adequate decisions. 
When Council members referred decision competencies to a sanctions committee 
stage in later phases of the regime, the expected effects of committee governance 
occurred and prompted rule-based decisions even against the interests of powerful 
committee members. 
The Iran sanctions regime confirms that the effects of rulemaking in fact provide 
incentives to adopt consistent rules. In the second case episode on listing decisions 
within the committee, an anticipated committee blockade prompted sanctions 
supporters to advocate adopting a general rule for the committee on sanctions 
violations in a Council resolution and the establishment of a panel of experts to make 
future committee designations more likely to succeed. The adopted rule is consistent 
and does not favor any powerful member. In the case episode on the processing of 
sanctions exemptions within the committee, the Council adopted consistent rules that 
did not favor any particular powerful member. 
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The Iran sanctions committee confirms the expectation according to which 
committee members facing a stream of separate decision proposals abide by given 
substantive and procedural rules, even if these rules contradict situation-specific 
preferences of some committee members (hypothesis 1). The committee episode of 
listing decisions demonstrates that after the Council had provided consistent rules on 
listing sanctions violators, the documented embargo violations brought in front of the 
committee prompted even highly skeptical permanent members to accept well-
documented decision proposals, while rejecting below threshold requests. 
The case of sanctions exemptions shows that committee procedures allocate 
decision powers and deprive the committee and therefore even powerful members of 
the possibility to challenge decisions unfavorable to their situation-specific interests. 
The sanctions committee processes exemption requests according to procedures given 
by UNSC resolutions which only provide for committee decisions on exemptions for 
“extraordinary expenses”, while others are processed under negative consensus or 
even notification procedures. UN members seeking exemptions to the assets freeze 
align their decision proposals to the rules and earlier precedents. Processing most 
exemptions as notification items precludes the committee from examining requests 
and forces even reluctant powerful actors to comply with committee rules. 
The case of commodity sanctions on proliferation-related items shows that the 
Security Council can also use externally provided focal points to solve a coordination 
situation on non-proliferation related commodity sanctions. The Council completely 
relies on NSG and MTCR provided export trigger lists of as knowledge-based 
solutions to the issue of regulatory export control. In this case, the extremely 
technical nature of establishing an effective export control regime defining which 
items are subject to trade restrictions and which not, provides incentives to adopt 
given NSG and MTCR lists of proliferation-related items. Because NSG and MTCR 
regulators are subject to the logic of rulemaking and associated consistency pressures, 
case-specific interests are difficult to introduce. On the Council level, members focus 
on larger political questions if and when such sanctions should be applied and which 
larger sections of lists should be authoritative. Bargaining over the contents of such 
lists is extremely unattractive so that UNSC members cannot re-negotiate the content 
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of the lists at acceptable costs. As a result, referring to NSG/MTCR lists does provide 
a rule-based solution to non-proliferation commodity sanctions. 
The alternative explanation, which holds that decision-making in the committee 
stage can be explained by the interest constellation of powerful members cannot 
convincingly account for observed decision-making patterns in the committee. In 
Council rulemaking, one cannot observe that powerful members bargained over 
exemption provisions that would one-sidedly favor any permanent member. On the 
contrary, decision criteria were consistent. Once the proactive members pursued 
additional sanctions designations within the committee, we cannot find any package 
deals that would confirm the rival explanation of power-based decision-making. 
The Iran sanctions regime complements the analysis of committee governance in 
UNSC sanctions regimes and allows for comparing Council and sanctions committee 
decision modes as well as two different types of sanctions (targeted sanctions and 
proliferation-related commodity sanctions). The Iran sanctions committee 
demonstrates that the effects of committee governance are independent from the exact 
type of decision and equally applies to decisions associated with targeted sanctions 
and decisions associated with nuclear-proliferation commodity sanctions. 
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10 Conclusion 
This study empirically analyzed how and with what consequences delegating decision 
competencies to sanctions committee affects the logic of decision-making among 
Council members and found substantial evidence that committee governance prompts 
rule-based decision-making. This effect can be primarily attributed to the altered 
decision situations resulting from the separation of rulemaking and the subsequent 
application of rules to a many technical implementation decisions. I find rule-based 
decision-making across four considerably different UNSC sanctions regimes, while 
the Sudan sanctions regime illustrates the boundaries of the mechanism of committee 
governance. 
In the following, I summarize the main findings derived from the empirical 
analysis of Security Council sanctions regimes. Then, I discuss the theoretical 
implications for the understanding of the UNSC and international organizations more 
broadly. Finally, I offer some policy implications for the governance of Security 
Council sanctions. 
 
10.1 Summary of main findings 
The empirical analysis of UNSC sanctions regimes confirms the tendency towards 
rule-based decision-making in the Council’s sanctions committees. Separating 
rulemaking and rule-application creates considerable incentives to decide according 
to generally-applicable rules in order to avoid decision blockades. The studied 
sanctions regimes demonstrate that even powerful actors relinquish pursuing their 
situation-specific interests in every case to preserve the operability of the Council’s 
sanctions regimes. The findings exemplify that committee governance affects 
decision-making even in the borderline case of a ‘high politics’ security institution 
such as the Security Council, in which the same group of members decides about all 
important aspects of a sanctions regime. 
The empirical results are robust across a range of preference constellations, 
sanctions measures or content of decisions. The effect is rooted in the comparable 
decision situation across sanctions regimes, namely, to decide about many similar 
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single cases over time. The rule-based nature of committee decision-making is not 
just observable in the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee that has attracted 
particular attention in the scholarly community because of the problematic aspect of 
fundamental human rights of affected individuals. Notably, the effect is equally 
observable in the sanctions regime maintaining an economic embargo on Iraq, where 
the committee mainly decided about humanitarian exemptions from the embargo. 
Beyond that, the Iraq sanctions regime shows that the effect almost immediately 
occurred in the early phase, before the vocal critique on the humanitarian 
consequences of comprehensive sanctions and any other form of institutionalization 
such as the Oil-for-Food Programme. The same applies to the Iran sanctions regime 
that imposes targeted sanctions against individuals involved in the Iranian nuclear 
program, but also non-proliferation related ‘dual-use’ commodity sanctions. Similarly, 
committee governance affected decision-making also in the DRC sanctions regime, 
where the conflict of interest lies not between the Western powers and China and 
Russia, but in between the three Western permanent members. 
These results show that the Security Council can be transformed from an 
exclusive forum for great power politics in uniform Council negotiations towards a 
more complex organization that decides according to general rules within the scope of 
its sanctions regimes. While the binding effects of committee governance are not 
entirely intended, the effects are not fundamentally at odds with the interests of great 
powers insofar as rule adherence promises to produce positive decisions for sanctions 
committee members on a whole. Thereby, the findings illustrate that the delegation of 
decision competencies to committees sets significantly different incentives even for 
the same group of actors and leads Council members to a decision behavior that they 
would have unlikely chosen without the delegation to committees. In effect, while 
UN member states will have to accept politically motivated sanctions decisions in the 
Council, the sanctions committees provide a more reliable and rule-oriented decision 
process that promises to yield increasingly rule-based, consistent and thus more 
predictable decisions. 
The studied case episodes of UNSC sanctions regimes provide empirical 
evidence that the causal mechanism of committee governance is present and works as 
expected. As concerns the logic of rulemaking, I expected that if the Security Council 
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delegates implementation decisions to a committee and concentrates on guiding 
decisions in the subsequent implementation stage, Council members adopt consistent 
substantive and procedural decision criteria for subsequent rule-application. To assess 
the empirical merits of this proposition, I scrutinized whether or not actors created 
exception clauses that only benefit few powerful members. 
The empirical analysis revealed that delegating decision competencies to a 
committee tasked with subsequent implementation decisions creates significantly 
altered incentives for the delegating body and systematically leads to remarkably 
consistent rules despite strong situation-specific interests of powerful members. In all 
studied case episodes, the adopted rules did neither one-sidedly favor the permanent 
members nor any other parties. For instance, second case episode of the Al-
Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime shows that the members of the Council adopt 
generally-applicable decision criteria for the listing of individuals and entities subject 
to targeted sanctions, although powerful Council members have diverging situation-
specific interests. In the case episode on aviation sanctions against Iraq, although a 
permanent member had strong situation-specific interests in objecting requests by 
particular countries, the powerful member had to strive for a consistent bargaining 
position that allowed for exemptions for a specific function (i.e. humanitarian flights). 
Similarly, in the Iran sanctions regime, the Council adopted consistent procedures for 
humanitarian exemptions from the assets freeze that equally applied to all state 
applicants, although a permanent member had strong situation-specific interests in 
preventing some of these decisions in the committee stage. 
The empirical analysis shows that the functions of rulemaking and rule-
application do not necessarily have to be institutionally separated between Council 
and committee, but that the effects of rulemaking also occurred if the committee 
elaborated rules, which it then applied to implementation decisions. Thus, the Council 
can also delegate its rulemaking function explicitly or implicitly to the committee. 
For instance, the case episode on delisting within the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions 
regime, where the Security Council has frequently directed its committee to engage in 
rulemaking, exemplifies that the committee effectively separates the consideration of 
rules from adopting subsequent implementation decisions. In the same vein, in the 
case episode on humanitarian exemptions after the Gulf War within the Iraq sanctions 
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regime, the committee frequently derived rules from precedents in the absence of 
Council guidance. In this case, committee members seriously considered the 
consequences of a decision on a single-case request for future decisions of a similar 
type before even deciding on such cases. The empirical findings demonstrate that 
committee members are subject to the same consistency constraints when deciding 
about rules. Elaborating rules naturally precedes deciding about single cases. 
Similarly, in the context of precedents, the decision on the first case serves as rule to 
guide all later cases of a similar type. Hence, these results confirm that the effect of 
committee governance does not depend on a separation of decision bodies but is in 
fact caused by a systematic separation of rulemaking and subsequent rule-application. 
The analysis of five Security Council sanctions committees confirms the rule-
application hypothesis that if a committee of states processes separate and 
asymmetric decision proposals of limited scope, committee members abide by given 
substantive and procedural rules, even if these rules contradict situation-specific 
preferences of some committee members (hypothesis 1). 
The case studies show that states systematically align their decision proposals to 
the decision criteria or previous precedents insofar as they know such rules and have 
the capacities to provide substantiated requests. Within the Iraq sanctions regime, 
while some states have simply forwarded all exemption requests received from 
exporting companies to the sanctions committee, other states have submitted 
primarily those requests that conformed to the rules and thus could be expected to be 
successful. Accordingly, those states that performed some sort of quality control fared 
substantially better overall, while this increase is rooted in the pre-selection process. 
Within the DRC sanctions regime, proactive states sort out those listing requests that 
do not conform with the decision criteria to avoid rejections by other committee 
members. In the committee listing episode within Iran sanctions regime, proactive 
committee members specifically submitted those listing requests to the committee 
that were equipped with the strongest evidence and conformed best to the established 
rules to increase the likelihood of committee approval. 
Within the committee stage, decision proposals are treated separately. In the Al-
Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime, the committee considered proposed designations on 
individuals and entities suspected of being associated with transnational terrorism as 
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entirely separate issues in the second stage of the regime. The listing episode in the 
DRC sanctions regime shows that even though states consider decision requests in 
sets, each of the individual requests is separately assessed. Processing exemption 
requests from the comprehensive trade embargo in the Iraq sanctions regime shows 
that the committee systematically treated every decision request on its own merits. 
The Sudan sanctions regime provides evidence that even if powerful members 
explicitly aim for a package deal within the committee, committee procedures 
effectively preclude adding single cases to packages because decisions are decided 
upon separate from one another. 
There is considerable empirical evidence that in the committee stage, members 
accepted requests in conformity with rules and rejected requests that violated 
establishes rules and that thereby the same criteria were applied to every request. The 
case episode of committee listing decisions in the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime 
revealed that the existence of substantive and procedural criteria in fact allowed 
committee members to systematically scrutinize and block decision requests if they 
did not conform to established rules. Similarly, the amended rules on delisting 
members of the Taliban allowed proactive members to submit requests that skeptical 
members eventually accepted, provided that there was evidence that the respective 
individuals renounced terrorism. On decision-making about sanctions violators in the 
Iran case, the committee accepted those requests that fulfilled a high standard of 
evidence, while the proactive members avoided submitting requests that fell below 
this evidence threshold. In the second listing case episode in the DRC sanctions 
regime, proactive members consistently sorted out listing proposals that fell below the 
established standards concerning justification and identifiers. At the same time, well-
documented listing proposals were accepted even if they originated from less 
powerful states. 
The empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis that committee members abide by 
rules derived from precedents, even if such rules contradict situation-specific 
preferences of some committee members (hypothesis 2). As an alternative to formal 
rules when regulation is absent or ambiguous, committee members frequently resort 
to earlier and similar cases as precedents to avoid blockade. The assessment of the 
systematic documentation of the Iraq sanctions committee, which decided about 
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humanitarian exemptions from the comprehensive trade embargo, reveals that its 
decision practice was strongly influenced by spontaneous rule adherence based on 
precedents, which committee members used to overcome decision blockades. A 
systematic large-n analysis of thousands of committee decisions confirms a rule-
based decision practice of the committee based on previously adopted precedents, 
despite the fact that two powerful committee members rejected any binding form of 
rules or rules emerging from precedent. The empirical evidence shows that committee 
members perceive no functional difference between formal rules and precedents. 
Similar to formal rules, committee members even accept that precedents bind non-
permanent committee members that have not been member when the precedent was 
accepted. 
Overall, the empirical assessment of UNSC sanctions regimes shows that 
committee governance prompted rule adherence even by the most powerful members 
of the international system. In other words, rules and rules derived from precedents 
equally bind powerful committee members, non-permanent members and other 
member states. Permanent members accepted committee decisions despite diverging 
case-specific preferences and rules have a binding effect even in key single cases 
insofar as actors are not interested in a blockade. In the first case episode of the Iraq 
sanctions regime, two permanent members gave in to a request to ship foodstuffs by a 
weak requestor because this request conformed to accepted rules, although they 
strongly opposed this request. In two case episodes, the considerable expansion of 
flight approvals by committee practice enabled even weak states to use the formal and 
informal procedures to force powerful states to unwillingly accept requests, if they 
complied with existing criteria. Similarly, in the Iran sanctions regime, Russia 
accepted listing requests with compelling evidence of sanctions violations despite 
opposing additional designations, because the requests conformed to established 
rules. In the case episode on the delisting of individuals and entities associated with 
the Taliban within the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime, Russia reluctantly accepted 
such delisting requests after the Taliban sanctions regime had been separated from the 
Al-Qaida sanctions regime, despite its long-standing opposition to such delistings. 
As concerns the content of decisions, the empirical analysis shows that committee 
governance in Security Council sanctions regimes indeed prompted rule-based 
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sanctions decisions. In other words, the quality of the decision requests was the 
decisive explanatory factor for decision outcomes. This effect is robust over all case 
studies given the presence of a more or less pronounced shared interest of all 
permanent members in the functionality of the sanctions regime. In the Al-
Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime, the increasing regulation of committee procedures 
ensured that committee members systematically sorted out unwarranted listing 
proposals and accepted the delisting of individuals that no longer met the designation 
criteria. In the DRC sanctions regime, the Western members applied a system of 
mutual control to ascertain that decisions conform to established rules, while those 
decision requests that fell short of established standards were dropped. In the Iraq 
sanctions committee, decisions about the exemptions from the comprehensive trade 
embargo consistently follow acceptable and unacceptable categories of goods purely 
determined by precedent. In the Iran sanctions regime, despite high evidence 
thresholds, proactive members were able to place successful listing requests that 
conformed to substantive decision criteria and were bolstered with significant 
evidence although skeptical members originally objected to additional designations. 
The comparison of the case episode of the independent review mechanism 
(Office of the Ombudsperson) within the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime with 
case episodes of other sanctions regimes shows that the effects of committee 
governance are also empirically observable in the absence of such a mechanism. 
Hence, the Ombudsperson as an institutionalized agent provides additional incentives 
for rule adherence as non-conforming listing decisions can be overturned 
subsequently. However, it does not systematically modify the decision situation of 
committee members. The phase of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime before the 
creation of the Ombudsperson shows that the separation of rulemaking and rule-
application already drives committee members towards rule adherence. The case 
episode of Taliban delistings in the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime underscores 
that the effects of committee governance provides incentives to rule-based decision-
making even for highly skeptical committee members and in the absence of the 
Ombudsperson. Nevertheless, without such institutionalized agents, the mechanism 
rests upon the willingness of committee members to carefully scrutinize decision 
requests and constantly bears the risk of politicization. 
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Three particular findings can be reconciled with the postulated causal mechanism 
of committee governance, but point to its limited applicability. First, the empirical 
analysis highlights a necessary precondition for the presence of the theoretically 
postulated causal mechanism of committee governance: Council members share a 
more or less pronounced common interest in the functionality of the sanctions regime. 
In other words, the effects of committee governance only occur, if actors find 
themselves in a coordination situation and prefer coordination over blockade. In the 
Sudan sanctions regime, the committee did not adopt any decisions on listing of 
individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions due to the veto position of few 
committee members. In the DRC sanctions regime, the non-permanent member 
Rwanda completely blocked the committee decision process on additional committee 
listings during its Council tenure. This points to the fact that the delegation of 
decision competencies by the Council does not naturally have to result in rule-based 
decision-making, because every committee member, even relatively small states, can 
provoke a committee decision blockade. The blockade can be explained by the fact 
that in both cases, China and Rwanda respectively have pursued a predominant 
strategy of blockade to undermine the functionality of the sanctions regime by using 
the committee veto position under the restrictive consensus procedure. Nevertheless, 
both cases show that committee members principally have the tools to refloat the 
work of the sanctions committee through rulemaking, for instance by abandoning the 
consensus requirement in favor for a majority threshold. While it failed in the Sudan 
case, because the Chinese preferred blockade over functionality, it is reasonable to 
assume that it might work if the committee blockade is caused by a non-permanent 
member. 
Second, the empirical results demonstrate that Council resolutions on the one 
hand and delegation to a sanctions committee on the other hand are two principled 
mechanisms to pursue a sanctions regime and each has considerable implications. The 
Iran sanctions regime provides evidence that delegation to a sanctions committee 
actually led to increasingly rule-based decisions in comparison to decisions observe 
in the uniform Council decision process. Here, the Council initially retained decision-
making competencies that it delegated to a committee in other cases and in other 
phases of the sanctions regime. Since 2006, the Council decided about listing of 
individuals and entities implicated in the Iranian nuclear program and only in 2012 
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delegated these implementation decisions to its sanctions committee. This exemplifies 
that Council members do not have to transfer decisions to a sanctions committee. 
However, as theoretically expected the Council has not decided about listing 
decisions separately but accumulated many aspects of the complex sanctions regime 
into package decisions, which do not follow the logic of rule adherence, by trading 
off listing proposals with other contents of a draft resolution. In 2012, the committee 
took over the listing task from the Council, which yielded rule-based decisions 
entirely different to the decision packages adopted by the Council. Both avenues are 
equally plausible and there is not automaticity to delegate. Therefore, actors may 
choose the avenue that they perceive as achieving the larger payoffs, dependent on 
the circumstances. 
Third, the mechanism of committee governance only becomes causally relevant, 
if the committee members have an actual interest in the decisions taken so that there 
is a certain conflict of interest among committee members. Without such a conflict of 
interest, committee members do not have incentives to challenge submitted decision 
proposals, which prompts the danger of blockade and the associated willingness to 
engage in rule-based decision-making in the first place. The first episode of the Al-
Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee follows this logic. In particular in the wake of 
9/11, this committee listed a high number of individuals and entities subject to 
targeted sanctions without leading to blockade. Thereby, the committee members 
caused a laissez-faire decision-making mode according to which listing requests were 
simply accepted across the board, regardless of their content, evidence and origin. 
From a theoretical point of view, this empirical finding highlights that the degree of 
rule adherence by sanctions committee members is based on the existence of a 
conflict of interest among Council members within the sanctions regime and their 
willingness to challenge and block non-conforming decisions. Indeed, this mutual 
system of control was observed intensively in other sanctions regimes. For instance, 
the US and the UK controlled other committee members in the Iraq sanctions regime. 
Equally, Russia and China exercised such scrutiny within the Iran sanctions regime. 
And in the DRC sanctions regime, the conflict of interest emerged among the Western 
permanent members. 
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The alternative explanation according to which decisions of the Security Council 
mirror the interest constellation among powerful members does not convincingly 
explain the observed patterns of committee governance in the Security Council. In 
fact, the logic of power-based decision-making applies to decision-making in uniform 
decision processes, for instance in the initial phase of the Iran sanctions regime, 
where the actors prefer Council package resolutions over a committee decision 
process. However, in all studied cases, the alternative explanation fails to account for 
the observed rule-based decision-making in the committee stage. For instance, the 
two flight exemption episodes of the Iraq sanctions committee show that even the 
powerful permanent members are constrained in rejecting unfavorable but rule-
conforming requests by weak countries. Likewise, the committee episode of the Iran 
sanctions regime shows that reluctant powerful members accept well-founded 
requests although they do not prefer additional listings. In none of the studied cases, I 
found any evidence that committee members were successfully pursuing package 
deals on the committee level. In fact, the Sudan sanctions regime even provides 
empirical counter-evidence for package deals. In this case, a strategy of package deals 
fails on the committee level even when actors explicitly aim at such packages because 
the committee’s organization of the no-objection procedure essentially precluded the 
submission of decision packages. Because the committee considered decision 
requests separately, proactive committee members were uncertain that their 
opponents would not just vote down the unfavorable part of the agreement. 
The empirical alternative explanation, according to which the increasing 
regulation of UNSC sanctions regimes can be primarily traced back to the systematic 
infringement of basic due process rights in the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime, is 
placed within a broader context. On the one hand, these approaches explain the 
observable effects and the increasing regulation of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions 
regime primarily by external pressure of states, non-governmental organizations or 
domestic and regional court decisions. On the other hand, these approaches ascribe 
the observed effects to specific institutional factors, in particular the far-reaching 
review and agenda-setting functions of the independent Ombudsperson, which only 
applies to the Al-Qaida sanctions regime. However, the empirical analysis provides 
evidence that the observed effect of rule-based decision-making equally occurs 
without external pressure by states, non-governmental organizations or court 
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decisions and in sanctions regimes that are not equipped with institutionalized bodies 
comparable to the Ombudsperson mechanism. This is particularly true for the Iraq 
sanctions regime that administers a comprehensive trade embargo. In that sense, the 
empirical analysis offers a broader perspective on explaining decision-making in 
Council sanctions regimes and thereby confirms practitioners’ observations that 
committee governance in the realm of sanctions regimes is a decisive step towards a 
legal-regulatory approach of the Council. 
 
10.2 Theoretical implications for the understanding of the Security 
Council and international organizations 
In the following, I draw theoretical implications of the comparative analysis of five 
UNSC sanctions regimes for the conceptual understanding of the Security Council 
and the study of the role and workings of international organizations more broadly. 
As concerns the conceptualization of the Security Council, the prevailing forum 
perspective does not suffice in explaining decision-making and the content of 
decisions in functionally differentiated Council decision processes that separate 
rulemaking from subsequent rule-application. At the same time, the concept of 
committee governance provides a fruitful basis for the analysis of differentiated 
decision-making processes. The analysis demonstrates that institutional theory 
complemented with elements from organizational theory offers a meaningful 
analytical instrument for systematically assessing the workings of the Security 
Council. In essence, the concept directs the focus towards the effect of the particular 
institutional setup of the Security Council on its decision-making and the decisions 
taken. Going beyond the scope and singularities of the institutional design of its 
sanctions regimes, the causal model highlights that the constraints offered by 
committee governance are a decisive factor for explaining Security Council decisions. 
This is true even though this organization is located in the realm of high politics and 
constitutes a purely intergovernmental body which provides wide-ranging 
prerogatives for the great powers. Thereby, the causal model of committee 
governance opens a new perspective for the analysis of the decision-making rationale 
of actors operating in intergovernmental security institutions, which constrain actors 
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in applying their material power resources and bargaining power in all instances. In 
fact, the causal model goes beyond neorealist concepts of international security 
institutions as well as institutionalist accounts according to which the field of 
international security eschews the logic of institutionalized cooperation that rational 
institutionalism observes for other low politics fields. 
As concerns the implications for the study of the role and workings of 
international organizations, in contrast to modern regulatory theory, which argues that 
delegating regulatory decisions to an independent agent is necessary to credibly 
commit member states to their long-term interest, the mechanism of committee 
governance demonstrates that these members can be implicitly committed to rule-
based governance even though they control all major decisions. In other words, the 
group of actors does not have to be excluded from the decision process to ensure that 
their long-term cooperation goal is achieved. In fact, the institutional setup, where the 
organization and its committee constitute of the same group of members is prevalent 
in international organizations and widely acceptable for their members because the 
alternative model of delegating decision competencies to an independent agent, for 
instance to a strong secretariat, limits the discretion of individual members and 
particularly touches upon the prerogatives of the great powers. Nonetheless, the 
institutional setup of committee governance also does not systematically insulate the 
decision-making process from political interference and constantly bears the risk of 
decision blockades. 
The ongoing debate about the role and workings of international organizations 
has to accommodate for the more fundamental sources of effects of organizations and 
thereby has to exceed beyond the prevailing focus on agents and bureaucratic actors. 
This conclusion is based on the finding that even an organization, which assigns tasks 
to two bodies that have the same membership, significantly affects decisions, even 
though no independent agents or bureaucratic actors are present. The concept of 
structuration of decision processes takes its outset at the basic function of 
organizations and is capable of systematically grasping the factors influencing the 
decisional behavior of the organization’s members. The concept of an international 
organization presented here incorporates the effect of agents but eschews a conceptual 
reduction to only one factor of organizational effects which may even lead to the 
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misperception that if there is no strong secretariat, the organization does not have an 
effect on decision-making. Notably, the developed theoretical concept incorporates 
elements derived from organization theory without leaving the fundamental 
assumptions of rational institutionalism and is therefore firmly grounded in 
mainstream international relations scholarship. 
The empirical application to an organization that is considered as least prone to 
institutionalized forms of cooperation, suggests that the mechanism of committee 
governance points to a general phenomenon of international organizations. Even 
though one cannot easily draw conclusions from one organization to another, it is 
reasonable to assume that if committee governance affects decision-making within 
the Security Council, it will also likely have an effect in other international 
organizations. Since the Security Council as a ‘high politics’ institution in the field of 
international security, it is commonly regarded as particularly unsuitable for the 
effects of institutionalization, the findings underpin the presumption that the effects 
should be even more applicable to other organizations. If the mechanism is present in 
‘high politics’ institutions then it should also be present in ‘low politics’ institutions 
that are typically regarded as more prone to rule-based governance. Particularly 
because the Security Council is comparatively simple structured, the findings should 
be transferable and applicable to other, possibly more complex structured 
organizations. Thereby, the selection of an institutional setting that had a low a priori 
likelihood of confirming the mechanism provided a strong test for a theory of 
committee governance. 
The developed causal model of committee governance specifies how committee 
governance can become a factor of influence on organizational decisions and is likely 
to prompt rule-based decision-making in any (international) organization if the 
following conditions are met. The mechanism occurs if a group of actors separates the 
decision functions of rulemaking and rule-application. This effect is independent from 
the specific content of decisions provided that the single cases are entered as a stream 
of separate decisions. The effect is also independent from the composition of the 
decision-making organs (e.g. experts or members states) and even occurs if the same 
group of actors controls both decision-making functions. On the contrary, it does not 
presuppose the existence of independent agents. The effect is independent of the 
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question if actors actually seek to bind themselves to their long-term interest or 
simply separate the decision functions to reduce their workload. In any case, the 
precondition is that the actors have to deal with a stream of separate decisions and 
that all actors prefer the functionality of the institution over blockade. 
 
10.3 Policy implications 
In the following I address five policy implications for the governance of UNSC 
sanctions regimes. First, the Security Council should systematically employ the built-
in effects of transferring a stream of single-case implementation decisions to its 
sanctions committees because it prompts rule-based decision-making and promises to 
make sanctions decisions of the Security Council more predictable. In effect, this 
provides for increasingly problem-adequate decisions, because they are increasingly 
based on evidence and information. If decision-making of Security Council sanctions 
committees within its sanctions regimes can in fact even bind the powerful permanent 
members to their interest in rule-based decisions, this has enormous implications for 
the Council’s sanctions policy. The Security Council gains the possibility to 
deliberately design its sanctions regimes so as to actually produce decisions that 
promise to realize its political objectives, provided that Council members have an 
interest in the case. Consequently, the Council becomes capable of determining its 
own effectiveness by facilitating procedures that, for instance, provide incentives for 
listed individuals to change their behavior. Whereas effective decision-making and 
reducing the workload of the Council have mainly motivated the creation of 
committees and delegation of decision competencies to them in the first place, the 
effects of committee governance will also increase the legitimacy of the Council’s 
sanctions decisions vis-á-vis non-Council member states. 
Second, the Security Council should as much as possible separate rule-making 
from applying rules to single-case implementation decisions. The Security Council 
has a powerful governance instrument for guiding the committee stage, when it takes 
its role as rulemaker seriously and provides substantive and procedural decision 
criteria. Thereby, rules can substantially change the incentives of committee members 
and either allow or amend some behavioral options, while it may completely remove 
other options from the menu. In fact, rules create incentives for committee members 
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to decide consistently and transform the incentives of individual committee members 
to strive for their interests by submitting criteria-based decision requests. In turn, this 
is of vital importance for the content of the decisions taken. The elaboration of rules 
can also be delegated to the committee without undermining the division of rule-
making and rule-application. In the studied cases, virtually every committee was 
involved in rule-making alongside the Council and member states frequently used the 
interplay between Council and committee. For instance, in the Al-Qaida case, the 
Council almost regularly demanded that the committee adopted increasingly clear 
decision criteria. In the Iraq case, the committee deliberately referred an unsolvable 
issue to the Council for guidance. These cases demonstrate that decision criteria can 
be developed as decision problems emerge or implementation decisions confront 
committee members with previously unexpected issues. In fact, decision criteria 
should be adapted over time as required. 
Third, single-case implementation decisions should rigorously follow the 
established substantive and procedural rules. The studied cases highlight that the 
decision situation prompts some form of implicit commitment of committee members 
including the permanent members to the established rules because insistence on 
situation-specific interests in all cases would create decision blockades and thus be 
detrimental to the effectiveness of the sanctions regime in the long run. In fact, the 
empirical analysis shows that even powerful members have an interest in upholding 
the rules, even if they have contradictory case-specific interests. The studied 
sanctions regimes demonstrate that committee members follow decision criteria in 
any event so they could in fact openly commit themselves to these rules to increase 
the predictability of the decision process and simultaneously increase the legitimacy 
of the decisions. 
Fourth, substantive and procedural criteria should be made widely accessible. For 
instance, the DRC regime shows that states, which are unacquainted with decision 
criteria as well as the kind and amount of evidence necessary to place successful 
decision requests, can add significant workload for the committee. While procedures 
might be public, evidentiary requirements are often subject of inaccessible committee 
practice. As a best practice example, the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee went 
great length in codifying and publishing its decision criteria in its committee 
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guidelines, fact sheets and standardized forms for submitting requests. Being more 
transparent about their procedures and criteria, sanctions committees could on the one 
hand reduce the number of obviously unjustified requests, increase the number of 
requests that have a reasonable chance of being accepted and at the same time 
increase the legitimacy of Council sanctions regimes in as much their rules are 
publicly accessible. 
Fifth, the Council should increasingly make use of externally provided 
information as produced by Council mandated Panels of Experts in as much these 
bodies provide solutions to decision problems when interests diverge. The Iran 
sanctions regime illustrates that suggestions for listing requests made by the Panel of 
Experts provide a meaningful solution to a committee decision problem, precisely 
because they did not originate from any of the great powers. Similarly, the usage of 
external Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime export 
trigger lists provides a means to coordinate behavior, because these lists have not 
been created in the context of the Iranian nuclear crisis. 
In sum, to achieve a decision practice that is more aligned to rules, the Council 
does not have to be less politicized - as is often assumed or demanded - precisely 
because the separation of rulemaking and rule-application can ensure that the 
Council’s decisions are rule-based while guaranteeing the member states right to take 
political decisions. In other words, it is astonishing to observe that a deliberately 
political organ is capable of taking fact-based technical decisions despite being 
composed of the world’s most powerful states that more often than not have diverging 
interests. When decisions are indeed increasingly oriented by impersonal rules, the 
Council gains the ability to ensure that the “right” individuals are sanctioned and by 
that, minimizing or even totally obviating potential humanitarian consequences. 
Indeed, the effect is not entirely intended and while reducing the Council’s workload 
is the ultimate motive, the effect rests in the separate processing of sanctions 
implementation decisions. 
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Annex 
Annex 1: List of UN Sanctions Regimes 
List of UN Sanctions Regimes 
Sanctions regime Initiated 
Date 
Terminated 
Date 
232 Southern Rhodesia SC Res. 232 
16 December 1966 
SC Res. 460 
21 December 1979 
418 South Africa SC Res. 418 
4 November1977 
SC Res. 919 
25 May 1994 
661 Iraq SC Res. 661 
6 August 1991 
SC Res. 1483 
22 May 2003 
713 Former Yugoslavia SC Res. 713 
25 September 1991 
Note verbale: SCA/96(4) 
18 June 1996 
733 Somalia SC Res. 733 
23 January 1992 
Continuing 
748 Libya SC Res. 748 
31 March 1992 
SC Res. 1506 
12 September 2003 
757 FRYSM SC Res. 757 
30 May1992 
SC Res. 1074 
1 October 1996 
788 Liberia SC Res. 788 
19 November 1992 
SC Res. 1343 
7 March 2001 
820 Bosnian Serbs SC Res. 820 
17 April 1993 
SC Res. 1074 
1 October 1996 
841 Haiti SC Res. 841 
15 June 1993 
 SC Res. 948 
15 October 1994 
864 Angola (UNITA) SC Res. 864 
15 September 1993 
SC Res. 1448 
9 December 2002 
918 Rwanda SC Res. 918 
17 May 1994 
SC Res. 1823 
10 July 2008 
1054 Sudan SC Res. 1054 
26 April 1996 
SC Res. 1372 
28 September 2001 
1132 Sierra Leone SC Res. 1132 
8 October 1997 
SC Res. 1940 
29 September 2010 
1160 Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia 
SC Res. 1160 
31 March 1998 
SC Res. 1367 
10 September 2001 
1267 Afghanistan/ 
Taliban/Al-Qaida 
SC Res. 1267 
15 October 1999 
Continuing 
1298 Eritrea/Ethiopia SC Res. 1298 
17 May 2000 
S/PRST/2001/14 
15 May 2001 
1343 Liberia SC Res. 1343 
7 March2001 
SC Res. 1521 
22 December 2003 
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List of UN Sanctions Regimes 
Sanctions regime Initiated 
Date 
Terminated 
Date 
1493 Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
SC Res. 1493 
28 July 2003 
Continuing 
1518 Iraq SC Res. 1518 
24 November 2003 
Continuing 
1521 Liberia SC Res. 1521 
22 December 2003 
Continuing 
1556 Sudan SC Res. 1556 
30 July 2004 
Continuing 
1572 Cote d’Ivoire SC Res. 1572 
15 November 2004 
Continuing 
1636 Lebanon SC Res. 1636 
31 October2005 
Continuing 
1718 North Korea SC Res. 1718 
14 October 2006 
Continuing 
1737 Iran SC Res. 1737 
27 December 2006 
Continuing 
1970 Libya SC Res. 1970 
26 February 2011 
Continuing 
1988 Taliban SC Res. 1988 
17 June 2011 
Continuing 
2048 Guinea-Bissau SC Res. 2048 
18 May 2012 
Continuing 
2127 Central African 
Republic 
SC Res. 2127 
5 December 2013 
Continuing 
2140 Yemen SC Res. 2140 
26 February 2014 
Continuing 
2206 South Sudan SC Res. 2206 
3 March 2015 
Continuing 
Notes: Author’s illustration based on Farrall 2007: 468–469; see also: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/index.shtml. ‘FRYSM’ denotes Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Serbia and Montenegro. 
